# NTSB DCA24FA179: Embraer EMB-145LR, N942JX, Houston, TX, May 3, 2024 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Minor injuries · Class 2 · Field · Final report - Date: May 3, 2024, 18:20 local (23:20 UTC) - Place: Houston, TX - Coordinates: 29.6459, -95.2769 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=29.6459&lon=-95.2769&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/550) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Landing-landing roll: Landing gear collapse](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/094) - Highest injury: Minor injuries - Injuries: 1 minor, 23 uninjured - Status: Completed, report September 22, 2026 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 2 - NTSB office: Major Investigations Division - Parties: FAA AVP-100, CENIPA | Brazil (Accredited Representative), Delux Public Charter, Embraer (Technical Advisor), JSX, Federal Aviation Administration, Embraer - NTSB case key (mKey): 194201 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=DCA24FA179 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/194201/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194201 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/DCA24FA179 ## Probable cause The captain’s unintentional use of the nose down pitch trim during final approach which limited the elevator control authority resulting in a hard landing that collapsed the left main landing gear. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Action: incorrect action performance](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041015): Personnel issues › Action/decision · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Embraer EMB-145LR, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041015/cases.md?model=3260212), [All aircraft, 1,386 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041015/cases.md) - [Attention/monitoring: monitoring equip/instruments](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02021525): Personnel issues › Psychological · Pilot; cases with it: [Embraer EMB-145LR, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02021525/cases.md?model=3260212), [All aircraft, 142 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02021525/cases.md) - [Wind: crosswind](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034040): Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena · Effect on personnel; cases with it: [Embraer EMB-145LR, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034040/cases.md?model=3260212), [All aircraft, 1,008 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034040/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Landing-landing roll: Landing gear collapse](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/094) (defining event); cases with it: [Embraer EMB-145LR, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/094/sequence.md?model=3260212), [All aircraft, 1,787 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/094/sequence.md) ## Analysis During descent into William P. Hobby International Airport (HOU), air traffic control (ATC) advised the Delux Public Charter, doing business as JSX Air, flight crew to expect runway 4 for landing and that winds were from 130° at 16 knots (kts), gusting to 24 kts, which was below the Embraer EMB-145LR’s recommended maximum gust of 30 kts. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, the captain, who was the pilot flying, expressed concern about the crosswind, but the first officer (FO), who was the pilot monitoring, stated it was “not that bad” of a crosswind. On approach, about 1,300 ft above ground level (agl), the autopilot was disconnected. Shortly thereafter, the pitch trim was moved in the aircraft nose down (AND) direction, while the captain pulled aft on the control column to maintain an aircraft nose up (ANU) attitude. Throughout the approach, the AND pitch trim continued and ANU pressure (aft) was applied to the control column. Before touchdown, the captain called for a go-around, but the airplane touched down before the go-around was initiated. The airplane did not flare before landing, likely due to the excessive use of AND pitch trim, which limited the captain’s control column authority to arrest the descent. The airplane touched down hard and the left main landing gear (LMLG) separated. FDR data captured the accident flight and two previous flights, one of which was flown by the accident captain. The Airplane Performance Study compared the use of pitch trim across the three flights in the 90 seconds before touchdown – the accident flight, a previous flight flown by the accident captain and a flight flown by a different pilot. In the accident flight, the accident captain made AND and ANU pitch trim inputs throughout the landing approach and pitch trim oscillated between about 0° and 2° ANU. This was likely a technique used to adjust airplane pitch and vertical speed. About 17 seconds before touchdown, AND inputs were made and at touchdown, pitch trim was at -2.86 and continued to about -4°, full AND. In the previous flight flown by the accident captain, the captain made similar AND and ANU pitch trim inputs until 10 seconds before touchdown when ANU pitch trim inputs were made to about 3° ANU at touchdown. In the flight flown by another pilot, the pilot flying made no pitch trim inputs. Although use of trim on the approach was not trained or encouraged by JSX, the data is consistent with the captain’s admission that she would use the trim during the approach and flare. However, on the accident flight, the captain continued to use AND trim rather than ANU trim, as was her technique. The captain had amblyopia, which likely impaired her binocular depth perception, but there was no evidence that impaired binocular depth perception was a factor in the accident. Amblyopia also may include brain effects that can adversely affect performance of some visuo-cognitive tasks. However, there was insufficient evidence to conclude thatany such effects contributed significantly to the captain’s workload or performance during the approach. Thus, reviewed evidence provided no clear indication that the captain’s amblyopia contributed to the accident. The LMLG separated during the hard landing due to vertical acceleration that exceeded its design limits. The hard landing and resulting gear separation resulted in substantial damage to the left wing structure. ## Factual narrative The Embraer 145LR airplane is a twin engine, regional jet airplane originally certified in 1998, see figure 1. The airplane is equipped with a T-tail and retractable tricycle landing gear. The airplane’s primary and secondary structures of the wing, fuselage, and tail are of all metal construction, primarily aluminum alloys. The accident airplane, N942JX, was acquired by JSX in August 2022. Figure 1. Accident Airplane, N942JX. (Source: planespotters.net) The horizontal stabilizer is electromechanically operated, and the control is automatic through the autopilot (AP) system or spoiler control unit (SCU) or manually through the trim switches on the control columns and central console (control pedestal). The horizontal stabilizer control unit (HSCU) controls the operation of the horizontal stabilizer actuator (HSA) which moves the stabilizer surface. There are two disconnect switches, one on each of the control columns. They will stop the electrical signals from the HSCU to the HSA electric motors if there is an accidental operation of the horizontal stabilizer. In addition, there are the main and back-up cut-out switches on the control pedestal. These switches stop the related mode operation if a failure occurs. Per the Embraer 145 Airplane Operations Manual, the maximum recommended crosswind for the accident airplane was 30 kts. The maximum recommended crosswind is the highest windspeed at a 90° angle that should be flown to ensure directional control and structural safety during a takeoff or landing. William P. Hobby International Airport is located 7 miles from downtown Houston, Texas. The airport had 3 paved landing surfaces for airplanes designated 04/22, 13R/31L, 13L/31R. Runway 4, the landing runway, was 7,602 ft long and 150 ft wide, and the elevation at the approach end of the runway 4 was 42 ft msl. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing spar III, which was fractured at two locations and partially fractured at three additional locations. Spar III is a principal structural element that incurred damage that adversely affected the structural strength of the left wing requiring major repair or replacement. The inboard left wing structure experienced the most amount of structural damage as a result of the separation of the LMLG. There was no visible damage to spar II and the integrity of the fuel tank was not compromised during the accident. The LMLG strut aft trunnion sheared away from the aft bearing assembly, translated upwards, bending rib 4A and puncturing through the upper skin of the left wing. The LMLG strut forward trunnion sheared away from the forward bearing assembly and translated downwards. To maintain the integrity of major structures and the fuel tank, the MLG installations are designed to separate from the airplane at the forward and aft trunnion and bearing assembly joints. The LMLG separated from the airplane structure as expected per design. Figure 4. The left photo shows the damage to the left mainlanding gear. The right photo shows the damage to the left rear wing-to-fuselage fairing. Embraer engineering performed a hard landing analysis and determined that at a landing weight of 1,729 kg the vertical acceleration limit of the MLG would be 2.190g. The FDR data revealed the airplane sustained a vertical acceleration of 3.879g at landing. At touchdown, the vertical acceleration applied to the LMLG was greater than the vertical acceleration design limit resulting in its failure. The FDR recording contained approximately 27 hours of data. The accident flight was the last flight of the recording, and its duration was about 45 minutes. The left elevator parameter was intermittent in the recorded data and invalid for the full accident flight. However, the right elevator parameter was valid for the duration of the recording. The data show that the airplane departed at 1713 CDT, and the autopilot was engaged about 600 ft agl. The airplane climbed to an altitude of 25,000 ft (FL250) and cruised about 300 kts indicated airspeed for about five minutes. The airplane then descended and intercepted the localizer on the final approach course at 17:55:23 and an altitude of 3,230 ft for a straight-in instrument landing system (ILS) approach. Flaps began to move to the 9° position at 17:56:00 at 222 kts. The airplane captured the glideslope at 17:56:52, and gear was selected down and flaps to 22° at 17:56:53. The autopilot was disconnected at 17:57:48, at about 1,300 ft and 145 kts. At the time the autopilot was disengaged, the pitch trim was at 3.72° ANU. About 17:58:13, the pitch trim began to move in the nose down direction. Control column and elevator position increased (ANU) as the trim position decreased (AND). At about 250 ft agl pitch trim was at about 2.0° ANU, and it moved steadily in the AND direction as the airplane was in the final portion of its descent. Column and elevator continued to increase ANU, and pitch did not show a corresponding ANU increase. At 17:59:21, the control column was 20.1° ANU, the elevator was 17.1° ANU, and airplane pitch was 0° with the pitch trim at 2.86° AND. A spike in accelerations was recorded, with peak impulse vertical load factor of 3.9g. A GPWS caution was also recorded at this time. Engine throttle lever angle was advanced to 80° and both engines responded and spooled up to high power. At 17:59:23, a Master Warning and Master Caution were recorded and the air/ground signal transitioned to On Ground. The recording ended at 17:59:38 when the airplane still had a ground speed of 112 kts. The reason for the premature end of the data could not be determined. On May 3, 2024, about 1820 central daylight time (CDT), Delux Public Charter, doing business as JSX Air flight 284, an Embraer EMB-145LR, LMLG collapsed during landing at HOU, Houston, Texas. There were no injuries to the 3 crew and 21 passengers onboard. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Codeof Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as a nonscheduled passenger flight from Dallas Love Field Airport (DAL), Dallas, Texas to HOU. According to the flight crew, the captain was the pilot flying and the FO was the pilot monitoring. The takeoff, climb, and cruise portions of the flight were uneventful. ATC advised the crew that they were landing runway 4 and the wind was reported at 130° at 16 kts, gusting to 24. The flight crew discussed the wind and arrival runway, about which the captain expressed concern. The FO tried to reassure her that it was “not that bad” of a crosswind and the captain replied that it did not mean she did not want to do it. The FO asked if the captain wanted to request another runway, but the captain declined. Although runway 13 was better suited for the wind, the crew stated in a postaccident interview that it was standard for HOU to use runway 4 for arrivals and runway 13 for departures, and that HOU was “always pretty adamant on doing that”. About 1,300 ft agl and 93 seconds before touchdown, the captain disconnected the autopilot. Flight data showed that at the time the autopilot was disconnected the pitch trim was 3.72° ANU. About 25 seconds later, the pitch trim moved in the AND direction and aft pressure was applied to the control column to maintain a nose up attitude. Pitch trim decreased from about 4° to about 2°ANU over about 10 seconds. The FO made the 500-foot callout. During a postaccident interview, the captain recalled being “a little bit fast, about nine to ten above the approach speed, but that's technically within parameters of stable for us and it wasn't trending worse.” FDR data showed that AND inputs continued, and at 250 ft agl pitch trim was about 2.0°AND. As nose down trim continued, column and elevator position also increased, however, FDR data did not show an increase in pitch. About 2 seconds before impact, the captain called for a go-around. The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) alerted “sink rate” about the time of impact, and the captain again stated go-around. The captain told investigators that she called for the go-around but it was too late. Although the captain did not recall initiating the go-around, FDR data showed an increase in engine power and aft control column position, however, AND pitch trim inputs continued. The FDR indicated that the vertical load factor during the touchdown was 3.9 gravitational constants (g). As the aircraft continued down the runway, the LMLG collapsed and punctured the left-wing. The airplane came to a stop on the left side of the runway about 567 ft from the end. Emergency personnel responded to the accident and assisted the passengers as they deplaned through the main cabin door (L1). The FO was transported to a local hospital for minor injuries. HOU was equipped with an automated surface observing system (ASOS). At 1753 CDT the ASOS was reporting wind from 130º at 16 kts, gusting to 24 kts. Visibility was greater than 10 statute mileswith no clouds observed below 10,000’ agl. The temperature was 26º C. There was no mention regarding low level windshear (LLWS) in the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF). Flight Crew Training Crosswind landings were trained in the simulator at CAE. During a postaccident interview, a CAE instructor explained that during the simulator check ride, it was standard to have crosswind landings with a steady 10 kt, 90° crosswind, and it is optional to do one landing with a steady 15 kt, 90° crosswind. Regarding training for maximum crosswind landings, he stated “so it's very common to get a demonstrated max crosswind landing but again, the electronic records that are pre-mapped just says crosswind” indicating it was instructor discretion as to the crosswind component given. The captain also stated in a postaccident interview that she routinely performed landings with a crosswind and was comfortable doing so. Regarding training for trimming the airplane after the autopilot is disconnected, the JSX director of training, JSX Embraer pilots, and CAE instructors told investigators that trimming after autopilot disconnect, and particularly below 500 ft, was rare and not a technique that was trained. Specifically, a JSX line pilot training check airman interviewed stated he trained there was no trimming below 500 ft on a visual approach. One pilot said he had another pilot recommend using trim on the approach but said he thought that was a bad idea and did not follow that recommendation; he did not recall who told him that. One CAE instructor recalled when he used to fly the Embraer there were “one or two guys” that used the technique of trimming nose down for landing. He continued that “the company, the instructors, they already advise us not to do something like that because it's not appropriate.” A JSX line pilot training check airman stated “if it is being taught, they [the lead instructor in the training department] nip it in the bud pretty quick. I mean, that's a no-no.” There was no published procedure on using trim after autopilot disconnect, nor was it a trained technique. According to a CAE instructor, he observed a Learjet pilot once using nose up trim during the landing flare which he stopped immediately and they talked about the consequences if the trim malfunctioned close to the ground. During a postaccident interview, the captain was asked about her use of trim when manually flying an approach, the captain told investigators “I like to trim it more so towards the end to help with the flare, smooth it out a little bit.” She also told investigators her use of trim was based on a “feel for the airplane on what it’s doing given the winds and the thrust” and “on average, I’d say I like to use more nose-up trim on the flare portion.” JSX Standard Operating Procedures stated “Make sure that the airplane is properly trimmed during the approach. This maximizes elevator authority for the flare or in the event of a missed approach.” Pitch trim is used to relievepressure on the flight controls and when adjusted properly, it holds the airplane’s desired attitude and eliminates the need for the pilot to constantly push forward or pull back on the control column; essentially, pitch trim allows the pilot to fly “hands off”. Captain The captain was hired by JSX Air in July 2022 as a FO. At the time of the accident, the captain was based at DAL and held a type rating for the EMB-145. A review of the captain’s training records indicated her most recent training and simulator check, which included crosswind landings, was completed satisfactorily on February 11 and 12, 2024. As of the accident date, the captain possessed a current first-class FAA medical certificate. In 2019, based on an eye examination and a successful medical flight test, the FAA had granted her a Statement of Demonstrated Ability (SODA) for first-class medical certification with right eye amblyopia, a stable condition that she had since childhood, and that made her unable to meet first-class visual acuity standards with her right eye. Her SODA carried a limitation that she must use corrective lenses and her medical certificate as of the accident date did not. Her most recent aviation medical examination before the accident was August 15, 2023. At that time, her distant and near visual acuities were normal when using both eyes together, without corrective lenses. First Officer The FO was hired by JSX Air in October 2023. At the time of the accident, the FO was based at DAL and held a type rating for the EMB-145 with a pilot in command (PIC) limitation. The FO completed EMB-145 initial type rating on November 16, 2023, and initial operating experience (IOE) on January 11, 2024. As of the accident date, the FO possessed a current first-class FAA medical certificate without limitations or waivers. The Airplane Performance Study was conducted based largely on data recovered from the FDR. The study compared data for three flights; the accident flight, the previous landing at North Las Vegas Airport (VGT), and another landing with a different flight crew. According to the study, the accident flight touched down hard, with a direct crosswind of 16 kts, gusting to 24 kts. The airplane came to rest 567 ft from the end of the runway. The accident pilot input AND trim during the landing approach and flare. However, it was only in the accident that the pilot continued to trim to the maximum AND stabilizer position in the seconds prior to touchdown; in the previous landing at VGT, the pilot input ANU stabilizer during the ten seconds preceding touchdown. Lastly, Figure 5 compares the longitudinal control and stabilizer trim inputs for the three flights. The 250 sec before touchdown for the three landings look similar except for the stabilizer trim input on the accident flight. The stabilizer was near the full AND position of 4°when the accident flight touched down. Figure 5. FDR longitudinal control and trim inputs for accident flight and two previousflights. A functional test of the pitch trim system was completed at the JSX facility at HOU on June 27, 2024. Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) TASK 27-40-00 Horizontal-Stabilizer – Adjustment/Test was used for the testing. It was verified that all systems were operational. The airplane came to rest about 567 ft from the threshold of runway 22 (figure 2). According to the recovery team, the left flap was retrieved on the left side of runway 4 about 2,835 ft from the airplane and 208 ft from the taxiway C centerline (between taxiway C and runway 13L). Figure 3 shows the damage to the left side of the accident airplane. Figure 2. Google Earth Image of HOU airport with the separated left flap and the accident airplane’s resting location. Figure 3. Photo of the accident airplane showing the damage to the left wing and left main landing gear. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N942JX](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N942JX-2024-10-17), registration cancelled 2024-10-17, S/N 145421, built 2001 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: EMBRAER EMB-145LR - Registry model: [Embraer EMB-145LR](https://openairdocs.org/model/embraer-emb-145lr) (registry code 3260212) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Allison AE-3007A](https://openairdocs.org/engine/allison-ae-3007a) (registry code 03030, turbo-fan) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 145421 - Year built: 2001 - Airframe hours: 42908 - Engines: ALLISON AE 3007A 7580 lbs thrust turbo fan; ALLISON AE 3007A 7580 lbs thrust turbo fan - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Part 135 - Operator: Delux Public Charter LLC, doing business as Jsx Air - Registered owner: Delux Public Charter LLC - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Transport - Last inspection: Continuous airworthiness, May 3, 2024 - Departed: KDAL, Dallas, TX - Destination: Same as departure - Flight plan: IFR - Airport: HOU, William P Hobby, runway 04/22, 7,602 × 150 ft, concrete - Equipment: Electronic primary flight display, Electronic multifunction display, Data recorder, Auto-pilot, Angle of attack indicator, Onboard weather, Stall warning system, ADS-B ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 28; injuries: none; commercial, flight instructor, airline transport; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, without waivers/limitations; last flight review February 26, 2024; seat: left; restraint: 5-point; flight hours: 1,822 total, 1,130 in this make and model, 695 as pilot in command, 164 in the last 90 days, 52 in the last 30 days, 6 in the last 24 hours - Co-pilot; age 26; injuries: minor; flight instructor, commercial; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, without waivers/limitations; last flight review November 30, 2023; seat: right; flight hours: 1,176 total, 293 in this make and model, 744 as pilot in command, 177 in the last 90 days, 42 in the last 30 days, 6 in the last 24 hours - Cabin crew; injuries: none; restraint: 5-point ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 130° at 16 knots, gusting 24 - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: 25,000 ft broken - Temperature: 79 °F, dew point 68 °F - Altimeter: 29.85 inHg - Turbulence: Moderate - Observed at: KHOU - METAR: KHOU 032253Z 13016G24KT 10SM SCT100 BKN250 26/20 A2985 RMK AO2 SLP112 T02610200 ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20240503021449A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20240503021449A), May 3, 2024: Embraer EMB-145LR, Houston, TX, Substantial damage. [privacy data omitted]From dallas love field (dal) to Houston William P Hobby (hou) experienced a left main gear collapse while landing runway 4. The airplane… ## Docket (17 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on September 22, 2026, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194201. 125 MB in all. - 6120 And pilot statements (item 1, PDF, 14 pages, 5.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20983475&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=6120%20DCA24FA179%20Redacted-Rel.pdf - Operational factors/human performance group chairman's factual report (item 2, PDF, 32 pages, 961 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20124055&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=DCA24FA179%20Ops-HP%20Factual%20Report%20Final-Rel.pdf - Operational factors/human performance group chairman's factual report - attachment 1 - flight crew interviews (item 3, PDF, 138 pages, 34.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20403679&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%201%20-%20Flight%20Crew%20Interviews_Redacted_v2-Rel.pdf - Operational factors/human performance group chairman's factual report - attachment 2 - other pilot interviews and director of training interview (item 4, PDF, 131 pages, 692 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20900817&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%202%20%E2%80%93%20Other%20Pilot%20Interviews%20and%20Director%20of%20Training%20Interview%20v2_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Operational factors/human performance group chairman's factual report - attachment 3 - flight crew training records (item 5, PDF, 72 pages, 15.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20990292&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%203%20%E2%80%93%20Flight%20Crew%20Training%20Records%20Redacted-Rel.pdf - Operational factors/human performance group chairman's factual report - attachment 4 - cae instructor and evaluator interviews (item 6, PDF, 160 pages, 41.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20403556&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%204%20%E2%80%93%20CAE%20Instructor%20and%20Evaluator%20Interviews_Redacted_v2-Rel.pdf - Operational factors/human performance group chairman's factual report - attachment 5 - FAA poi-flm interviews (item 7, PDF, 83 pages, 432 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20403566&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%205%20%E2%80%93%20FAA%20POI-FLM%20Interviews_Redacted_v2-Rel.pdf - Operational factors/human performance group chairman's factual report - attachment 6 EMB-145 emergency evacuation procedure (item 8, PDF, 2 pages, 79 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19660685&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%206%20-%20EMB-145%20Emergency%20Evacuation%20Procedure-Rel.pdf - Operational factors/human performance group chairman's factual report - attachment 7 - accident flight weight and balance (item 9, PDF, 2 pages, 867 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20123118&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%207%20%E2%80%93%20Accident%20Flight%20Weight%20and%20Balance_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Systems factual report (item 10, PDF, 18 pages, 634 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18745076&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=DCA24FA179%20Systems%20Factual%20Report%20final-Rel.pdf - Systems factual report - attachment 1 (item 11, PDF, 17 pages, 2.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20401371&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=DCA24FA179%20Systems%20factual%20-%20Attachment%201%20-%20Portions%20of%20AMM%20TASK%2027-40-00-Rel.pdf - Airworthiness group chairman factual report (item 12, PDF, 21 pages, 3.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20149585&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Airworthiness%20Group%20Chairman%20Factual%20Report-Rel.pdf - Flight data recorder specialist's factual report (item 13, PDF, 15 pages, 3.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20933622&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Report_DCA24FA179-FINAL-Rel.pdf - Flight data recorder specialist's factual report - attachment 1 (item 14, CSV, 14.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19588366&FileExtension=csv&FileName=Flight%20Data%20Recorder%20Specialist%27s%20Factual%20Report%20-%20Attachment%201-Rel.csv - Cockpit voice recorder - group chair's factual report (item 15, PDF, 25 pages, 448 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20913140&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Report_DCA24FA179-Crew%20Review%20Final3-Rel.pdf - Airplane performance study (item 16, PDF, 14 pages, 2.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18009533&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=DCA24FA179_airplane_performance_study_v3-Rel.pdf - Medical factual report (item 17, PDF, 13 pages, 210 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20960831&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=DCA24FA179_MedicalFactualReport-Rel.pdf From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.