# NTSB ANC25LA008: Cub Crafters CC18-180, N55PK, Anchorage, AK, November 2, 2024 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Serious injuries · Class 3 · Limited · Final report - Date: November 2, 2024, 14:36 local (22:36 UTC) - Place: Anchorage, AK - Coordinates: 61.186401, -149.96498 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=61.1864&lon=-149.9650&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Takeoff](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/300) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Takeoff: Flight control sys malf/fail](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/333) - Highest injury: Serious injuries - Injuries: 1 serious - Status: Completed, report November 19, 2025 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 3 - NTSB office: Alaska Regional Office - Parties: FAA, US Department of Interior - NTSB case key (mKey): 195428 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ANC25LA008 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/195428/pdf - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ANC25LA008 ## Probable cause The incorrect installation of the rear flight control stick, resulting in the pilot’s inability to control the pitch attitude, coupled with the pilot’s inadequate control system check before departure, all which resulted in an aerodynamic stall during takeoff. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Training: training with equipment](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02031530): Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge · Pilot - [Inspection: preflight inspection](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02061510): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot - [Knowledge: knowledge of equipment](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02032015): Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge · Pilot - [Knowledge: knowledge of equipment](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02032015): Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge · Maintenance personnel (probable cause) - [Info processing/decision: identification/recognition](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041510): Personnel issues › Action/decision · Pilot - [Training: initial training](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04031010): Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring · Operator - [Training: initial training](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04031010): Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring · Manufacturer - [Policy/procedure: adequacy of policy/proc](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04021015): Organizational issues › Management · Manufacturer - [Design: equipment design](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04011010): Organizational issues › Development · Manufacturer - [Flight control system: control column section](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022701): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Incorrect service/maintenance (probable cause) ## Analysis The pilot reported that during takeoff, just after becoming airborne, he was unable to move the flight control stick forward. The airplane started climbing aggressively and the pilot attempted to recover using elevator trim control. The airplane subsequently stalled and began an uncontrolled, nose-down descent toward the runway. During the descent, the pilot was able to level the airplane; however, there was insufficient altitude to recover from the stall. The airplane impacted the runway, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage and both wing lift struts. The accident pilot reported that just before departure, he did a control system check, which did not reveal any anomalies. A postaccident examination revealed that the rear flight control stick was incorrectly installed. The flight control stick was installed in reverse. The curve of the control stick was curved forward, which resulted in the control stick contacting the pilot’s (front) seatback, which limited movement and prevented the control stick from moving full forward. The investigation did not determine who improperly installed the control stick. However, it was normal practice for the pilots to remove and reinstall the rear seat control stick if they were flying with just cargo in the rear seat area. The pilot reported that he has never removed the control stick and was not trained to do so. Had the pilot been trained on the removal and installation of the control stick, he may have noticed the control stick was installed backwards during his preflight. He also stated that he was not aware that the control stick could be installed incorrectly. The airplane manufacturers’ supplement dated January 13, 2016, which describes the process and requirements for reinstalling the rear control stick, states in part: “Ensure full range of motion (including trim) is met without the rear stick contacting anything.” Additionally, the supplement must be added to the pilot’s operating handbook and the Federal Aviation Administration approved flight manual when the rear control stick is removed and reinstalled. Following the accident, the operator issued an agency safety alert to address the correct installation of the rear flight control stick. Additionally, the safety alert highlights the preflight and before takeoff checklists requiring flight control checks to verify the maximum range of travel. ## Factual narrative On November 2, 2024, about 1436 Alaska daylight time, a Cub Crafters CC18-180 airplane, N55PK, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident at the Lake Hood Airport (LHD) Anchorage, Alaska. The pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a public aircraft flight. The accident airplane was owned by the U.S. Department of the Interior and operated by the National Park Service. The purpose of the flight was to reposition the airplane back to Fairbanks, Alaska, where the pilot and airplane were based. The airplane departed from runway 32 at LHD. The pilot reported that, after the airplane became airborne, he was unable to move the flight control stick forward and the airplane started climbing aggressively. The pilot attempted to use the elevator trim control to lower the nose and level the airplane. However, the airplane stalled and began an uncontrolled, nose-down descent toward the runway. The pilot was able to level the airplane slightly but there was insufficient altitude to recover from the stall. The airplane impacted the runway and came to rest about 78 ft from the initial impact site, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage and both wing lift struts. A postaccident examination revealed that the rear flight control stick was incorrectly installed. The flight control stick was installed in reverse. The curve of the control stick was curved forward; the control stick would contact the pilot’s seatback, which restricted movement and limited the control stick from moving forward. The pilot’s front seat was found in the full aft and locked position. It was the operator’s practice that pilots could remove the aft control stick when they were flying cargo so that the cargo wouldn’t interfere with the control stick. The accident pilot reported that he had never removed the rear control stick in the airplane, nor had he received training on how to remove or install the rear flight control stick. The pilot was unaware that the rear flight control stick could be installed incorrectly. The pilot had always flown with an instructor pilot in the rear seat. The pilot did not know who installed the rear control stick before his flight, and the subsequent accident investigation was unable to identify who installed it incorrectly. The pilot stated that he performed a preflight inspection and found no discrepancies. The rear control stick was already installed when he arrived. The weight and balance was calculated to be within limits. He then taxied the airplane to Runway 32 for departure. He said, in part: ”I did one last carburetor heat check and one last control check and then got clearance from the tower for takeoff.” A postaccident reenactment of the flight control check and takeoff was conducted in an exemplary CC18 in the Office of Aviation Services hangar. The front seat was positioned in the aft position and the rear control stick was installed backward. The flight control check appeared normal with no binding.After applying backstick pressure to simulate the takeoff, forward pressure was applied, and the control stick became jammed in the forward position and was unmovable in any direction until the pilot leaned forward and the stick released. During the reenactment, the control stick became jammed with the front seatback frame. Cub Crafters’ supplement dated January 13, 2016, which describes the process and requirements for reinstalling the rear control stick, states in part: “Ensure full range of motion (including trim) is met without the rear stick contacting anything.” Additionally, the supplement must be added to the pilot’s operating handbook and the Federal Aviation Administration approved flight manual when the rear control stick is removed and reinstalled. As a result of this investigation, the U.S. Department of the Interior issued a safety alert (DOI SA 25-01) dated November 15, 2024, to address the correct installation of the rear flight control stick. Additionally, the safety alert highlights the preflight and before takeoff checklists requiring flight control checks to verify the maximum range of travel is available. ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Takeoff: Flight control sys malf/fail](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/333) (defining event) - [Takeoff: Loss of control in flight](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240) ## Aircraft - Registration: [N55PK](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N55PK), registered now, S/N CC18-0096, built 2019 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: CUB CRAFTERS INC CC18-180 - Registry model: [Cub Crafters CC18-180](https://openairdocs.org/model/cub-crafters-cc18-180) (registry code 2470003) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Lycoming O-360-C1G](https://openairdocs.org/engine/lycoming-o-360-c1g) (registry code 42284, reciprocating) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: CC18-0096 - Year built: 2019 - Airframe hours: 353.3 - Engines: LYCOMING O-360-C1G 180 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Public aircraft, Public use - Operator: National Park Service - Registered owner: US Department Of The Interior - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: Annual, July 31, 2024, 25.6 hours before - Destination: FAI, Fairbanks, AK - Flight plan: VFR - Airport: PALH, Lake Hood Airport, runway 32, 2,200 × 75 ft, gravel - Equipment: ADS-B, Satellite tracking device, Stall warning system ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 43; injuries: serious; commercial, flight engineer; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine sea, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 2, without waivers/limitations; last flight review June 21, 2024; seat: front; restraint: 5-point; flight hours: 2,014 total, 1,856 as pilot in command, 18 in the last 90 days, 0 in the last 30 days, 0 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 40° at 4 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: 8,000 ft overcast - Temperature: 34 °F, dew point 30 °F - Altimeter: 29.27 inHg - Observed at: PALH - METAR: PALH 022253Z AUTO 04004KT 10SM SCT065 OVC080 01/M01 A2927 RMK AO2 SLP913 T00111011 TSNO ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20241102017749A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20241102017749A), Nov 2, 2024: Cub Crafters Inc CC18-180, Anchorage, AK, Substantial damage. The intended type of operation of this aircraft as a [privacy data omitted] aircraft was related to a repositioning flight to fairbanks international airport.… From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.