# Accident 20010322006059A: Agusta A109, Hanapepe, HI, March 22, 2001 - Type: FAA accident report (Accident/Incident Data System), as reported - Date: March 22, 2001, 11:40 local time - Place: Hanapepe, HI - Airport: Port Allen Airport - Damage: No damage - Operating rules: Air taxi and commuter (Part 135) - Operator: NUIA - Location: 21.8967° N, 159.6031° W: From the FAA - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=21.8967&lon=-159.6031&mi=10 - Aircraft: N293G (not matched to a registry record) - Reported make and model: AGUSTA A109 - People aboard: 2 - Fatal injuries: 0 - NTSB investigation: [NTSB LAX01FA127](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/LAX01FA127) (OpenAirDocs) - FAA source: FAA Aviation Safety Information Portal (https://asip.faa.gov/) - Page: https://openairdocs.org/incident/20010322006059A ## Narrative As the FAA filed it, in capitals; the FAA replaces private details with ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^. (.19) ON MARCH 22,2001, AT 1140 HOURS HAWAIIAN STANDARD TIME, AN AGUSTA A109A, N293G, MADE A HARD LANDING FROM A HOVER ON RUNWAY 27 AT THE PORT ALLEN AIRPORT, HANAPEPE, HAWAII. THE HELICOPTER WAS OPERATED BY NIHAU HELICOPTERS, INC. UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF 14 CFR PART 91 AS AN FAA PART 135.293 FLIGHT CHECK. THE HELICOPTER SUSTAINED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE. THE FAA INSPECTOR PROVIDING THE RECURRENT FLIGHT CHECK AND THE COMMERCIAL HELICOPTER PILOT WERE NOT INJURED. VISUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS PREVAILED FOR THE LOCAL AREA FLIGHT. THE FLIGHT DEPARTED ROBINSON RANCH, A PRIVATE HELIPAD, ABOUT 1120. THE FLIGHT WAS SCHEDULED TO TERMINATE AT THE SAME LOCATION. NO FLIGHT PLAN HAD BEEN FILED. A SAFETY BOARD INVESTIGATOR INTERVIEWED BOTH PILOTS. THE FAA CHECK AIRMAN REPORTED THAT HE HAD TOLD THE PILOT HE WOULD BE SIMULATING AN ANTI-TORQUE SYSTEM FAILURE OR A "STUCK PEDAL" SCENARIO. HE THEN DEPRESSED THE LEFT PEDAL ABOUT HALFWAY TOWARD THE STOP. AT THE DIRECTION OF THE CHECK AIRMAN, THE PILOT REMAINED ON THE CONTROLS AND CONTINUED IN THE TRAFFIC PATTERN FOR A VISUAL APPROACH TO RUNWAY 09. THE APPROACH PROGRESSED ROUTINELY UNTIL SHORT FINAL. AT THAT POINT, THE CHECK AIRMAN SAW THAT THE PILOT WAS TERMINATING THE APPROACH AT A HOVER. HE TOLD THE PILOT THAT IF HE MADE A SLIGHT POWER REDUCTION AND INCREASED THE PITCH ATTITUDE SLIGHTLY, THE HELICOPTER WOULD SETTLE ON THE RUNWAY. INSTEAD, THE PILOT PULLED BOTH THROTTLES BACK TO IDLE AND THIS PUT THE HELICOPTER IN A POSITION THAT REQUIRED THE EXECUTION OF A HOVERING AUTOROTAION. THE CHECK AIRMAN ESTIMATED THAT THE HELICOPTER WAS ABOUT 5 TO 6 FEET ABOVE THE RUNWAY. THE CHECK AIRMAN STATED THAT HE WAS NOT OVERLY CONCERNED BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THAT THE PILOT COULD SUCCESSFULLY PERFORM A HOVERING AUTOROTAION FROM THAT ALTITUDE. ONCE HE FELT THE PILOT'S FEET ON THE PEDALS, HE RELINQUISHED PEDAL CONTROL. HE ESTIMATED THAT THE NOSE OF THE HELICOPTER SPUN ABOUT 60 DEGREES TO THE LEFT AND STOPPED AS THE PILOT INITIATED THE AUTOROTAION. AS THE MANUEVER PROGRESSED THE CHECK AIRMAN THOUGHT THAT THE PILOT WAS ATTEMPTING TO PULL COLLECTIVE PITCH TOO SOON, AND THAT THE HELICOPTER WAS STILL SETTLING TOO FAST. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT NOTICE ANY LATERAL DRIFT DURING THE FINAL DESCENT BUT THE HELICOPTER WAS STILL SETTLING TOO FAST. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT NOTICE ANY LATERAL DRIFT DURING THE FIRST DESCENT BUT THE HELICOPTER BOUNCED BACK INTO THE AIR ABOUT 1.5 FEET. AS THE HELICOPTER TOUCHED DOWN THE SECOND TIME IT BEGAN A ROLL TO THE RIGHT. WITH NO POWER AVAILABLE TO CONTROL THE ROLL, THE HELICOPTER CAME TO REST ON ITS RIGHT SIDE. THE PILOT REPORTED THAT WHILE ON THE CROSSWIND LEG OF THE SECOND APPROACH THE CHECK AIRMAN SIMULATED A "STUCK PEDAL" WITH ABOUT 3 INCHES OF LEFT PEDAL DISPLACEMENT. ON FINAL HE WAS TOLD TO PICK A PLACE TO TERMINATE ADJACENT TO THE WINDSOCK. AS THE AIRSPEED SLOWED BEFOW 60 KNOTS, THE NOSE OF THE HELICOPTER MOVED TO THE LEFT ABOUT 10 TO 20 DEGREES, AND THE HELICOPTER BEGAN TO SLIP. AS HE REACHED THE PRESELECTED SPOT, THE CHECK AIRMAN TOLD HIM TO SLOW DOWN A LITTLE. THE PILOT TERMINATED THE APPROACH AT A 20-FOOT HOVER. AT THIS POINT HE SAID HE COULD FEEL THE CHECK AIRMAN PULLING UP ON THE COLLECTIVE AS HE WAS PUSHING DOWN. THE CHECK AIRMAN TOLD HIM TO PULL THE THROTTLES BACK AS THIS WOULD HELP THE HELICOPTER TO SETTLE. WHEN HE PULLED THE THROTTLES BACK, THE NOSE YAWED LEFT ABOUT 170 DEGREES. HE THEN ATTEMPTED TO EXECUTE A HOVERING AUTOROTAION AND ESTIMATED THEIR HEIGHT ABOVE THE RUNWAY TO BE ABOUT 10 FEET. HE ATTEMPTED TO LEVEL THE HELICOPTER. HE FURTHER STATED THAT HE DID NOT NOTICE ANY FOR, AFT, OR LATERAL MOVEMENT DURING THE MANUEVER. THE PILOT FELT THE HELICOPTER BOUNCE ONCE AND THEN BEGIN TO ROLL ONTO ITS RIGHT SIDE. THE PILOT SAID HE INTENDED TO DELAY HIS COLLECTIVE PULL UNTIL HE WAS CLOSER TO THE GROUND; HOWEVER, THE COLLECTIVE BEGAN COMING UP IN HIS HAND. HE SAID HE WAS NOT SURE IF THAT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF THE INPUT FROM THE CHECK AIRMAN. THE PILOT STATED THAT HE WAS NOT FAMILAR WITH THE MANUEVER. THE CHECK AIRMAN HAD NOT DEMONSTRATED THE MANUEVER AND IT HAD NOT BEEN EXPLAINED TO HIM PRIOR TO THE FLIGHT CHECK. THE CHECK AIRMAN STATED THAT HE DID NOT PROVIDE A PREBRIEFING TO THE PILOT CONCERNING THE "STUCK PEDAL" MANUEVER. THE ANTI-TORQUE SYSTEM FAILURE WAS NOT A LISTED FLIGHT MANUEVER ON THE PART 135 AIRMAN COMPETENCY/PROFICIENCY CHECK. TWO WITNESSES LOCATED AT THE WEST END OF THE RUNWAY SAW THE HELICOPTER FALL FROM ABOUT 10 FEET. THE HELICOPTER BOUNCED UP "SLIGHTLY", AND THEN ROLLED OVER ON ITS SIDE. A POSTACCIDENT INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE GEAR DOWN-LOCKS WERE BROKEN ON BOTH OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR. THE ALNDING GEAR IS HYDRAULICALLY ACTUATED. THE ACTUATOR IS SUPPORTED BY A TRI-BRACE. THE TIRE AND WHEEL ASSEMBLY ARE SUPPORTED BY A STRUT AND A MIDDLE BRACE THAT ARE ATTACHED TO THE ACTUATOR AND TRI-BRACE ASSEMBLY. ON THE RIGHT LANDING GEAR THE MOUNTING BRACKETS WERE BROKEN IN AN OUTWARD DIRECTION (TOWARDS THE GEAR DOORS). THE ACTUATOR WAS PULLED OUT FROM THE LOWER MOUNTING BRACKET. THE FRACTURE SURFACES WERE ANGULAR, GRANULAR, AND ROUGHT IN APPEARANCE.THE LEFT LANDING GEAR MOUNTING BRACKETS WERE BROKEN IN AN OUTWARD DIRECTION. THE FRACTURE SURFACES WERE ANGULAR, GRANULAR, AND ROUGH IN APPEARANCE. THE MANUFACTURER REPORTED THAT THE MANUEVER AS PERFORMED WAS NOT AN AUTHORIZED OR APPROVED MANUEVER IN THE A109A. AN ANTI-TORQUE SYSTEM FAILURE SHOULD BE BRIEFED PRIOR TO CONDUCTING A PRACTICAL DEMONSTATION. THE PROCEDURE IS DEMONSTRATED WITH THE ANTI-TORQUE PEDALS IN A NEUTRAL POSITION. OTHERWISE WHEN POWER IS REDUCED, THE NOSE WILL TRAVEL IN THE DIRECTION OF THE DEPRESSED PEDAL. THE MANUEVER IS TO CONCLUDE WIHT A RUN ON LANDING, NOT IN A HOVER. ACCORDING TO THE MANUFACTURER, THE HELICOPTER CERTIFICATION BASIS IS FAA (FAR) PART 27. IN ORDER TO PASS CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, THE MANUFACTURER HAD TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE LANDING GEAR COULD WITHSTAND A DROP AT MAXIMUM GROSS WEIGHT WITH A 2 METER/PER SECOND DROP. (-23) THE PIC WAS TAKING A 14 CFR PART 135.293B ANNUAL VFR COMPETENCY CHECK ADMINISTERED BY AN FAA INSPECTOR. THE INSPECTOR ASKED THE PIC TO PERFORM A LANDING WITH A SIMULATED STUCK LEFT PEDAL. TO SIMULATE THE SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, THE INSPECTOR DEPRESSED AND HELD THE ANTI-TORQUE PEDAL, THE APPROACH WAS MADE TO A MID-POINT ON RUNWAY 9. THE A/C CAME TO A HOVER AT BETWEEN 5 AND 10 FEET AGL AT WHICH POINT THE PIC REDUCED BOTH THROTTLES TO IDLE. THE A/C ROTATED TO THE LEFT AND SETTLED HARD ONTO THE RUNWAY. THE IMPACT DAMAGED BOTH MAIN LANDING GEAR, THE TAIL ROTOR AND VERTICAL STABILIZER. THE A/C ROLLED OVER ON IT'S RIGHT SIDE RESULTING IN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAIN ROTOR BLADES. SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE TO THE HELICOPTER. ## The NTSB's investigation of this event (1) From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. - [NTSB LAX01FA127](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/LAX01FA127), Mar 22, 2001: Agusta A109A (N293G), Hanapepe, Kauai, HI, substantial damage. Probable cause: the pilot's misjudged flare during an autorotation, which resulted in a hard landing. A contributing factor was the check airman's failure to demonstrate a stuck pedal maneuver prior to assigning the… From the FAA Accident/Incident Data System. Reports are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. For accidents, the NTSB's own investigation is the fuller record. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.