# AD 95-10-01: Airworthiness Directives; Raytheon Model Hawker 1000 and BAe 125- 1000A Series Airplanes

- Type: Airworthiness directive
- Effective: May 23, 1995
- Published: May 8, 1995, 60 FR 22501–22503
- Issued as: Final rule; request for comments
- Superseded by: Nothing supersedes this AD
- Amendment: 39-9218
- Docket: 95-NM-73-AD
- Official PDF: https://openairdocs.org/files/sha256/09/26/09266dfa3d3dd8f07fac5437855caace02f1c480b31f52ea973f4a1f12ad534a (from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-05-08/pdf/95-10835.pdf)
- Federal Register: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/1995/05/08/95-10835/airworthiness-directives-raytheon-model-hawker-1000-and-bae-125--1000a-series-airplanes
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/ad/95-10-01

## Summary

This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Raytheon Model Hawker 1000 and BAe 125-1000A series airplanes. This action requires inspections to detect various discrepancies of the fuel hose assemblies on the auxiliary power unit (APU), and correction of any discrepancy found. This amendment is prompted by several reports of heat damage to the fuel hose assembly on the APU. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent failure of a fuel hose due to heat damage caused by incorrect routing or bleed air leakage; such failure could result in a malfunction of the APU, a fuel fire in the fuselage rear equipment bay, and reduced structural integrity of the surrounding structure.

## The airworthiness directive

### PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89.

### Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

95-10-01 Raytheon Corporate Jets, Inc. (Formerly de Havilland; Hawker Siddeley; British Aerospace, plc): Amendment 39-9218. Docket 95-NM-73-AD.

Applicability: Model Hawker 1000 and BAe 125-1000A series airplanes, post modification 259722C, certificated in any category.

[[Page 22503]] Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (b) to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition; or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any airplane from the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent failure of a fuel hose assembly on the auxiliary power unit (APU), which could result in a malfunction of the APU, a potential fuel fire in the fuselage rear bay, and reduced structural integrity of the surrounding structure, accomplish the following:

### (a)

  (a) Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, perform inspections to detect discrepancies of the fuel feed hose assemblies on the APU; an inspection to assure proper positioning of the air leak detection system; and an inspection of the bleed air system for signs of leakage; in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of the Accomplishment Instructions of Raytheon Service Bulletin SB 49-44, dated January 20, 1995.

  (1) If no discrepancy is found: Thereafter, following the last flight of each day, perform an inspection to detect discoloration of the fuel hose assembly (outlet from the fuel pump box) on the APU, in accordance with paragraph 2.B.(2) and 2.C. of the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin.

  (2) If any discrepancy is found, prior to further flight, correct the discrepancy in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin.

### (b)

  (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113.

### (c)

  (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with Secs. 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

### (d)

  (d) The actions shall be done in accordance with Raytheon Service Bulletin SB 49-44, dated January 20, 1995. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Raytheon Corporate Jets, Inc., Customer Support Department, Adams Field, P.O. Box 3356, Little Rock, Arkansas 72203. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

### (e)

  (e) This amendment becomes effective on May 23, 1995.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 27, 1995. James V. Devany, Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

## Rule preamble

### Dates

Effective May 23, 1995.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of May 23, 1995.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before July 7, 1995.

### Addresses

Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 95-NM-73-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from Raytheon Corporate Jets, Inc., Customer Support Department, Adams Field, P.O. Box 3356, Little Rock, Arkansas 72203. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

### For further information contact

William Schroeder, Aerospace Engineer, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (206) 227-2148; fax (206) 227-1320.

### Supplementary information

The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), which is the airworthiness authority for the United Kingdom, recently notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on certain Raytheon Model Hawker 1000 and BAe 125-1000A series airplanes. The CAA advises that it has received recent reports of heat damage to the fuel feed hose assemblies on the auxiliary power unit (APU) installed on several Model BAe 125-1000A airplanes. In one case, the outer sheath was charred due to a suspected leak of the bleed air. In another case, while performing a pre-flight inspection, the flight crew found [[Page 22502]] a fuel hose that was damaged by heat. Subsequently, an inspection of ten more airplanes revealed five airplanes with hoses damaged by heat. These airplanes had accumulated between 540 and 1,054 total hours time-in-service. Failure of a fuel hose, if not corrected, could result in a malfunction of the APU, a potential fuel fire in the fuselage rear equipment bay, and reduced structural integrity of the surrounding structure.

The subject assemblies installed on Model BAe 125-1000A series airplanes are similar to those installed on Model Hawker 1000 series airplanes. Therefore, both airplane models are subject to this same unsafe condition.

Raytheon has issued Service Bulletin SB 49-44, dated January 20, 1995, which describes procedures for a visual inspection of both fuel hose assemblies (inlet and outlet from the fuel pump box) on the APU to detect certain discrepancies, as follows:

1. Signs of overheating of hose assemblies (scorching or discoloration);

2. Correct routing of the fuel feed hose assembly on the APU;

3. Minimum clearance of 0.5 inch between the hose assembly and the left-hand mixer valve/left-hand main air valve assemblies and associated hot air ducting;

4. Signs of leakage of bleed air from the left-hand mixer valve and/or left-hand main air valve and bellows; and

5. Correct positioning of the air leak detection system elements adjacent to the left-hand main air valve and mixer valve flange (including the auxiliary air supply branch).

These airplane models are manufactured in the United Kingdom and is type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of Sec. 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, the CAA has kept the FAA informed of the situation described above. The FAA has examined the findings of the CAA, reviewed all available information, and determined that AD action is necessary for products of this type design that are certificated for operation in the United States.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design registered in the United States, this AD is being issued to prevent failure of a fuel feed hose assembly on the APU, which could result in a malfunction of the APU, a potential fuel fire the fuselage rear equipment by, and reduced structural integrity of the surrounding structure. This AD requires inspections to detect discrepancies of the fuel feed hose assemblies on the APU; inspection for proper positioning of the rear equipment bay air leak detection system; inspection of the bleed air system for signs of leakage; and, under certain conditions, repetitive inspections of one hose assembly to detect discoloration of that assembly. This AD also requires the correction of any discrepancies found during the inspections. The actions are required to be accomplished in accordance with the service bulletin described previously.

Since a situation exists that requires the immediate adoption of this regulation, it is found that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are impracticable, and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

### Comments Invited

Although this action is in the form of a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety and, thus, was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment, comments are invited on this rule. Interested persons are invited to comment on this rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified under the caption ADDRESSES. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered, and this rule may be amended in light of the comments received. Factual information that supports the commenter's ideas and suggestions is extremely helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of the AD action and determining whether additional rulemaking action would be needed.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might suggest a need to modify the rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this AD will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this rule must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ``Comments to Docket Number 95-NM-73-AD.'' The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

The FAA has determined that this regulation is an emergency regulation that must be issued immediately to correct an unsafe condition in aircraft, and that it is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866. It has been determined further that this action involves an emergency regulation under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is determined that this emergency regulation otherwise would be significant under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, a final regulatory evaluation will be prepared and placed in the Rules Docket. A copy of it, if filed, may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

### Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

No proposed rule in this release led to it. Its text cites no advisory circulars or STCs.

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