# NTSB CEN25LA018: Piper PA-32R-301, N81481, Van, TX, October 17, 2024 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Minor injuries · Class 3 · Limited · Final report - Date: October 17, 2024, 09:46 local (14:46 UTC) - Place: Van, TX - Coordinates: 32.538302, -95.670379 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=32.5383&lon=-95.6704&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Enroute](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/400) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Enroute-cruise: Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/340) - Highest injury: Minor injuries - Injuries: 3 minor - Status: Completed, report October 29, 2025 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 3 - NTSB office: Central Region - Parties: Lycoming, FAA, Piper Aircraft - SAIBs cited in the narratives: [SAIB CE-14-23](https://openairdocs.org/saib/CE-14-23) (OpenAirDocs) - NTSB case key (mKey): 195337 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=CEN25LA018 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/195337/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=195337 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/CEN25LA018 ## Probable cause The mechanic’s improper maintenance of the engine’s air induction scat duct, which collapsed during the flight and resulted in a loss of engine power. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Misc hardware: hoses and tubes](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01071410): Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware · Not serviced/maintained (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-32R-301, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01071410/cases.md?model=7103218), [All aircraft, 40 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01071410/cases.md) - [Misc hardware: hoses and tubes](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01071410): Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware · Incorrect use/operation (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-32R-301, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01071410/cases.md?model=7103218), [All aircraft, 40 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01071410/cases.md) - [Maintenance: repair](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062015): Personnel issues › Task performance · Maintenance personnel (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-32R-301, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062015/cases.md?model=7103218), [All aircraft, 99 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062015/cases.md) - [Maintenance: replacement](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062020): Personnel issues › Task performance · Maintenance personnel (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-32R-301, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062020/cases.md?model=7103218), [All aircraft, 70 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062020/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Enroute-cruise: Loss of engine power (total)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/341); cases with it: [Piper PA-32R-301, 6 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/341/sequence.md?model=7103218), [All aircraft, 3,820 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/341/sequence.md) - [Enroute-cruise: Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/340) (defining event); cases with it: [Piper PA-32R-301, 3 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/340/sequence.md?model=7103218), [All aircraft, 820 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/340/sequence.md) ## Analysis The pilot and two passengers completed an uneventful flight and refueled the airplane. They departed again, and while established in cruise flight, the engine gradually lost power. The pilot’s troubleshooting attempts were unsuccessful in restoring engine power, and the pilot performed a forced landing, which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage. Postaccident examination revealed that the air induction hose (scat duct) to the fuel servo was the incorrect part and was also damaged and degraded. The scat duct had several tears on the outside that were covered with orange sealant. The sealant was torn open in several places but appeared to have been previously covering tears in the scat duct. The scat duct’s internal metal wire was loose and had been rubbing/chafing on the inside of the airbox. The scat duct was able to collapse easily when light pressure was applied to the outside; the internal wiring shifted easily and allowed the scat duct to collapse. The collapsed duct would have restricted airflow to the engine and resulted in a loss of engine power. During an annual inspection about 7 months before the accident, the lower cowl induction air scoop was rebonded to the engine cowling. The failed scat duct would have likely been removed and reinstalled to the airbox during this work, and the mechanic would have been able to assess its condition and recognize that it was not a manufacturer-approved part. The airplane’s maintenance logbooks did not document when the scat duct was originally installed or subsequently repaired. ## Factual narrative On October 17, 2024, at 0947 central daylight time, a Piper PA-32R-301, N81481, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Van, Texas. The pilot and two passengers received minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported to the responding FAA inspector that he had just completed a flight to Terrell Municipal Airport (TRL), Terrell, Texas, where he received 60 gallons of fuel. He departed again and while established in cruise flight the engine began to gradually lose power, so he switched to the left fuel tank and partial power was restored. He then switched back to the right fuel tank, but the engine was unable to regain power. During the descent for an emergency landing, the pilot kept the landing gear and flaps retracted. The airplane collided with a wooden utility pole during landing, resulting in substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage. The FAA inspector examined the airplane and found 30 to 35 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel in each of the fuel tanks. The fuel samples were free of water contamination. The engine remained attached to the firewall and did not exhibit signs of catastrophic failure. Postaccident examination revealed that the air induction filter remained installed and appeared free of blockages. The air induction hose was impact separated from the fuel servo; this orange hose from the airbox to the fuel servo inlet adapter was an orange scat duct with no part numbers or identifying markings. The scat duct had several tears on the outside that were covered with an orange sealant. The sealant was ripped and torn in several places, but appeared to have been previously covering tears in the scat duct. The metal wire on the inside of the scat duct was loose and had been rubbing/chafing on the inside of the airbox. The scat duct was able to collapse easily when light pressure was applied to the outside of the scat duct; the internal wiring shifted easily, allowing the scat duct to collapse. There was no evidence of impact damage to the scat duct or the internal wiring. The orange scat duct was the incorrect part and should have been a double wall flexible air duct, part number 99849-08. The engine was removed from the airframe for a test run, which was completed with no anomalies noted. The airplane’s maintenance logbooks revealed that an annual inspection was completed on March 25, 2024, and another on August 1, 2024. During the March annual inspection, the lower cowl induction air scoop was rebonded to the engine cowling. The logbooks did not document when the scat duct was originally installed or subsequently repaired. On August 6, 2014, the FAA published a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) CE-14-23 for certain Piper models, including the accident airplane model, regarding the air intake inlet hose (scat duct), specifically for structural deterioration and possible collapse of the air inlet hose. The airinlet hose may be between the air filter and the fuel injector, carburetor, or carburetor heat box depending on the airplane model. A collapsed hose reduces airflow to the engine and could result in a rough running engine or a loss of power. The SAIB recommended to inspect the inlet hose within the next 25 hours of time in service, and to verify that it is an approved Piper part and that it does not exhibit broken or loose cords on the external surface, loose or displaced supporting wire, or signs of wear, perforation, deterioration, or collapse. If an air inlet hose is observed exhibiting any of the conditions listed above or is not an approved Piper part, then the SAIB recommended replacement of the hose with an approved Piper part before the next flight. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N81481](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N81481), registered now, S/N 32R-8013049, built 1979 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: PIPER PA-32R-301 - Registry model: [Piper PA-32R-301](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-32r-301) (registry code 7103218) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Lycoming IO-540 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/lycoming-io-540-series) (registry code 41530, reciprocating) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 32R-8013049 - Year built: 1979 - Airframe hours: 3969.8 - Engines: Lycoming IO-540-K1G5D 300 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Personal, Part 91 - Registered owner: Bci Aviation LLC - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: Annual, August 1, 2024, 8 hours before - Departed: TRL, Terrell, TX - Destination: NEW, New Orleans, LA - Equipment: Electronic primary flight display, Onboard weather, Stall warning system, ADS-B, Angle of attack indicator, Auto-pilot, Electronic flight bag or handheld device ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 69; injuries: minor; private; airplane ratings: single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 3, with waivers/limitations; seat: left; restraint: lap only; flight hours: 2,412 total, 2,359 in this make and model, 2,324 as pilot in command, 8 in the last 90 days, 1 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 120° at 10 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 57 °F, dew point 34 °F - Altimeter: 30.36 inHg - Observed at: KTYR, 17 nm away - METAR: KTYR 171453Z 12010KT 10SM CLR 14/01 A3036 RMK AO2 SLP279 T01440011 53016 ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20241017022139A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20241017022139A), Oct 17, 2024: Piper PA-32R-301, Van, TX, Substantial damage. Aircraft was crusing at approximately 7,500 feet asl when the engine began to slowly lose power. Pilot switched fuel tanks and turned on fuel boost pump to… ## Docket (13 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on October 29, 2025, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=195337. 73.1 MB in all. - Pilot/operator aircraft accident report, NTSB form 6120.1 (item 1, PDF, 10 pages, 12.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18877097&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=-%206120%20-%20Pilot_Redacted-Rel.pdf - NTSB investigation summary (item 2, PDF, 10 pages, 1.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18876854&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=NTSB%20Investigation%20Summary%20N81481-Rel.pdf - Photos (item 3, PDF, 14 pages, 13 photos, 20.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18878134&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Photos-Rel.pdf - Maintenance records (item 4, PDF, 20 pages, 26.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18877008&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Maintenance%20logbooks_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Piper parts catalog - flexible air duct (item 5, PDF, 2 pages, 75 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18877209&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=-%20Pages%20from%20761-718%2032R-301%20Parts%20Catalog-Rel.pdf - FAA SAIB CE-14-23 (item 6, PDF, 2 pages, 38 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18938417&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=CE-14-23-Rel.pdf - MVP-50 engine monitor data graphs (item 7, PDF, 3 pages, 381 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18877107&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=-%20MVP-50%20engine%20data%20graphs-Rel.pdf - MVP-50 engine monitor tabular data (item 8, CSV, 954 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18876864&FileExtension=csv&FileName=-%20Flt578_10-17-24f%20MVP-50%20data-Rel.csv - Flight and engine data - google earth kmz (item 9, KML, 1.4 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18876988&FileExtension=kml&FileName=Flt578_Accident_Flt_KML_Screened%20(engine%20parameters)-Rel.kml - FAA ADS-B data (item 10, XLSX, 1.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18877607&FileExtension=xlsx&FileName=20241017_AB1BC2_568535203_ADSB-Rel.xlsx - Terrell aviation fuel documentation (item 11, PDF, 10 pages, 6.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18876836&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=-%20TRL%20Airport%20Fueling%20Documentation_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Statement of party representatives to NTSB investigation (item 12, PDF, 2 pages, 208 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18877219&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=-%20Party%20forms_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Release of aircraft wreckage, NTSB form 6120.15 (item 13, PDF, 1 page, 1.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18924459&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Wreckage%20Release%20signed_Redacted-Rel.pdf From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.