# NTSB DCA26LA142: Boeing 787, Houston, TX, February 27, 2026 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · No injuries · Class 4 · Limited · Final report - Date: February 27, 2026, 13:53 UTC - Place: Houston, TX - Coordinates: 29.993422, -95.331682 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=29.9934&lon=-95.3317&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/550) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Landing-flare/touchdown: Tailstrike](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/091) - Highest injury: No injuries - Injuries: 209 uninjured - Status: Completed, report September 8, 2026 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 4 - Basic report with no Prelim publish - NTSB office: Major Investigations Division - Parties: Boeing, FAA, JTSB, All Nippon Airways - NTSB case key (mKey): 202574 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=DCA26LA142 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/202574/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=202574 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/DCA26LA142 ## Probable cause The captain’s inadvertent activation of the takeoff/go around switch at touchdown that caused an increase in the airplane pitch attitude that was not corrected before the lower fuselage contacted the runway. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Action: incorrect action selection](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041010): Personnel issues › Action/decision · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [All aircraft, 397 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041010/cases.md) - [Use of equip/info: aircraft control](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [All aircraft, 9,295 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040/cases.md) - [Fuselage: fuselage main structure](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01035310): Aircraft › Aircraft structures · Damaged/degraded (probable cause); cases with it: [All aircraft, 24 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01035310/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Landing-flare/touchdown: Tailstrike](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/091) (defining event); cases with it: [All aircraft, 124 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/091/sequence.md) ## Analysis All Nippon Airways (ANA) flight 114 experienced a tailstrike during landing on runway 26L at Houston George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH), Houston, Texas. The scheduled international passenger flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129. The airplane sustained substantial damage and there were no injuries to the 12 crewmembers and 197 passengers on board. At the time of the accident, the captain was the pilot flying and the first officer (FO) was the pilot monitoring. According to the flight crew, the visibility at IAH was forecast to be poor due to fog. Based on the conditions at IAH, the flight crew elected to perform a Category III (CAT III) approach and landing using the airplane’s autoland system. The flight crew recalled no issues during the approach. When the airplane touched down, the captain stated he confirmed the engine thrust levers were at full idle. The captain recalled the speedbrakes deployed, and as he moved to raise the thrust reversers, he noted that the nose of the airplane rose unexpectedly. The captain manually pushed the control column forward with enough force to both disconnect the autopilot and lower the nose, but pulled the column back to prevent the nose landing gear from “slamming down.” The FO recalled the touchdown was smooth and recognized the speedbrakes had deployed. The FO was looking at the flight mode annunciator (FMA), located at the top on the primary flight display (PFD), and called out that the system entered takeoff/go around (TOGA) mode. The FO recalled the three fields for the FMA showed the following from left to right: 1) a blank field, 2) TOGA, and 3) TOGA. The captain and FO did not recall the TOGA switch was pressed. The flight crew recalled the pitch attitude rose to about 7.5° on the PFD. The flight crew did not recall any further issues during the remainder of the landing roll. While exiting the runway, the captain recalled seeing a “tailstrike” message on the engine indicating and crew alerting system (EICAS). Postlanding inspection of the airplane confirmed substantial damage to the lower fuselage consistent with its contact with the runway. Additionally, scraping damage was found on the tailstrike sensor and on an antenna on the lower fuselage. There was no reported mechanical malfunction that contributed to the excessive airplane pitch angle after the airplane touched down. The recorded flight data showed that the autopilot pitch mode and autothrottle mode were both in “flare” mode at the time the airplane touched down on the runway. About half a second after touchdown, the flight data showed the TOGA switch was pressed. As a result, the autopilot pitch and autothrottle modes both transitioned to TOGA mode. However, the autothrottle TOGA mode was canceled when the throttles were moved to reverse thrust. The autopilot pitch mode, still in TOGA mode, commanded the elevator and stabilizer to target a go-around pitch attitude, with the pitchattitude increasing from 3.5° to 7.4° over 2 seconds. About 5 seconds after TOGA mode was activated, the control column was pushed forward (airplane nose down) and 2 seconds later showed a peak control column force of 40 pounds, which disconnected the autopilot. At that time, the airplane pitch attitude reached 7.8°, sufficient to result in a tailstrike, with a subsequent peak value of 7.9°. The flight data also showed the tailstrike protection function had activated and was commanding an elevator deflection, after the TOGA switch was pressed, to reduce elevator deflection. However, the tailstrike protection function could not prevent the pitch attitude increase that resulted in the tailstrike due to its limited authority. According to flight crew statements, they did not recall pressing the TOGA switch and did not believe they pressed them. There was no evidence of an autopilot system malfunction, therefore it is likely the captain inadvertently pressed the TOGA switch when he reached for the thrust reversers at touchdown. According to the airplane manufacturer, the conditions that inhibit TOGA activation were not yet satisfied when the TOGA switch was pressed, allowing for both the autopilot pitch mode and autothrottle mode to transition to TOGA. The flight crew was unaware that TOGA mode was activated, and their delayed detection of the increase in pitch attitude prevented timely application of corrective pitch control inputs to avert the tailstrike. ## Aircraft - Registration: JA873A (not matched to a registry record) - Reported make and model: BOEING 787 (9) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 34530 - Year built: 2015 - Airframe hours: 44393.8 - Engines: Rolls-Royce Trent 1000K2 78129 lbs thrust turbo fan; Rolls-Royce Trent 1000K3 78129 lbs thrust turbo fan - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Part 129 - Operator: All Nippon Airlines - Registered owner: All Nippon Airlines - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Transport - Last inspection: Continuous airworthiness, February 23, 2026 - Departed: HND, Tokyo, OF - Destination: Same as departure - Flight plan: IFR - Airport: IAH, George Bush Intcntl/Houston, runway 08R/26L, 9,402 × 150 ft, concrete - Equipment: ADS-B, Angle of attack indicator, Auto-pilot, Data recorder, Electronic flight bag or handheld device, Electronic multifunction display, Electronic primary flight display, Heads up display, Onboard weather, Stall warning system ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 56; injuries: none; commercial, private, airline transport; airplane ratings: multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: unknown; seat: left; restraint: 5-point; flight hours: 16,413 total, 2,969 in this make and model, 8,142 as pilot in command - Co-pilot; age 34; injuries: none; commercial, airline transport, private; airplane ratings: multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: unknown; seat: right; restraint: 5-point; flight hours: 3,929 total, 2,575 in this make and model, 86 as pilot in command - Other flight crew; injuries: none; airline transport, private, commercial; medical: unknown; seat: rear; restraint: 5-point ## Weather - Conditions: Instrument (IMC), Day - Wind: calm - Lowest ceiling: 200 ft - Temperature: 63 °F, dew point 63 °F - Altimeter: 29.99 inHg - Observed at: IAH ## Docket (4 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on September 8, 2026, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=202574. 3.2 MB in all. - Pilot/operator aircraft accident report, NTSB form 6120.1 (item 1, PDF, 10 pages, 1.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20513274&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=6120%20Form%20(DCA26LA142)_Redacted-Rel.pdf - NH114 flight crew statements (item 2, PDF, 19 pages, 520 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20512896&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Crew%20Statements%20(DCA26LA142)-Rel.pdf - JA873A photo array (item 3, PDF, 3 pages, 2 photos, 233 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20740384&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=JA873A%20Lower%20Fuselage%20Damage%20(DCA26LA142)-Rel.pdf - NH114 flight data plots (item 4, PDF, 3 pages, 759 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20740394&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=NH114%20Flight%20Data%20Plots%20(DCA26LA142)_Redacted-Rel.pdf From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.