# NTSB CEN12FA100: Cessna 421C, N421SY, Sioux Falls, SD, December 9, 2011

- Type: NTSB accident investigation
- Classification: Accident · Fatal · Field investigation · Final report
- Date: December 9, 2011, 14:24 local (20:24 UTC)
- Place: Sioux Falls, SD
- Coordinates: 43.592224, -96.751945
- Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=43.5922&lon=-96.7519&mi=10
- Phase of flight: [Maneuvering](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/450) (OpenAirDocs' grouping)
- Defining event: [Maneuvering: Aerodynamic stall/spin](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/241)
- Highest injury: Fatal
- Injuries: 4 fatal
- Status: Completed, report April 10, 2013
- Report: Approved by Office Director
- NTSB office: Central Region
- Parties: RAM Aircraft LP, McCauley Propeller Systems, Quest Aviation, FAA -- Rapid City Flight Standards, Cessna Aircraft Company, Continental Motors Inc.
- NTSB case key (mKey): 82487
- NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=CEN12FA100
- NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/82487/pdf
- NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=82487
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/CEN12FA100

## Probable cause

The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate airspeed after shutting down one engine, which resulted in an inadvertent aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to follow the guidance contained in the pilot’s operating handbook, which advised feathering the propeller of the secured engine and retracting the flaps and landing gear.

## Findings

NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause.

- [Performance/control parameters: airspeed](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062010): Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability · Not attained/maintained (probable cause); cases with it: [Cessna 421C, 4 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062010/cases.md?model=2076016), [All aircraft, 1,681 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062010/cases.md)
- [Use of equip/info: aircraft control](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Cessna 421C, 10 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040/cases.md?model=2076016), [All aircraft, 9,295 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040/cases.md)
- [Info processing/decision: decision making/judgment](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041520): Personnel issues › Action/decision · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Cessna 421C, 6 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041520/cases.md?model=2076016), [All aircraft, 3,098 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041520/cases.md)
- [Use of equip/info: use of checklist](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063030): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Cessna 421C, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063030/cases.md?model=2076016), [All aircraft, 336 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063030/cases.md)

## Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened.

- [Takeoff: Fire/smoke (non-impact)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/150); cases with it: [Cessna 421C, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/150/sequence.md?model=2076016), [All aircraft, 504 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/150/sequence.md)
- [Takeoff: Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/340); cases with it: [Cessna 421C, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/340/sequence.md?model=2076016), [All aircraft, 820 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/340/sequence.md)
- [Maneuvering: Aerodynamic stall/spin](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/241) (defining event); cases with it: [Cessna 421C, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/241/sequence.md?model=2076016), [All aircraft, 1,529 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/241/sequence.md)
- [Maneuvering: Loss of control in flight](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240); cases with it: [Cessna 421C, 15 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md?model=2076016), [All aircraft, 5,002 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md)
- [Uncontrolled descent: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Cessna 421C, 15 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=2076016), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md)

## Analysis

Shortly after the airplane lifted off, the tower controller informed the pilot that a plume of smoke was visible behind the airplane. No communications were received from the pilot after he acknowledged the takeoff clearance. Witnesses reported that white smoke appeared to be trailing from the area of the left engine during takeoff. The witnesses subsequently observed flames at the inboard side of the left engine. The airplane began a left turn. As the airplane continued the turn, the flames and trail of white smoke were no longer visible. When the airplane reached a southerly heading, the nose dropped abruptly, and the airplane descended to the ground. Witnesses stated that they heard an increase in engine sound before impact. A postimpact fire ensued. The accident site was located about 3/4 mile from the airport. A postaccident examination determined that the left engine fuel selector and fuel valve were in the OFF position, consistent with the pilot shutting down that engine after takeoff. However, the left engine propeller was not feathered. Extensive damage to the right engine propeller assembly was consistent with that engine producing power at the time of impact. The landing gear and wing flaps were extended at the time of impact. Teardown examinations of both engines did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a loss of engine power. The left engine oil cap was observed to be unsecured at the accident site; however, postaccident comparison of the left and right engine oil caps revealed disproportionate distortion of the left oil cap, likely due to the postimpact fire. As a result, no determination was made regarding the security of left engine oil cap before the accident. Emergency procedures outlined in the pilot’s operating handbook (POH) noted that when securing an engine, the propeller should be feathered. Performance data provided in the POH for single-engine operations were predicated on the propeller of the inoperative engine being feathered, and the wing flaps and landing gear retracted. Thus, the pilot did not follow the emergency procedures outlined in the POH for single-engine operation.

## Factual narrative

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On December 9, 2011, at 1424 central standard time, a Cessna 421C, N421SY, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain after takeoff from the Joe Foss Field Airport (FSD), Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. The aircraft was registered to S & S Aviation LLC and operated by Quest Aviation, Inc. under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an on-demand air taxi flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight was originating at the time of the accident. The intended destination was the Rapid City Regional Airport (RAP), Rapid City, South Dakota. At 1422:07 (hhmm:ss), the FSD Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) controller issued a takeoff clearance to the accident flight. At 1423:32, the controller informed the pilot that a “plume” was visible behind the airplane; although, he could not determine the source. The controller subsequently advised the pilot that the “plume” was no longer visible. At 1423:59, the controller cleared the flight to land. No communications were received from the pilot after he acknowledged the takeoff clearance. Witnesses reported that the airplane appeared to be trailing white smoke from the area of the left engine during takeoff from runway 33. They subsequently observed flames at the inboard side of the left engine. The airplane began a left turn and as the turn continued, the flames and trail of white smoke were no longer visible. When the airplane reached a south heading, the nose dropped abruptly and it impacted the ground from an altitude of 800 to 1,000 feet above ground level. They stated that they heard an increase in engine sound prior to impact. A postimpact fire ensued. Radar track data associated with the discrete transponder code assigned to the accident flight was plotted by the National Transportation Safety Board. The initial radar data point was recorded at 1423:11, and positioned approximately 2,100 feet from the approach end of runway 33. According to the track data, the airplane drifted to the left of the runway centerline as it climbed out. About 1423:38, the airplane began a left turn from a position about 0.21 nautical miles (nm) northwest of the departure end of runway 33 at 2,000 feet msl. The left turn continued until the final radar data point, which was recorded at 1424:07. The final data point was positioned about 0.41 nm west of the departure end of runway 33. The associated altitude was 1,900 feet msl. This was about 0.13 nm (790 feet) west of the accident site. The diameter of the turn was approximately 0.31 nm. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate, with single and multi-engine land airplane, and instrument airplane ratings. He also held a flight instructor certificate with single and multi-engine airplane, and instrument airplane ratings. He was issued a first class airman medicalcertificate on August 15, 2011, with a restriction for corrective lenses. The pilot's most recent regulatory checkride was completed on November 10, 2011. A review of the pilot's logbook revealed a total logged flight time of 3,848.8 hours. This included 1,320.8 hours in multi-engine airplanes and 357.4 hours in Cessna 421 airplanes. He had logged 107.7 hours within the preceding 90 days, with 55.6 hours in Cessna 421 airplane in that time period. This included flights in the accident airplane totaling 4.4 hours, dated December 8th, the day prior to the accident. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The accident airplane was a Cessna 421C, serial number 421C0051. It was a twin-engine, low wing airframe configuration, with a retractable tricycle landing gear. The airplane was accessed by a single entry door at the left, rear area of the cabin. The cabin was configured for a maximum of 9 occupants. According to maintenance records, an annual inspection was completed on December 5, 2011, at 4,882.1 hours total airframe time. The airplane was powered by two 375-horsepower Continental Motors GTSIO-520-L turbocharged, reciprocating engines. The left engine, serial number 239805-R, was overhauled and installed on the airframe in April 2004. At the time of the inspection, it had accumulated 1,499.9 hours since overhaul. The right engine, serial number 272006-R, was overhauled and installed on the airframe in October 2011. At the time of the annual inspection, it had accumulated 24.7 hours since overhaul. The maintenance records did not reveal any evidence of unresolved airworthiness issues. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION Weather conditions recorded by the FSD Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS), recorded at 1356, were: wind from 300 degrees at 11 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature -07 degrees Celsius, dew point -21 degrees Celsius, and altimeter 30.36 inches of mercury. At 1456, the FSD recorded weather conditions were: wind from 290 degrees at 10 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature -07 degrees Celsius, dew point -21 degrees Celsius, and altimeter 30.36 inches of mercury. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The airplane impacted an open field about 3/4 mile northwest of the airport. It came to rest upright, with the aft fuselage separated immediately forward of the vertical stabilizer. The main fuselage and the separated portion of the aft fuselage were oriented on approximate magnetic headings of 078 degrees and 151 degrees, respectively. A scorched area about 230 feet long by 40 feet wide emanated from the fuselage oriented approximately 120 degrees. All major airframe components were located at the accident site. The cockpit, cabin, wings, and aft fuselage were discolored consistent with the effects of a postimpact fire. The fire had consumed the top and portions of the sides of the fuselage; the cockpit and cabin areas were exposed. The airplane also exhibited damage consistent with impact forces. The wings were in position relativeto the fuselage, with both engines remaining attached to their respective engine mounts and in position relative to each wing. The horizontal and vertical stabilizers remained attached to the separated portion of the aft fuselage. The elevators and rudder remained attached to their respective stabilizers. No anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure of the elevator or rudder control systems were observed. The left wing structure outboard of the engine pylon/nacelle exhibited fire damage, with limited portions being consumed. The left aileron and flap remained partially attached to the wing. The entire right wing structure exhibited fire damage, with extensive portions being consumed. Portions of the right aileron and flap were observed in position adjacent to the wing. No anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure of the aileron control system were observed. The flap drive chain was positioned consistent with a 40-degree flap deflection. Both main landing gear assemblies had collapsed aft, consistent with the landing gear in the extended position at the time of impact. Examination of the left engine assembly did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure. The cylinders remained attached to the crankcase. The crankcase exhibited transverse cracks across both the left and right halves at the upper, forward portion of the case, consistent with impact forces. The pistons, crankshaft, and connecting rods appeared intact. The left engine fuel valve was positioned consistent with the valve being in the OFF position. The oil cap was not secured to the filler neck when first observed at the accident site. The filler neck was deformed at the base and the cap was retained to the filler neck by the chain. A comparison of the left and right engine oil caps noted distortion of the left oil cap. (Detail photos of the engine oil caps are included with the docket material associated with this accident case.) Examination of the right engine assembly did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure. The cylinders remained attached to the crankcase. The crankcase was fractured at the lower, forward portion of the case, consistent with impact forces. The pistons, crankshaft, and connecting rods appeared intact. The right engine fuel valve was not observed consistent with it being consumed by the postimpact fire. The oil cap was secured to the filler neck when first observed at the accident site. The filler neck was deformed at the base and the cap was retained by the chain. The left propeller assembly remained attached to the engine. The hub was fractured and one blade had separated from the hub. The blade was located under the engine. The remaining two blades were retained by the hub. They appeared undeformed and exhibited light chordwise scratches. The blades appeared to be in a low pitch position. Witness marks on the hub due to the blade counterweights were positioned consistent with low pitch at the time of impact. Theright propeller hub was fractured and all three blades were separated from the hub. Fragments of the hub were located in the debris path. One propeller blade was embedded into the ground adjacent to the right horizontal stabilizer. The second blade came to rest within the scorched area about 140 feet from the right engine. The third blade came to rest on a dirt embankment about 300 feet from the right engine. The blades exhibited bending, twisting, and chordwise scratching. The cockpit fuel selector for the left engine was observed in the OFF position at the time of the on-scene examination. The right engine fuel selector was in the ON position. The emergency fuel shutoff lever located between cockpit fuel selectors was in the OFF (disengaged) position. The engine tachometer was identified among the cockpit and instrument panel debris. The unit was discolored due to the postimpact fire. The glass face was not present in the unit. The indicating needles (left and right engine) remained attached to the center post and appeared intact. The needle denoted with "L" was positioned to indicate approximately 1,000 rpm. The needle denoted with "R" was positioned to indicate approximately 2,250 rpm. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION An autopsy of the pilot was completed by the Minnehaha County Coroner on December 10, 2011, in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The pilot’s death was attributed to blunt force injuries sustained as a result of the accident. The report also noted the presence of postmortem thermal injuries. However, the report stated that no soot was observed in the pilot’s airway. FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute toxicology testing was negative for all substances in the screening profile. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The pilot’s operating handbook (POH) contained data related to climb performance with one engine inoperative. Based on the weather conditions present on the day of the accident, the single engine climb performance would have been expected to be about 480 feet per minute. That performance data was predicated on having the wing flaps and landing gear retracted, and the propeller of the inoperative engine feathered. The Engine Securing Procedure contained in the Emergency Procedures section of the POH noted that the throttle be closed, the propeller feathered, the mixture set to idle-cutoff, and the fuel selector set to off.

## Aircraft

- Registration: [N421SY](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N421SY-2014-04-18), registration cancelled 2014-04-18, S/N 421C0051, built 1975 (OpenAirDocs)
- Reported make and model: CESSNA 421C
- Registry model: [Cessna 421C](https://openairdocs.org/model/cessna-421c) (registry code 2076016) (OpenAirDocs)
- Category: Airplane
- Serial number: 421C0051
- Airframe hours: 4882
- Engines: Continental GTSIO-520-L 375 horsepower reciprocating; reciprocating
- Damage: Substantial damage
- Fire: On-Ground
- Flight: Part 135
- Operator: Quest Aviation Inc.
- Registered owner: S & S Aviation LLC
- Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal
- Last inspection: Annual, December 5, 2011
- Departed: FSD, Sioux Falls, SD
- Destination: RAP, Rapid City, SD
- Flight plan: IFR
- Airport: FSD, Joe Foss Field, runway 33, 8,000 × 150 ft, concrete

## Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

- Pilot; age 54; injuries: fatal; airline transport, flight instructor; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, with waivers/limitations; last flight review November 10, 2011; seat: left; toxicology performed; flight hours: 3,848 total, 357 in this make and model, 3,712 as pilot in command, 107 in the last 90 days, 31 in the last 30 days, 4 in the last 24 hours

## Weather

- Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day
- Wind: 300° at 11 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Lowest ceiling: none
- Temperature: 19 °F, dew point -6 °F
- Altimeter: 30.36 inHg
- Observed at: FSD, 1 nm away

## FAA reports on this event (1)

The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs).

- [Accident 20111209029109A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20111209029109A), Dec 9, 2011: Cessna 421C, Sioux Falls, SD, Destroyed, 4 fatal. On December 9th, 2011 at 1422 CST, a Cessna 421C aircraft N421SY operated by quest aviation and piloted by [privacy data omitted], took off from Joe Foss Field…

## Docket (43 files)

The files NTSB released with the investigation on February 25, 2013, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=82487. 54.5 MB in all.

- Witness Statements (item 1, .PDF, 486 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40386014&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Witness%20Statements-Redacted.PDF
- Air Traffic Controller Statements (item 2, .PDF, 261 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382202&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Air%20Traffic%20Controller%20Statements-Redacted.PDF
- Transcripts of Air Traffic Control Communications (item 3, .PDF, 290 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382210&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Transcripts%20of%20Air%20Traffic%20Control%20Communications-Redacted.PDF
- Plot of Radar Track Data (item 4, .PDF, 477 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382209&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Plot%20of%20Radar%20Track%20Data-Master.PDF
- Itinerary and Flight Plan (item 5, .PDF, 84 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382214&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Itinerary%20and%20Flight%20Plan-Redacted.PDF
- Summary of On-Scene Examination (item 6, .PDF, 41 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382208&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Summary%20of%20On-Scene%20Examination-Master.PDF
- Examination Report -- Left Engine (item 7, .PDF, 4.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382288&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Examination%20Report%20--%20Left%20Engine-Redacted.PDF
- Examination Report -- Right Engine (item 8, .PDF, 4.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382287&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Examination%20Report%20--%20Right%20Engine-Redacted.PDF
- Detail Photos of Engine Oil Caps (with 10 embedded photos) (item 9, .PDF, 225 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40386017&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Detail%20Photos%20of%20Engine%20Oil%20Caps%20(with%2010%20embedded%20photos)-Master.PDF
- Airport Diagram -- Joe Foss Field (item 10, .PDF, 140 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382211&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airport%20Diagram%20--%20Joe%20Foss%20Field-Master.PDF
- Pilot's Logbook -- Excerpts (item 11, .PDF, 16.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382215&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%27s%20Logbook%20--%20Excerpts-Redacted.PDF
- Calculation of Pilot's Flight Experience (item 12, .PDF, 52 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382216&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Calculation%20of%20Pilot%27s%20Flight%20Experience-Master.PDF
- Airframe Maintenance Logbook (item 13, .PDF, 7.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40385968&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airframe%20Maintenance%20Logbook-Redacted.PDF
- Left Engine Maintenance Logbook (item 14, .PDF, 2.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382226&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Left%20Engine%20Maintenance%20Logbook-Redacted.PDF
- Right Engine Maintenance Logbook (item 15, .PDF, 1.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382227&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Right%20Engine%20Maintenance%20Logbook-Redacted.PDF
- Left Propeller Maintenance Logbook (item 16, .PDF, 226 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382228&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Left%20Propeller%20Maintenance%20Logbook-Redacted.PDF
- Right Propeller Maintenance Logbook (item 17, .PDF, 223 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40386013&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Right%20Propeller%20Maintenance%20Logbook-Redacted.PDF
- Airworthiness Directive Listing (item 18, .PDF, 623 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382230&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20Directive%20Listing-Redacted.PDF
- Weight & Balance Data (item 19, .PDF, 143 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40386056&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Weight%20%26%20Balance%20Data-Master.PDF
- Pilot's Operating Handbook -- Excerpts (item 20, .PDF, 3.4 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40386091&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%27s%20Operating%20Handbook%20--%20Excerpts-Master.PDF
- Toxicological Report (item 21, .PDF, 81 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382204&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Toxicological%20Report-Redacted.PDF
- Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation (item 22, .PDF, 428 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382213&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Statement%20of%20Party%20Representatives%20to%20NTSB%20Investigation-Redacted.PDF
- Photo 1 -- Accident Site (item 23, .PDF, 359 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382264&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%201%20--%20Accident%20Site-Master.PDF
- Photo 2 -- Accident Site (item 24, .PDF, 382 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382265&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%202%20--%20Accident%20Site-Master.PDF
- Photo 3 -- Accident Site (item 25, .PDF, 429 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382266&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%203%20--%20Accident%20Site-Master.PDF
- Photo 4 -- Main Wreckage (item 26, .PDF, 428 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382267&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%204%20--%20Main%20Wreckage-Master.PDF
- Photo 5 -- Main Wreckage (item 27, .PDF, 384 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382268&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%205%20--%20Main%20Wreckage-Master.PDF
- Photo 6 -- Main Wreckage (item 28, .PDF, 454 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382269&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%206%20--%20Main%20Wreckage-Master.PDF
- Photo 7 -- Fuselage (item 29, .PDF, 563 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382270&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%207%20--%20Fuselage-Master.PDF
- Photo 8 -- Right Wing (item 30, .PDF, 684 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382271&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%208%20--%20Right%20Wing-Master.PDF
- Photo 9 -- Left Wing (item 31, .PDF, 570 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382272&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%209%20--%20Left%20Wing-Master.PDF
- Photo 10 -- Empennage (item 32, .PDF, 363 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382273&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2010%20--%20Empennage-Master.PDF
- Photo 11 -- Left Engine (item 33, .PDF, 556 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382274&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2011%20--%20Left%20Engine-Master.PDF
- Photo 12 -- Left Engine (item 34, .PDF, 563 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382275&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2012%20--%20Left%20Engine-Master.PDF
- Photo 13 -- Left Engine Oil Cap (item 35, .PDF, 364 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382276&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2013%20--%20Left%20Engine%20Oil%20Cap-Master.PDF
- Photo 14 -- Left Propeller, Separated Blade (item 36, .PDF, 745 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382277&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2014%20--%20Left%20Propeller,%20Separated%20Blade-Master.PDF
- Photo 15 -- Right Engine (item 37, .PDF, 674 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382278&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2015%20--%20Right%20Engine-Master.PDF
- Photo 16 -- Right Engine (item 38, .PDF, 598 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382279&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2016%20--%20Right%20Engine-Master.PDF
- Photo 17 -- Left Propeller, Blade 1 (item 39, .PDF, 694 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382280&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2017%20--%20Left%20Propeller,%20Blade%201-Master.PDF
- Photo 18 -- Left Propeller, Blade 2 (item 40, .PDF, 816 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382281&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2018%20--%20Left%20Propeller,%20Blade%202-Master.PDF
- Photo 19 -- Left Propeller, Blade 3 (item 41, .PDF, 399 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382282&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2019%20--%20Left%20Propeller,%20Blade%203-Master.PDF
- Photo 20 -- Cockpit Area (item 42, .PDF, 514 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382283&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2020%20--%20Cockpit%20Area-Master.PDF
- Photo 21 -- Tachometer (item 43, .PDF, 327 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40382284&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2021%20--%20Tachometer-Master.PDF

From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

---
OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.