# NTSB ANC08MA038: Piper PA-31-350, N509FN, Kodiak, AK, January 5, 2008 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Fatal · Major investigation · Final report - Date: January 5, 2008, 13:43 local (17:43 UTC) - Place: Kodiak, AK - Coordinates: 57.750556, -152.468612 (estimated) - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=57.7506&lon=-152.4686&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Initial climb](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/350) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Initial climb: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330) - Highest injury: Fatal - Injuries: 6 fatal, 3 serious, 1 minor - Status: Completed, report April 15, 2009 - Report: Approved by Office Director - NTSB office: Alaska Regional Office - Parties: Textron Lycoming, Servant Air, Piper Aircraft, Inc., Federal Aviation Administration (Airworthiness) - NTSB case key (mKey): 67341 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ANC08MA038 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/67341/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=67341 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ANC08MA038 ## Probable cause The failure of company maintenance personnel to ensure that the airplane's nose baggage door latching mechanism was properly configured and maintained, resulting in an inadvertent opening of the nose baggage door in flight. Contributing to the accident were the lack of information and guidance available to the operator and pilot regarding procedures to follow should a baggage door open in flight and an inadvertent aerodynamic stall. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Doors: cargo/baggage doors](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01035230): Aircraft › Aircraft structures · Incorrect service/maintenance (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-31-350, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01035230/cases.md?model=7103110), [All aircraft, 9 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01035230/cases.md) - [Maintenance: repair](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062015): Personnel issues › Task performance · Maintenance personnel (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-31-350, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062015/cases.md?model=7103110), [All aircraft, 99 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062015/cases.md) - [Training: emergency proc training](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04031030): Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring · Manufacturer (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-31-350, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04031030/cases.md?model=7103110), [All aircraft, 8 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04031030/cases.md) - [Policy/procedure: availability of policy/proc](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04021010): Organizational issues › Management · Manufacturer (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-31-350, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04021010/cases.md?model=7103110), [All aircraft, 28 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04021010/cases.md) - [Performance/control parameters: airspeed](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062010): Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability · Not attained/maintained (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-31-350, 5 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062010/cases.md?model=7103110), [All aircraft, 1,681 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062010/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Initial climb: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330) (defining event); cases with it: [Piper PA-31-350, 6 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330/sequence.md?model=7103110), [All aircraft, 994 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330/sequence.md) - [Initial climb: Aerodynamic stall/spin](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/241); cases with it: [Piper PA-31-350, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/241/sequence.md?model=7103110), [All aircraft, 1,529 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/241/sequence.md) - [Initial climb: Loss of control in flight](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240); cases with it: [Piper PA-31-350, 7 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md?model=7103110), [All aircraft, 5,002 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md) - [Uncontrolled descent: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Piper PA-31-350, 18 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=7103110), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md) ## Analysis The airline transport pilot and nine passengers were departing in a twin-engine airplane on a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air taxi flight from a runway adjacent to an ocean bay. According to the air traffic control tower specialist on duty, the airplane became airborne about midway down the runway. As it approached the end of the runway, the pilot said he needed to return to the airport, but gave no reason. The specialist cleared the airplane to land on any runway. As the airplane began a right turn, it rolled sharply to the right and began a rapid, nose- and right-wing-low descent. The airplane crashed about 200 yards offshore and the fragmented wreckage sank in the 10-foot-deep water. Survivors were rescued by a private float plane. A passenger reported that the airplane's nose baggage door partially opened just after takeoff, and fully opened into a locked position when the pilot initiated a right turn towards the airport. The nose baggage door is mounted on the left side of the nose, just forward of the pilot's windscreen. When the door is opened, it swings upward, and is held open by a latching device. To lock the baggage door, the handle is placed in the closed position and the handle is then locked by rotating a key lock, engaging a locking cam. With the locking cam in the locked position, removal of the key prevents the locking cam from moving. The original equipment key lock is designed so the key can only be removed when the locking cam is engaged. Investigation revealed that the original key lock on the airplane's forward baggage door had been replaced with an unapproved thumb-latch device. A Safety Board materials engineer's examination revealed evidence that a plastic guard inside the baggage compartment, which is designed to protect the door's locking mechanism from baggage/cargo, appeared not to be installed at the time of the accident. The airplane manufacturer's only required inspection of the latching system was a visual inspection every 100 hours of service. Additionally, the mechanical components of the forward baggage door latch mechanism were considered "on condition" items, with no predetermined life-limit. On May 29, 2008, the Federal Aviation Administration issued a safety alert for operators (SAFO 08013), recommending a visual inspection of the baggage door latches and locks, additional training of flight and ground crews, and the removal of unapproved lock devices. In July 2008, Piper Aircraft issued a mandatory service bulletin (SB 1194, later 1194A), requiring the installation of a key lock device, mandatory recurring inspection intervals, life-limits on safety-critical parts of forward baggage door components, and the installation of a placard on the forward baggage door with instructions for closing and locking the door to preclude an in-flight opening. Postaccident inspection discovered no mechanical discrepancies with the airplane other than the baggage door latch. The airplane manufacturer's pilot operating handbook did not contain emergency procedures for an in-flight opening of the nose baggage door, nor did the operator's pilot training program include instruction on the proper operation of the nose baggage door or procedures to follow in case of an in-flight opening of the door. Absent findings of any other mechanical issues, it is likely the door locking mechanism was not fully engaged and/or the baggage shifted during takeoff, and contacted the exposed internal latching mechanism, allowing the cargo door to open. With the airplane operating at a low airspeed and altitude, the open baggage door would have incurred additional aerodynamic drag and further reduced the airspeed. The pilot's immediate turn towards the airport, with the now fully open baggage door, likely resulted in a sudden increase in drag, with a substantive decrease in airspeed, and an aerodynamic stall. ## Factual narrative HISTORY OF FLIGHT On January 5, 2008, about 1343 Alaska standard time, a twin-engine Piper PA-31-350 airplane, N509FN, received substantial damage when it collided with ocean water following a loss of control shortly after takeoff from Runway 36 at the Kodiak Airport, Kodiak, Alaska. The airplane was being operated by Servant Air, Inc., Kodiak, as a visual flight rules (VFR) on-demand charter flight under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135, when the accident occurred. Of the 10 people aboard, the airline transport pilot and 5 passengers died at the scene, 3 passengers sustained serious injuries, and 1 passenger sustained minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and company flight following procedures were in effect. The flight was en route to Homer, Alaska. During an initial hospital room interview with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC), on January 5, about 2200, a passenger related that the purpose of the flight was to transport a group of commercial fishermen from Kodiak to Homer for Russian Christmas. He added that many of the passengers were family members that lived in the same community near Homer. The passenger stated that he was seated in the third row on the right side of the airplane. He said that shortly after becoming airborne, he saw the airplane's nose baggage door open slightly, which he said initially startled the pilot. He said that while the airplane was still over the departure end of Runway 36, the pilot initiated a shallow right turn, presumably to return to the airport. He said that as soon as the pilot started the right turn, the baggage door swung open to the full open position, and it remained in that position. The passenger said that as the airplane continued the right turn, it rolled sharply to the right, and began a rapid, nose and right wing low descent. It collided with the water adjacent to the departure end of Runway 36. The passenger said that during the collision the fuselage fragmented, and the airplane sank shortly after impact. He said that he was able to free himself from the sinking wreckage by swimming though a large void in the airplane's fuselage. According to the contract Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) specialist that was on duty at the time of the accident, the accident airplane departed from runway 36, and became airborne about midway along the 5,013-foot long runway. The ATCT specialist said that as the airplane continued to climb approaching the departure end of the runway, the pilot calmly stated that he needed to return to the airport, but gave no reason for his need to return. The ATCT specialist reported that as the airplane began a right turn, it began a steep roll to the right, and descended nose-low into the water. He said that immediately after witnessing the accident, he alerted airport fire rescue crew of the accident, and contacted the U.S. Coast Guard's Air Station Kodiak, which is located adjacent to the Kodiak airport. The ATCT specialist noted that just after the accident, another Kodiak-based operator in a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 Beaver airplane contacted him on the tower radio frequency and said, in part: "[Kodiak] tower, Beaver five forty five's by the Crash Harbor, um can I help there?" The ATCT specialist responded by saying: "Beaver five forty five, yeah, you may be able to uh, you may be the first one that can get to those people that are in the water, they are right off the approach end of runway one eight, just off Buskin Beach, and uh you can transition into the airspace at your discretion." The ATCT specialist said that the pilot of the float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 went directly to the accident site, then landed near the partially submerged wreckage. During an interview with the NTSB IIC, on January 8, the pilot of the de Havilland DHC-2 Beaver airplane reported that at the time of the accident he was doing a postmaintenance engine run following a 100-hour inspection of his airplane. He said that while parked in a bay locally known as "Crash Harbor" adjacent to the Kodiak Airport, he initially overheard the radio conversation between the accident pilot and ATCT specialist, followed by the conversations between the ATCT specialist and the fire rescue crews, so he offered his assistance. The pilot said that once he found the partially submerged wreckage, he landed, and then taxied close as he could to the sinking wreckage. He said he discovered two passengers swimming in the water next to the submerged wreckage, and two other passengers clinging to the airplane's exposed vertical stabilizer. He said that wind conditions at the time of the rescue made it very difficult to maneuver his airplane next to the wreckage. Once he had the four severely hypothermic passengers aboard, he departed to the north, and flew directly to the Kodiak boat harbor where an ambulance was waiting. The pilot noted that when he departed the accident site, no other passengers were visible on the surface of the water. Pilot Preflight During an interview with the NTSB IIC on January 8, an employee of Servant Air reported that the accident pilot loaded the airplane himself, while his passengers waited in the operator's lounge. The employee noted that he watched the pilot load various items into the forward baggage area, closed and latched the baggage door, then continued loading the remaining items in the aft baggage area, and wing lockers. He said that when the pilot was done loading the airplane, he saw him do a "walk around" the entire airplane. He said that when the pilot approached the forward baggage area, the pilot slide his open left hand across the closed door, then while making a loose fist, he lightly tapped the door, just above the door's handle and lock assembly, then continued around the airplane's right wing. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Pilot Information The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane multiengine land and sea, and helicopter ratings. He also held a flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, instrument airplane, and helicopter ratings. His most recent first-class medical certificate was issued August 7, 2007, and contained no limitations. According to the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120.1) submitted by Servant Air, dated January 18, 2008, the pilot's total flight time was 9,437 hours, of which 400 were in the accident airplane make and model, and 1,108 in multiengine airplanes. His most recent airman competency/proficiency check (CFR Part 135.293) check ride was on September 1, 2007, the company president, who was a company check airman, administered the check ride in the accident airplane. A review of the flight and duty records for the pilot revealed in the 30 days before the accident, he flew about 47.5 hours. His flight time in the previous 90 days was about 179.6 hours. According to the operator, the company hired the pilot on June 1, 2004, and at that time, his total combined (helicopter and airplane) flight experience was about 6,555 flight hours, with 36 hours in multiengine airplanes. Before being hired by Servant Air, the pilot was a full-time helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard. During his time in service with the Coast Guard, he was stationed in various theaters around the world, including Alaska. While in the Coast Guard, he accumulated about 6,000 flight hours in helicopters, and about 465 hours in airplanes. Company Information The operator is a Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 135 Air Carrier, and holds scheduled commuter and on-demand operations specifications. Company facilities are in Kodiak and Anchorage, Alaska. The president/director of maintenance and chief pilot reside in Kodiak. The vice president/director of operations resides in A ## Aircraft - Registration: [N509FN](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N509FN-2018-01-23), registration cancelled 2018-01-23, S/N 31-7952162, built 1979 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: PIPER PA-31-350 - Registry model: [Piper PA-31-350](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-31-350) (registry code 7103110) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Lycoming TI0-540 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/lycoming-ti0-540-series) (registry code 41533, turbo-prop) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 31-7952162 - Airframe hours: 13130 - Engines: Lycoming TIO-540 Serie 350 horsepower reciprocating; Lycoming TIO-540 Serie 350 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Part 135 - Operator: Servant Air, Inc. - Registered owner: Osowski Wes A - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: 100 hour, December 18, 2007, 27 hours before - Departed: ADQ, KODIAK, AK - Destination: HOM, HOMER, AK - Flight plan: Company VFR - Airport: ADQ, Kodiak, runway 36, 5,013 × 150 ft, asphalt ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 50; injuries: fatal; airline transport; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine sea, single-engine land; instrument ratings: helicopter, airplane; medical: class 1, without waivers/limitations; last flight review September 1, 2007; seat: left; toxicology performed; flight hours: 9,437 total, 400 in this make and model, 179 in the last 90 days, 74 in the last 30 days, 3 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 300° at 17 knots, gusting 26 - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Temperature: 25 °F, dew point 14 °F - Altimeter: 28.96 inHg - Observed at: ADQ ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20080105009679A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20080105009679A), Jan 5, 2008: Piper PA31350, Kodiak, AK, Destroyed, 6 fatal. (-23) Taking off on runway 36 the aircraft's front baggage door came partially open at lift off or shortly thereafter. According to the survivor sitting in the… ## Docket (23 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on February 19, 2009, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=67341. 5.3 MB in all. - Materials Laboratory Factual Report 08-081, Cargo door assembly (item 1, .PDF, 433 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40296797&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Materials%20Laboratory%20Factual%20Report%2008-081,%20Cargo%20door%20assembly-Master.PDF - Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 (item 2, .PDF, 547 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308461&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1-Redacted.PDF - Witness Statements (item 3, .PDF, 150 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308462&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Witness%20Statements-Redacted.PDF - Maps of Accident Site (item 4, .PDF, 388 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308463&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Maps%20of%20Accident%20Site-Master.PDF - Weather Information (item 5, .PDF, 98 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308464&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Weather%20Information-Redacted.PDF - Transcript of Radio Communications (item 6, .PDF, 198 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308465&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Transcript%20of%20Radio%20Communications-Redacted.PDF - Lycoming Report (item 7, .PDF, 432 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40401970&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Lycoming%20Report-Redacted.PDF - Piper Report (item 8, .PDF, 172 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308467&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Piper%20Report-Master.PDF - Piper Aircraft Service Bulletin (item 9, .PDF, 809 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308476&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Piper%20Aircraft%20Service%20Bulletin-Master.PDF - FAA Safety Alert for Operators "SAFO" (item 10, .PDF, 613 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308477&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=FAA%20Safety%20Alert%20for%20Operators%20%22SAFO%22-Master.PDF - Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation (item 11, .PDF, 379 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308478&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Statement%20of%20Party%20Representatives%20to%20NTSB%20Investigation-Redacted.PDF - Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 (item 12, .PDF, 94 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308479&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Release%20of%20Aircraft%20Wreckage,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.15-Redacted.PDF - Toxicological Report (item 13, .PDF, 59 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308480&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Toxicological%20Report-Redacted.PDF - Image 1. Aerial photo of accident during rescue/recovery, looking to the west. Departure end of Runway 36 is in the background. Photo Provided by U.S. Coast Guard (item 14, .PDF, 90 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308482&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%201.%20Aerial%20photo%20of%20accident%20during%20rescue%2Frecovery,%20looking%20to%20the%20west.%20Departure%20end%20of%20Runway%2036%20is%20in%20the%20background.%20Photo%20Provided%20by%20U.S.%20Coast%20Guard-Master.PDF - Image 2. Aerial photo of submerged wreckage. Photo provided by U.S. Coast Guard (item 15, .PDF, 102 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308484&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%202.%20Aerial%20photo%20of%20submerged%20wreckage.%20%20Photo%20provided%20by%20U.S.%20Coast%20Guard-Master.PDF - Image 3. Photo of January 6, 2008 wreckage recovery operation. (item 16, .PDF, 180 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308485&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%203.%20Photo%20of%20January%206,%202008%20wreckage%20recovery%20operation.-Master.PDF - Image 4. Photo of January 6, 2008, recovery operation. (item 17, .PDF, 88 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308486&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%204.%20Photo%20of%20January%206,%202008,%20recovery%20operation.-Master.PDF - Image 5. Photo of forward baggage door locking mechanism, which was found disengaged from the baggage door handle. Photo taken just after being recovered. (item 18, .PDF, 44 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308487&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%205.%20Photo%20of%20forward%20baggage%20door%20locking%20mechanism,%20which%20was%20found%20disengaged%20from%20the%20baggage%20door%20handle.%20%20Photo%20taken%20just%20after%20being%20recovered.-Master.PDF - Image 6. Photo of accident airplane's forward baggage door, which depicts the thumb latch. The thumb latch is installed where the original key lock was installed. (item 19, .PDF, 118 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308488&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%206.%20Photo%20of%20accident%20airplane%27s%20forward%20baggage%20door,%20which%20depicts%20the%20thumb%20latch.%20%20The%20thumb%20latch%20is%20installed%20where%20the%20original%20key%20lock%20was%20installed.-Master.PDF - Image 7. Overall photo of the interior portion of the forward bagage door. Photo was taken in the same condition as it was found during the recovery process. Note: No plastic guard was found installed, or with the wreckage debris. (item 20, .PDF, 87 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308491&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%207.%20Overall%20photo%20of%20the%20interior%20portion%20of%20the%20forward%20bagage%20door.%20%20Photo%20was%20taken%20in%20the%20same%20condition%20as%20it%20was%20found%20during%20the%20recovery%20process.%20%20Note%3A%20No%20plastic%20guard%20was%20found%20installed,%20or%20with%20the%20wreckage%20debris.-Master.PDF - Image 8. Overall exterior view of the forward baggage door. (item 21, .PDF, 76 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308492&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%208.%20Overall%20exterior%20view%20of%20the%20forward%20baggage%20door.-Master.PDF - Image 9. Photo of locking mechanism of the forward baggage door. Figure 1 depicts the locked position, and figure 2 depicts the unlocked position. (item 22, .PDF, 74 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308493&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%209.%20Photo%20of%20locking%20mechanism%20of%20the%20forward%20baggage%20door.%20%20Figure%201%20depicts%20the%20locked%20position,%20and%20figure%202%20depicts%20the%20unlocked%20position.-Master.PDF - Image 10. Photo of wreckage review and layout area. (item 23, .PDF, 89 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40308494&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%2010.%20Photo%20of%20wreckage%20review%20and%20layout%20area.-Master.PDF From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.