# NTSB CEN25LA356: Sikorsky S-76, N36RP, Round Mountain, TX, September 1, 2025

- Type: NTSB accident investigation
- Classification: Accident · Serious injuries · Class 3 · Limited · Final report
- Date: August 31, 2025, 21:02 local (Sep 1, 2025, 02:02 UTC)
- Place: Round Mountain, TX
- Coordinates: 30.343587, -98.157517 (estimated)
- Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=30.3436&lon=-98.1575&mi=10
- Phase of flight: [Landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/550) (OpenAirDocs' grouping)
- Defining event: [Landing: Collision during takeoff/land](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/490)
- Highest injury: Serious injuries
- Injuries: 3 serious
- Status: Completed, report August 25, 2026
- Report: Approved by Office Director
- Investigation class: Class 3
- NTSB office: Central Region
- Parties: Pratt & Whitney Canada, FAA San Antonio FSDO, Transportation Safety Board of Canada
- NTSB case key (mKey): 200918
- NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=CEN25LA356
- NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/200918/pdf
- NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=200918
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/CEN25LA356

## Probable cause

The flight crew’s failure to properly identify the heliport in dark night conditions, which resulted in the flight crew attempting to land and a subsequent impact with trees and terrain.

## Findings

NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause.

- [Light condition: dark](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03036020): Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena · Effect on operation (probable cause); cases with it: [Sikorsky S-76D, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03036020/cases.md?model=8143021), [All aircraft, 448 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03036020/cases.md)
- [Attention/monitoring: task monitoring/vigilance](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02021520): Personnel issues › Psychological · Flight crew (probable cause); cases with it: [Sikorsky S-76D, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02021520/cases.md?model=8143021), [All aircraft, 330 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02021520/cases.md)
- [Info processing/decision: identification/recognition](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041510): Personnel issues › Action/decision · Flight crew (probable cause); cases with it: [Sikorsky S-76D, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041510/cases.md?model=8143021), [All aircraft, 559 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041510/cases.md)
- [Perception/orientation/illusion: situational awareness](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02022035): Personnel issues › Psychological · Flight crew (probable cause); cases with it: [Sikorsky S-76D, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02022035/cases.md?model=8143021), [All aircraft, 111 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02022035/cases.md)
- [Info processing/decision: decision making/judgment](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041520): Personnel issues › Action/decision · Flight crew (probable cause); cases with it: [Sikorsky S-76D, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041520/cases.md?model=8143021), [All aircraft, 3,098 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041520/cases.md)
- [Action: incorrect action performance](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041015): Personnel issues › Action/decision · Flight crew (probable cause); cases with it: [Sikorsky S-76D, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041015/cases.md?model=8143021), [All aircraft, 1,386 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041015/cases.md)
- [Use of equip/info: use of equip/system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063015): Personnel issues › Task performance · Flight crew; cases with it: [Sikorsky S-76D, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063015/cases.md?model=8143021), [All aircraft, 1,391 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063015/cases.md)
- [Navigation system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023400): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Incorrect use/operation; cases with it: [Sikorsky S-76D, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023400/cases.md?model=8143021), [All aircraft, 13 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023400/cases.md)

## Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened.

- [Landing: Navigation error](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/280); cases with it: [Sikorsky S-76D, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/280/sequence.md?model=8143021), [All aircraft, 21 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/280/sequence.md)
- [Landing: Wrong surface or wrong airport](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/284); cases with it: [Sikorsky S-76D, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/284/sequence.md?model=8143021), [All aircraft, 56 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/284/sequence.md)
- [Landing: Collision during takeoff/land](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/490) (defining event); cases with it: [Sikorsky S-76D, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/490/sequence.md?model=8143021), [All aircraft, 1,309 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/490/sequence.md)
- [Post-impact: Evacuation](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/460); cases with it: [Sikorsky S-76D, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/460/sequence.md?model=8143021), [All aircraft, 103 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/460/sequence.md)

## Analysis

The purpose of the on-demand night flight in the helicopter was to transport the passenger from a commercial airport to a private heliport on a ranch in a rural area. Due to previous issues with the helicopter’s autopilot system and the possible concern of losing control in instrument meteorological conditions, the captain decided not to perform an instrument flight rules flight to the heliport. During the flight, an instrument approach was loaded into the helicopter’s flight management system, but it was not activated. Additionally, each pilot had an Apple iPad mounted in the cockpit, that was utilizing ForeFlight with the heliport coordinates loaded into ForeFlight. During the approach to the heliport, the captain contacted the ranch manager via text message on a cellular phone, to ensure the heliport floodlight system was activated. The first officer activated the heliport ground lights, which were a green color, via a radio frequency. Both pilots acknowledged observing green lights in their sight. The captain reported that he “cross-checked” the map display with the outside visual references to confirm alignment with the heliport, which he thought had matched. The first officer extended the landing gear, he completed the before landing checklist, and he then transitioned to viewing outside of the helicopter to try and visually acquire the heliport. The captain delayed turning on the landing lights until closer to the heliport to avoid glare from moisture and haze reflecting in the light beams. The captain began maneuvering the helicopter for landing. Within seconds, the captain lost outside visual references, and he transitioned to instruments. The first officer looked inside the cockpit and observed the radar altimeter indicated 20 ft. Before the first officer could verbally call out to execute a go around, the helicopter terrain awareness and warning system activated an alert, and the helicopter impacted trees and terrain. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, the main rotor system, the tail boom, the empennage, and the tail rotor system. The captain reported there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airframe or the two turboshaft engines that would have precluded normal operation. A review of meteorological data at the time of the accident showed dark night conditions were present for the accident site. It is likely the flight crew failed to properly identify the heliport in dark night conditions, which resulted in the flight crew attempting to land at the incorrect location. It is also likely the flight crew failed to properly utilize navigation information and visual cues to verify the location of the heliport.

## Factual narrative

On August 31, 2025, about 2102 central daylight time, a Sikorsky S-76D helicopter, N36RP, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near Round Mountain, Texas. The captain, the first officer, and the passenger sustained serious injuries. The helicopter was operated by Paradigm Helicopters, LLC, as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand flight. The purpose of the unaided night flight in the transport category helicopter was to transport the passenger from a commercial airport to a private heliport on a ranch in a rural area. Due to previous issues with the helicopter’s autopilot system and the possible concern of losing control in instrument meteorological conditions, the captain decided not to perform an instrument flight rules flight to the heliport. Prior to the flight, the captain completed the operator’s flight risk assessment tool. During the flight, an instrument approach was loaded into the helicopter’s flight management system, but it was not activated. Additionally, each pilot had an Apple iPad mounted in the cockpit, that was utilizing ForeFlight with the heliport coordinates loaded into ForeFlight. During the approach to the heliport, the captain contacted the ranch manager via text message on a cellular phone, to ensure the heliport floodlight system was activated. The first officer activated the heliport ground lights, which were a green color, via a radio frequency. Both pilots acknowledged observing green lights in their sight. The captain reported that he “cross-checked” the map display with the outside visual references to confirm alignment with the heliport, which he thought had matched. The first officer extended the landing gear, he completed the before landing checklist, and he then transitioned to viewing outside of the helicopter to try and visually acquire the heliport. The captain delayed turning on the landing lights until closer to the heliport to avoid glare from moisture and haze reflecting in the light beams. The captain began maneuvering the helicopter for landing. Within seconds, the captain lost outside visual references, and he transitioned to instruments. The first officer looked inside the cockpit and observed the radar altimeter indicated 20 ft. Before the first officer could verbally call out to execute a go around, the helicopter terrain awareness and warning system activated an alert, and the helicopter impacted trees and terrain. The helicopter came to rest on its right side. The first officer, who then moved the two engine throttle levers to what he believed was the stop position, was able to egress from the helicopter on his own, while the captain and the passenger were assisted by witnesses and first responders. The captain reported that he previously landed at the heliport between 20 to 25 times, during both day and night conditions, and that he did not recall experiencing any visual illusions during the accident flight. The first officer reported that hepreviously landed at the heliport 20 times, but only during day conditions. The accident site, which was a heavily wooded area near a recreational vehicle park on private property, was about 1.54 miles north of the heliport, and a prominent west to east running river separates the two locations. A review of meteorological data at the time of the accident showed dark night conditions were present for the accident site. While the flight crew reported checking meteorological data from several enroute locations, they did not report checking meteorological data from the closest weather stations near the heliport. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, the main rotor system, the tail boom, the empennage, and the tail rotor system. The captain reported there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airframe or the two turboshaft engines that would have precluded normal operation. The operator reported that the accident could have been prevented by implementing a night vision goggle program for non-airport operations.

## Aircraft

- Registration: [N36RP](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N36RP), registered now, S/N 761037, built 2013 (OpenAirDocs)
- Reported make and model: SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORP S-76 (D)
- Registry model: [Sikorsky S-76D](https://openairdocs.org/model/sikorsky-s-76d) (registry code 8143021) (OpenAirDocs)
- Registry engine: [Pratt & Whitney Canada PW210S](https://openairdocs.org/engine/pratt-whitney-canada-pw210s) (registry code 52294, turbo-shaft) (OpenAirDocs)
- Category: Helicopter
- Serial number: 761037
- Year built: 2013
- Airframe hours: 1005.2
- Engines: Pratt & Whitney Canada PW210S 1077 horsepower turbo shaft; Pratt & Whitney Canada PW210S 1077 horsepower turbo shaft
- Damage: Substantial damage
- Flight: Part 135
- Operator: Paradigm Helicopters LLC, doing business as Paradigm Helicopters LLC
- Registered owner: Mirasol Sky LLC
- Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Transport
- Last inspection: 100 hour, August 4, 2025, 3.6 hours before
- Departed: DAL, Dallas, TX
- Destination: TA22, Dripping Springs, TX
- Flight plan: Company VFR
- Airport: TA22, Mirasol Hills, runway Helipad H1, 10 × 10 ft, grass/turf
- Equipment: Electronic flight bag or handheld device, Electronic multifunction display, Electronic primary flight display, Onboard weather, ADS-B, Auto-pilot, Data recorder

## Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

- Pilot; age 64; injuries: serious; commercial; instrument ratings: helicopter; medical: class 2, with waivers/limitations; last flight review April 4, 2025; seat: right; restraint: 5-point; flight hours: 13,043 total, 344 in this make and model, 12,125 as pilot in command, 14 in the last 90 days, 3 in the last 30 days, 1 in the last 24 hours
- Co-pilot; age 55; injuries: serious; private, flight instructor, commercial, airline transport; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: helicopter, airplane; medical: class 1, with waivers/limitations; last flight review May 9, 2025; seat: left; restraint: 5-point; flight hours: 6,160 total, 56 in this make and model, 3,165 as pilot in command, 151 in the last 90 days, 21 in the last 30 days, 1 in the last 24 hours

## Weather

- Conditions: Visual (VMC), Night/dark
- Wind: 60° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 7 statute miles
- Temperature: 73 °F, dew point 73 °F
- Altimeter: 30.08 inHg
- Observed at: KRYW, 14 nm away
- METAR: METAR KRYW 010215Z AUTO 06003KT 7SM -RA SCT005 23/23 A3008 RMK AO2 T02260226=

## FAA reports on this event (1)

The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs).

- [Accident 20250831012969A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20250831012969A), Aug 31, 2025: Sikorsky Aircraft Corp S-76D, Round Mountain, TX, Destroyed. On 31 aug 2025, at approx. 21:30 local time, a S-76D helicopter operating as a part 135 corporate flight, crashed attempting to land at night, VFR, unaided.…

## Docket (23 files)

The files NTSB released with the investigation on August 19, 2026, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=200918. 78.8 MB in all.

- Pilot/operator aircraft accident report, NTSB form 6120.1 (item 1, PDF, 10 pages, 1.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19396106&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=CEN25LA356%20NTSB%20Form%206120_1_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Investigation photographs (item 2, PDF, 11 pages, 2.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19403092&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Investigation%20Photographs-Rel.pdf
- Accident flight route - google earth pro imagery (item 3, PDF, 1 page, 381 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19495104&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Accident%20Flight%20Route%20-%20Google%20Earth%20Pro-Rel.pdf
- Accident flight ADS-B data - google earth pro (.kmz file) (item 4, KMZ, 248 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19395332&FileExtension=kmz&FileName=20250901_A40B78_599184029-Rel.kmz
- Accident flight ADS-B data - microsoft excel (.xlsx file) (item 5, XLSX, 10.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19395602&FileExtension=xlsx&FileName=20250901_A40B78_599184029_ADSB-Rel.xlsx
- Captain - statement (item 6, PDF, 2 pages, 86 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19397315&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=PIC%20Statement_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Captain - interview (item 7, PDF, 5 pages, 153 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19479526&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=PIC%20FAA%20Interview_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Captain - recent flight duty times (item 8, PDF, 1 page, 63 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19396558&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Captain%20-%20Flight%20Duty%20Times-Rel.pdf
- Captain - training records excerpt (item 9, PDF, 4 pages, 4.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19403210&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=PIC%20Training%20Records%20Excerpts_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- First officer - statement (item 10, PDF, 2 pages, 69 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19397470&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=SIC%20Statement-Rel.pdf
- First officer - interview (item 11, PDF, 4 pages, 122 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19407866&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=SIC%20FAA%20Interview_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- First officer - recent flight duty times (item 12, PDF, 1 page, 62 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19396568&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=First%20Officer%20-%20Flight%20Duty%20Times-Rel.pdf
- First officer - training records excerpt (item 13, PDF, 4 pages, 2.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19404240&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=SIC%20Training%20Records%20Excerpts_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Passenger - statement (item 14, PDF, 1 page, 51 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19477231&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Passenger%20Statement_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Witness - statement (item 15, PDF, 1 page, 23 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19396078&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=CEN25LA356%20Witness%20Statement-Rel.pdf
- Weather factual report (item 16, PDF, 11 pages, 894 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19516372&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=CEN25LA356_weatherfactualSuffernfinal-Rel.pdf
- Mirasol sky LLC - flight log (item 17, PDF, 1 page, 47.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19397506&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Flight%20Log_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Paradigm helicopters LLC - crew trip sheet (item 18, PDF, 2 pages, 71 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19396830&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=CEN25LA356%20Crew%20Trip%20Sheet_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Paradigm helicopters LLC - flight risk assessment tool (item 19, PDF, 9 pages, 653 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19395763&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=CEN25LA356%20FRAT-Rel.pdf
- Paradigm helicopters LLC - previous autopilot system issues documents (item 20, PDF, 10 pages, 4.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19522404&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=N36RP%20-%20Previous%20Autopilot%20System%20Issues_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Paradigm helicopters LLC - recent airframe and engines maintenance records (item 21, PDF, 6 pages, 2.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19397112&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Recent%20Maintenance%20Records_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Sikorsky aircraft corporation - S-76D rotorcraft flight manual excerpts (item 22, PDF, 10 pages, 160 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19511220&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Sikorsky%20S-76D%20RFM%20Excerpts-Rel.pdf
- Release of aircraft wreckage, NTSB form 6120.15 (item 23, PDF, 1 page, 116 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19420486&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=CEN25LA356%20Release%20of%20Bulk%20Wreckage%20Form_Redacted-Rel.pdf

From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

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