# Incident 20011112037169I: Amtr SEASTAR, Deland, FL, November 12, 2001

- Type: FAA incident report (Accident/Incident Data System), as reported
- Date: November 12, 2001, 16:00 local time
- Place: Deland, FL
- Airport: Deland Municipal-Sidney H Taylor
- Damage: Substantial damage
- Phase of flight: Normal Cruise
- Operating rules: General operating rules (Part 91)
- Location: 29.0670° N, 81.2838° W: Placed by OpenAirDocs at DELAND MUNI-SIDNEY H TAYLOR FLD (DED), within about a mile (OpenAirDocs)
- Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=29.0670&lon=-81.2838&mi=10
- Aircraft: N601SS, a cancelled registration (https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N601SS-2019-06-28) (OpenAirDocs)
- Registry model: Precision Design SEASTAR (registry code 05608IW, https://openairdocs.org/model/precision-design-seastar) (OpenAirDocs)
- Registry engine: Amateur-built UNKNOWN ENG (registry code 99999, https://openairdocs.org/engine/amateur-built-unknown-eng) (OpenAirDocs)
- Reported make and model: AMTR SEASTAR
- Reported engine: WALTER M601D
- People aboard: 1
- Fatal injuries: 0
- Pilot flight hours: 3,500 total, 29 in this make and model, 66 in the last 90 days
- FAA source: FAA Aviation Safety Information Portal (https://asip.faa.gov/)
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/incident/20011112037169I

## Narrative

As the FAA filed it, in capitals; the FAA replaces private details with ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^.

(-23) INSPECTORS STATEMENT: ON NOVEMBER 15, 2001, SEASTAR N601SS, AN EXPERIEMENTAL AMPHIBIOUS COMPOSITE TURBOPROPELLER AIRCRAFT, WAS INSPECTED AT THE DELAND AIRPORT, IN DELAND, FLORIDA. THE PILOT HAD DECLARED AN EMERGENCY AFTER EXPERIENCING TAIL FLUTTER. ACCORDING TO THE PILOT, HE WAS IN CRUISE FLIGHT AT A SPEED OF OVER 200 MPH WHEN FIRST FELT THE THE FLUTTER. HE ADDED THAT THIS WAS THE SECOND TIME THAT HE HAD EXPERIENCED FLUTTER IN THIS AIRCRAFT. THE INSPECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT REVEALED THAT THE SIX FOOT LONG ELEVATOR TRIM TAB WAS MISSING AND THAT THE TRIM TAB HINGE WAS RIPPED OFF THE ELEVATOR EXCEPT FOR SEVERAL INCHES ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE ELEVATOR THAT WAS STILL ATTACHED. IT WAS NOTICED THAT POP RIVETS HAD BEEN USED TO HOLD THE TRIM TAB TO THE ELEVATOR. THE RIVETS EDGE DISTANCE IN THE BASE MATERIAL RANGED FROM AN APPROXIMATE MINIMUM FOR THE DIAMETER OF THE RIVET USED, TO A ZERO EDGE DISTANCE. THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 10 TO 12 CORD WISE BRAKES IN THE ELEVATOR STARTING FROM THE LEADING EDGE RADIATING AFT SEVERAL INCHES. THE ELEVATOR TIPS COULD BE TWISTED IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS SPAN WISE INDICATING INTERNAL DAMAGE TO THE ELEVATOR. THE TRAILING EDGE OF THE ELEVATOR HAD COMPLETELY SEPARATED. CLOSER INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE STRUCTURAL ADHESIVE THAT WAS USED HAD FAILED, NOT THE COMPOSITE SKIN ITSELF. THE TRIM TAB ACTUATOR ROD-END HAD FAILED AT THE ACTUATOR. ACCORDING TO THE PILOT, THIS WAS THE SECOND ACTUATOR TO FAIL AND ALLOW THE TRIM TAB TO FLUTTER. THE TRIM TAB ACTUATOR APPEARED TO BE MADE FROM SOME TYPE OF PLASTIC. THERE WAS NO OTHER DETECTABLE DAMAGE NOTED. IT WAS RECOMMENDED TO THE PILOT THAT PRIOR TO FURTHER FLIGHT, THE AIRCRAFT AND ESPECIALLY THE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM BE INSPECTED FOR HIDDEN DAMAGE POSSIBLY CAUSED BY THE ELEVATOR AND TRIM TAB FLUTTER. IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PILOT AND THE BUILDER OF THE AIRCRAFT, IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT FLUTTER ANALYSES SHOULD BE PERFORMED AND THAT RECOGNIZED DESIGN STANDARDS AS WELL AS RECOGNIZED STANDARDS OF WORKMANSHIP SHOULD BE OBSERVED.

From the FAA Accident/Incident Data System. Reports are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. For accidents, the NTSB's own investigation is the fuller record.

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