# AD 72-07-10: Wear on Elevator Bungee Housing

- Type: Airworthiness directive
- Status: Current
- Products: True Flight Holdings AA-1, AA-1A and AA-1B
- Effective: July 10, 1974
- Superseded by: Nothing supersedes this AD
- Product type: Aircraft, Small airplane
- Amendment: 39-1893
- Registered aircraft: 618 may be affected, by airframe or engine model (OpenAirDocs)
- FAA DRS: https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/B68F1BC87D43889D86256E0D005040A2.0001
- DRS record last changed: May 30, 2024
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/ad/72-07-10

## The airworthiness directive

72-07-10 GRUMMAN-AMERICAN AVIATION CORPORATION: formerly American Aviation. Amendment 39-1421 as amended by Amendment 39-1893. Applies to American Aviation Models AA-1, AA-1A, and AA-1B certificated in all categories as listed below:

Compliance required within the next 25 hours in service after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive unless already accomplished within the last 75 hours and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours in service from the last inspection.

a) To detect loose rivets in the shear link and excessive wear on the outer surface of the elevator bungee housing assembly, accomplish the following:

1) Visually inspect shear link for loose rivets. (Models AA-1, AA-1A, and AA-1B.

2) Visually inspect the bungee housing outer surface at the support bearing for excessive wear. (Models AA-1 and AA-1A only.)

b) Loose rivets or bungee housing outer surface worn more than 0.016 inches deep must be replaced with a part of the same part number or a Federal Aviation Administration approved equivalent part before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair can be performed.

c) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through a Federal Aviation Administration Maintenance Inspector, the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Great Lakes Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection interval specified in this airworthiness directive. Federal Aviation Administration approved equivalent parts will be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Great Lakes Region.

NOTE: American Aviation Service Letter No. 71-11A covers this same subject.

Amendment 39-1421 became effective April 6, 1972. This Amendment 39-1893 becomes effective July 10, 1974.

## Affected data sheets (1) (OpenAirDocs)

The type certificate data sheets whose models the AD names.

- [TCDS A11EA](https://openairdocs.org/tcds/A11EA): True Flight Holdings LLC; names 3 of 4 models: AA-1A, AA-1, AA-1B

## Registered aircraft it may apply to (OpenAirDocs)

Matched by airframe and engine model; the AD's applicability may narrow it by serial number, part number or equipment.

- Aircraft: 618 (618 by airframe model, 0 by engine model)
- Makers: American 386, Grumman American Avn. 232

Models with the most aircraft:

- [Grumman American Avn. AA-1B](https://openairdocs.org/model/grumman-american-avn-aa-1b): 231 aircraft (airframe model)
- [American AA-1A](https://openairdocs.org/model/american-aa-1a): 207 aircraft (airframe model)
- [American AA-1](https://openairdocs.org/model/american-aa-1): 153 aircraft (airframe model)
- [American AA-1B](https://openairdocs.org/model/american-aa-1b): 26 aircraft (airframe model)
- [Grumman American Avn. AA-1A](https://openairdocs.org/model/grumman-american-avn-aa-1a): 1 aircraft (airframe model)

All 5 models: https://openairdocs.org/ad/72-07-10/models.md
Every aircraft: https://openairdocs.org/ad/72-07-10/aircraft.md

Its text cites no advisory circulars or STCs.

## NTSB investigations that cite this AD (1)

From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

- [NTSB CEN14LA221](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/CEN14LA221), Apr 21, 2014: American AA 1 (N481HY), Peyton, CO, destroyed. Probable cause: The loss of directional control during takeoff for reasons that could not be determined due to the extent of fire damage.

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