# NTSB CEN17FA072: Cessna 525, N614SB, Cleveland, OH, December 30, 2016

- Type: NTSB accident investigation
- Classification: Accident · Fatal · Field investigation · Final report
- Date: December 29, 2016, 22:57 local (Dec 30, 2016, 03:57 UTC)
- Place: Cleveland, OH
- Coordinates: 41.554721, -81.70333
- Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=41.5547&lon=-81.7033&mi=10
- Phase of flight: [Initial climb](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/350) (OpenAirDocs' grouping)
- Defining event: [Initial climb: Loss of control in flight](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240)
- Highest injury: Fatal
- Injuries: 6 fatal
- Status: Completed, report July 16, 2018
- Report: Approved by Office Director
- NTSB office: Central Region
- Parties: FAA Flight Standards, Williams International, Rockwell Collins, Textron Aviation
- NTSB case key (mKey): 94545
- NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=CEN17FA072
- NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/94545/pdf
- NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=94545
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/CEN17FA072

## Probable cause

Controlled flight into terrain due to pilot spatial disorientation. Contributing to the accident was pilot fatigue, mode confusion related to the status of the autopilot, and negative learning transfer due to flight guidance panel and attitude indicator differences from the pilot's previous flight experience.

## Findings

NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause.

- [Perception/orientation/illusion: spatial disorientation](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02022025): Personnel issues › Psychological · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Cessna 525C, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02022025/cases.md?model=2076618), [All aircraft, 358 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02022025/cases.md)
- [Alertness/Fatigue](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02013500): Personnel issues › Physical · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Cessna 525C, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02013500/cases.md?model=2076618), [All aircraft, 48 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02013500/cases.md)
- [Attention/monitoring: monitoring equip/instruments](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02021525): Personnel issues › Psychological · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Cessna 525C, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02021525/cases.md?model=2076618), [All aircraft, 142 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02021525/cases.md)
- [Experience/qualifications: total experience w/ equipment](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02031025): Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Cessna 525C, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02031025/cases.md?model=2076618), [All aircraft, 269 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02031025/cases.md)

## Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened.

- [Initial climb: Altitude deviation](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/282); cases with it: [Cessna 525C, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/282/sequence.md?model=2076618), [All aircraft, 104 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/282/sequence.md)
- [Initial climb: Course deviation](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/281); cases with it: [Cessna 525C, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/281/sequence.md?model=2076618), [All aircraft, 52 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/281/sequence.md)
- [Initial climb: Other weather encounter](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/400); cases with it: [Cessna 525C, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/400/sequence.md?model=2076618), [All aircraft, 1,127 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/400/sequence.md)
- [Initial climb: Collision avoidance alert](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/420); cases with it: [Cessna 525C, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/420/sequence.md?model=2076618), [All aircraft, 11 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/420/sequence.md)
- [Initial climb: Loss of control in flight](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240) (defining event); cases with it: [Cessna 525C, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md?model=2076618), [All aircraft, 5,002 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md)
- [Uncontrolled descent: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Cessna 525C, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=2076618), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md)

## Analysis

The airplane entered a right turn shortly after takeoff and proceeded out over a large lake. Dark night visual conditions prevailed at the airport; however, the airplane entered instrument conditions shortly after takeoff. The airplane climb rate exceeded 6,000 fpm during the initial climb and it subsequently continued through the assigned altitude of 2,000 ft mean sea level. The flight director provided alerts before the airplane reached the assigned altitude and again after it had passed through it. The bank angle increased to about 62 degrees and the pitch attitude decreased to about 15 degrees nose down, as the airplane continued through the assigned heading. The bank angle ultimately decreased to about 25 degrees. During the subsequent descent, the airspeed and descent rate reached about 300 knots and 6,000 fpm, respectively. The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) provided both "bank angle" and "sink rate" alerts to the pilot, followed by seven "pull up" warnings. A postaccident examination of the recovered wreckage did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. It is likely that the pilot attempted to engage the autopilot after takeoff as he had been trained. However, based on the flight profile, the autopilot was not engaged. This implied that the pilot failed to confirm autopilot engagement via an indication on the primary flight display (PFD). The PFD annunciation was the only indication of autopilot engagement. Inadequate flight instrument scanning during this time of elevated workload resulted in the pilot allowing the airplane to climb through the assigned altitude, to develop an overly steep bank angle, to continue through the assigned heading, and to ultimately enter a rapid descent without effective corrective action. A belief that the autopilot was engaged may have contributed to his lack of attention. It is also possible that differences between the avionics panel layout on the accident airplane and the airplane he previously flew resulted in mode confusion and contributed to his failure to engage the autopilot. The lack of proximal feedback on the flight guidance panel might have contributed to his failure to notice that the autopilot was not engaged. The pilot likely experienced some level of spatial disorientation due to the dark night lighting conditions, the lack of visual references over the lake, and the encounter with instrument meteorological conditions. It is possible that once the pilot became disoriented, the negative learning transfer due to the differences between the attitude indicator display on the accident airplane and the airplane previously flown by the pilot may have hindered his ability to properly apply corrective control inputs. Available information indicated that the pilot had been awake for nearly 17 hours at the time of the accident. As a result, the pilot was likely fatigued which hindered his ability to manage the high workload environment, maintain aneffective instrument scan, provide prompt and accurate control inputs, and to respond to multiple bank angle and descent rate warnings.

## Factual narrative

Flight Guidance Panel The flight guidance panel (FGP), located on the glareshield, allows the pilot to select manual or autopilot guidance for airplane control. The autopilot button is located on the upper row of button controls near the right side of the panel. Autopilot engagement is indicated in the flight control system display area along the upper portion of the primary flight display (PFD). There is no indication of the autopilot status on or near the autopilot button on the flight guidance panel. A comparison of the Cessna 525 systems and those of the airplane previously flown by the pilot, a Cessna 510, revealed that the autopilot engagement button on the Cessna 510 is located in a slightly different location on the Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) panel. In the Cessna 510, autopilot engagement is indicated along the upper portion of the PFD similar to the accident airplane. In addition, an indicator light adjacent to the autopilot button on the AFCS panel is illuminated when the autopilot is engaged. Primary Flight Display The attitude indicator presented by the PFD on the Cessna 525 was an ego-centric ("inside out") type display. An "inside out" perspective involves a fixed aircraft symbol and moving horizon similar to what a pilot sees when looking outside of the aircraft. On the other hand, the Cessna 510 utilizes an exo-centric ("outside in") display. An "outside in" perspective involves a fixed horizon and a moving aircraft symbol. Spatial Disorientation The FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute's publication, "Introduction to Aviation Physiology," defines spatial disorientation as a loss of proper bearings or a state of mental confusion as to position, location, or movement relative to the position of the earth. Factors contributing to spatial disorientation include changes in acceleration, flight in IMC, frequent transfer between visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and IMC, and unperceived changes in aircraft attitude. The FAA's Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3A) describes some hazards associated with flying when the ground or horizon are obscured. The handbook states, in part: "The vestibular sense (motion sensing by the inner ear) in particular tends to confuse the pilot. Because of inertia, the sensory areas of the inner ear cannot detect slight changes in the attitude of the airplane, nor can they accurately sense attitude changes that occur at a uniform rate over a period of time. On the other hand, false sensations are often generated; leading the pilot to believe the attitude of the airplane has changed when in fact, it has not. These false sensations result in the pilot experiencing spatial disorientation." FAA records revealed that the airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate in January 2012 and was subsequently exported to Brazil. The airplane was imported to the United States and purchased by the owner in October 2016. An FAA standard airworthiness certificate was issued at that time. Accordingto the airplane maintenance records, the most recent inspection was completed on October 3, 2016, at 812.7 hours airframe total time. Compliance with all current airworthiness directives and mandatory service bulletins was confirmed at that time. Additional maintenance work was completed on October 14, 2016, at 814.1 hours total airframe time. The most recent maintenance work occurred on December 17, 2016, at 860.7 hours total airframe time. On December 29, 2016, at 2257 eastern standard time, a Cessna 525C (Citation CJ4) airplane, N614SB, was destroyed during an in-flight collision with Lake Erie shortly after takeoff from runway 24R (6,604 feet by 150 feet, asphalt) at the Burke Lakefront Airport (BKL), Cleveland, Ohio. The pilot and five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Maverick Air LLC and operated by the pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The intended destination was the Ohio State University Airport (OSU), Columbus, Ohio. The pilot and passengers departed OSU about 1730 and arrived at BKL about 1800. The pilot checked in at the fixed base operator (FBO) at 1812. The pilot and passengers attended a local sporting event before returning to the airport about 2230. A review of the air traffic control (ATC) communications transcript, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, automated dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) data, and full authority digital engine control (FADEC) unit data revealed the following: At 2255, the pilot was cleared for takeoff. He was instructed to turn right to a heading of 330° and maintain 2,000 feet mean sea level (msl) after departure. The pilot acknowledged the clearance. At 2256:33, the engine power increased for takeoff, and 15 seconds later the airplane became airborne. At 2257:09, an automated voice annunciated "altitude." A second "altitude" annunciation followed 14 seconds later. At 2257:25, a sound similar to a decrease in engine power was recorded. Two seconds later, the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) provided an excessive bank angle warning. At 2257:29, about 2 seconds after the bank angle warning, the tower controller instructed the pilot to contact departure control. The pilot replied, "to departure six one four sierra bravo;" however, that communication was not received by the tower controller suggesting that the pilot did not have the microphone push-to-talk button depressed. At 2257:37, the controller again attempted to contact the pilot. Two seconds after the controller's transmission, the EGPWS provided a "sink rate" warning to the pilot. The pilot again responded, "six one four sierra bravo," but this was not received by the tower controller. Beginning at 2257:43, the EGPWS provided 7 "pull up" warnings at 1.6-second intervals until the end of theCVR recording. During that time, a sound similar to the overspeed warning began, which continued until the end of the recording. The CVR recording ended at 2257:58. The tower controller's continued attempts to contact the pilot were unsuccessful, and he subsequently initiated search and rescue procedures. A summary of the operational factors associated with the accident, including a detailed history of flight, is included in the docket associated with the investigation. An autopsy and toxicology testing were not performed due to the limited remains recovered. The observations from BKL and Cleveland Hopkins International (CLE) indicated that marginal visual conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Precipitation was reported in the one-minute observations at BKL until 2251, with no precipitation reported at the surface until 2342. While the surface temperature remained above freezing after the airplane landed at BKL and about the accident time, the dew point temperature remained below freezing the entire time with precipitation occurring on and off in the snow shower activity. The pilot's Cessna 525 single-pilot type rating was added December 8, 2016, after he successfully completed the prescribed Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) practical test (checkride). His initial Cessna 525 training was completed in the accident airplane. The pilot subsequently completed a simulator-based recurrent training course at FlightSafety International on December 17, 2016. The pilot had accumulated a total of 56.5 hours in Cessna 525 airplanes. Of that time, 8.7 hours were as pilot-in-command which included the practical test. His most recent logged flight was on December 17 from Orlando International (MCO) to OSU. The pilot owned a Cessna 510 (Mustang) for about 2 years before purchasing the accident airplane. He had logged 372.9 hours total time in Cessna 510 airplanes. Interviews with the pilot's instructor confirmed that the pilot was trained to consistently use the autopilot after takeoff. Available information indicated that the pilot had been awake for nearly 17 hours at the time of the accident. The accident site was located in Lake Erie about 2 miles northwest of BKL. The depth of the lake at that location was about 40 feet. Search and recovery efforts were hampered by weather and lake conditions. Airplane debris, including the cockpit voice recorder, was located beginning on January 5. The recovery operations were conducted over the following 2 weeks as lake conditions permitted. A postaccident examination of the recovered wreckage did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction.

## Aircraft

- Registration: [N614SB](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N614SB-2020-02-03), registration cancelled 2020-02-03, S/N 525C0072, built 2012 (OpenAirDocs)
- Reported make and model: CESSNA 525
- Registry model: [Cessna 525C](https://openairdocs.org/model/cessna-525c) (registry code 2076618) (OpenAirDocs)
- Registry engine: [Williams FJ44-4A](https://openairdocs.org/engine/williams-fj44-4a) (registry code 66011, turbo-fan) (OpenAirDocs)
- Category: Airplane
- Serial number: 525C0072
- Year built: 2012
- Airframe hours: 861.5
- Engines: Williams International FJ44-4A 3621 lbs thrust turbo fan; Williams International FJ44-4A 3621 lbs thrust turbo fan
- Damage: Destroyed
- Flight: Personal, Part 91
- Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Commuter
- Last inspection: AAIP, December 17, 2016, 1 hours before
- Departed: BKL, Cleveland, OH
- Destination: OSU, Columbus, OH
- Flight plan: IFR
- Airport: BKL, Burke Lakefront, runway 24R, 6,604 × 150 ft, asphalt
- Equipment: Electronic primary flight display, Stall warning system, ADS-B, Auto-pilot, Electronic multifunction display

## Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

- Pilot; age 45; injuries: fatal; private; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 3, without waivers/limitations; last flight review December 8, 2016; seat: left; restraint: 5-point; flight hours: 1,205 total, 56 in this make and model, 919 as pilot in command, 56 in the last 90 days, 22 in the last 30 days, 0.5 in the last 24 hours

## Weather

- Conditions: Visual (VMC), Night/dark
- Wind: 260° at 22 knots, gusting 31
- Visibility: 9 statute miles
- Lowest ceiling: 2,300 ft broken
- Temperature: 34 °F, dew point 28 °F
- Altimeter: 29.73 inHg
- Observed at: BKL, 2 nm away

## FAA reports on this event (1)

The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs).

- [Accident 20161229022289A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20161229022289A), Dec 29, 2016: Cessna 525C, Cleveland, OH, Destroyed, 6 fatal. On December 29, 2016, at 2257 eastern standard time, a Cessna model 525C (citation CJ4) airplane, N614SB, was destroyed after impacting lake erie shortly after…

## Docket (35 files)

The files NTSB released with the investigation on June 21, 2018, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=94545. 118 MB in all.

- Plot of ADS-B Position Data (item 1, .PDF, 1 photo, 486 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464314&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Plot%20of%20ADS-B%20Position%20Data-Master.PDF
- ADS-B Data (item 2, .CSV, 208 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464315&FileExtension=.csv&FileName=ADS-B%20Data-Master.csv
- Transcript of Air Traffic Control Communications (item 3, .PDF, 2.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464316&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Transcript%20of%20Air%20Traffic%20Control%20Communications-Master.PDF
- Cockpit Voice Recorder - Group Chairman's Factual Report (item 4, .PDF, 411 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464317&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Cockpit%20Voice%20Recorder%20-%20Group%20Chairman%27s%20Factual%20Report-Master.PDF
- Summary of Operational Factors (item 5, .PDF, 266 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464318&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Summary%20of%20Operational%20Factors-Master.PDF
- Customer Service Personnel Statements - FBO (item 6, .PDF, 99 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464319&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Customer%20Service%20Personnel%20Statements%20-%20FBO-Master.PDF
- Conversation Summary - Pilot's Colleague (item 7, .PDF, 118 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464320&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Conversation%20Summary%20-%20Pilot%27s%20Colleague-Master.PDF
- Conversation Summary - OSU Airport Manager (item 8, .PDF, 113 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464321&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Conversation%20Summary%20-%20OSU%20Airport%20Manager-Master.PDF
- Accident Report Photos (item 9, .PDF, 11 photos, 4.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464322&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Accident%20Report%20Photos-Master.PDF
- Summary of Pilot's Flight Experience (item 10, .PDF, 66 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464323&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Summary%20of%20Pilot%27s%20Flight%20Experience-Master.PDF
- Pilot Logbooks - Excerpt (item 11, .PDF, 13.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464324&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%20Logbooks%20-%20Excerpt-Master.PDF
- Pilot Training Records (item 12, .PDF, 883 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464325&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%20Training%20Records-Master.PDF
- Conversation Summary - Flight Instructor (item 13, .PDF, 154 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464326&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Conversation%20Summary%20-%20Flight%20Instructor-Master.PDF
- Conversation Summary - Designated Pilot Examiner (item 14, .PDF, 96 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464327&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Conversation%20Summary%20-%20Designated%20Pilot%20Examiner-Master.PDF
- Statements from Pilots Regarding KBKL (item 15, .PDF, 118 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464328&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Statements%20from%20Pilots%20Regarding%20KBKL-Master.PDF
- Excerpts from Textron Aviation Aircraft Operating Manuals (item 16, .PDF, 294 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464329&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Excerpts%20from%20Textron%20Aviation%20Aircraft%20Operating%20Manuals-Master.PDF
- Summary of Airplane Examination (item 17, .PDF, 125 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464330&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Summary%20of%20Airplane%20Examination-Master.PDF
- Maintenance Records - Airframe (item 18, .PDF, 24.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464331&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Maintenance%20Records%20-%20Airframe-Master.PDF
- Maintenance Records - Left Engine (item 19, .PDF, 17.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464332&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Maintenance%20Records%20-%20Left%20Engine-Master.PDF
- Maintenance Records - Right Engine (item 20, .PDF, 19.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464333&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Maintenance%20Records%20-%20Right%20Engine-Master.PDF
- Maintenance Records - Weight and Balance (item 21, .PDF, 218 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464334&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Maintenance%20Records%20-%20Weight%20and%20Balance-Master.PDF
- Maintenance Status Report (item 22, .PDF, 222 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464335&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Maintenance%20Status%20Report-Master.PDF
- FADEC Download Report (item 23, .PDF, 97 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464336&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=FADEC%20Download%20Report-Master.PDF
- E-mail Correspondence - Williams International (item 24, .PDF, 214 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464337&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=E-mail%20Correspondence%20-%20Williams%20International-Master.PDF
- Aircraft Performance (item 25, .PDF, 3.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464338&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Aircraft%20Performance-Master.PDF
- Weather Study Report (item 26, .PDF, 3.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464339&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Weather%20Study%20Report-Master.PDF
- Weather Attachment 1 (item 27, .GIF, 986 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464340&FileExtension=.gif&FileName=Weather%20Attachment%201-Master.gif
- Weather Attachment 2 (item 28, .GIF, 8.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464341&FileExtension=.gif&FileName=Weather%20Attachment%202-Master.gif
- Weather Attachment 3 (item 29, .PDF, 177 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464342&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Weather%20Attachment%203-Master.PDF
- Weather Attachment 4 (item 30, .PDF, 1.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464343&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Weather%20Attachment%204-Master.PDF
- Weather Attachment 5 (item 31, .PDF, 23 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464344&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Weather%20Attachment%205-Master.PDF
- Weather Attachment 6 (item 32, GZ, 10.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464345&FileExtension=gz&FileName=Weather%20Attachment%206-Master
- Weather Attachment 7 (item 33, .PDF, 1.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464346&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Weather%20Attachment%207-Master.PDF
- Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 (item 34, .PDF, 135 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464347&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Release%20of%20Aircraft%20Wreckage,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.15-Master.PDF
- Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation (item 35, .PDF, 708 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40464348&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Statement%20of%20Party%20Representatives%20to%20NTSB%20Investigation-Master.PDF

From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

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