# Accident 20260227010859A: Textron Aviation Inc C680A, Richmond, VA, February 27, 2026 - Type: FAA accident report (Accident/Incident Data System), as reported - Date: February 27, 2026, 11:00 local time - Place: Richmond, VA - Airport: Richmond International Airport - Damage: Substantial damage - Phase of flight: Ground/Ramp/Ma - Operating rules: General operating rules (Part 91) - Operator: DXTA - Location: 25.8056° N, 80.2899° W: From the FAA - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=25.8056&lon=-80.2899&mi=10 - Aircraft: N519QS, registered now (https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N519QS) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry model: Textron 680A (registry code 2076814, https://openairdocs.org/model/textron-680a) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: Pratt & Whitney Canada PW306D (registry code 52041, https://openairdocs.org/engine/pratt-whitney-canada-pw306d) (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: TEXTRON AVIATION INC C680A - Reported engine: P&W CANADA PW306D - People aboard: 2 - Fatal injuries: 0 - Other injuries: 0 - Pilot certificates: Airline transport, flight instructor - Pilot flight hours: 17,833 total, 2,526 in this make and model, 94 in the last 90 days - NTSB investigation: [NTSB ERA26LA130](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA26LA130) (OpenAirDocs) - FAA source: FAA Aviation Safety Information Portal (https://asip.faa.gov/) - Page: https://openairdocs.org/incident/20260227010859A ## Narrative As the FAA filed it, in capitals; the FAA replaces private details with ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^. DURING THE INITIAL TAXI TO REPOSITION THE CE-680A AIRCRAFT FOR A SECOND ENGINE START, AND UNKNOWN TO THE FLIGHT CREW, THE RIGHT OUTBOARD SECTION OF THE ELEVATOR MADE MINOR CONTACT WITH A JET BLAST FENCE. DURING POST EVENT DEBRIEFINGS, THE FLIGHT CREW STATED THEY “…FELT A SMALL JOLT…” DURING THE INITIAL TAXI, WHICH CAUSED THEM TO DISCONTINUE THE TAXI AND HAVE THE SECOND-IN-COMMAND (SIC) EXIT THE AIRCRAFT TO DETERMINE IF THE AIRCRAFT INADVERTENTLY TAXIED OVER A CHOCK, WHICH DID NOT OCCUR. THE GROUND MARSHALER INDICATED TO THE SIC HE THOUGHT THE AIRCRAFT NOSEWHEEL ABRUPTLY RECENTERED DURING THE INITIAL TAXI. THE SIC COMPLETED A FULL INSPECTION OF THE NOSE WHEEL/GEAR ASSEMBLY AND DID NOT DETERMINE ANY MAINTENANCE ISSUE. THE SIC THEN COMPLETED A FULL WALK-AROUND OF THE AIRCRAFT PRIMARILY LOOKING FOR ANY FOREIGN OBJECT DEBRIS (FOD) THE AIRCRAFT COULD HAVE TAXIED OVER, NONE WAS LOCATED. AT NO TIME WAS THERE ANY INDICATION THE AIRCRAFT HAD SUSTAINED DAMAGE TO THE ELEVATOR. THE DAMAGE TO THE JET BLAST FENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN ALMOST IMPERCEPTIBLE, BEING ONLY AN APPROXIMATE 2” MINOR SCUFF APPROXIMATELY 13’ OFF THE GROUND. DURING THE TAXI OUT, ADDITIONAL CREW DISCUSSIONS DETERMINED AN ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT INSPECTION SHOULD BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO TAKE-OFF. THE CREW CONTINUED TO THINK THE “SMALL JOLT” WAS A RESULT OF A LANDING GEAR ISSUE, A THIRD INSPECTION WAS COMPLETED AT A REMOTE LOCATION ON THE AIRPORT. THE LANDING GEAR AGAIN WAS INSPECTED AND DID NOT DETERMINE ANY MAINTENANCE ISSUE. ALL FLIGHT CONTROL CHECKLIST ITEMS WERE COMPLETED AND WITHOUT ISSUE. THE AIRCRAFT DEPARTED THEREAFTER AND WITHOUT ISSUE. APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR INTO THE FLIGHT, THE SIC - PILOT FLYING (PF) FELT ABNORMAL VIBRATIONS IN THE FLIGHT CONTROLS BUT INITIALLY IDENTIFIED THE VIBRATIONS AS ROUTINE TURBULENCE. AFTER ASSESSING THE SITUATION FURTHER, THE PILOT IN COMMAND (PIC) ELECTED TO DIVERT TO THE RICHMOND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (KRIC) FOR A PRECAUTIONARY LANDING AND A MAINTENANCE INSPECTION. DURING THE DESCENT THE CREW RECEIVED AN ABNORMAL TRIM INDICATION WHICH WAS ADDRESSED BY A QUICK REFERENCE HANDBOOK (QRH) PROCEDURE. THE AIRCRAFT LANDED UNEVENTFULLY AND DURING THE POST-FLIGHT, DAMAGE TO THE ELEVATOR WAS IDENTIFIED. THE RIGHT OUTBOARD ELEVATOR WAS FOUND DETACHED AT THE OUTBOARD HINGE POINT. THIS WAS LATER DETERMINED TO BE A RESULT OF THE CONTACT WITH THE JET BLAST FENCE AND INFLIGHT AERODYNAMIC FORCES WITH NORMAL FLIGHT CONTROL APPLICATIONS. POST-FLIGHT PICTURES INDICATED THE DAMAGE TO THE OUTBOARD SECTION OF THE ELEVATOR WOULD HAVE MOST LIKELY BEEN INDISTINGUISHABLE DURING A GROUND INSPECTION BECAUSE OF AMBIENT LIGHT CONDITIONS AND THE HEIGHT OF THE ELEVATOR ABOVE THE GROUND. THE OPERATORS AVIATION SAFETY ACTION PROGRAM (ASAP) EVENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (ERC) COMPLETED AN IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION WHICH INCLUDED A FLIGHT CREW INTERVIEW, RAMP VIDEO REVIEW, AIRCRAFT/JET BLAST FENCE DAMAGE IMAGES, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE/REPAIR DOCUMENTATION REVIEW, RAMP AREA REVIEW, AND FBO PARKING PROCEDURES REVIEW. THE ERC DETERMINED THE FLIGHT CREW PROACTIVELY AND REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE “…SMALL JOLT…” BUT BECAUSE OF CONFIRMATION BIAS THOUGHT THE AIRCRAFT TAXIED OVER AN OBJECT AND THEREFORE DID NOT CONSIDER THE AIRCRAFT CONTACTED A JET BLAST FENCE 13’ OFF THE GROUND. THE ERC INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THIS EVENT WAS DUE TO THE LOCATION OF THE JET BLAST FENCE THAT WAS CONSTRUCTED IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE RAMP PARKING AREA. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE IMPROPER FBO AIRCRAFT PARKING PROCEDURES WHICH ALLOWED THE AIRCRAFT ELEVATOR TO BE PARKED ADJACENT AND BEHIND THE JET BLAST FENCE AND THE FLIGHT CREW NOT OBSERVING THE ELEVATOR DAMAGE DURING POST CONTACT PREDEPARTURE INSPECTIONS BECAUSE OF CONFIRMATION BIAS. THE ERC CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED: FBO REQUIREMENT TO PAINT RESTRICTED AREA SURFACE MARKINGS ON THE RAMP, MODIFY AIRCRAFT PARKING PROCEDURES AND CONDUCT A FLIGHT CREW “HUMAN FACTORS" DE-BRIEFING. ## The NTSB's investigation of this event (1) From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. - [NTSB ERA26LA130](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA26LA130), Feb 27, 2026: Textron 680A (N519QS), Miami, FL, substantial damage. Probable cause: The flight crew’s failure to maintain adequate clearance from the blast fence during taxi to the runway for departure, and their inadequate inspection of the airplane after it contacted the blast… From the FAA Accident/Incident Data System. Reports are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. For accidents, the NTSB's own investigation is the fuller record. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.