# NTSB CEN10LA312: Piper PA-34-220T, N104NW, Ankeny, IA, June 9, 2010 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · No injuries · Limited investigation · Final report - Date: June 9, 2010, 18:20 local (23:20 UTC) - Place: Ankeny, IA - Coordinates: 41.691112, -93.56639 (estimated) - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=41.6911&lon=-93.5664&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/550) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Landing-flare/touchdown: Hard landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/092) - Highest injury: No injuries - Injuries: 3 uninjured - Status: Completed, report April 7, 2011 - Report: Approved by Office Director - NTSB office: Central Region - Parties: FAA-Des Moines FSDO, Piper Aircraft - SAIBs cited in the narratives: [SAIB CE-01-30](https://openairdocs.org/saib/CE-01-30) (OpenAirDocs) - NTSB case key (mKey): 76274 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=CEN10LA312 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/76274/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=76274 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/CEN10LA312 ## Probable cause The failure of the stabilator control cable due to wear. Contributing to the accident was the inadequate maintenance inspection of the stabilator control cable. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Flight control system: stabilizer control system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022740): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Failure (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-34-220T, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022740/cases.md?model=7103420), [All aircraft, 13 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022740/cases.md) - [Flight control system: stabilizer control system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022740): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Fatigue/wear/corrosion (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-34-220T, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022740/cases.md?model=7103420), [All aircraft, 13 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022740/cases.md) - [Maintenance: scheduled/routine maintenance](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062010): Personnel issues › Task performance · Maintenance personnel (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-34-220T, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062010/cases.md?model=7103420), [All aircraft, 320 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062010/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Landing-flare/touchdown: Hard landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/092) (defining event); cases with it: [Piper PA-34-220T, 4 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/092/sequence.md?model=7103420), [All aircraft, 2,102 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/092/sequence.md) ## Analysis The pilot reported that when he pulled back on the control yoke during the landing flare the nose of the airplane did not pitch up. The airplane landed hard on the nosewheel and bounced several times before stopping on the runway. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the stabilator control cable had fractured in two pieces. The location of the fracture was in the unobstructed area in the tail cone; the location of the fracture was not associated with a pulley, fairlead, or bulkhead, and no rubbing or chaffing was found in the area of the fracture. The entire length of the cable was covered with dried black grease and the majority of the fractured ends of the individual wires exhibited wear damage with the exposed surfaces of the wires covered in grease. The ends of the fractured wires exhibited features typical of overstress separation, with no evidence of fatigue cracking. Federal Aviation Administration guidance states that the inspection and repair of control cables should be accomplished during annual inspections. The aircraft maintenance logbooks indicated that the last annual maintenance inspection was conducted about three months prior to the accident, equating to 17 flight hours. The logbook entry for that inspection indicated that the control cables were checked for correct rigging and cable tensions. The logbook entry stated, “Stabilator OK.” There was no indication of any repair or replacement of the stabilator control cable. ## Factual narrative On June 9, 2010, at 1820 central daylight time, a Piper PA-34-220T, N104NW, sustained substantial damage during a hard landing on runway 36 (5,500 feet by 100 feet, concrete) at the Ankeny Regional Airport (IKV), Ankeny, Iowa. The pilot and two passengers were not injured. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight departed Detroit Lakes (DTL), Minnesota, about 1622 with IKV as the destination airport. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules(IFR) flight plan was filed. The pilot reported that the flight was normal until the final approach for landing. He reported that when he pulled back on the control yoke during the flare, the nose of the airplane did not pitch up. The airplane landed hard on the nose wheel and bounced several times. The pilot maintained directional control of the airplane before he stopped it on the runway. Once stopped, he taxied the airplane to the ramp. The firewall and fuselage sustained substantial damage. A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness inspector examined the airplane. Maintenance personnel removed the floorboards and tunnel panels for inspection of the control cables. The inspection revealed that the stabilator control cable had fractured in two pieces. The location of the fracture was in the unobstructed space in the tail cone. The location of the fracture was not associated with a pulley, fairlead, or bulkhead, and no rubbing or chaffing was found in the area of the fracture or tail cone. The entire length of the cable was covered with dried black grease. The cable was removed and sent to the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) Materials Laboratory for examination. The NTSB Materials Laboratory’s inspection revealed that the cable’s composition was consistent with stainless steel. The cable fractured approximately 18 inches from the turnbuckle end and approximately 65 inches from the ball portion of the single-shank ball-end terminal. The entire length of the cable was covered with grease. The individual cable wires in the area of the fracture were found partially unraveled and the exposed surfaces were covered with grease. A majority of the fractured ends of the individual wires exhibited wear damage at a slant plane relative the length of the cable that reduced the ends of the wire to a knife edge. Wear damage reduced the majority of a wire’s cross section. The ends of the remaining fractured wires exhibited elongation deformation and cup and cone fracture features typical of overstress separation. The fractured end of the wires showed micro-void coalescence dimple features typical of overstress separation with no evidence of fatigue cracking. On January 3, 2001, the New Piper Aircraft Company issued Service Bulletin (SB) 1048, “Stainless Steel Control Cables.” It identified Piper manufactured airplanes that had stainless steel cables installed. According to the SB-1048, the accident airplane, N104NW, serial number 34-8133059, hadstainless steel control cables installed during its manufacture. The bulletin stated, “Service reports have been received stating that stainless steel cables in the aircraft control system have a considerably shorter service life as compared to galvanized cables for the same application.” The service bulletin stated that it was mandatory to inspect and maintain the control system cables in accordance with the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 41.13. On July 11, 2001, the FAA issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) No. CE-01-30. The SAIB recommended that owners or operators of the affected aircraft perform an inspection and possible replacement of the stainless steel cables as outlined in the Piper SB-1048. The FAA recommended that the inspections be accomplished at each 100-hour or annual inspection. FAA AC-41.13, “Acceptable Methods, Techniques and Practices – Aircraft Inspection and Repair,” stated that the inspection and repair of control cables should be accomplished at annual inspections and during 100-hours inspections. It stated that a cloth should be passed over the cable to snag on broken wires. The aircraft maintenance logbooks indicated that the last annual maintenance inspection was conducted on March 18, 2010. The total time on the airframe at the time of the inspection was 7,240.2 hours. The airplane had flown about 17 hours since the last annual inspection. The logbook entry indicated that the control cables were checked for correct rigging and cable tensions. The logbook entry stated, “Stabilator OK.” There was no indication of any repair or replacement of the stabilator control cable. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N104NW](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N104NW-2010-11-23), registration cancelled 2010-11-23, S/N 34-8133059, built 1981 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: PIPER PA-34-220T - Registry model: [Piper PA-34-220T](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-34-220t) (registry code 7103420) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Continental TSIO-360 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/continental-tsio-360-series) (registry code 17019, reciprocating) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 34-8133059 - Airframe hours: 7240 - Engines: CONT MOTOR TSIO-360 SER 225 horsepower reciprocating; CONT MOTOR TSIO-360 SER 220 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Personal, Part 91 - Operator: Mclaughlin John H - Registered owner: Mclaughlin John H - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: Annual, March 19, 2010, 17 hours before - Departed: DTL, Detroit Lakes, MN - Destination: IKV, Ankeny, IA - Flight plan: IFR - Airport: IKV, Ankeny Regional Airport, runway 36, 5,500 × 100 ft, concrete ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 72; injuries: none; private, commercial; airplane ratings: single-engine sea, single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 2, with waivers/limitations; seat: left; flight hours: 4,168 total, 1,460 in this make and model ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 330° at 12 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 82 °F, dew point 50 °F - Altimeter: 29.93 inHg - Observed at: IKV, 1 nm away ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20100609036399A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20100609036399A), Jun 9, 2010: Piper PA-34-220T, Ankeny, IA, Substantial damage. Pilot reported that on landing at Ankeny Regional Airport (ikv) he was unable to flare. The aircraft landed hard in a nose low configuration. The aircraft… ## Docket (17 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on November 18, 2010, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=76274. 6.0 MB in all. - Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 (item 1, .PDF, 1.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339392&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1-Redacted.PDF - Materials Laboratory Factual Report 10-072 (item 2, .PDF, 369 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40333623&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Materials%20Laboratory%20Factual%20Report%2010-072-Master.PDF - FAA SAIB No. CE-01-30 (item 3, .PDF, 122 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339677&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=FAA%20SAIB%20No.%20CE-01-30-Master.PDF - Piper Maintenance Manual, Chapter 27 "Flight Controls" (item 4, .PDF, 654 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339396&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Piper%20Maintenance%20Manual,%20Chapter%2027%20%22Flight%20Controls%22-Master.PDF - Piper Service Bulletin - 1048 (item 5, .PDF, 133 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339398&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Piper%20Service%20Bulletin%20-%201048-Master.PDF - Piper Service Letter - 1069 (item 6, .PDF, 57 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339399&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Piper%20Service%20Letter%20-%201069-Master.PDF - Aircraft Logbook Pages (item 7, .PDF, 1.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339400&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Aircraft%20Logbook%20Pages-Redacted.PDF - Figure of Stabilator Control Installation (item 8, .PDF, 33 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339725&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Figure%20of%20Stabilator%20Control%20Installation-Redacted.PDF - Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation (item 9, .PDF, 71 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339403&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Statement%20of%20Party%20Representatives%20to%20NTSB%20Investigation-Redacted.PDF - Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 (item 10, .PDF, 118 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339709&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Release%20of%20Aircraft%20Wreckage,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.15-Redacted.PDF - Photo 1. View of cable run in tail (item 11, .PDF, 408 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339409&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%201.%20View%20of%20cable%20run%20in%20tail-Master.PDF - Photo 2. View of debris in tail (item 12, .PDF, 511 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339410&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%202.%20View%20of%20debris%20in%20tail-Master.PDF - Photo 3. View of fractured cable (item 13, .PDF, 483 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339411&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%203.%20View%20of%20fractured%20cable-Master.PDF - Photo 4. View of fractured cable (item 14, .PDF, 300 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339412&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%204.%20View%20of%20fractured%20cable-Master.PDF - Photo 5. View of entire cable (item 15, .PDF, 56 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339413&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%205.%20View%20of%20entire%20cable-Master.PDF - Photo 6. View of fractured cable (item 16, .PDF, 41 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339414&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%206.%20View%20of%20fractured%20cable-Master.PDF - Photo 7. View of fractured cable (item 17, .PDF, 30 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40339415&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%207.%20View%20of%20fractured%20cable-Master.PDF From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.