# NTSB DCA07MA072: Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW, Cleveland, OH, February 18, 2007 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · No injuries · Class 1 · Major · Final report - Date: February 18, 2007, 15:06 local (20:06 UTC) - Place: Cleveland, OH - Coordinates: 41.411666, -81.849723 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=41.4117&lon=-81.8497&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/550) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Highest injury: No injuries - Injuries: 74 uninjured - Status: Completed, report August 28, 2008 - Report: Board-adopted at Board Meeting - Investigation class: Class 1 - NTSB office: Major Investigations Division - Parties: Cleveland, OH FSDO - Safety recommendations: Yes - NTSB case key (mKey): 65333 - NTSB case page: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA07MA072.aspx - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/65333/pdf - Board report AAR0801 (PDF): https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR0801.pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=65333 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/DCA07MA072 ## Probable cause the failure of the flight crew to execute a missed approach when visual cues for the runway were not distinct and identifiable. Contributing to the accident were (1) the crew's decision to descend to the ILS decision height instead of the localizer (glideslope out) minimum descent altitude; (2) the first officer's long landing on a short contaminated runway and the crew's failure to use reverse thrust and braking to their maximum effectiveness; (3) the captain's fatigue, which affected his ability to effectively plan for and monitor the approach and landing; and (4) Shuttle America's failure to administer an attendance policy that permitted flight crewmembers to call in as fatigued without fear of reprisals. ## Analysis The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/A_Acc1.htm. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-08/01. On February 18, 2007, about 1506 eastern standard time, Delta Connection flight 6448, an Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW, operated by Shuttle America, Inc., was landing on runway 28 at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport, Cleveland, Ohio, during snow conditions when it overran the end of the runway, contacted an instrument landing system (ILS) antenna, and struck an airport perimeter fence. The airplane's nose gear collapsed during the overrun. Of the 2 flight crewmembers, 2 flight attendants, and 71 passengers on board, 3 passengers received minor injuries. The airplane received substantial damage from the impact forces. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. ## Factual narrative The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/A_Acc1.htm. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-08/01. On February 18, 2007, about 1506 eastern standard time, Delta Connection flight 6448, an Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW, operated by Shuttle America, Inc., was landing on runway 28 at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport (CLE), Cleveland, Ohio, during snow conditions when it overran the end of the runway, contacted an instrument landing system (ILS) antenna, and struck an airport perimeter fence. The airplane's nose gear collapsed during the overrun. Of the 2 flight crewmembers, 2 flight attendants, and 71 passengers on board, 3 passengers received minor injuries. The airplane received substantial damage from impact forces. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL), Atlanta, Georgia. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. According to weather observations, 15 inches of snow was on the ground at CLE at 0700 on February 17, 2007. Light snow fell from 0910 to 2156, with 1 inch of new snow reported during that period. Snow began to fall again from 0541 to 1201 on February 18, with 2 inches of new snow reported during the period, and from 1436 to 1538, with less than 1 inch of additional snow accumulation. On the day of the accident, the captain traveled as a nonrevenue passenger on a flight from Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field (SDF), Louisville, Kentucky, to ATL to report for a scheduled 2-day trip. The captain was scheduled to report to SDF at 0525, and the flight to ATL had a scheduled arrival time of 0733. The first flight leg, from ATL to Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), Sarasota, Florida, was delayed because of weather. The flight departed ATL at 0914 and arrived at SRQ at 1042. The second flight leg departed SRQ at 1108 and arrived at ATL at 1242. The third flight leg, the accident flight, departed on time (with a different first officer) from ATL at 1305 and had an expected arrival time at CLE of 1451. The accident flight was the first one in which the captain and the first officer had flown together. Shuttle America's common practice is for the captain to be the flying pilot for the first flight of any crew pairing. The captain reported that he received only about 1 hour of sleep during the night before the accident and, as a result, asked the first officer to be the flying pilot for the flight. The first officer reported that he would have preferred not to be the flying pilot because he had just completed a 3-day, 6-leg trip sequence but that he agreed to be the flying pilot because of the captain's references to fatigue and lack of sleep the night before. (The first officer did not verbalize this preference to the captain before the flight.) The flight dispatcher provided the crew with a weather update about 1310, via the airplane's aircraft communications addressing and reporting system (ACARS), indicating that visibility was unrestricted with no snow. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording began about 1316:10. Shortly afterward, the captain stated, "so tired … had about an hours sleep last night. I just tossed and turned." The dispatcher provided the crew with another ACARS weather update about 1407, again indicating that visibility was unrestricted with no snow. About 1429:19, the flight crew received automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information Alpha, which indicated that the ILS runway 24R approach was in use, the landing runway was 24R, the glideslopes for runways 24L and 28 were "unusable due to snow build-up," and braking action advisories were in effect. The first officer then briefed the ILS procedure for runway 24R. About 1442:41, the crew received ATIS information Bravo, which indicated that the ILS runway 28 approach was in use and that the landing runway was 28. Also, this ATIS repeated that the glideslopes for runways 24L and 28 were unusable and that braking action advisories were in effect. Neither flight crewmember discussed the information in each ATIS broadcast about the unusable glideslopes. The weather information in the flight crew's preflight paperwork included a notice to airmen (NOTAM) for runways 24L and 28 that stated, "due to the effects of snow on the glide slope minimums temporarily raised to localizer only for all category aircraft. Glide slope remains in service. However angle may be different than published." During postaccident interviews, both pilots indicated that they had not read this NOTAM. About 1450:14, the captain contacted Cleveland approach control, and the approach controller provided vectors for the ILS runway 28 approach. About 1453:06, the first officer briefed the ILS procedure for that runway, stating the location of the glideslope, descent altitude, minimum safe altitudes, and missed approach procedure. The first officer did not brief the runway length, and the captain did not request this information. The approach controller then notified the flight crew that ATIS information Charlie was current and that the winds were from 290º at 18 knots, visibility was 1/4 mile with heavy snow, and the runway 28 runway visual range (RVR) was 6,000 feet. The captain then stated, "one-quarter mile visibility … well we got the RVR. So we're good there." According to the Jeppesen March 24, 2006, ILS approach chart for CLE runway 28, the minimums for the precision (ILS) approach required an RVR of 2,400 feet or 1/2-mile visibility, and the minimums for the nonprecision localizer (glideslope out) approach required an RVR of 4,000 feet or 3/4-mile visibility. About 1458:46, the approach controller informed a Jet Link flight crew that the flight was cleared for an ILS runway 28 approach and that the glideslope was unusable. The Shuttle America flight crew heard this transmission, and the crew began to discuss how that flight could be cleared for an ILS approach if the glideslope were unusable. About 1459:10, the approach controller instructed the Shuttle America flight crew to descend from 6,000 to 3,000 feet, and the captain acknowledged this instruction. Afterward, the captain stated, "it's not an ILS if there's no glideslope," to which the first officer replied, "exactly, it's a localizer." During postaccident interviews, both pilots stated that they were confused by the term "unusable," but the CVR indicated that neither pilot asked the controller for clarification regarding the status of the glideslope. About 1500:04, the approach controller instructed the flight crew to turn left onto a new heading and intercept the runway 28 localizer. The captain acknowledged this instruction. The first officer then stated, "wonder why they put it on two eight without a … glideslope if it's … ILS." About 1500:30, the controller instructed the crew to maintain 3,000 feet until established on the localizer and indicated that the flight was cleared for the ILS runway 28 approach and that the glideslope was unusable. The captain acknowledged the approach clearance and the altitude restriction but did not read back that the glideslope was unusable. About 1501:09, the captain contacted the tower controller, stating "localizer to two eight." The controller then cleared the airplane to land on runway 28 and reported that the winds were from 310º at 12 knots and that the braking action was "fair." The captain acknowledged the landing clearance. About 1502:01, the first officer stated that the glideslope had been captured. During a postaccident interview, the first officer stated that he and the captain did the "mental math" for a 3º glideslope and that, on the basis of this calculation, they assumed that the glideslope was functioning normally. Also, the captain stated that the cockpit instrumentation showed the airplane on the glideslope with no w ## Sequence of events In NTSB's coding before 2008 (https://www.ntsb.gov/GILS/Documents/codman.pdf). - Overrun, landing - roll - missed approach - not performed, flightcrew (cause) - fatigue, pilot in command (contributing factor) - procedure inadequate, company/operator management (contributing factor) - airport facilities,runway/landing area condition - other (contributing factor) - On ground/water collision with object, landing - roll - object - antenna ## Aircraft - Registration: [N862RW](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N862RW), registered now, S/N 17000098, built 2005 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: Embraer ERJ-170 - Registry model: [Embraer ERJ 170-100 SE](https://openairdocs.org/model/embraer-erj-170-100-se) (registry code 3260406) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [GE CF34 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/ge-cf34-series) (registry code 30015, turbo-fan) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Engines: turbo fan; General Electric CF34-8E5 turbo fan; General Electric CF34-8E5 turbo fan - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Part 121 - Registered owner: Shuttle America - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Transport - Departed: ATL, Atlanta, GA - Destination: CLE, Cleveland, OH - Flight plan: IFR - Airport: CLE, Cleveland Hopkins Internationa, runway 28, 6,017 × 150 ft, asphalt ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 31; injuries: none; airline transport, commercial; airplane ratings: single-engine sea, multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, with waivers/limitations; last flight review December 1, 2006; seat: left; flight hours: 4,500 total, 1,200 in this make and model, 142 in the last 90 days, 41 in the last 30 days, 5 in the last 24 hours - Co-pilot; age 46; injuries: none; airline transport, commercial, flight instructor; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, with waivers/limitations; last flight review July 1, 2006; seat: right; flight hours: 3,900 total, 1,200 in this make and model, 229 in the last 90 days, 96 in the last 30 days, 7 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Instrument (IMC) - Wind: 330° at 13 knots, gusting 19 - Visibility: 0.25 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: 300 ft broken - Temperature: 18 °F, dew point 12 °F - Altimeter: 30.03 inHg - Observed at: CLE ## Docket (43 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on September 21, 2007, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=65333. 60.4 MB in all. - Operations 2 - Factual Report of Group Chairman (item 1, .PDF, 1.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279863&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman-Master.PDF - Operations 2 - Attachment 1 Interview Summaries (item 2, .PDF, 484 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279853&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Attachment%201%20Interview%20Summaries-Master.PDF - Operations 2 - Attachment 2 ERJ-170 Simulator Session (item 3, .PDF, 23 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279818&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Attachment%202%20ERJ-170%20Simulator%20Session-Master.PDF - Operations 2 - Attachment 3 Flight Papers (item 4, .PDF, 705 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279835&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Attachment%203%20Flight%20Papers-Master.PDF - Operations 2 - Attachment 4 ERJ-170 POH Limitations (item 5, .PDF, 170 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279822&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Attachment%204%20ERJ-170%20POH%20Limitations-Master.PDF - Operations 2 - Attachment 5 ERJ-170 POH Normal Procedures (item 6, .PDF, 1.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279825&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Attachment%205%20ERJ-170%20POH%20Normal%20Procedures-Master.PDF - Operations 2 - Attachment 6 ERJ-170 POH Emergency and Abnormal Checklists (item 7, .PDF, 125 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279827&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Attachment%206%20ERJ-170%20POH%20Emergency%20and%20Abnormal%20Checklists-Master.PDF - Operations 2 - Attachment 7 ERJ-170 POH Weather Operations (item 8, .PDF, 207 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279829&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Attachment%207%20ERJ-170%20POH%20Weather%20Operations-Master.PDF - Operations 2 - Attachment 8 ERJ-170 POH Training Maneuvers (item 9, .PDF, 198 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279830&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Attachment%208%20ERJ-170%20POH%20Training%20Maneuvers-Master.PDF - Operations 2 - Attachment 9 ERJ-170 POH Performance (item 10, .PDF, 726 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279831&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Attachment%209%20ERJ-170%20POH%20Performance-Master.PDF - Operations 2 - Attachment 10 170 GOM Flight Preparation (item 11, .PDF, 187 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279832&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Attachment%2010%20170%20GOM%20Flight%20Preparation-Master.PDF - Operations 2 - Attachment 11 170 GOM Enroute Operations (item 12, .PDF, 280 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279833&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Attachment%2011%20170%20GOM%20Enroute%20Operations-Master.PDF - Operations 2 - Attachment 12 170 GOM Dispatch (item 13, .PDF, 1.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279834&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%202%20-%20Attachment%2012%20170%20GOM%20Dispatch-Master.PDF - ATC 3 - Factual Report of Group Chairman (item 14, .PDF, 371 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40280436&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=ATC%203%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman-Master.PDF - ATC 3 - CLE ILS Runway 28 Chart (item 15, .PDF, 320 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40280063&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=ATC%203%20-%20CLE%20ILS%20Runway%2028%20Chart-Master.PDF - ATC 3 - FAA Aircraft Accident Package (item 16, .PDF, 3.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40280061&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=ATC%203%20-%20FAA%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Package-Master.PDF - Meteorology 5 - Factual Report of Group Chairman (item 17, .PDF, 1.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40275425&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Meteorology%205%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman-Master.PDF - Meteorology 5 - Attachment 1 Dispatch Release (item 18, .PDF, 1.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40275427&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Meteorology%205%20-%20Attachment%201%20Dispatch%20Release-Master.PDF - Meteorology 5 - Attachment 2 Weather Document (item 19, .PDF, 2.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40275428&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Meteorology%205%20-%20Attachment%202%20Weather%20Document-Master.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Factual Report of Group Chairman (item 20, .PDF, 352 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40280118&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman-Master.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 1 - CLE Operations Log and NOTAMS (item 21, .PDF, 807 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40280968&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%201%20-%20CLE%20Operations%20Log%20and%20NOTAMS-Master.PDF - Survival Factors 6 - Attachment 2 - CLE ARFF Log, Statements, and Equipment List (item 22, .PDF, 406 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40371272&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Survival%20Factors%206%20-%20Attachment%202%20-%20CLE%20ARFF%20Log,%20Statements,%20and%20Equipment%20List-Redacted.PDF - Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report (item 23, .PDF, 4.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282418&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Flight%20Data%20Recorder%2010%20-%20Specialist%27s%20Factual%20Report-Master.PDF - Flight Data Recorder 10 - Attachment 1: Tabular Data (item 24, .CSV, 134 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282419&FileExtension=.csv&FileName=Flight%20Data%20Recorder%2010%20-%20Attachment%201%3A%20Tabular%20Data-Master.csv - Cockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group Chairman (item 25, .PDF, 370 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282808&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Cockpit%20Voice%20Recorder%2012%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman-Master.PDF - Aircraft Performance 13 - Factual Report of Group Chairman, Part 1 (item 26, .PDF, 12.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40280019&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Aircraft%20Performance%2013%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman,%20Part%201-Master.PDF - Aircraft Performance 13 - Factual Report of Group Chairman, Part 2 (item 27, .PDF, 7.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40280020&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Aircraft%20Performance%2013%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman,%20Part%202-Master.PDF - Aircraft Performance 13 - Factual Report of Group Chairman, Part 3 (item 28, .PDF, 9.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40280021&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Aircraft%20Performance%2013%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman,%20Part%203-Master.PDF - Human Performance 14 - Factual Report of Group Chairman (item 29, .PDF, 128 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279864&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Human%20Performance%2014%20-%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Group%20Chairman-Master.PDF - Human Performance 14 - Attachment 1 (item 30, .PDF, 38 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279866&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Human%20Performance%2014%20-%20Attachment%201-Master.PDF - Human Performance 14 - Attachment 2 (item 31, .PDF, 403 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279868&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Human%20Performance%2014%20-%20Attachment%202-Master.PDF - Human Performance 14 - Attachment 3 (item 32, .PDF, 30 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279869&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Human%20Performance%2014%20-%20Attachment%203-Master.PDF - Human Performance 14 - Attachment 4 (item 33, .PDF, 52 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279870&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Human%20Performance%2014%20-%20Attachment%204-Master.PDF - Human Performance 14 - Attachment 5 (item 34, .PDF, 11 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279871&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Human%20Performance%2014%20-%20Attachment%205-Master.PDF - Human Performance 14 - Attachment 6 (item 35, .PDF, 267 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40279872&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Human%20Performance%2014%20-%20Attachment%206-Master.PDF - Human Performance 14 - Attachment 7 (item 36, .PDF, 223 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40371273&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Human%20Performance%2014%20-%20Attachment%207-Redacted.PDF - Human Performance 14 - Addendum 1 - Industry Survey (item 37, .PDF, 23 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40281853&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Human%20Performance%2014%20-%20Addendum%201%20-%20Industry%20Survey-Master.PDF - Test Results - Brake Control Modules (item 38, .PDF, 1.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40371274&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Test%20Results%20-%20Brake%20Control%20Modules-Redacted.PDF - Post-accident Telephone Calls (item 39, .PDF, 1.4 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40283696&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Post-accident%20Telephone%20Calls-Master.PDF - Aar 87-06 (item 40, .PDF, 3.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40283703&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=AAR%2087-06-Master.PDF - Shuttle America Submission to NTSB (item 41, .PDF, 383 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40288286&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Shuttle%20America%20Submission%20to%20NTSB-Master.PDF - Cockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Addendum 1 (item 42, .PDF, 46 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40290472&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Cockpit%20Voice%20Recorder%2012%20-%20Addendum%201-Master.PDF - Runway 28 Lighting (item 43, .PDF, 744 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40292239&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Runway%2028%20Lighting-Master.PDF From the NTSB's public API. 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