# AD 87-02-02: Primary Control Cables

- Type: Airworthiness directive
- Status: Current
- Products: M7 Aerospace SA226-AT, SA226-T, SA226-TC, SA226-T(B), SA227-AC (C-26A), SA227-AT and SA227-TT
- Effective: January 27, 1987
- Superseded by: Nothing supersedes this AD
- Product type: Aircraft, Small/large airplane
- Amendment: 39-5518
- Registered aircraft: 148 may be affected, by airframe or engine model (OpenAirDocs)
- FAA DRS: https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/2C75F559B609B4EA862569850066AE00.0001
- DRS record last changed: May 30, 2024
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/ad/87-02-02

## The airworthiness directive

87-02-02 FAIRCHILD AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-5518. Applies to Models SA 226-T, SA 226-T(B), SA 226-AT, SA 226-TC, SA 227-TT, SA 227-AT, and SA 227-AC (all serial numbers) airplanes certificated in any category.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished.

To prevent possible primary control system cable failures, accomplish the following:

  (a) For airplanes with 10,000 or more hours time-in-service (TIS) on the effective date of this AD, within the next 150 hours TIS after the effective date of this AD and each 400 hours TIS thereafter, inspect control cables in accordance with paragraph (a)(1) of this AD or, within the next 150 hours TIS and each 10,000 hours TIS thereafter, replace control cables in accordance with paragraph (a)(2) of this AD:

  (1) Inspect all elevator, rudder, aileron and aileron to rudder interconnect primary control cables, including cables that are routed inside the control column, as follows:

      (A) Gain access to control cables in accordance with appropriate maintenance instructions.

      (B) Release tension on each cable.

      (C) Pass a cloth along the entire length of each cable to clean the cable for visual inspection and to detect broken wires. Visually inspect the entire length for broken wires and general condition. Rotate the cable 180 degrees where the cable contacts any pulley/fairlead or pressure seal, birdcage cable (slightly untwist), and visually inspect for wear/broken wires and for general condition 24 inches either side of contact area when the controls are in the neutral position.

      (D) Prior to further flight, replace with a new cable any cable found to have any one of the following conditions:

    (i) More than three (3) broken wires within any one-foot section of the cable (any wire worn more than one-half its diameter is considered broken), or

    (ii) More than one (1) one-foot section with three broken wires, or(iii) Cables whose total number of broken wires exceeds the total number of feet in length of that cable, or

    (iv) More than six (6) wires worn not more than one-half of the wire diameter in any one-inch length of cable.

      (E) In cases where discrepant cables have been found, prior to further flight, inspect the condition of the associated fairleads/pressure seals or pulleys in accordance with appropriate maintenance instructions and replace any unserviceable components as required.

      (F) Prior to returning the airplane to service, reset cable tensions, rerig primary control systems, reassemble the airplane and verify proper control systems operation, all in accordance with appropriate maintenance instructions, and make an appropriate maintenance record entry.

  (2) Remove and replace all elevator, rudder, aileron and aileron to rudder interconnect primary control cables with new cables in accordance with appropriate maintenance instructions. Prior to returning the airplane to service, reset cable tensions, rerig primary control systems, reassemble the airplane and verify proper control systems operations, all in accordance with appropriate maintenance instructions, and make an appropriate maintenance record entry.

  (b) For airplanes with less than 10,000 hours TIS on the effective date of this AD, prior to the accumulation of 10,150 hours TIS and each 400 hours TIS thereafter, inspect control cables in accordance with paragraph (a)(1) of this AD or, prior to the accumulation of 10,150 hours TIS and each 10,000 hours TIS thereafter, replace control cables in accordance with paragraph (a)(2) of this AD.

  (c) Paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD do not restrict compliance to one alternative (repetitive inspections or replacement at specified intervals) exclusive of the other, but may be complied with interchangeably provided the inspection/replacement intervals are complied with.

  (d) Operators who have kept recordsof hours TIS on all individual control cables in an airplane may substitute these records in lieu of airplane hours TIS for determining the compliance times in this AD.

  (e) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished.

  (f) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Airplane Certification Branch, ASW-150, Southwest Regional Office, FAA, Fort Worth, Texas 76101; Telephone (817) 624-5150.

All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to Fairchild Aircraft Corporation, P.O. Box 32486, San Antonio, Texas 78284; or FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.

This amendment becomes effective on January 27, 1987.

## Affected data sheets (2) (OpenAirDocs)

The type certificate data sheets whose models the AD names.

- [TCDS A5SW](https://openairdocs.org/tcds/A5SW): Ontic Engineering and Manufacturing Inc.; names 4 of 7 models: SA227-AT, SA227-TT, SA226-AT, SA226-T(B)
- [TCDS A8SW](https://openairdocs.org/tcds/A8SW): Ontic Engineering and Manufacturing Inc.; names 2 of 4 models: SA226-TC, SA227-AC (C-26A)

## Registered aircraft it may apply to (OpenAirDocs)

Matched by airframe and engine model; the AD's applicability may narrow it by serial number, part number or equipment.

- Aircraft: 148 (148 by airframe model, 0 by engine model)
- Makers: Swearingen 79, Fairchild 69

Models with the most aircraft:

- [Fairchild SA227-AC](https://openairdocs.org/model/fairchild-sa227-ac): 54 aircraft (airframe model)
- [Swearingen SA-226T](https://openairdocs.org/model/swearingen-sa-226t): 21 aircraft (airframe model)
- [Swearingen SA226-T(B)](https://openairdocs.org/model/swearingen-sa226-t-b): 16 aircraft (airframe model)
- [Swearingen SA227-AT](https://openairdocs.org/model/swearingen-sa227-at): 12 aircraft (airframe model)
- [Swearingen SA227-TT](https://openairdocs.org/model/swearingen-sa227-tt): 11 aircraft (airframe model)
- [Fairchild SA227-AT](https://openairdocs.org/model/fairchild-sa227-at): 9 aircraft (airframe model)
- [Swearingen SA226TC](https://openairdocs.org/model/swearingen-sa226tc): 8 aircraft (airframe model)
- [Swearingen SA227-AC](https://openairdocs.org/model/swearingen-sa227-ac): 8 aircraft (airframe model)
- [Fairchild SA226-T(B)](https://openairdocs.org/model/fairchild-sa226-t-b): 3 aircraft (airframe model)
- [Swearingen SA-226AT](https://openairdocs.org/model/swearingen-sa-226at): 3 aircraft (airframe model)
- [Fairchild SA226-TC](https://openairdocs.org/model/fairchild-sa226-tc): 1 aircraft (airframe model)
- [Fairchild SA226-T](https://openairdocs.org/model/fairchild-sa226-t): 1 aircraft (airframe model)
- [Fairchild SA226-AT](https://openairdocs.org/model/fairchild-sa226-at): 1 aircraft (airframe model)

All 13 models: https://openairdocs.org/ad/87-02-02/models.md
Every aircraft: https://openairdocs.org/ad/87-02-02/aircraft.md

Its text cites no advisory circulars or STCs.

## NTSB investigations that cite this AD (3)

From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

- [NTSB DEN06IA056](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/DEN06IA056), Apr 5, 2006: Swearingen SA226TC (N770S), Denver, CO, incident, no damage. Probable cause: the failure of the elevator down cable due to an improperly routed cable by unknown maintenance personnel. A contributing factor was the improper inspection of the elevator cable by the operator's…
- [NTSB FTW95IA124](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/FTW95IA124), Feb 27, 1995: Fairchild SA227-AC (N369AE), Austin, TX, incident, no damage. Probable cause: THE FAILURE OF THE MISROUTED RUDDER CONTROL CABLE DUE TO IMPROPER INSTALLATION DURING SCHEDULED REPLACEMENT TO COMPLY WITH AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE.
- [NTSB FTW92FA218](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/FTW92FA218), Aug 25, 1992: Fairchild SA 227-AC (N342AE), Hot Springs, AR, destroyed, 3 fatal. Probable cause: INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION BY THE OPERATOR'S MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL, AND THE FAILURE OF THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND TO ASSURE PROPER TRAVEL DIRECTION OF THE AIRPLANE'S PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS…

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