# NTSB CEN25LA042: Piper PA-23-160, N4143P, Manvel, TX, November 15, 2024 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · No injuries · Class 3 · Limited · Final report - Date: November 15, 2024, 16:39 local (22:39 UTC) - Place: Manvel, TX - Coordinates: 29.474677, -95.325507 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=29.4747&lon=-95.3255&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Initial climb](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/350) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Initial climb: Fuel starvation](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/191) - Highest injury: No injuries - Injuries: 2 uninjured - Status: Completed, report October 29, 2025 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 3 - NTSB office: Central Region - Parties: FAA, Lycoming, Piper Aircraft - ADs cited in the narratives: [AD 60-03-08](https://openairdocs.org/ad/60-03-08), [AD 80-18-10](https://openairdocs.org/ad/80-18-10) (OpenAirDocs) - NTSB case key (mKey): 195498 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=CEN25LA042 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/195498/pdf - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/CEN25LA042 ## Probable cause A loss of left engine power during the initial climb due to restricted fuel flow as a result of a binding fuel control cable. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Fuel system: fuel selector/shutoff valve](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022823): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Damaged/degraded (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-23-160, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022823/cases.md?model=7102304), [All aircraft, 176 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022823/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Initial climb: Fuel starvation](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/191) (defining event); cases with it: [Piper PA-23-160, 4 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/191/sequence.md?model=7102304), [All aircraft, 733 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/191/sequence.md) ## Analysis The pilots stated that the airplane had flown multiple flights on the day of the accident with no issues reported. They completed a preflight inspection and an engine runup before departing on the accident flight. During the initial climb, about 100 ft above ground level (agl), the left engine lost total power. Unable to maintain altitude, they maneuvered for a forced landing in a pasture off the left side of the runway. During the landing roll, the nose landing gear collapsed. The pilots secured the airplane and egressed without further incident. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the forward fuselage. Postaccident examination revealed that the left fuel selector lever was difficult to move from the Off position to either the Auxiliary or Main positions. When the lever was moved full forward from the Off position to the Main position, there was significant resistance to the movement. If the lever was released, it would spring back toward the Off position with notable force. The left engine fuel control cable between the fuel control support arm and the fuel shutoff valves exhibited binding and was slow to actuate. With this control cable disconnected and the fuel selector On, an engine functional test run was completed with no anomalies noted. Additionally, review of the engine data indicated a sudden reduction in fuel flow to the left engine shortly before the end of the data. Accordingly, the binding fuel control cable likely allowed the fuel selector valve to remain in an intermediate position that restricted fuel flow to the left engine, which resulted in the loss of engine power. ## Factual narrative On November 15, 2024, at 1639 central standard time, a Piper PA-23-160, N4143P, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Manvel, Texas. The flight instructor and pilot receiving instruction were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. The pilots stated that the airplane had flown multiple flights that day with no issues reported. They completed a preflight inspection and an engine runup before departing on the accident flight. During the initial climb, about 100 ft agl, the left engine lost total power. Unable to maintain altitude, the pilots maneuvered for a forced landing in a pasture off the left side of the runway. During the landing roll, the nose landing gear collapsed. The pilots secured the airplane and egressed without further incident. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the forward fuselage. The fuel tanks remained intact and were mostly full of fuel. The left engine oil dipstick indicated adequate oil, and the exterior of the engine did not reveal any signs of catastrophic failure. An engine data monitor was removed from the airplane, and the data was extracted. The unit recorded exhaust gas temperatures, cylinder head temperatures, and fuel flow for both engines during the accident flight. A review of the data indicated a sudden reduction in fuel flow to the left engine shortly before the end of the data. Shortly after, there was a subsequent reduction in fuel flow to the right engine, consistent with the pilot’s statements that they reduced power on the right engine in preparation for landing in the field. There were no other anomalies noted in the data. Postaccident examination of the fuel system revealed that the left fuel selector lever was difficult to move from the Off position to either the Auxiliary or Main positions. When the lever was moved full forward from the Off position to the Main position, there was significant resistance to the movement. If the lever was released, it would spring back (aft) towards the Off position with notable force. The fuel control support arm rotated slowly toward the outboard position after the selector lever was actuated. The support arm continued to move for about 10 to 12 seconds following the movement of the selector lever only if the lever was held in the forward (Main) position. The airplane owner stated that the left fuel quantity display was consistently delayed when switching between tanks. The delay matched the slow movement of the fuel control support arm, which actuates the electrical switches and controls the source for the fuel quantity gauge. The fuel control cable from the selector lever and the fuel control cable to the shut off valve were disconnected from the fuel control support arm. The left fuel control selector lever was then manipulated and moved without restriction or resistance, like before. The fuel control support arm was able to rotate easily and smoothly withnormal contact noted on the fuel quantity electrical switches. The fuel control cable to the shutoff valve could not be pushed or pulled manually. This cable was disconnected from the fuel shutoff valve in the left engine nacelle to determine whether it was the cable or the valves that were resistant to movement. Each of the fuel valves were able to move freely and smoothly. The fuel control cable between the fuel control support arm and the fuel shutoff valves exhibited binding and was unable to move manually once disconnected from the support arm and shutoff valve. A functional test run of left engine was completed. The left main fuel shutoff valve, which had been disconnected from the auxiliary fuel shutoff valve and control cable, was manually placed in the On position. The engine started and the engine speed was kept below 1,200 rpm due to vibration from the bent propeller. The engine ran for about 1½ minutes with no anomalies noted. The most recent inspection in the maintenance logbook was completed on October 14, 2024. The logbook entry noted that FAA airworthiness directives (AD) for the fuel control cable inspection (AD 60-03-08R3) and the fuel selector valve inspection (AD 80-18-10) were completed with no defects noted on any of the inspections. AD 60-03-08R3 required the following: Check rigging and clamping of control cable and rigging of valve control linkage to eliminate bowing and to ensure proper valve operation. AD 80-18-10 required the following: In accordance with Piper Service Bulletin No. 507 and appropriate Piper Service Manual, inspect all fuel valves and control cables through all detent positions by having someone operate the fuel controls in the cockpit while inspecting for the following: · Rigging and adjustment. · Unrestricted motion of cable wires, swivel fitting and valve actuating levers. · Proper lubrication of fuel valve attachments and controls. Correct unsatisfactory conditions in accordance with the appropriate aforementioned Piper Service documents. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N4143P](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N4143P), registered now, S/N 23-1624, built 1959 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: PIPER PA-23-160 - Registry model: [Piper PA-23-160](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-23-160) (registry code 7102304) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Lycoming 0-320 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/lycoming-0-320-series) (registry code 41508, reciprocating) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 23-1624 - Year built: 1959 - Airframe hours: 9215.7 - Engines: Lycoming O-360-A1D 180 horsepower reciprocating; Lycoming O-360-A1D 180 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Instructional, Part 91 - Operator: Sparrowhawk Aviation - Registered owner: Sparrowhawk Aviation - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: Annual, October 14, 2024 - Airport: 3T2, Wolfe Air Park, runway 02/20, 2,910 × 80 ft - Equipment: ADS-B ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 77; injuries: none; commercial, flight instructor, airline transport, flight engineer; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 2, with waivers/limitations; last flight review October 10, 2023; seat: right; restraint: 4-point; flight hours: 30,120 total, 12.8 in this make and model, 16,500 as pilot in command, 270 in the last 90 days, 83 in the last 30 days, 4.4 in the last 24 hours - Pilot; age 35; injuries: none; flight instructor, commercial; airplane ratings: single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, without waivers/limitations; last flight review May 13, 2024; seat: left; restraint: 4-point; flight hours: 990 total, 10.9 in this make and model, 830.9 as pilot in command, 320 in the last 90 days, 110 in the last 30 days, 1.8 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 120° at 4 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 72 °F, dew point 48 °F - Altimeter: 30.00 inHg - Observed at: KAXH, 8 nm away - METAR: KAXH 152235Z AUTO 12004KT 10SM CLR 22/09 A3000 RMK AO2 T02200092 ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20241115019609A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20241115019609A), Nov 15, 2024: Piper PA-23-160, Manvel, TX, Substantial damage. During takeoff pilot experienced loss of power in the left engine. Due to low altitude pilots conducted an emergency landing in a field just to the left of the… From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.