# AD 69-22-02: Failure of Control Wheel - Type: Airworthiness directive - Status: Current - Products: Piper PA-28-140, PA-28-150, PA-28-160, PA-28-180, PA-28-235, PA-32-260 and PA-32-300 - Effective: July 30, 1979 - Published: July 30, 1979 - Issued: July 19, 1979 - Superseded by: Nothing supersedes this AD - Product type: Aircraft, Small airplane - Amendment: 39-3521 - Registered aircraft: 10,640 may be affected, by airframe or engine model (OpenAirDocs) - FAA DRS: https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/F8F586AD288A169B86256E01005476AE.0001 - DRS record last changed: November 21, 2025 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ad/69-22-02 ## The airworthiness directive 69-22-02 PIPER: Amdt. 39-865 as amended by Amendment 39-1288 is further amended by Amendment 39-3521. Applies to the following models: PA-28-140, /-150, /-160, /-180, /-235, and PA-32-260/-300. The following are affected serial numbers: PA-28-140, 28-20001 through 28-7725290 inclusive; PA-28-150/-160/-180, 28-1 through 28-4377 inclusive; PA-28-235, 28- 10001 through 28-11039 inclusive; PA-32-260, 32-1 through 32-1110 inclusive; and PA-32-300, 32-40001 through 32-40565 inclusive. Compliance required within 25 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 75 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service from the last inspection. To prevent possible failure of the control wheel, accomplish the following: (a) Remove the Piper medallion from the face of each control wheel. (b) Inspect each control wheel for cracks which may extend radially from the retaining pin.Cracks may be evident on the bottom of the control wheel hub where the pin enters the wheel as line cracks on the face or back of the hub as a crack in the hub cavity in line with the pin. The inspection is to be done using either of the following methods: (1) Use a small pen light next to the surface and inspect under at least a three-power glass. Inspect in at least a 1/2" path from the top of the pin to the bottom on the front and back of the control wheel hub. Cracks, either needle shaped or extending across the entire surface will show as black lines in the light field. If a line is only a scratch, the bottom will always be visible. The wheel should be cleaned with ordinary detergent and water only. The use of chemical cleaners and/or solvents such as acetone must be avoided. (2) An equivalent inspection method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region. (c) If cracks are found in the path along the hub as described in (b)(1), replace the control wheel before further time in service. This AD is applicable to new control wheels of the same part number installed in accordance with this paragraph. (d) The control wheel medallion may be replaced with regular contact cement which has been allowed to dry thoroughly before assembly or with any commercial 2-part epoxy adhesive. Under no circumstances use acetate adhesive or other plastic cements or any form of Locktite as these materials may not be compatible with the plastic material in the wheel. (e) The repetitive inspection requirements of this AD may be terminated by replacing the plastic control wheel(s) with metal ramshorn type control wheel Piper part number 78729-02V (.750" o.d. shaft) or 79276-00V (1.125" o.d. shaft) as applicable. Replacement of one control wheel (i.e., left or right) does not terminate the requirement for continuing repetitive inspections of the other control wheel, if that other control wheel is the molded plastic type. (f) Piper Service Letter No. 527D, dated June 21, 1978, or later approved revisions, pertains to this same subject. (g) Make appropriate logbook entry indicating compliance with the provisions of this AD. Amendment 39-865 became effective November 4, 1969. Amendment 39-1288 became effective September 15, 1971. This amendment 39-3521 becomes effective July 30, 1979. ## Affected data sheets (2) (OpenAirDocs) The type certificate data sheets whose models the AD names. - [TCDS 2A13](https://openairdocs.org/tcds/2A13): Piper Aircraft Inc.; names 5 of 18 models: PA-28-150, PA-28-140, PA-28-160, PA-28-180, PA-28-235 - [TCDS A3SO](https://openairdocs.org/tcds/A3SO): Piper Aircraft Inc.; names 2 of 13 models: PA-32-300, PA-32-260 ## Registered aircraft it may apply to (OpenAirDocs) Matched by airframe and engine model; the AD's applicability may narrow it by serial number, part number or equipment. - Aircraft: 10,640 (10,640 by airframe model, 0 by engine model) - Makers: Piper 10,639, Piper/Valdes-Ervin 1 Models with the most aircraft: - [Piper PA-28-140](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-28-140): 4,258 aircraft (airframe model) - [Piper PA-28-180](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-28-180): 3,504 aircraft (airframe model) - [Piper PA-32-300](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-32-300): 992 aircraft (airframe model) - [Piper PA-28-235](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-28-235): 859 aircraft (airframe model) - [Piper PA-32-260](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-32-260): 650 aircraft (airframe model) - [Piper PA-28-160](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-28-160): 253 aircraft (airframe model) - [Piper PA-28-150](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-28-150): 123 aircraft (airframe model) - [Piper/Valdes-Ervin PA-28-235](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-valdes-ervin-pa-28-235): 1 aircraft (airframe model) All 8 models: https://openairdocs.org/ad/69-22-02/models.md Every aircraft: https://openairdocs.org/ad/69-22-02/aircraft.md Its text cites no advisory circulars or STCs. ## NTSB investigations that cite this AD (1) From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. - [NTSB SEA06LA109](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/SEA06LA109), Jun 2, 2006: Piper PA-28-160 (N1123W), Laurel, MT, substantial damage. Probable cause: The failure of maintenance personnel to properly reinstall the left-hand control yoke to the left-hand control column, and the failure of other maintenance personnel to properly verify the… --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.