# NTSB DCA24LA330: Boeing 737-8, N8830Q, Kenner, LA, December 20, 2023

- Type: NTSB incident investigation
- Classification: Incident · Class 2 · Limited · Final report
- Date: December 20, 2023, 14:14 local (20:14 UTC)
- Place: Kenner, LA
- Coordinates: 29.997399, -90.261693
- Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=29.9974&lon=-90.2617&mi=10
- Phase of flight: [Takeoff](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/300) (OpenAirDocs' grouping)
- Defining event: [Takeoff: Birdstrike](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/901)
- Status: Completed, report February 25, 2026
- Report: Approved by Office Director
- Investigation class: Class 2
- NTSB office: Major Investigations Division
- Parties: SWAPA, Boeing, FAA, Southwest Airlines, CFM International
- Safety recommendations: Yes
- NTSB case key (mKey): 195527
- NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=DCA24LA330
- NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/195527/pdf
- NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=195527
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/DCA24LA330

## Probable cause

A partial loss of engine power due to bird ingestion in the No. 1 (left) engine, which resulted in the activation of the load reduction device to prevent vibration. The load reduction device activation resulted in smoke and fumes entering the cockpit.

## Findings

NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause.

- [Power plant](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01057100): Aircraft › Aircraft power plant · Damaged/degraded (probable cause); cases with it: [Boeing 737-8, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01057100/cases.md?model=13844FZ), [All aircraft, 198 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01057100/cases.md)
- [Object/animal/substance: animal(s)/bird(s)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03022045): Environmental issues › Physical environment · Effect on equipment (probable cause); cases with it: [Boeing 737-8, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03022045/cases.md?model=13844FZ), [All aircraft, 358 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03022045/cases.md)
- [Air conditioning system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022100): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Design; cases with it: [Boeing 737-8, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022100/cases.md?model=13844FZ), [All aircraft, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022100/cases.md)
- [Eng oil sys (airframe furnish)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01057900): Aircraft › Aircraft power plant · Design; cases with it: [Boeing 737-8, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01057900/cases.md?model=13844FZ), [All aircraft, 18 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01057900/cases.md)
- [Manufacture/production](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04013000): Organizational issues › Development · Manufacturer; cases with it: [Boeing 737-8, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04013000/cases.md?model=13844FZ), [All aircraft, 17 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04013000/cases.md)
- [Engine bleed air system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01057500): Aircraft › Aircraft power plant · Design; cases with it: [Boeing 737-8, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01057500/cases.md?model=13844FZ), [All aircraft, 7 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01057500/cases.md)
- [Policy/procedure: adequacy of policy/proc](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04021015): Organizational issues › Management · Manufacturer; cases with it: [Boeing 737-8, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04021015/cases.md?model=13844FZ), [All aircraft, 106 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04021015/cases.md)

## Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened.

- [Takeoff: Birdstrike](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/901) (defining event); cases with it: [Boeing 737-8, 4 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/901/sequence.md?model=13844FZ), [All aircraft, 253 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/901/sequence.md)

## Analysis

During initial climbout shortly after takeoff, Southwest Airlines flight 554 struck and ingested a bird into its No. 1 (left) engine, resulting in damage to the left engine fan blades and a partial loss of engine power. The airplane began to “shake violently with a distinct loss of thrust” in the left engine. The engine master caution activated, and the captain reported that he heard the fire bell sound. The captain called for the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation checklist on the Quick Reference Card (QRC). According to the captain, after the first officer (FO) started the checklist, the cockpit began to fill with “acrid white smoke.” The FO called out “masks,” the pilots donned their masks, and they resumed performance of the checklist. The flight crew declared an emergency to air traffic control and requested airport rescue and firefighting (ARFF) in preparation for the flight’s return to the departure airport. The flight crew notified the cabin crew and passengers about the emergency. The captain later reported that, due to the smoke, his instrument panel was difficult to see and that he thought he might need to fly the airplane by solely using the heads-up guidance system. However, the captain stated that the smoke began to rapidly dissipate after the FO pulled the engine fire switch. After flight 554 landed and came to a full stop, ARFF personnel inspected the airplane before the flight crew taxied to the assigned gate. The passengers deplaned normally, and no injuries were reported. Postaccident examination found that the smoke in the cockpit was a result of the activation of the No. 1 engine’s load reduction device (LRD) after the bird ingestion. LRD activation is designed to reduce the severity of the vibration transmitted into the airframe by disconnecting the left engine’s fan blades from the turbomachinery. When the LRD activated, tubes supplying oil to the engine sump became dislodged and the flange from the sump area opened, allowing engine oil to enter the core compressor upstream of the pneumatic bleed ports that supply bleed air to the cabin and cockpit. The oil was exposed to high temperatures and resulted in smoke and fumes that were then fed into the cockpit. About 15 seconds after the bird ingestion, the left engine’s core speed (N2) was below 62% rpm, which would have de-energized the engine’s running relay and subsequently closed the pressure regulating shutoff valve (PRSOV). Following the closure of the PRSOV, which was the point of access into the cockpit, the smoke and fumes would have quickly dissipated. Considering that both crewmembers described the airplane as shaking following the bird ingestion, the captain’s decision to begin the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation checklist was appropriate (one of the conditions for using the checklist was airframe vibrations). Although the crew did not report performing the Smoke, Fire or Fumes checklist, the first officer stating “masks”accomplished two of the three memory items by donning their one-piece oxygen masks. Postincident review of this checklist found that it instructed pilots to turn off various switches, including the RECIRC FAN switches at step 9. It is not until step 11 that the checklist instructs that if the smoke or fumes become the greatest threat, pilots should reference another checklist. It is likely that the incident flight crew would have performed the Smoke, Fire or Fumes checklist first if they had not experienced severe airframe vibration following the bird ingestion. Boeing released a flight crew operations manual (FCOM) bulletin on February 9, 2024, that described the results of the bird ingestion in this incident and the actions a flight crew should take if they experience a similar incident. Boeing also updated the system description in the Boeing 737-8 FCOM on November 15, 2024, and the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) on November 30, 2024, to include engine failure with smoke or fumes in the flight deck or cabin as a condition to trigger reference to the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation QRC. Although the NTSB found no clear evidence of significant toxic or irritant exposure to the flight crew resulting from the LRD activation on the incident flight, such an event may pose a toxicological risk. There are insufficient data to reliably determine the nature and magnitude of such risk, especially at what is expected to be limited exposure duration. It is reasonable to consider the potential for irritant effects on the pilots among the threats to the immediate safety of the flight in an LRD-related smoke event.

## Factual narrative

According to the FAA, there have been “about 292,000 reported wildlife strikes with civil aircraft between 1990 and 2023. In 2023, reported bird strikes occurred at 780 U.S. airports.” Of note, the “Wildlife Strike Database” indicated that in 2023 there were 19,400 strikes that occurred at 713 U.S. airports. Over half of the bird strikes occurred between July and October with over 30 percent of the bird strikes occurring during the take-off run and initial climb. The database entry associated with the incident flight reported the species of bird struck as a bald eagle. Title 14 Code of Federal Regulation Part 139.337 provides regulatory guidance for airports to alleviate wildlife hazards. A letter dated February 8, 2024, from the New Orleans Wildlife Control Coordinator to the FAA Airport Safety and Standards Division stated that MSY had completed a review and evaluation of their Wildlife Hazard Management Plan (WHMP) and they believed that the section that referred to eagle permits provided the best overall consideration for eagle hazards and mitigation that the law provides for the harassment of such a species. Boeing released an FCOM bulletin on February 9, 2024, that described the results of the bird ingestion in the MSY incident and the actions a flight crew should take if they experience a similar incident. Boeing also updated the system description in the Boeing 737-8 FCOM on November 15, 2024, and the QRH on November 30, 2024, to include engine failure with smoke or fumes in the flight deck or cabin as a condition to trigger reference to the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation QRC. In addition, on February 14, 2024, Southwest Airlines issued a Read Before Fly brief to its pilots describing the event and incorporating Boeing’s updates from its FCOM bulletin. The brief indicated that section 5.5.4 Engine Failure or Shutdown in the aircraft operating manual would be updated to indicate that if smoke enters the flight deck or cabin, flight crews should accomplish the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation steps of the QRC. The NTSB is aware that CFM International, in collaboration with Boeing, has begun work on an engine software design update that they anticipate completing in the first quarter of 2026. The update will mitigate the presence of smoke or fumes in the cockpit or airplane cabin by closing the PRSOV when the LRD activates. This update will be entirely software-based and made available through a service bulletin upon certification. The NTSB is also aware the FAA convened a corrective action review board in November 2024 to evaluate the potential for smoke in the cockpit and cabin resulting from LRD activation; the corrective action review board determined the issue did not warrant immediate action and that any corrective action would be taken through the usual regulatory process. As a result of findings during this investigation, on June 18, 2025, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendations A-25-10 through-14. The airplane was equipped with two CFM International LEAP-1B engines, which incorporate an LRD designed to minimize aircraft and engine damage during a significant fan imbalance. The design was intended to enable the fan to be mechanically disconnected from the turbomachinery, thus reducing the severity of the vibration that is transmitted into the airframe. LRD devices are a mechanical design feature and do not require any pilot intervention (see figure 1). Figure 1. The location of the LRD on the LEAP-1B engine. (Source: CFM) Postincident examination found that the No. 1 engine LRD was activated in this event, causing tubes supplying oil to the engine sump to become dislodged and the flange from the sump area to open. The open flange allowed oil to enter the core compressor upstream of the pneumatic bleed ports that supply bleed air to the cabin and cockpit. The oil was exposed to high temperatures and resulted in smoke and fumes that were then fed into the cockpit. Each engine has a PRSOV that, when closed, prevents bleed air from entering the airplane (see figure 2). Pulling the engine fire switch, causes the PRSOV to automatically close. Figure 2. Simplified engine bleed air diagram with PRSOV depicted. (Image Copyright © Boeing. Reprinted with permission.) Postincident examination of the airplane found damage to the left engine fan blades consistent with a bird ingestion (see figure 3). Figure 3. Close-up photo of damage to the left engine. (Source: Southwest Airlines) On December 20, 2023, about 1414 central standard time, Southwest Airlines flight 554, a Boeing 737-8 airplane, N8830Q, was departing from the Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport (MSY), Kenner, Louisiana, when a bird ingestion occurred in the No. 1 engine during the initial climbout. The flight crew returned to the airport. None of the 139 occupants aboard the airplane were injured, and the airplane sustained minor damage. The regularly scheduled passenger flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 from MSY to Tampa International Airport (TPA), Tampa, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight. The captain was the pilot flying for the incident flight, and the FO was the pilot monitoring. The flight crew reported that, after an uneventful takeoff and while climbing through about 1,000 ft, the FO heard the captain say “bird,” which was followed immediately by a “thump” on the left side of the airplane. The airplane began to “shake violently with a distinct loss of thrust” in the left engine. The engine master caution activated, and the captain reported that he heard the fire bell sound. The captain called for the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation checklist on the QRC. According to the captain, after the FO started the checklist, the flight deck began to fill with “acrid white smoke.” The FO stated that he could not clearly see the captain. The FO called out “masks,”the pilots donned their masks, and they resumed performance of the checklist. The flight crew declared an emergency to air traffic control and asked ARFF to roll the trucks in preparation for the airplane’s return to MSY. The captain stated that visibility in the cockpit was restricted and that he could see nothing beyond the FO, who was holding the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). The captain also stated that his instrument panel was difficult to see and that he thought he might need to fly the airplane by solely using the heads-up guidance system. The captain further stated that, after the engine fire switch had been pulled (by the FO), the smoke began to rapidly dissipate. The flight crew notified the flight attendants about the emergency and made a public address announcement to notify the passengers that fire trucks would be meeting the airplane. After landing at the airport, the airplane came to a full stop on the arrival runway, and ARFF inspected the airplane before the flight crew taxied the airplane to the assigned gate under its own power. The passengers deplaned normally, and no injuries were reported. Data from the airplane’s digital flight data recorder was sent to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC, for analysis. The data showed that, after takeoff, while the airplane was climbing through about 600 ft, both the left and right engine fan speed (N1) values were about 83% rpm. About 2 seconds later, the left engine’s N1 decreased to 75% rpm. Subsequently, the airborne vibration monitor began to increase, and the left engine’s oil tank quantity began to decrease from 16.25 quarts. About 15 seconds after the bird ingestion, the left engine’s core speed (N2) was below 62% rpm, which would have de-energized the engine’s running relay and subsequently closed the PRSOV. About 28 seconds later, the left engine’s N1 stabilized at 6% rpm with an oil tank quantity of 3.5 quarts. The NTSB conducted a study to evaluate the potential for toxic and irritant effects of smoke entering the cockpit or cabin after activation of the LRD. Because there was no direct measurable evidence of the chemical composition of the smoke or the concentrations of chemicals in the cockpit air over time during the incident, and because there was no practical experimental approach by which to reliably determine the chemical composition of the smoke or the concentrations of chemicals in the cockpit or cabin air, the study was limited to characterizing the incident exposure from available information, and to examining the potential toxicity of future LRD-related smoke events from a theoretical perspective. The study found no evidence that the captain or first officer experienced impairing irritant or toxic symptoms of smoke exposure during the incident flight. After the flight, no adverse health effects of smoke exposure were conclusively identified for either pilot, although the captain experienced some incompletely characterized respiratory symptomsin the months following the flight. The Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation checklist, current at the time of the event, in the Boeing 737-8 QRH stated the following: Condition: One or more of these occur: • Engine fire warning • Airframe vibrations with abnormal engine indications • Engine separation 1. Autothrottle (if engaged) .......... Disengage 2. Thrust lever (affected engine) ...... Confirm ........ Close 3. Engine start lever (affected engine) ...... Confirm ...... CUTOFF 4. Engine fire switch (affected engine) ...... Confirm ........ Pull To manually unlock the engine fire switch, press the override and pull. 5. If the engine fire switch or ENG OVERHEAT light is illuminated: Engine fire switch ...... Rotate to the stop and hold for 1 second If after 30 seconds the engine fire switch or ENG OVERHEAT light stays illuminated: Engine fire switch ...... Rotate to the other stop and hold for 1 second 6. Choose one: - High airframe vibration occurs and continues after the engine is shut down: Without delay, reduce airspeed and descend to a safe altitude which results in an acceptable vibration level. Note: If high vibration returns and further airspeed reduction and descent are not practical, increasing airspeed may reduce the vibration. o Go to step 7 - High airframe vibration does not occur or does not continue after the engine is shut down: o Go to step 7 7. ISOLATION VALVE switch .......... CLOSE 8. PACK switch (affected side) .......... OFF This step causes the operating pack to regulate to high flow in flight with the flaps up. 9. APU BLEED air switch .......... OFF 10. Choose one: - APU is available for start: APU .......... START When APU is running: APU GEN switch (affected side) .......... ON o Go to step 14 - APU is not available: o Go to step 11 11. Advise the Cabin Crew that the cabin lighting will be extinguished, but passenger reading lights will continue to work. 12. CAB/UTIL switch .......... OFF 13. IFE/PASS SEAT switch .......... OFF 14. Balance fuel as needed. 15. Transponder mode selector .......... TA This step prevents climb commands which can exceed single engine performance capability. 16. ISOLATION VALVE switch (after the fire has been extinguished) .......... AUTO This step ensures bleed air is available to both wings if wing anti-ice is needed. Note: If wing anti-ice is needed above FL220, maintain a minimum of 50% N1. 17. Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport. Note: Do not use FMC performance predictions. The Smoke, Fire or Fumes checklist, current at the time of the event, in the Boeing 737-8 QRH stated the following: Condition: Smoke, fire, or fumes occur. 1. Diversion may be needed. 2. Don oxygen masks and set regulators to 100%. 3. Don smoke goggles, as needed. 4. Establish Crew and cabin communications. 5. BUS TRANSFER switch .......... OFF 6. Advise the Cabin Crew that the cabin lighting will be extinguished, but passenger reading lights will continue to work. 7. CAB/UTIL switch.......... OFF 8. IFE/PASS SEAT switch .......... OFF 9. RECIRC FAN switches (both) .......... OFF 10. APU BLEED air switch .......... OFF 11. Anytime the smoke or fumes become the greatest threat: o Go to the Smoke or Fumes Removal checklist on page 8.18 12. Choose one: - Source of the smoke, fire, or fumes is obvious and can be extinguished quickly: Isolate and extinguish the source. If possible, remove power from the affected equipment by switch or circuit breaker in the flight deck or cabin. o Go to step 13 - Source of the smoke, fire, or fumes is not obvious or cannot be extinguished quickly: o Go to step 14 13. Choose one: - Source is visually confirmed to be extinguished and the smoke or fumes are decreasing: Continue the flight at the Captain’s discretion. Restore unpowered items at the Captain’s discretion. o Go to the Smoke or Fumes Removal checklist on page 8.18, if needed - Source is not visually confirmed to be extinguished or smoke or fumes are not decreasing: o Go to step 14 14. EQUIP COOLING SUPPLY and EXHAUST switches (both) .......... ALTN 15. Instruct the Cabin Crew to: - Turn on cabin reading lights. - Turn on galley attendants work lights. 16. Divert to the nearest suitable airport while continuing the checklist. 17. Consider an immediate landing if the smoke, fire, or fumes situation becomes uncontrollable. 18. Do not delay landing in an attempt to complete all of the following steps. 19. ISOLATION VALVE switch .......... CLOSE 20. R PACK switch .......... OFF 21. Wait 2 minutes unless the smoke or fumes are increasing. This allows time for the smoke or fumes to clear. 22. Choose one: - Smoke or fumes are decreasing: o Go to the Smoke or Fumes Removal checklist on page 8.18, if needed - Smoke or fumes continue or are increasing: R PACK switch .......... AUTO L PACK switch .......... OFF o Go to step 23 23. Wait 2 minutes unless the smoke or fumes are increasing. This allows time for the smoke or fumes to clear. 24. Choose one: - Smoke or fumes are decreasing: o Go to the Smoke or Fumes Removal checklist on page 8.18, if needed - Smoke or fumes continue or are increasing: L PACK switch .......... AUTO Consider an immediate landing.

## Aircraft

- Registration: [N8830Q](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N8830Q), registered now, S/N 67750, built 2022 (OpenAirDocs)
- Reported make and model: BOEING 737-8
- Registry model: [Boeing 737-8](https://openairdocs.org/model/boeing-737-8) (registry code 13844FZ) (OpenAirDocs)
- Registry engine: [CFM International LEAP-1B28 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/cfm-international-leap-1b28-series) (registry code 13120, turbo-fan) (OpenAirDocs)
- Category: Airplane
- Serial number: 67750
- Year built: 2022
- Airframe hours: 3141.18
- Engines: CFM INTL LEAP-1B28 SER 29317 lbs thrust turbo fan; CFM INTL LEAP-1B28 SER 29317 lbs thrust turbo fan
- Damage: Minor damage
- Flight: Part 121
- Operator: Southwest Airlines Co
- Registered owner: Southwest Airlines Co
- Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Transport
- Last inspection: Continuous airworthiness, December 16, 2023
- Destination: KTPA, Tampa, FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- Airport: MSY, Louis Armstrong New Orleans Intl, runway 11/29, 10,104 × 150 ft, concrete
- Equipment: Stall warning system, Onboard weather, Heads up display, Electronic primary flight display, Electronic multifunction display, ADS-B, Electronic flight bag or handheld device, Data recorder, Auto-pilot, Angle of attack indicator

## Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

- Pilot; age 62; injuries: none; commercial, airline transport; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane, helicopter; medical: class 1, waiver time limited special; last flight review October 27, 2023; seat: left; restraint: 5-point; flight hours: 25,000 total, 20,000 in this make and model, 22,000 as pilot in command, 115 in the last 90 days, 44 in the last 30 days, 6 in the last 24 hours
- Co-pilot; age 58; injuries: none; airline transport; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, with waivers/limitations; last flight review March 1, 2023; seat: right; restraint: 5-point; flight hours: 20,800 total, 7,000 in this make and model, 207 in the last 90 days, 76 in the last 30 days, 6 in the last 24 hours

## Weather

- Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day
- Wind: 50° at 10 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Temperature: 61 °F, dew point 48 °F
- Altimeter: 30.32 inHg
- Observed at: KMSY, 1 nm away
- METAR: SPECI KMSY 202031Z 05010KT 10SM FEW030 FEW150 SCT250 16/09 A3032 RMK AO2 T01560094

## Docket (34 files)

The files NTSB released with the investigation on February 25, 2026, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=195527. 34.2 MB in all.

- Operational factors group factual report (item 1, PDF, 36 pages, 2.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19981756&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=DCA24LA330%20-%20Factual%20-%20Final-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 1 - incident flight crew transcripts and written statements (item 2, PDF, 130 pages, 513 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18880301&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%201%20-%20Flight%20Crew%20Transcripts%20and%20Written%20Statements_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 2 - incident flight crew training records [excerpts] (item 3, PDF, 14 pages, 1.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18679727&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%202%20-%20Incident%20Flight%20Crew%20Training%20Records%20%5BExcerpts%5D_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 3 - southwest airlines B737 normal checklist (item 4, PDF, 3 pages, 705 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18862560&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%203%20-%20Southwest%20Airlines%20B737%20Normal%20Checklist-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 4 - southwest airlines B737 operating manual [excerpts] (item 5, PDF, 12 pages, 1.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18679879&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%204%20-%20Southwest%20Airlines%20B737%20Operating%20Manual%20%5BExcerpts%5D-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 5 - southwest airlines B737 flight operations manual - postincident [excerpts] (item 6, PDF, 6 pages, 778 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19230448&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%205%20-%20Southwest%20Airlines%20B737%20Flight%20Operations%20Manual%20-%20Postincident%20%5BExcerpts%5D-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 6 - southwest airlines B737 non-normal quick reference card (item 7, PDF, 3 pages, 1.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18680042&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%206%20-%20Southwest%20Airlines%20B737%20Non-Normal%20Quick%20Reference%20Card-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 7 - southwest airlines B737MAX quick reference handbook [excerpts] (item 8, PDF, 7 pages, 803 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18679889&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%207%20-%20Southwest%20Airlines%20B737MAX%20Quick%20Reference%20Handbook%20%5BExcerpts%5D-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 8 - southwest airlines postincident guidance (item 9, PDF, 2 pages, 150 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18680092&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%208%20-%20Southwest%20Airlines%20Postincident%20Guidance_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 9 - Boeing postincident guidance (item 10, PDF, 15 pages, 2.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18679737&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%209%20-%20Boeing%20Postincident%20Guidance-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 10 - FAA bird and wildlife strike data (item 11, PDF, 5 pages, 251 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18679899&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%2010%20-%20FAA%20Bird%20and%20Widlife%20Strke%20Data-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 11 - msy wildlife strike data (item 12, CSV, 579 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18680102&FileExtension=csv&FileName=Wildlife_Export_1312025%20-%20MSY-Rel.csv
- Operational factors - attachment 12 - new orleans report following incident (item 13, PDF, 2 pages, 165 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18679747&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%2012%20-%20New%20Orleans%20Report%20Following%20Incident_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 13 - msy weather (item 14, PDF, 3 pages, 73 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18680388&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%2013%20-%20MSY%20Weather-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 14 - advisory circular 120-80B (item 15, PDF, 32 pages, 832 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18679909&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%2014%20-%20Advisory%20Circular%20120-80B-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 15 - operational factors group party forms (item 16, PDF, 17 pages, 523 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18680112&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operational%20Factors%20-%20Attachment%2015%20-%20Operational%20Factors%20Group%20Party%20Forms_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - simulated smoke evaluation (item 17, PDF, 16 pages, 2.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19643530&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=DCA24LA330%20-%20Smoke%20Simulation%20Evaluation-Rel.pdf
- Mitigations concerning load reduction device activation in cfm international leap-1B engines (item 18, PDF, 11 pages, 671 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18920963&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=AIR-25-03-Rel.pdf
- Flight data recorder's - specialist's factual report (item 19, PDF, 17 pages, 6 photos, 2.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19711493&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Flight%20Data%20Recorder%27s%20-%20Specialist%27s%20Factual%20Report-Rel.pdf
- Flight data recorder's - specialist's factual report - ATTACHMENT1 - FDR tabular data (item 20, CSV, 7.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19290558&FileExtension=csv&FileName=Flight%20Data%20Recorder%27s%20-%20Specialist%27s%20Factual%20Report%20-%20Attachment1%20-%20FDR%20Tabular%20Data-Rel.csv
- Flight data recorder's - specialist's factual report - ATTACHMENT2 - qar tabular data (item 21, CSV, 1.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19290447&FileExtension=csv&FileName=Flight%20Data%20Recorder%27s%20-%20Specialist%27s%20Factual%20Report%20-%20Attachment2%20-%20QAR%20Tabular%20Data-Rel.csv
- Systems 737-8 max bleed air specialist's report (item 22, PDF, 7 pages, 263 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19459640&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=DCA24LA330%20Specialist%27s%20Report-Rel.pdf
- Smoke toxicity group chair's study (item 23, PDF, 19 pages, 268 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19977029&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=DCA24LA330_SmokeToxicityGroupChairsStudy-Rel.pdf
- Smoke toxicity group chair's study - attachment 1 - service bulletin excerpt with approved oils for cfm leap-1B (item 24, PDF, 2 pages, 264 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19977420&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%201%20-%20%20Service%20Bulletin%20Excerpt%20with%20Approved%20Oils%20for%20CFM%20LEAP-1B%20Engines-Rel.pdf
- Smoke toxicity group chair's study - attachment 2 - safety data sheet for eastman turbo oil 2380 (item 25, PDF, 11 pages, 293 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19716483&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%202%20-%20Safety%20Data%20Sheet%20for%20Eastman%20Turbo%20Oil%202380-Rel.pdf
- Smoke toxicity group chair's study - attachment 3 - safety data sheet for eastman turbo oil 2197 (item 26, PDF, 13 pages, 221 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19716549&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%203%20-%20Safety%20Data%20Sheet%20for%20Eastman%20Turbo%20Oil%202197-Rel.pdf
- Smoke toxicity group chair's study - attachment 4 - safety data sheet for mobil jet oil ii (item 27, PDF, 11 pages, 157 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19717309&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%204%20-%20Safety%20Data%20Sheet%20for%20Mobil%20Jet%20Oil%20II-Rel.pdf
- Smoke toxicity group chair's study - attachment 5 - safety data sheet for mobil jet oil 254 (item 28, PDF, 11 pages, 154 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19717360&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%205%20-%20Safety%20Data%20Sheet%20for%20Mobil%20Jet%20Oil%20254-Rel.pdf
- Smoke toxicity group chair's study - attachment 6 - safety data sheet for aeroshell turbine oil 560 (item 29, PDF, 16 pages, 296 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19717550&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%206%20-%20Safety%20Data%20Sheet%20for%20AeroShell%20Turbine%20Oil%20560-Rel.pdf
- Smoke toxicity group chair's study - attachment 7 - safety data sheet for turbonycoil 600 (item 30, PDF, 9 pages, 244 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19717039&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%207%20-%20Safety%20Data%20Sheet%20for%20TURBONYCOIL%20600-Rel.pdf
- Smoke toxicity group chair's study - attachment 8 - Boeing lrd analysis summary (item 31, PDF, 12 pages, 928 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19717117&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%208%20-%20Boeing%20LRD%20Analysis%20Summary-Rel.pdf
- Powerplants specialist's factual report (item 32, PDF, 23 pages, 1.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19831677&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=DCA24LA330%20-%20Powerplant%20Specialist%20Factual%20Report-Rel.pdf
- Southwest airlines pilots association - party submission (item 33, PDF, 9 pages, 732 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19957859&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=DCA24LA330%20-%20SWAPA%20Party%20Submission-Rel.pdf
- Develop realistic scenario-based simulated training for smoke in the cockpit events (item 34, PDF, 7 pages, 301 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20358577&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=AIR-26-03-Rel.pdf

From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

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