# NTSB CHI01FA104: Airbus Industrie A320-200, N357NW, Detroit, MI, March 17, 2001 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Minor injuries · Field investigation · Final report - Date: March 17, 2001, 07:05 local (12:05 UTC) - Place: Detroit, MI - Coordinates: 42.212501, -83.33889 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=42.2125&lon=-83.3389&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Takeoff](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/300) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Highest injury: Minor injuries - Injuries: 3 minor, 150 uninjured - Status: Completed, report November 25, 2003 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Parties: Airbus Industrie, NTSB, BEA, FAA, Northwest Airlines, NATCA - Safety recommendations: Yes - NTSB case key (mKey): 51932 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=CHI01FA104 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/51932/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=51932 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/CHI01FA104 ## Probable cause The pilot induced oscillations and the delay in aborting the takeoff. Factors associated with the accident were the first officer used an improper trim setting and the captain did not identify and correct the setting during the taxi checklist, and the wet runway conditions. ## Sequence of events In NTSB's coding before 2008 (https://www.ntsb.gov/GILS/Documents/codman.pdf). - Loss of control - in flight, takeoff - stabilator trim - improper, copilot/second pilot (contributing factor) - stabilator trim - not corrected, pilot in command (contributing factor) - porpoise/pilot-induced oscillation - inadvertent, pilot in command (cause) - aborted takeoff - delayed, pilot in command (cause) - In flight collision with terrain/water, takeoff - Overrun, takeoff - aborted - airport facilities,runway/landing area condition - wet (contributing factor) - terrain condition - soft - Miscellaneous/other, standing - engine(s) not operating - misc eqpt/furnishings,slides - disengaged - misc eqpt/furnishings,slides - not deployed ## Analysis The Airbus A320 contacted the runway and the terrain during takeoff on runway 3C (8,500 feet by 200 feet, wet) at the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport. An emergency evacuation was made during which time the emergency evacuation slide on the 2 left (2L) door failed to deploy. The captain reported that during the initial takeoff run, he held half forward pressure until reaching 80 knots. He reported that up to this point, everything was normal. He stated he released forward stick pressure by about 100 knots and the nose of the airplane began lifting off the ground with neutral stick, which was not normal. He reported he applied about half forward stick and the nose came back down. He reported that at 120 knots the nose again began to rise with one half to one quarter stick input. He then pushed the stick forward to the forward stop and the nose came up at a rapid rate. The captain reported that his attention was focused outside the airplane and he did not hear the first officer call V1. He reported that he felt the airplane was going to stall so he pulled the power off and aborted the takeoff. The captain stated that he was trained not to perform high-speed aborted takeoffs, but he felt the airplane would have been uncontrollable if the takeoff continued. The captain stated the thrust reversers were deployed and he initially thought there was enough runway remaining to stop. He assumed the autobrakes activated, but he pressed on the brakes anyway. He reported the airplane was not decelerating and it departed the end of the runway at a high speed. The captain reported that deceleration was rapid once the airplane departed the paved surface and the engines flamed out during the ground roll. Post accident inspection of the airplane revealed the horizontal stabilizer trim was set to negative 1.7 (units of trim), when it should have been set at positive 1.7. The first officer stated he set the trim while on the taxiway. The captain did not notice the improper trim setting during the cross check which was part of the taxi checklist. Further investigation revealed the operator procedures were to set the trim using units instead of percentage of mean aerodynamic chord as recommended by the manufacturer. In addition, it was discovered that the manner in which the units of trim were displayed on the trim control wheel, on the electronic centralized aircraft monitoring system (ECAM), and in the aircraft communications addressing and reporting system (ACARS) were not consistent. As a result the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendations A-02-06 and A-02-07. Post accident examination of the 2L slide/raft that did not deploy revealed an improper chamfer on the telescopic girt bar which attaches the slide/raft to the airplane structure. This allowed the slide/raft to detach from the airplane when the 2L door was opened. As a result the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendations A-01-27 and A-01-28. Being a fly-by wire airplane, the Airbus A320 has two sources of control lag in the pitch control. One is the latency between the pilot's input and the elevator movement through the elevator aileron control (ELAC) computer and the other is the rate limit of the elevator. Examination of the digital flight data recorded data for this accident revealed the pilot changed the pitch input faster than the elevator system would respond and saturation occurred in the rate at which the elevator surface could respond to the inputs. This resulted in pilot inducted oscillations (PIO) during the takeoff roll. ## Factual narrative HISTORY OF FLIGHT On March 17, 2001, at 0705 eastern standard time, an Airbus Industrie A320-200, N357NW, operated by Northwest Airlines (NWA) as Flight 985, contacted the runway and the terrain during takeoff on runway 3C at the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, Detroit, Michigan. The airplane received substantial damage. Three passengers reported minor injuries. The captain, co-pilot, 4 flight attendants, and 144 passengers were not injured. The 14 CFR Part 121 flight was operating in instrument meteorological conditions and an IFR flight plan was filed. The flight was originating at the time of the accident and the intended destination was Miami, Florida. The captain stated that when he reported on the morning of the accident, he completed his paperwork then went to the airplane where he performed the captain's "flow", checked maintenance records, briefed the flight attendants, and loaded the flight plan into the multifunction control display unit (MCDU). He stated they received the load data five to six minutes before they pushed back and it was entered into the flight management guidance computer (FMGC). The V-speeds were also set while at the gate. He stated that it was snowing so he had the first officer arrange to have the airplane deiced. The captain stated the first officer set the stabilizer trim prior to reaching the deice pad. The captain reported they taxied to the deice pad and he left the engines and auxiliary power unit (APU) running while the airplane was being deiced. Type 1 deice fluid was used, which resulted in a 15 minute hold over time, giving him 10 minutes to become airborne by time the deicing was completed. The captain reported they moved the airplane out of the deice pad before they turned the systems back on. They then completed the engines-running deicing procedure checklist and requested a taxi clearance. The captain reported the deice pad used was only 5 or 6 airplane lengths away from the end of runway 03C. He said he performed the taxi checklist as the airplane was taxied to the end of the runway, accomplishing all the checklist items. He reported that as part of the checklist, he noted the trim setting on the electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) display and the maximum gross load (MGL). He reported that he checked this information against the setting on the trim wheel, making sure it was in the green band. New automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information was received and he noted that the weather was deteriorating. He stated they accomplished the before takeoff checklist, and he briefed the first officer regarding what they would do in case of an engine failure on takeoff. The airplane was then cleared into position to hold, followed 30 seconds later by the takeoff clearance. The captain reported that takeoff/go-around (TOGA) thrust was set, and he held half forward pressure on the control yoke until reaching 80 knots. He reported that up to this point, everything was normal. He stated he released forward stick pressure by about 100 knots, and the nose of the airplane began lifting off the ground with neutral stick, which was not normal. He reported he applied about half forward stick and the nose came back down. He reported that at 120 knots the nose again began to rise with one half to one quarter stick input. He then pushed the stick forward to the forward stop and the nose came up at a rapid rate. The captain reported that his attention was focused outside the airplane and he did not hear the first officer call V1. He reported that he felt the airplane was going to stall so he pulled the power off and aborted the takeoff. The captain stated that he was trained not to perform high-speed aborted takeoffs, but he felt the airplane would have been uncontrollable if the takeoff continued. The captain stated the thrust reversers were deployed and he initially thought there was enough runway remaining to stop. He assumed the autobrakes activated, but he pressed on the brakes anyway. He reported the airplane was not decelerating and it departed the end of the runway at a high speed. The captain reported that deceleration was rapid once the airplane departed the paved surface and the engines flamed out during the ground roll. The captain reported that he believed the tail struck the runway during the aborted takeoff, followed by the main gear and then the nose gear. He stated the impact was hard enough that he thought the airplane was structurally damaged and there was a threat of fire so he initiated an emergency evacuation of the airplane. The flightcrew performed the emergency evacuation checklist, notified the tower, and went to the back of the airplane. He reported he waited until the airplane was empty, then he exited the airplane through the 1R door and the first officer exited using the 1L door. The first officer stated he checked in for the flight and proceeded to the gate where he met the captain and flight attendants. He received his paperwork and waited for the arriving flight to be off loaded. He then proceeded to the airplane where he checked the flight attendant log and reviewed the minimum equipment list with the captain. He then left the airplane to perform the external preflight. The first officer stated that after returning to the cockpit, he arranged to have the airplane deiced, then he continued the preflight. He reported he received the aircraft communication addressing and reporting system (ACARS) load data prior to pushback at which time he entered the request for runway 3C, and requested a pack-off variable speed takeoff. He stated he discussed this with the captain and the captain concurred. The first officer stated he entered the V speed, the zero fuel weight, and the block-out fuel weight information into the computer. He then began his "flow", accomplished the before-start checklist, and called for a pushback clearance. After pushback he called for the taxi clearance. The first officer stated that while established on the taxiway, he set the stabilizer trim to negative 1.7 and performed the flight control check. He then received their taxi clearance to the runway 3C deice pad. The first officer stated the airplane felt normal while taxiing. The deicing checklist was then accomplished and the deicing was performed. During the deicing he reviewed the hold over chart and used "light snow" for determining the holdover time. They then accomplished the before taxi checklist and received their taxi clearance to runway 3C. The first officer stated the taxi checklist was completed, new ATIS information was received, and the before takeoff checklist was completed before the flight was cleared into position and hold. The flight was then cleared for takeoff. The first officer stated the takeoff started off normally and he made the "80 knots thrust normal" call. He stated that at 100 knots, he felt the nose coming up and he noticed the captain was correcting for it. At about 120 knots, he felt the airplane was coming up, at which time he looked at the captain and then at the airspeed indicator. He noticed the pitch rate was unusual and the captain called "abort". He stated the airplane landed hard and proceeded off the end of the runway. The first officer stated the captain called air traffic control (ATC). They then accomplished the emergency evacuation checklist. The captain then instructed the flight attendants to evacuate the airplane. The first officer stated he and the captain then left the cockpit and exited the airplane. He stated the emergency vehicles were already at the airplane when he exited. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The captain held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane multi-engine land rating and a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single engine land rating. He also held an experimental aircraft builder certificate. The ca ## Aircraft - Registration: [N357NW](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N357NW), registered now, S/N 830, built 1998 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: Airbus Industrie A320-200 - Registry model: [Airbus Industrie A320-212](https://openairdocs.org/model/airbus-industrie-a320-212) (registry code 3930322) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [CFM International CFM56 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/cfm-international-cfm56-series) (registry code 13802, turbo-fan) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 830 - Airframe hours: 9346 - Engines: CFM International CFM56-5-A3 26500 lbs thrust turbo jet; CFM International CFM56-5-A3 26500 lbs thrust turbo jet - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Part 121 - Registered owner: Northwest Airlines - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Transport - Last inspection: Continuous airworthiness, March 7, 2001, 85 hours before - Departed: DTW, Detroit, MI - Destination: MIA, Miami, FL - Flight plan: IFR - Airport: DTW, Detroit Metropolitan, Wayne Co, runway 3C, 8,500 × 200 ft, asphalt ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 48; injuries: none; commercial, airline transport; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, valid medical--w/ waivers/lim; last flight review January 26, 2001; seat: left; toxicology performed; flight hours: 15,600 total, 7,198 in this make and model, 155 in the last 90 days, 2 in the last 24 hours - Co-pilot; age 37; injuries: none; flight engineer, commercial, airline transport, flight instructor; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, valid medical--w/ waivers/lim; last flight review April 26, 2000; seat: rear; flight hours: 12,500 total, 131 in the last 90 days, 2 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Instrument (IMC), Day - Wind: 350° at 8 knots - Visibility: 0.75 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: 700 ft indefinitevv - Temperature: 28 °F, dew point 27 °F - Altimeter: 30.04 inHg - Observed at: DTW ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20010317039169A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20010317039169A), Mar 17, 2001: Airbus A320212, Detroit, MI, Substantial damage. (-23) It appears the trim was improperly set. ## Docket (49 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on June 16, 2003, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=51932. 19.9 MB in all. - Survival Factors 6 - Factual Report of Group Chairman (item 1, .PDF, 666 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170672&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman-Master.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 1 (item 2, .PDF, 556 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170679&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%201-Redacted.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 2 (item 3, .PDF, 10.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170680&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%202-Master.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 3 (item 4, .PDF, 105 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170682&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%203-Master.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 4 (item 5, .PDF, 86 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170683&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%204-Master.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 5 (item 6, .PDF, 72 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170684&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%205-Master.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 6 (item 7, .PDF, 88 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170685&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%206-Master.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 7 (item 8, .PDF, 166 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170686&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%207-Redacted.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 8 (item 9, .PDF, 236 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170687&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%208-Redacted.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 9 (item 10, .PDF, 112 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170698&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%209-Redacted.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 10 (item 11, .PDF, 92 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170690&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%2010-Master.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 11 (item 12, .PDF, 123 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170691&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%2011-Master.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 12 (item 13, .PDF, 299 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170692&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%2012-Master.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 13 (item 14, .PDF, 380 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170693&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%2013-Master.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 14 (item 15, .PDF, 84 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40170694&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%2014-Master.PDF - Cockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group Chairman (item 16, .PDF, 68 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40181964&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Cockpit%20Voice%20Recorder%2012%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman-Master.PDF - Report on Aircraft Performance Group Investigation (item 17, .PDF, 1.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40182351&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Report%20on%20Aircraft%20Performance%20Group%20Investigation-Master.PDF - Takeoff Trajectory Study (item 18, .PDF, 286 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40182353&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Takeoff%20Trajectory%20Study-Master.PDF - Flight Data Recorder - Factual Report of Group Chairman (item 19, .PDF, 262 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183726&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Flight%20Data%20Recorder%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman-Master.PDF - Errata - Report on Aircraft Performance Group Investigation (item 20, .PDF, 11 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183751&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Errata%20-%20Report%20on%20Aircraft%20Performance%20Group%20Investigation-Master.PDF - Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 & Passenger Manifest (item 21, .PDF, 489 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40419106&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1%20%26%20Passenger%20Manifest-Master.PDF - Captain Interviews (item 22, .PDF, 415 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40419108&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Captain%20Interviews-Redacted.PDF - First Officer Interviews (item 23, .PDF, 351 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40419109&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=First%20Officer%20Interviews-Master.PDF - Flight Attendant Statements (item 24, .PDF, 210 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183896&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Flight%20Attendant%20Statements-Master.PDF - Airport Diagram (item 25, .PDF, 51 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183897&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airport%20Diagram-Master.PDF - Weather Information and ATIS (item 26, .PDF, 86 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183898&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Weather%20Information%20and%20ATIS-Master.PDF - ATC Transcripts (item 27, .PDF, 126 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40419110&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=ATC%20Transcripts-Master.PDF - ATC Personnel Statements (item 28, .PDF, 189 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40419113&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=ATC%20Personnel%20Statements-Master.PDF - NTSB Safety Recommendations A-01-27 and A-01-28 (item 29, .PDF, 389 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183901&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=NTSB%20Safety%20Recommendations%20A-01-27%20and%20A-01-28-Master.PDF - Airbus A320 Fuselage Station Information (item 30, .PDF, 49 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183902&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airbus%20A320%20Fuselage%20Station%20Information-Master.PDF - Fuel Slip (item 31, .PDF, 56 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183904&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Fuel%20Slip-Master.PDF - FDR Data (item 32, .PDF, 125 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183906&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=FDR%20Data-Master.PDF - DTW Runway Friction Test Information (item 33, .PDF, 106 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183908&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=DTW%20Runway%20Friction%20Test%20Information-Master.PDF - Weight and Balance Information (item 34, .PDF, 43 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183909&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Weight%20and%20Balance%20Information-Master.PDF - Airbus Checklist Items (item 35, .PDF, 161 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183911&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airbus%20Checklist%20Items-Master.PDF - Trim Wheel and ECAM Display (item 36, .PDF, 75 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183913&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Trim%20Wheel%20and%20ECAM%20Display-Master.PDF - Northwest Airlines Checklists (item 37, .PDF, 263 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183916&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Northwest%20Airlines%20Checklists-Master.PDF - ACARS Data (item 38, .PDF, 50 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183917&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=ACARS%20Data-Master.PDF - NTSB Safety Recommendations A-02-06 and A-02-07 (item 39, .PDF, 215 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183918&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=NTSB%20Safety%20Recommendations%20A-02-06%20and%20A-02-07-Master.PDF - Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation (item 40, .PDF, 338 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40419111&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Statement%20of%20Party%20Representatives%20to%20NTSB%20Investigation-Master.PDF - Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 (item 41, .PDF, 43 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40419112&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Release%20of%20Aircraft%20Wreckage,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.15-Master.PDF - Photo 1. Impact Marks on Runway 03C (item 42, .PDF, 201 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183921&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%201.%20%20Impact%20Marks%20on%20Runway%2003C-Master.PDF - Photo 2. Area Where N357NW Exited the Runway (item 43, .PDF, 184 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183922&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%202.%20%20Area%20Where%20N357NW%20Exited%20the%20Runway-Master.PDF - Photo 3. Aft Fuselage Damage to N357NW (item 44, .PDF, 162 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183923&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%203.%20%20Aft%20Fuselage%20Damage%20to%20N357NW-Master.PDF - Photo 4. Aft Fuselage Damage to N357NW (item 45, .PDF, 180 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183926&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%204.%20%20Aft%20Fuselage%20Damage%20to%20N357NW-Master.PDF - Photo 5. Internal Damage to the Aft Fuselage of N357NW (item 46, .PDF, 168 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183927&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%205.%20%20Internal%20Damage%20to%20the%20Aft%20Fuselage%20of%20N357NW-Master.PDF - Photo 6. Trim Setting as Found After the Accident (item 47, .PDF, 204 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183929&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%206.%20%20Trim%20Setting%20as%20Found%20After%20the%20Accident-Master.PDF - Photo 7. Stabilator Trim Position (item 48, .PDF, 110 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183930&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%207.%20%20Stabilator%20Trim%20Position-Master.PDF - Photo 8. N357NW Off the End of Runway 03C (item 49, .PDF, 43 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40183931&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%208.%20%20N357NW%20Off%20the%20End%20of%20Runway%2003C-Master.PDF From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.