# NTSB CEN21LA102: Hughes 369D, N103SU, Tuckers Crossing, MS, December 29, 2020

- Type: NTSB accident investigation
- Classification: Accident · Fatal · Class 3 · Limited · Final report
- Date: December 29, 2020, 08:35 local (14:35 UTC)
- Place: Tuckers Crossing, MS
- Coordinates: 31.611861, -89.086611
- Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=31.6119&lon=-89.0866&mi=10
- Phase of flight: [Maneuvering](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/450) (OpenAirDocs' grouping)
- Defining event: [Maneuvering-low-alt flying: Off-field or emergency landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/440)
- Highest injury: Fatal
- Injuries: 1 fatal
- Status: Completed
- Report: Approved by Office Director
- Investigation class: Class 3
- NTSB office: Central Region
- Parties: FAA, MD Helicopters, Signature Utility Services, Rolls Royce
- NTSB case key (mKey): 102472
- NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=CEN21LA102
- NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/102472/pdf
- NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=102472
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/CEN21LA102

## Probable cause

The pilot’s loss of helicopter control when the external saw contacted trees during an attempted emergency landing due to a main rotor transmission oil pressure warning. The reason that the pilot did not release the external saw from the helicopter during the attempted emergency landing could not be determined based on the available evidence.

## Findings

NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause.

- [Main rotor system: main rotor indicating system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01046240): Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor · Related operating info (probable cause); cases with it: [Hughes Helicopters HUGHES 369D, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01046240/cases.md?model=4470706), [All aircraft, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01046240/cases.md)
- [Use of equip/info: use of equip/system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063015): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Hughes Helicopters HUGHES 369D, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063015/cases.md?model=4470706), [All aircraft, 1,391 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063015/cases.md)
- [Not determined](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/05000000): Not determined › Not determined · Unknown/Not determined (probable cause); cases with it: [Hughes Helicopters HUGHES 369D, 8 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/05000000/cases.md?model=4470706), [All aircraft, 2,247 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/05000000/cases.md)
- [Performance/control parameters: descent rate](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062037): Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability · Attain/maintain not possible (probable cause); cases with it: [Hughes Helicopters HUGHES 369D, 5 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062037/cases.md?model=4470706), [All aircraft, 242 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062037/cases.md)
- [Action: lack of action](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041030): Personnel issues › Action/decision · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Hughes Helicopters HUGHES 369D, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041030/cases.md?model=4470706), [All aircraft, 792 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041030/cases.md)
- [Use of equip/info: aircraft control](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Hughes Helicopters HUGHES 369D, 11 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040/cases.md?model=4470706), [All aircraft, 9,295 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040/cases.md)

## Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened.

- [Maneuvering-low-alt flying: Off-field or emergency landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/440) (defining event); cases with it: [Hughes Helicopters HUGHES 369D, 9 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/440/sequence.md?model=4470706), [All aircraft, 3,365 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/440/sequence.md)
- [Emergency descent: External load event (Rotorcraft)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/480); cases with it: [Hughes Helicopters HUGHES 369D, 9 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/480/sequence.md?model=4470706), [All aircraft, 51 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/480/sequence.md)
- [Maneuvering: Unknown or undetermined](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/000); cases with it: [Hughes Helicopters HUGHES 369D, 3 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/000/sequence.md?model=4470706), [All aircraft, 1,703 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/000/sequence.md)
- [Emergency descent: Controlled flight into terr/obj (CFIT)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/120); cases with it: [Hughes Helicopters HUGHES 369D, 9 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/120/sequence.md?model=4470706), [All aircraft, 1,074 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/120/sequence.md)

## Analysis

The pilot departed for the first flight of the day to begin aerial tree trimming operations along a transmission line. The mission’s ground support specialist (GSS), who was in communication with the pilot via radio, observed the helicopter approach the trimming zone from the south then fly northbound to the east of the transmission line; the helicopter was equipped with an external saw assembly that was about 120 ft in length and about 40 to 50 ft above the trees. The GSS and the pilot discussed hazards located in the trimming zone. Shortly thereafter, the pilot announced over the radio that he would be making an emergency landing. The GSS reported that he did not see any smoke or hear “odd noises” coming from the helicopter and that “the helicopter made a quick forward descent until the saw disappeared into the east tree line.” The helicopter subsequently impacted trees and terrain, and a postimpact fire ensued. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation, but the examination was limited due to the thermal damage to the helicopter. Annunciator light bulb filament analysis revealed that the main rotor transmission oil pressure light was likely illuminated at the time of the accident, and the emergency procedure is to land as soon as possible. The pilot was likely performing an emergency landing due to the illumination of the transmission oil pressure warning light. The reason that the pilot did not release the external saw from the helicopter during the attempted emergency landing could not be determined based on the available evidence. The reason that the warning light likely illuminated could also not be determined. Operator text communications showed that, about 2 weeks before the accident, another company pilot reported an issue with the accident helicopter, to which a mechanic responded, “trans oil pressure may be the cause.” However, the operator stated that the main rotor transmission oil pressure light could illuminate when ferrying the external saw at higher speeds due to the aerodynamic drag placed on the external saw in forward flight and the nose-low attitude required to pull the saw during flight. The operator also stated that slowing the airspeed or adjusting the helicopter into trim would extinguish the light and allow for normal operation.

## Factual narrative

A review of the airframe maintenance records revealed that, on December 20, 2020, a 100 hour helicopter inspection was completed, which included the removal of the over running clutch and the installation of a serviceable over-running clutch. On December 21, 2020, a 300-hour airframe inspection was also completed with a total airframe time of 12,807.2 hours. The engine records revealed that 150/300/600-hour inspections were completed on December 17, 2020, with a total engine time of 3,332.3 hours, and 3,468 cycles. On December 7, 2020, the fuel control unit was replaced “due to erratic engine operation during start up sequence.” According to company text communications regarding helicopter maintenance and flight operations information, on December 13, 2020, a pilot reported that “had the ‘warning’ tone annunciate 3 [times] in the last flight. Had no secondary indications. Early in the flight so I don’t think it was the low fuel light blinking.” A company mechanic responded, “Trans oil pressure may be the cause on [N103SU], a quick flicker will cause tone.” A company employee replied that another helicopter in the company’s fleet “does it all the time on windy days with the warning audio going off and no secondary indication. If you’re not low on fuel then it’s likely the trans pressure [gauge].” This company employee also stated that he had “caught it faintly illuminating the panel light with a good gust pushing things way out of trim for a second.” The pilot then responded that he “was figuring one or the 2” and that he “tried inducing a trans press light but couldn’t get it to do it.” The pilot further stated that he would “keep an eye on it.” No additional related communications were provided through December 23, 2020, when the text conversation ended. According to the rotorcraft flight manual emergency and malfunction procedures, if the main rotor transmission oil pressure indicator (red warning light) illuminates, the procedure is to land as soon as possible. The main transmission oil pressure warning does not produce an audible tone; audible and visual warnings are only provided for engine-out and low-rotor conditions. A review of the accident helicopter’s instrument panel showed a warning tone switch below the annunciator panel lights in the center of the upper instrument panel (see figure 2.). The maintenance records did not indicate an installed separate warning tone system for the helicopter. Figure 2. Instrument panel with warning tone switch (Source: MD Helicopters). According to the operator, previous flight experience showed that the main rotor transmission oil pressure light can illuminate when ferrying the external saw at higher speeds or turbulent conditions due to the aerodynamic drag placed on the external saw in forward flight and the nose-low attitude required to pull the external saw during flight. The operator also stated that slowing the airspeed or adjusting the helicopter into trim would extinguish the light and allowfor normal operation. The operator added that “the nose-low attitude is not seen during normal flight profiles without the external load’s drag.” On December 29, 2020, about 0835 central standard time, a Hughes 369D helicopter, N103SU, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Tuckers Crossing, Mississippi. The pilot was fatally injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 133 external load flight. According to the operator, the pilot departed for the first flight of the day from a private landing zone to begin aerial tree trimming operations along a transmission line, which was about 2.7 miles from the departure location. The helicopter contained about 400 pounds of fuel and was equipped with an external saw assembly that was about 120 ft in length. The mission’s ground support specialist (GSS), who was in communication with the pilot via radio, stated that the helicopter approached the trimming zone from the south and flew northbound to the east of the transmission line. He estimated that the external saw was about 40 to 50 ft above the trees. The GSS and the pilot discussed hazards located in the trimming zone. Shortly thereafter, the pilot announced over the radio that he would be making an emergency landing. The GSS reported he did not see any smoke or hear any “odd noises” coming from the helicopter and that “the helicopter made a quick forward descent until the saw disappeared into the east tree line.” The helicopter subsequently impacted trees and terrain, and a postimpact fire ensued. The accident site was located in wooded terrain to the east of the transmission line (see figure 1). The external saw assembly was found connected to the helicopter’s trapeze assembly and entangled in the trees. Figure 1. Main wreckage (Source: Federal Aviation Administration). On August 11, 2017, the pilot successfully completed the “MD520N Pilot Transition Training” course provided by MD Helicopters. The operator provided the pilot’s two resumes, which were not dated. On one resume, the pilot reported 785 hours of flight experience with external load/long-line operations; on the other resume, the pilot reported 1,100 hours. The operator hired the pilot in April 2019, and he completed the 14 CFR 133.37 knowledge and skills tests on May 11, 2019. Between June 2019 and March 2020, the pilot completed 126 flights and accumulated 119.4 total flight hours, of which 117.1 hours were for external load operations. The available information for this accident did not show the pilot’s total flight experience with the operator. The main wreckage, which consisted of the fuselage, engine, main transmission, and rotor assembly, was consumed by the postimpact fire. The tail rotor assembly had separated from the tailboom near the tail rotor gearbox and was found adjacent to the main wreckage. Postaccident examination of the helicopter found that the airframe fuselage, cockpit structure, and helicopter instrumentsand avionics exhibited extensive thermal damage. The tailboom had separated from the aft fuselage boom fairing tail cone. Damage consistent with three main rotor blade strikes was observed on the tailboom. The cargo hook system, which consisted of a primary (electrical) and secondary (hydraulic) release system, was intact, and no anomalies were noted with the system. The cargo hook remained attached to the external saw. Due to thermal damage, flight control continuity could not be established to the cyclic, collective, and anti-torque controls. A damaged section of the anti-torque control tube located in the aft tailboom section moved appropriately when the tail rotor blades were manipulated by hand. The overrunning clutch and main transmission driveshaft exhibited extensive thermal damage. The coupling between the overrunning clutch and main transmission driveshaft was partially separated. The main rotor transmission was thermally damaged except for some internal gears. The main rotor driveshaft was observed inside the static mast. The lower end of the main rotor driveshaft remained splined to the output gear of the main transmission and the upper end was bolted to the main rotor hub. Thermal damage was observed on the static mast and visible portions of the main rotor driveshaft. The main rotor system exhibited extensive thermal damage. The main rotor hub, including the main rotor blades and pitch housing, remained attached to the main rotor driveshaft. The five main rotor blades exhibited varying degrees of deformation, which included warping, bending, trailing-edge separation, chordwise scratching, and thermal damage. Four main rotor blade pitch links remained attached and intact; one was bent and fractured about midspan. Three main rotor blade pitch horns were intact; two were fractured. The main rotor hub rotated when the main rotor driveshaft was rotated by hand using the main transmission output gear. The tail rotor driveshaft was fractured into several segments. One segment exhibited damage consistent with a main rotor blade strike. The tail rotor transmission rotated when the tail rotor assembly was rotated by hand; no unusual sounds were heard during rotation. The tail rotor transmission chip detector was removed and found to be free of visible particulate matter. No fuel system components were identified in the wreckage due to the postimpact fire. The engine exhibited extensive thermal damage. The engine was disassembled, and seven airfoils, comprising a single packet of third-stage turbine wheel airfoils between the shroud slots, were fractured in overload near the shroud. No evidence indicated progressive fracture on any of the third-stage turbine blades. The intact portion of the shroud on the third stage turbine wheel exhibited asymmetric rub damage, with the most severe rub damage located about 90° in the direction of engine rotation from the center of the packet of missing airfoils. The first- and second stage turbine airfoilsexhibited tip rub. All other damage was consistent with impact or thermal damage. Examination of the available airframe and engine components revealed no anomalies that would have precluded operation. The cockpit warning and caution indicators, which were located at the top of the instrument panel, were submitted to the National Transportation Safety Board’s Materials Laboratory for examination. The individual annunciators, each of which had four bulbs, were removed and x rayed to determine the status of the bulb filaments. The XMSN (transmission) OIL PRESSURE annunciator exhibited hot filament stretching, consistent with the warning light being illuminated at the time of the impact.

## Aircraft

- Registration: [N103SU](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N103SU-2023-02-04), registration cancelled 2023-02-04, S/N 210895D, built 1981 (OpenAirDocs)
- Reported make and model: HUGHES 369D
- Registry model: [Hughes Helicopters HUGHES 369D](https://openairdocs.org/model/hughes-helicopters-hughes-369d) (registry code 4470706) (OpenAirDocs)
- Registry engine: [Allison 250-C20B](https://openairdocs.org/engine/allison-250-c20b) (registry code 03081, turbo-shaft) (OpenAirDocs)
- Category: Helicopter
- Serial number: 210895D
- Year built: 1981
- Airframe hours: 12801.5
- Engines: ALLISON 250-C20B 420 horsepower turbo shaft
- Damage: Destroyed
- Fire: On-Ground
- Flight: External load, Part 133
- Operator: Signature Property Holdings LLC, doing business as Signature Utility Services
- Registered owner: Signature Property Holdings LLC
- Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal
- Last inspection: 100 hour, December 20, 2020
- Destination: Same as departure
- Equipment: Satellite tracking device, Onboard weather, ADS-B, Electronic flight bag or handheld device, Handheld GPS

## Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

- Pilot; age 40; injuries: fatal; flight instructor, commercial; instrument ratings: helicopter; medical: class 2, without waivers/limitations; last flight review April 3, 2019; seat: left; toxicology performed; flight hours: 5,247 total, 392 in this make and model, 3,485 as pilot in command

## Weather

- Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day
- Wind: 80° at 6 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Lowest ceiling: none
- Temperature: 55 °F, dew point 52 °F
- Altimeter: 30.36 inHg
- Observed at: KLUL, 6 nm away
- METAR: KLUL 291455Z AUTO 08006KT 10SM CLR 13/11 A3036 RMK A02 T01320108

## FAA reports on this event (1)

The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs).

- [Accident 20201229020189A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20201229020189A), Dec 29, 2020: Hughes 369D, Tuckers Crossin, MS, Destroyed, 1 fatal. On December 29, 2020 at about 08:36 CST (1436 UTC), a Hughes (MD helicopters, inc.) model 369D helicopter, FAA registration N103SU, impacted terrain south-east…

## Docket (28 files)

The files NTSB released with the investigation on November 18, 2022, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=102472. 135 MB in all.

- Pilot/operator aircraft accident report, NTSB form 6120.1 (item 1, PDF, 9 pages, 6.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14513586&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=6120_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- NTSB light bulb filament report (item 2, PDF, 6 pages, 3.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14513623&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Email%20report-CEN21LA102%20(Instrument%20Panel)_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Flight track (item 3, PDF, 1 page, 28.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14513633&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Flight%20Track-Rel.pdf
- End of flight track (item 4, PDF, 1 page, 30.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14514341&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=End%20of%20Flight%20Track-Rel.pdf
- ADS-B data (item 5, CSV, 313 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14514488&FileExtension=csv&FileName=N103SU%2012-29-2020%20CVS%20FILE-Rel.csv
- Witness statement goff (item 6, PDF, 1 page, 42 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14516959&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Clay%20Goff%20Statement%2012-29-20_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Witness statement groves (item 7, PDF, 1 page, 39 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14513643&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Josh%20Groves%20Statement%2012-29-20_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Company pre-briefing (item 8, PDF, 2 pages, 2.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14514010&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=N103SU%20PJB%2012-29-20_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Company weight and balance calculation (item 9, PDF, 1 page, 20 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14513653&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=N103SU%20W%26B%20CALC%2012-29-20-Rel.pdf
- Company accident report (item 10, PDF, 2 pages, 78 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14514250&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=SUS%20N103SU%20Crash%20Event%20Report_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Excerpt of pilot records (item 11, PDF, 7 pages, 1.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14516512&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Excerpt%20of%20Pilot%20Records_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Pilot MD helicopter training record (item 12, PDF, 3 pages, 8.4 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14577070&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Excerpt%20of%20Pilot%20MD%20Training%20Records_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Helicopter examination summary (item 13, PDF, 7 pages, 131 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14755257&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Examination%20Summary%20MD-Rel.pdf
- Rolls royce engine summary report (item 14, PDF, 20 pages, 1.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14514536&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Signature%20Utilities%20Engine%20Report-Rel.pdf
- Rolls royce materials report (item 15, PDF, 108 pages, 30.4 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14977748&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=21FAE-055-Rel.pdf
- Excerpts of airframe records (item 16, PDF, 6 pages, 6.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14513769&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=N103SU%20Recent%20Airframe%20MX%20Logs_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Excerpt of engine records (item 17, PDF, 7 pages, 7.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14513779&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=CAE-835942%20Recent%20Engine%20MX%20Logs_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Excerpt of company communications (item 18, PDF, 3 pages, 56 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14514270&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Pages%20from%20N103SU%20Communication%20on%20Whatapp-Rel.pdf
- Record of conversation - pilot friend (item 19, PDF, 1 page, 147 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14514164&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ROC%20D%27Hondt-Rel.pdf
- Flight manual caution and warning indicators (item 20, PDF, 1 page, 83 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14514144&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Flight%20Manual%20Warning%20and%20Caution%20Indicators-Rel.pdf
- Flight manual emergency procedure main transmission malfunction (item 21, PDF, 1 page, 68 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14514546&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=RFM%20-%20EP%20for%20MR%20Transmission%20Oil%20Pressure-Rel.pdf
- Memo - operator information on annunciator light (item 22, PDF, 1 page, 65 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14751683&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Memo%20for%20Operator%20Light-Rel.pdf
- Toxicological report (item 23, PDF, 1 page, 521 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14516664&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Pilot%20Tox_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Statement of party representatives to NTSB investigation MD helicopters (item 24, PDF, 1 page, 256 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14514125&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=CEN21LA102%20NTSB%20Certification%20of%20Party%20Representative%20MDHI_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Statement of party representatives to NTSB investigation rolls royce (item 25, PDF, 1 page, 730 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14518021&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=RR%20Party%20Form_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Statement of party representatives to NTSB investigation signature utility services (item 26, PDF, 1 page, 1.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14514641&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=NTSB%20Cert%20of%20Party%20Rep%20Signature_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Release of aircraft wreckage, NTSB form 6120.15 (item 27, PDF, 1 page, 120 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14517928&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Signed%20wreckage%20release_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Accident photographs (item 28, PDF, 7 pages, 4.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14514174&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Photo%20Array-Rel.pdf

From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

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