# NTSB DCA00MA080: Piper PA-31 Navajo, N27944, Burlington Twp., NJ, August 9, 2000 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Fatal · Major investigation · Final report - Date: August 9, 2000, 07:52 local (11:52 UTC) - Place: Burlington Twp., NJ - Phase of flight: [Enroute](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/400) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Highest injury: Fatal - Injuries: 11 fatal - Status: Completed, report January 30, 2003 - Report: Approved by Office Director - NTSB office: Major Investigations Division - Parties: FAA - NTSB case key (mKey): 49936 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=DCA00MA080 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/49936/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=49936 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/DCA00MA080 ## Probable cause (aircraft 2) the failure of the pilots of the two airplanes to see and avoid each other and maintain proper airspace separation during visual flight rules flight. ## Probable cause (aircraft 1) the failure of the pilots of the two airplanes to see and avoid each other and maintain proper airspace separation during visual flight rules flight. ## Sequence of events In NTSB's coding before 2008 (https://www.ntsb.gov/GILS/Documents/codman.pdf). - Midair collision, cruise - visual lookout - inadequate, pilot in command (cause) - Midair collision, cruise - visual lookout - inadequate, pilot in command (cause) ## Analysis (aircraft 2) A Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, N27944, operated by Patuxent Airways, Inc., Hollywood, Maryland, and a Piper PA-44-180 Seminole, N2225G, operated by Hortman Aviation Services, Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were destroyed when they collided in flight over Burlington Township, New Jersey. The airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, and seven passengers aboard the Navajo Chieftain were killed, as were the flight instructor and the private pilot aboard the Seminole. Day visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident, and both airplanes were operating under visual flight rules when the collision occurred. The flight crews of both airplanes were properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable Federal regulations. None of these individuals was experiencing any personal problems or rest anomalies that would have affected their performance. The airplanes had undergone the required inspections. Examination of their maintenance documents revealed that both airplanes complied with all appropriate airworthiness directives. Evidence gathered from the wreckage indicated that neither airplane had experienced an in-flight fire, bird strike, or structural or mechanical failure. Tissue samples revealed that the pilot of the Seminole had taken doxylamine sometime before the accident. (Doxylamine is a sedating antihistamine that has substantial adverse effects on performance.) However, the amount of blood available for analysis was insufficient for determining exactly when the pilot may have ingested the medication or whether his performance was impaired by the effects of doxylamine. A partial cockpit visibility study revealed that the Seminole would have been visible to the pilots in the Chieftain for at least the 60 seconds before the collision. No stereo photographs from a Seminole cockpit were available to determine precise obstruction angles. However, because of the relative viewing angle, the Chieftain would have been visible to the pilots in the Seminole for most of the last 60 seconds. The study further revealed that about 4 seconds before impact, or about .11 nm separation, the angular width of each airplane in each pilot's field of vision would have been approximately 0.5 to 0.6 degrees or about 1/4 inch apparent size at the windscreen. ## Analysis (aircraft 1) A Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, N27944, operated by Patuxent Airways, Inc., Hollywood, Maryland, and a Piper PA-44-180 Seminole, N2225G, operated by Hortman Aviation Services, Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were destroyed when they collided in flight over Burlington Township, New Jersey. The airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, and seven passengers aboard the Navajo Chieftain were killed, as were the flight instructor and the private pilot aboard the Seminole. Day visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident, and both airplanes were operating under visual flight rules when the collision occurred. The flight crews of both airplanes were properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable Federal regulations. None of these individuals was experiencing any personal problems or rest anomalies that would have affected their performance. The airplanes had undergone the required inspections. Examination of their maintenance documents revealed that both airplanes complied with all appropriate airworthiness directives. Evidence gathered from the wreckage indicated that neither airplane had experienced an in-flight fire, bird strike, or structural or mechanical failure. Tissue samples revealed that the pilot of the Seminole had taken doxylamine sometime before the accident. (Doxylamine is a sedating antihistamine that has substantial adverse effects on performance.) However, the amount of blood available for analysis was insufficient for determining exactly when the pilot may have ingested the medication or whether his performance was impaired by the effects of doxylamine. A partial cockpit visibility study revealed that the Seminole would have been visible to the pilots in the Chieftain for at least the 60 seconds before the collision. No stereo photographs from a Seminole cockpit were available to determine precise obstruction angles. However, because of the relative viewing angle, the Chieftain would have been visible to the pilots in the Seminole for most of the last 60 seconds. The study further revealed that about 4 seconds before impact, or about .11 nm separation, the angular width of each airplane in each pilot's field of vision would have been approximately 0.5 to 0.6 degrees or about 1/4 inch apparent size at the windscreen. ## Factual narrative (aircraft 2) HISTORY OF FLIGHT On August 9, 2000, at 0752 eastern daylight time (all times in this brief are eastern daylight time based on a 24-hour clock), a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, N27944, operated by Patuxent Airways, Inc., and a Piper PA-44-180 Seminole, N2225G, operated by Hortman Aviation Services, Inc., collided in flight over Burlington Township, New Jersey. The captain, first officer, and seven passengers aboard the Chieftain were killed, as were the flight instructor and the certificated private pilot aboard the Seminole. Both airplanes were destroyed. The Chieftain was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as a visual flight rules (VFR) charter flight for Department of the Navy personnel. The Seminole was operating under 14 CFR Part 91 as a local, multiengine airplane instructional flight. Day visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the collision. The Chieftain was en route from Trenton Mercer County Airport (TTN), Trenton, New Jersey, to Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. TTN air traffic control cleared the Chieftain for takeoff at 0746. At 0748, the tower controller cleared the crew to change to radio frequency 123.8 MHz (a Philadelphia Approach Control frequency), which the crew acknowledged. No further transmissions were heard from the airplane on any frequency. Impact and fire damage prevented investigators from determining the radio frequencies that had been selected by the Chieftain crew. The Seminole departed Northeast Philadelphia Airport (PNE), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, under VFR, from runway 24, at 0745. (PNE is located 14.5 nautical miles [nm] southwest of TTN.) Shortly after takeoff, the tower controller stated, "two five golf frequency change approved," and a crewmember responded, "two five golf." No further transmissions were heard from the airplane on any frequency. Investigators found that the Seminole's radio transmitter had been set to the COMM 2 ("communications radio 2") position. The COMM 1 switch was in the ON position, and the frequency was set to 121.70. The COMM 2 switch was in the TEST position, and the frequency was set to 126.90. PNE's ground control frequency was 121.70, and the tower frequency was 126.90. According to airport personnel who talked to the Seminole's instructor pilot before takeoff, no practice instrument flight was to be accomplished. The president of Hortman Aviation stated that radar advisories were not normally requested during training flights. He also stated that company aircraft were supposed to fly with strobe lights on at all times. When advised that the Seminole was flying between 130 and 135 knots' airspeed when the accident occurred, the president stated that the airplane would not have been doing maneuvers at that time because that airspeed was too high. The recorded radar data indicate that shortly before the collision, the Seminole was flying generally northeast, and the Chieftain was flying generally south. Both airplanes were flying at about 3,000 feet. About a minute before the collision, the Seminole started a gradual left turn toward the north-northeast. The last secondary radar return before the collision was received from the Seminole at 0752:37.68 at an altitude of 3,000 feet, less than .4 nm southwest of the Chieftain's last radar return. The only returns received after 0752:37.68 in the area surrounding the collision were primary returns that began to appear at 0752:42.35, near the last secondary returns associated with the Chieftain and Seminole. The loss of secondary returns and the appearance of a cloud of primary returns are consistent with loss of power to the transponders and the breakup of the two airplanes following the collision. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The Chieftain Captain The Chieftain captain held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for multiengine land airplanes and single-engine land airplanes. His latest Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical certificate had no limitations and was dated February 11, 1999. According to Patuxent Airways' records, the captain had 3,968 hours of flight time, 3,651 hours of multiengine flight time, and 1,418 hours of flight time in Piper Navajo Chieftains. He had 122 hours of flight time in the previous 90 days, 21 hours in the previous 30 days, and no flight time in the previous 24 hours. His last flight before the accident flight was on July 19, 2000. The captain successfully completed an "Airman Competency/Proficiency Check, FAR [Federal Aviation Regulation] 135" in a PA-31-350, on February 13, 2000. He was designated as Patuxent Airways' chief pilot in November 1998. In a June 13, 2000, letter from the FAA, the captain was also designated as a "Proficiency Check Pilot - Aircraft" and a "Line Check Pilot - All Seats," effective May 24, 2000. According to peers and employers, the captain was a good pilot. Interviews with his wife revealed no personal problems or rest anomalies. The Chieftain First Officer The first officer was a certificated commercial pilot with ratings in multiengine land airplanes, single-engine land airplanes, and single-engine seaplanes. He was also certified as a flight instructor and instrument instructor in both multiengine and single-engine airplanes. His latest FAA first-class medical certificate had no limitations and was dated April 21, 2000. According to Patuxent Airways' records and a multiengine flight time estimate, the first officer had 2,185 hours of flight time, 700 hours of multiengine time, and 298 hours in Piper Navajo Chieftains. The first officer had 110 hours of flight time in the previous 90 days, 38 hours in the previous 30 days, and no flight time in the previous 24 hours. His last flight before the accident flight was on August 4, 2000. The first officer successfully completed an "Airman Competency/Proficiency Check, FAR 135" in a PA-31-350, on January 27, 2000. The first officer's employer stated that he had not flown with the first officer, who had flown almost exclusively with the accident captain. Interviews with first officer's parents revealed no personal problems or rest anomalies. The Seminole Flight Instructor The flight instructor was certified as a flight instructor and instrument instructor in both multiengine and single-engine land airplanes. He had been a flight instructor for about 10 years and had received his rating as a multiengine flight instructor on March 23, 2000. He also held a commercial pilot certificate for multiengine and single-engine land airplanes. The flight instructor's latest FAA second-class medical certificate, dated July 3, 2000, required that he wear corrective lenses. The flight instructor's last logbook entry was for a flight on July 13, 2000. As of that date, he had 1,442 hours of flight time, 60 hours of multiengine flight time, and 773 hours of flight time as a flight instructor, with 3 of those hours in multiengine airplanes. His employer stated that everyone liked the way in which the flight instructor taught, and that he did not think the flight instructor ever had a student who failed a checkride. Interviews with the instructor's wife revealed no personal problems or rest anomalies. The Seminole Pilot Receiving Instruction The pilot receiving multiengine flight instruction was a certificated private pilot, rated in single-engine land airplanes. His latest second-class medical certificate, dated August 20, 1998, required that he wear contact lenses for distance vision. He had 187 hours of flight time, with 12 hours in multiengine airplanes. He had 52 hours of flight time in the previous 90 days, 8 hours in the previous 30 days, and no flight time in the previous 24 hours. This was not the student pilot's first multiengine flight. The private pilot was described as "a low-key guy who knew what he wanted," "a real good student," and "con ## Factual narrative (aircraft 1) HISTORY OF FLIGHT On August 9, 2000, at 0752 eastern daylight time (all times in this brief are eastern daylight time based on a 24-hour clock), a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, N27944, operated by Patuxent Airways, Inc., and a Piper PA-44-180 Seminole, N2225G, operated by Hortman Aviation Services, Inc., collided in flight over Burlington Township, New Jersey. The captain, first officer, and seven passengers aboard the Chieftain were killed, as were the flight instructor and the certificated private pilot aboard the Seminole. Both airplanes were destroyed. The Chieftain was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as a visual flight rules (VFR) charter flight for Department of the Navy personnel. The Seminole was operating under 14 CFR Part 91 as a local, multiengine airplane instructional flight. Day visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the collision. The Chieftain was en route from Trenton Mercer County Airport (TTN), Trenton, New Jersey, to Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. TTN air traffic control cleared the Chieftain for takeoff at 0746. At 0748, the tower controller cleared the crew to change to radio frequency 123.8 MHz (a Philadelphia Approach Control frequency), which the crew acknowledged. No further transmissions were heard from the airplane on any frequency. Impact and fire damage prevented investigators from determining the radio frequencies that had been selected by the Chieftain crew. The Seminole departed Northeast Philadelphia Airport (PNE), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, under VFR, from runway 24, at 0745. (PNE is located 14.5 nautical miles [nm] southwest of TTN.) Shortly after takeoff, the tower controller stated, "two five golf frequency change approved," and a crewmember responded, "two five golf." No further transmissions were heard from the airplane on any frequency. Investigators found that the Seminole's radio transmitter had been set to the COMM 2 ("communications radio 2") position. The COMM 1 switch was in the ON position, and the frequency was set to 121.70. The COMM 2 switch was in the TEST position, and the frequency was set to 126.90. PNE's ground control frequency was 121.70, and the tower frequency was 126.90. According to airport personnel who talked to the Seminole's instructor pilot before takeoff, no practice instrument flight was to be accomplished. The president of Hortman Aviation stated that radar advisories were not normally requested during training flights. He also stated that company aircraft were supposed to fly with strobe lights on at all times. When advised that the Seminole was flying between 130 and 135 knots' airspeed when the accident occurred, the president stated that the airplane would not have been doing maneuvers at that time because that airspeed was too high. The recorded radar data indicate that shortly before the collision, the Seminole was flying generally northeast, and the Chieftain was flying generally south. Both airplanes were flying at about 3,000 feet. About a minute before the collision, the Seminole started a gradual left turn toward the north-northeast. The last secondary radar return before the collision was received from the Seminole at 0752:37.68 at an altitude of 3,000 feet, less than .4 nm southwest of the Chieftain's last radar return. The only returns received after 0752:37.68 in the area surrounding the collision were primary returns that began to appear at 0752:42.35, near the last secondary returns associated with the Chieftain and Seminole. The loss of secondary returns and the appearance of a cloud of primary returns are consistent with loss of power to the transponders and the breakup of the two airplanes following the collision. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The Chieftain Captain The Chieftain captain held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for multiengine land airplanes and single-engine land airplanes. His latest Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical certificate had no limitations and was dated February 11, 1999. According to Patuxent Airways' records, the captain had 3,968 hours of flight time, 3,651 hours of multiengine flight time, and 1,418 hours of flight time in Piper Navajo Chieftains. He had 122 hours of flight time in the previous 90 days, 21 hours in the previous 30 days, and no flight time in the previous 24 hours. His last flight before the accident flight was on July 19, 2000. The captain successfully completed an "Airman Competency/Proficiency Check, FAR [Federal Aviation Regulation] 135" in a PA-31-350, on February 13, 2000. He was designated as Patuxent Airways' chief pilot in November 1998. In a June 13, 2000, letter from the FAA, the captain was also designated as a "Proficiency Check Pilot - Aircraft" and a "Line Check Pilot - All Seats," effective May 24, 2000. According to peers and employers, the captain was a good pilot. Interviews with his wife revealed no personal problems or rest anomalies. The Chieftain First Officer The first officer was a certificated commercial pilot with ratings in multiengine land airplanes, single-engine land airplanes, and single-engine seaplanes. He was also certified as a flight instructor and instrument instructor in both multiengine and single-engine airplanes. His latest FAA first-class medical certificate had no limitations and was dated April 21, 2000. According to Patuxent Airways' records and a multiengine flight time estimate, the first officer had 2,185 hours of flight time, 700 hours of multiengine time, and 298 hours in Piper Navajo Chieftains. The first officer had 110 hours of flight time in the previous 90 days, 38 hours in the previous 30 days, and no flight time in the previous 24 hours. His last flight before the accident flight was on August 4, 2000. The first officer successfully completed an "Airman Competency/Proficiency Check, FAR 135" in a PA-31-350, on January 27, 2000. The first officer's employer stated that he had not flown with the first officer, who had flown almost exclusively with the accident captain. Interviews with first officer's parents revealed no personal problems or rest anomalies. The Seminole Flight Instructor The flight instructor was certified as a flight instructor and instrument instructor in both multiengine and single-engine land airplanes. He had been a flight instructor for about 10 years and had received his rating as a multiengine flight instructor on March 23, 2000. He also held a commercial pilot certificate for multiengine and single-engine land airplanes. The flight instructor's latest FAA second-class medical certificate, dated July 3, 2000, required that he wear corrective lenses. The flight instructor's last logbook entry was for a flight on July 13, 2000. As of that date, he had 1,442 hours of flight time, 60 hours of multiengine flight time, and 773 hours of flight time as a flight instructor, with 3 of those hours in multiengine airplanes. His employer stated that everyone liked the way in which the flight instructor taught, and that he did not think the flight instructor ever had a student who failed a checkride. Interviews with the instructor's wife revealed no personal problems or rest anomalies. The Seminole Pilot Receiving Instruction The pilot receiving multiengine flight instruction was a certificated private pilot, rated in single-engine land airplanes. His latest second-class medical certificate, dated August 20, 1998, required that he wear contact lenses for distance vision. He had 187 hours of flight time, with 12 hours in multiengine airplanes. He had 52 hours of flight time in the previous 90 days, 8 hours in the previous 30 days, and no flight time in the previous 24 hours. This was not the student pilot's first multiengine flight. The private pilot was described as "a low-key guy who knew what he wanted," "a real good student," and "con ## Aircraft 1 - Registration: [N27944](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N27944-2013-08-08), registration cancelled 2013-08-08, S/N 31-7952056, built 1979 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: Piper PA-31 NAVAJO (PA-31 NAVA) - Registry model: [Piper PA-31-350](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-31-350) (registry code 7103110) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Lycoming TI0-540 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/lycoming-ti0-540-series) (registry code 41533, turbo-prop) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Engines: unknown - Damage: Destroyed - Flight: Part 135 - Operator: Patuxent Airways, Inc - Registered owner: Patuxent Airways, Inc. - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: 100 hour, July 14, 2000 - Departed: TTN, TRENTON, NJ - Destination: NHK, PATUXENT, MD - Flight plan: IFR ## Aircraft 2 - Registration: [N2225G](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N2225G-2015-05-20), registration cancelled 2015-05-20, S/N 44-7995171, built 1978 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: Piper PA-44 SEMINOLE (PA-44 SEMI) - Registry model: [Piper PA-44-180](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-44-180) (registry code 7104402) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Lycoming O&VO-360 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/lycoming-o-vo-360-series) (registry code 41514, reciprocating) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Engines: unknown - Damage: Destroyed - Flight: Instructional, Part 91 - Operator: Hortman Aviation Services - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Departed: PNE, PHILADELPHIA, PA - Flight plan: Unknown ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot, aircraft N27944; airline transport; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 2, valid medical--no waivers/lim.; toxicology performed; flight hours: 3,968 total, 1,418 in this make and model, 122 in the last 90 days, 21 in the last 30 days, 0 in the last 24 hours - Flight instructor, aircraft N2225G; injuries: fatal; flight instructor, commercial; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 2, valid medical--w/ waivers/lim; toxicology performed; flight hours: 1,442 total - Student pilot, aircraft N2225G; injuries: fatal; private; airplane ratings: single-engine land; medical: class 2, valid medical--w/ waivers/lim; flight hours: 187 total, 52 in the last 90 days, 8 in the last 30 days, 0 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Not reported - Wind: 190° at 4 knots - Temperature: 73 °F, dew point 72 °F - Altimeter: 29.93 inHg - Observed at: KTTN ## FAA reports on this event (2) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20000809043421A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20000809043421A), Aug 9, 2000: Piper PA31350, Burlington, NJ, Destroyed, 9 fatal. (-23) N27944, a Piper PA-31-350 and N2225G, a Piper PA-44-180 collided while operating VFR and no air traffic was involved. Both aircraft were destroyed. - [Accident 20000809043422A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20000809043422A), Aug 9, 2000: Piper PA44180, Burlington, NJ, Destroyed, 2 fatal. (-23) N2225G, a Piper PA-44-180 and N27944, a Piper pa 31-350 collided while operating VFR with no air traffic involved. Both aircraft were destroyed. ## Docket (35 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on August 21, 2001, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=49936. 20.3 MB in all. - Operations 2 - Group Chairman Factual Report (item 1, .PDF, 571 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144685&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Group%20Chairman%20Factual%20Report-Master.PDF - Meteorology 5 - Factual Report of Group Chairman (item 2, .PDF, 281 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40451565&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Meteorology%205%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman-Master.PDF - Meteorology 5 - Factual Report of Group Chairman Attachments (item 3, .PDF, 3.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144687&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Meteorology%205%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman%20Attachments-Master.PDF - Airworthiness Group Chairman's Factual Report (item 4, .PDF, 638 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144688&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20Group%20Chairman%27s%20Factual%20Report-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Appendix A - Wreckage Distribution (item 5, .PDF, 153 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144689&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Appendix%20A%20-%20Wreckage%20Distribution-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Appendix B - Diagram of contact marks. (item 6, .PDF, 133 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144690&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Appendix%20B%20-%20Diagram%20of%20contact%20marks.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Appendix C - Photographs (item 7, .PDF, 22 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144691&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Appendix%20C%20-%20Photographs-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 1. Navajo Chieftain main wreckage site. Arrow #1 points to the left wing. Arrow #2 points to the Empennage. (item 8, .PDF, 41 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144692&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%201.%20%20Navajo%20Chieftain%20main%20wreckage%20site.%20%20Arrow%20%231%20points%20to%20the%20left%20wing.%20%20Arrow%20%232%20points%20to%20the%20Empennage.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 2. Navajo Chieftain Baggage Door. (item 9, .PDF, 31 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144693&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%202.%20%20Navajo%20Chieftain%20Baggage%20Door.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 3. Navajo Chieftain left wing. View looking forward. (item 10, .PDF, 39 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144694&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%203.%20%20Navajo%20Chieftain%20left%20wing.%20%20%20View%20looking%20forward.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 4. Navajo Chieftain right wing. View looking forward. (item 11, .PDF, 35 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144695&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%204.%20%20Navajo%20Chieftain%20right%20wing.%20%20View%20looking%20forward.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 5. Navajo Chieftain Vertical Stabilizer, right side. (item 12, .PDF, 40 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144696&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%205.%20%20Navajo%20Chieftain%20Vertical%20Stabilizer,%20right%20side.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 6. Navajo Chieftain left engine. View looking aft. (item 13, .PDF, 35 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144697&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%206.%20%20Navajo%20Chieftain%20left%20engine.%20%20View%20looking%20aft.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 7. Navajo Chieftain right engine. View looking aft. (item 14, .PDF, 42 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144698&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%207.%20%20Navajo%20Chieftain%20right%20engine.%20%20View%20looking%20aft.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 8. Seminole Right Wing and Navajo Cheiftain Rudder Trim Tab. (item 15, .PDF, 34 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144699&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%208.%20%20Seminole%20Right%20Wing%20and%20Navajo%20Cheiftain%20Rudder%20Trim%20Tab.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 9. Seminole Reconstruction. View looking aft. (item 16, .PDF, 47 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144700&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%209.%20%20Seminole%20Reconstruction.%20%20View%20looking%20aft.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 10. Seminole Seat Reconstruction. (item 17, .PDF, 45 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144701&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%2010.%20Seminole%20Seat%20Reconstruction.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 11. Seminole outboard section of right wing. View looking forward. (item 18, .PDF, 30 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144702&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%2011.%20Seminole%20outboard%20section%20of%20right%20wing.%20View%20looking%20forward.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 12. Seminole inboard section of right wing. View looking forward. (item 19, .PDF, 50 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144703&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%2012.%20Seminole%20inboard%20section%20of%20right%20wing.%20%20View%20looking%20forward.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 13. Seminole left wing. View looking forward. (item 20, .PDF, 38 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144704&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%2013.%20Seminole%20left%20wing.%20%20View%20looking%20forward.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 14. Seminole main carry through spar. (item 21, .PDF, 49 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144705&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%2014.%20Seminole%20main%20carry%20through%20spar.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 15. Seminole Empennage right side. Arrow #1 points to blade strike. Arrow #2 points to compression damage. (item 22, .PDF, 47 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144706&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%2015.%20Seminole%20Empennage%20right%20side.%20%20Arrow%20%231%20points%20to%20blade%20strike.%20%20Arrow%20%232%20points%20to%20compression%20damage.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 16. Seminole left engine propeller. View looking aft. (item 23, .PDF, 34 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144707&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%2016.%20Seminole%20left%20engine%20propeller.%20%20View%20looking%20aft.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 17. Seminole left engine. (item 24, .PDF, 56 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144708&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%2017.%20Seminole%20left%20engine.-Master.PDF - Airworthiness - Photo 18. Seminole right engine. (item 25, .PDF, 41 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144709&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airworthiness%20-%20Photo%2018.%20Seminole%20right%20engine.-Master.PDF - Toxicology Reports (item 26, .PDF, 281 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40451566&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Toxicology%20Reports-Master.PDF - Radar Data - EWR ASR RBBTRT (item 27, .PDF, 2.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144711&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Radar%20Data%20-%20EWR%20ASR%20RBBTRT-Master.PDF - Radar Data - EWR ASR TATU (item 28, .PDF, 2.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144712&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Radar%20Data%20-%20EWR%20ASR%20TATU-Master.PDF - Radar Data - EWR ASR TG (item 29, .PDF, 821 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144713&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Radar%20Data%20-%20EWR%20ASR%20TG-Master.PDF - Radar Data - NY NTAP (item 30, .PDF, 91 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144714&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Radar%20Data%20-%20NY%20NTAP-Master.PDF - Radar Data - NY NTAP1 (item 31, .PDF, 70 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144715&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Radar%20Data%20-%20NY%20NTAP1-Master.PDF - Radar Data - PHL ASR BTRTRB (item 32, .PDF, 5.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144716&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Radar%20Data%20-%20PHL%20ASR%20BTRTRB-Master.PDF - Evaluation of the August 9, 2000, New Jersey Mid-air Collision - Situational Awareness and Collision Avoidance Options - Group 92, Air Traffic Control Systems - June 28, 2001 (item 33, .PDF, 681 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144717&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Evaluation%20of%20the%20August%209,%202000,%20%20New%20Jersey%20Mid-air%20Collision%20-%20Situational%20Awareness%20and%20Collision%20Avoidance%20Options%20-%20Group%2092,%20Air%20Traffic%20Control%20Systems%20-%20June%2028,%202001-Master.PDF - Animation of the August 9, 2000, New Jersey Mid-air Collision - Group 92, Air Traffic Control System - June 28, 2001 (item 34, .PDF, 268 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144718&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Animation%20of%20the%20August%209,%202000,%20New%20Jersey%20Mid-air%20Collision%20-%20Group%2092,%20Air%20Traffic%20Control%20System%20-%20June%2028,%202001-Master.PDF - Aircraft Performance Radar & Cockpit Visibility Study (item 35, .PDF, 1.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40144719&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Aircraft%20Performance%20Radar%20%26%20Cockpit%20Visibility%20Study-Master.PDF From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.