# NTSB DEN05FA034: Mitsubishi MU-2B-60, N538EA, Englewood, CO, December 11, 2004 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Fatal · Field investigation · Final report - Date: December 10, 2004, 19:40 local (Dec 11, 2004, 02:40 UTC) - Place: Englewood, CO - Coordinates: 39.54639, -104.843055 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=39.5464&lon=-104.8431&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Initial climb](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/350) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Highest injury: Fatal - Injuries: 2 fatal - Status: Completed, report May 30, 2006 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Parties: Flight Line, Inc., Honeywell Engines, Systems and Services, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc., FAA Flight Standards District Office, Hartzell Propeller Inc. - NTSB case key (mKey): 60707 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=DEN05FA034 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/60707/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=60707 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/DEN05FA034 ## Probable cause the pilot's failure to maintain minimum controllable airspeed during the night visual approach resulting in a loss of control and uncontrolled descent into terrain. A contributing factor was the precautionary shutdown of the left engine for undetermined reasons. ## Analysis Shortly after takeoff, the pilot reported to air traffic control he needed to return to the airport to land. The controller asked the pilot if he required any assistance, and the pilot responded, "negative for right now uh just need to get in as soon as possible." The controller then asked the pilot what the problem was, in which the pilot responded, "stand by one minute." Approximately 30 seconds later and while the airplane was on a left downwind to runway 35R, the pilot stated he was declaring an emergency and "...we've got an air an engine ta shut down uh please roll the equipment." The controller and other witnesses observed the airplane on the base leg and then overshoot the final approach to runway 35R. After observing the airplane overshoot the final approach, the controller then cleared the pilot to the next runway, runway 28, and there was no response from the pilot. The controller observed the airplane's landing lights turn down toward the terrain, and "the MU2 was gone." A witness observed the airplane make an "immediate sharp bank to the left and descend to the ground. The impact appeared to be just less than a 45 degree angle, nose first." A performance study revealed that while the airplane was on downwind, the airplane started to bank to the left. The bank angle indicated a constant left bank angle of about 24 degrees as the airplane turned to base leg. Twenty-three seconds later, the bank angle began to increase further as the airplane turned to final approach, overshooting the runway, while the angle of attack reached stall angle of about 17 degrees. The flight path angle then showed a decrease by 22 to 25 degrees, the calibrated airspeed showed a decrease by 40 to 70 knots, and the vertical speed indicated a 3,000 feet per minute descent rate just before impact. Examination of the airframe revealed the flaps were in the 20 degree position, and the landing gear was retracted. According to the airplane flight manual, during the base leg, the flaps should remain in the 5 degree position and the landing gear extended; and when landing is assured, the flaps then extended to 20 degrees and maintain 125 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS) during final and 110 KCAS when over the runway. Minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc) for the airplane is 99 KCAS. Examination of the propellers revealed that at the time of impact, the left propeller was in the feathered position and the right propeller was in the normal operating range. Examination of the left engine revealed static witness marks on several internal engine components, and no anomalies were noted that would have precluded normal operation. The reason for the precautionary shutdown of the left engine was not determined. Examination of the right engine revealed rotational scorring and metal spray deposits on several internal engine components. Four vanes of the oil pump transfer tube were separated and missing. The gearbox oil-scavenge pump was not free to rotate and was disassembled. Disassembly of the oil-scavenge pump revealed one separated oil pump transfer tube vane was located in the pump. Pitting and wear damage was noted on all of the roller bearing elements and the outer bearing race of the propeller shaft roller bearing. No additional anomalies were noted. ## Factual narrative HISTORY OF FLIGHT On December 10, 2004, approximately 1940 mountain standard time, a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 twin-engine turbo-prop airplane, N538EA, operated as American Check 900 (ACT 900), was destroyed when it impacted terrain following a loss of control while maneuvering near Centennial Airport (APA), Englewood, Colorado. The airplane was registered to and operated by Flight Line, Inc., Watkins, Colorado. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The unscheduled domestic cargo flight was being operated under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 135 under an instrument flight rules flight plan. The airline transport pilot and pilot-rated passenger sustained fatal injuries. The flight departed APA at 1936, and was en route to Salt Lake City International Airport (SLC), Salt Lake City, Utah. According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Centennial Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) transcripts and Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) radar data, at 1929:27, the local controller cleared ACT 900 to taxi to runway 35R, and the pilot acknowledged the instruction. At 1933:09, the pilot informed the local controller they were ready for takeoff at the end of the runway. At 1935:05, the controller instructed ACT 900 to "full length runway three five right position and hold..." At 1936:04, the controller cleared ACT 900 for takeoff on runway 35R, and the pilot acknowledged the takeoff clearance. At 1936:56, the controller instructed ACT 900 to turn left to a heading of 280 degrees, and the pilot acknowledged the instruction. At 1937:02, the airplane was approximately 500 feet agl, and the local controller instructed the pilot to contact Denver departure control; the pilot acknowledged the request. At 1937:36, the airplane was approximately 900 feet agl, and the pilot stated, "...we need to uh go around back in the pattern and come back in on uh either three five right or left please." At 1937:42, the controller stated, "...make a right turn make well you already your left turn keep keep un left turn and uh make left traffic for runway three five right." At 1937:53, the controller asked, "uh mitsubishi nine hundred uh are you do you require any assistance?" The pilot responded, "negative for right now uh just need to get in as soon as possible." At 1938:03, the controller stated, "o k say nature of the problem." At 1938:11, the pilot stated, "stand by one minute." At 1938:31, the airplane was approximately 500 feet agl, and the pilot reported, "tower americheck nine hundred declaring emergency we've got an air an engine ta shut down uh please roll the equipment." At 1938:49, the controller cleared ACT 900 to land on runway 35R and stated the rescue/fire equipment was responding. At 1939:19, the controller requested from ACT 900 the souls on-board and fuel remaining. The airplane was approximately 400 feet agl, and the pilot responded, "two souls on board uh nineteen hundred pounds of fuel." At 1939:47, the controller stated, "americheck nine hundred you you can go ta two eight if you can do it." There was no response from ACT 900. At 1940:00, a transmission from an unknown source stated, "wind check". No further communications were received from ACT 900. According to the controller-in-charge statement, "I saw ACT 900 turn base, overshoot final, and finally turn north. The aircraft lights made an abrupt nose down turn and the MU2 was gone." According to the local controller statement, "I cleared [pilot] to land on [runway] 35R. He overshot the base to final turn and went down east of the [runway]." A witness, located in an airplane at APA who was monitoring the radio communications, reported he observed the airplane make the turn to base, "however, they shot through the final approach course, headed approximately due east." He stated the airplane was approximately 500 feet agl. While the airplane was on base leg, the witness observed the airplane continue to the east in a shallow descent with the left wing slightly low until it went out of the witness's sight. The witness stated he could tell the left wing was slightly low based on looking at the red position light and the rotating beacon. Another witness, located in a vehicle traveling south on a nearby road, stated she observed the airplane at "less that 75 feet [agl], an average height, in my opinion, had the airplane been aligned with runway 35R to land. The airplane appeared to be flying on its side, as if to make a hard left turn. It then leveled out briefly, and I could see the bottom of the fuselage. Considering the darkness, I did not see the landing gear deployed... As the airplane passed my side window, I heard an aggressive throttle and the airplane make an immediate sharp bank to the left and descended to the ground. The airplane was descending as the speed increased. The impact appeared to be just less than a 45 degree angle, nose first." Approximately 5 minutes after the crash, rescue personnel arrived on the accident scene. Another witness, located in a vehicle traveling north on the nearby road, stated he observed the airplane flying "very low". He stated, "just before impact, [the airplane] banked left and down." PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot, age 28, who was seated in the left front seat position, held an airline transport pilot certificate, issued June 24, 2002, with an airplane multi-engine land rating, and a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating, issued September 10, 1996. The pilot's most recent FAA first-class airman medical certificate was issued on September 1, 2004, and contained a limitation for corrective lenses. The pilot's logbook was used to document the pilot's flight experience. The pilot's total flight time at the time of the accident was 2,495.8 hours, with 1,864.2 hours in multi-engine airplanes. The pilot had accumulated 363.8 total hours in the accident airplane make and model, of which all were recorded as pilot-in-command. In the 90 days preceding the accident, the pilot had accumulated 206.5 total flight hours, all of which were in the accident airplane make and model; and 70.1 total hours in the 30 days preceding the accident. According to the "Remarks, Procedures, Maneuvers, Endorsements" section in the pilot's logbook, one engine inoperative operations and other multi-engine maneuvers were recorded as having been conducted on October 15, 1998, on an undocumented date in 1998, and on March 3 and March 7, 1999. Both entries were recorded as having been conducted in a Piper PA-34-200 airplane. On February 5, 2003, the pilot recorded in the remarks section of the logbook, "Engine Failure", which was listed as occurring on a flight in a Piper PA-31-310. No additional one engine inoperative operations were documented. In the logbook remarks section, on April 21, 2001, "Part 135 Checkride" in a Piper PA-31-350 was documented; on June 19 - 23, 2003, "Simuflite Training Level D Simulator" was documented; on June 28, 2002, "135 Check" in a Beech BE-200 was documented; and on January 29, 2003, "Check Ride" in a Piper PA-31-350 was documented. No check ride entries were documented in the logbook for the accident aircraft make and model. On June 30, 2004, the pilot recorded the first entry in the logbook for a flight (APA to SLC) in the accident airplane make and model. No documentation was noted in the "Remarks, Procedures, Maneuvers, Endorsements" section of the pilot's logbook for the accident airplane make and model. The operator provided the pilot's personnel records to the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC). A review of the records revealed the operator hired the pilot in January 2003. The pilot completed the operator's "initial new-hire" training in the Piper PA-31 model airplane on January 29, 2003. According to the flight training records, on the second of three training flights, the ins ## Sequence of events In NTSB's coding before 2008 (https://www.ntsb.gov/GILS/Documents/codman.pdf). - Loss of engine power, takeoff - initial climb - 1 engine - stowed - reason for occurrence undetermined (contributing factor) - Loss of control - in flight, approach - vfr pattern - base leg/base to final - airspeed(vmc) - not maintained, pilot in command (cause) - In flight collision with terrain/water, descent - uncontrolled - terrain condition - ground ## Aircraft - Registration: [N538EA](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N538EA-2007-12-01), registration cancelled 2007-12-01, S/N 1538 S.A., built 1981 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 - Registry model: [Mitsubishi MU-2B-60](https://openairdocs.org/model/mitsubishi-mu-2b-60) (registry code 5780460) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [AiResearch TPE331 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/airesearch-tpe331-series) (registry code 01514, turbo-prop) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 15385A - Airframe hours: 12665 - Engines: Honeywell TPE331-10501M 715 horsepower turbo prop - Damage: Destroyed - Flight: Part 135 - Registered owner: Flight Line Inc. - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: AAIP, November 1, 2004, 60 hours before - Departed: APA, Englewood, CO - Destination: SLC, Salt Lake City, UT - Flight plan: IFR - Airport: APA, Centennial Airport ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 28; injuries: fatal; airline transport, private; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, valid medical--w/ waivers/lim; last flight review July 12, 2004; seat: left; toxicology performed; flight hours: 2,496 total, 364 in this make and model, 2,281 as pilot in command, 207 in the last 90 days, 70 in the last 30 days, 1 in the last 24 hours - Co-pilot; age 25; injuries: fatal; flight instructor, commercial; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, valid medical--no waivers/lim.; seat: right; toxicology performed; flight hours: 857 total, 0 in this make and model ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Night - Wind: 270° at 10 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 48 °F, dew point 25 °F - Altimeter: 30.25 inHg - Observed at: APA, 1 nm away ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20041210033119A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20041210033119A), Dec 10, 2004: Mtsbsi MU2B60, Denver, CO, Destroyed, 2 fatal. (-23) After departure on runway 35R, the pilot reported a problem to the tower and said he needed to return for landing. He then informed the tower he had a… ## Docket (52 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on March 15, 2006, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=60707. 56.2 MB in all. - Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 (item 1, .PDF, 1.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40396837&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1-Redacted.PDF - NTSB Performance Study (item 2, .PDF, 142 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256466&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=NTSB%20Performance%20Study-Master.PDF - Controller Statements (item 3, .PDF, 119 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256467&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Controller%20Statements-Redacted.PDF - Witness Statements (item 4, .PDF, 345 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40396838&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Witness%20Statements-Redacted.PDF - Satellite Image with Radar/Communications (MHIA) (item 5, .PDF, 1.4 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256737&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Satellite%20Image%20with%20Radar%2FCommunications%20(MHIA)-Master.PDF - Wreckage Diagram (MHIA) (item 6, .PDF, 84 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256470&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Wreckage%20Diagram%20(MHIA)-Master.PDF - APA Weather Information (item 7, .PDF, 37 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256471&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=APA%20Weather%20Information-Master.PDF - ATC Report and Transcript (item 8, .PDF, 156 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256472&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=ATC%20Report%20and%20Transcript-Redacted.PDF - Excerpt of Airframe Report (item 9, .PDF, 181 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40257184&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Excerpt%20of%20Airframe%20Report-Redacted.PDF - Excerpt of Honeywell Report (item 10, .PDF, 1.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256473&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Excerpt%20of%20Honeywell%20Report-Master.PDF - Woodward Left Fuel Control Report (item 11, .PDF, 121 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256475&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Woodward%20Left%20Fuel%20Control%20Report-Master.PDF - Woodward Left Prop Governor Report (item 12, .PDF, 74 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256476&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Woodward%20Left%20Prop%20Governor%20Report-Master.PDF - Woodward Right Fuel Control Report (item 13, .PDF, 93 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256477&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Woodward%20Right%20Fuel%20Control%20Report-Master.PDF - Woodward Right Prop Governor Report (item 14, .PDF, 66 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256478&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Woodward%20Right%20Prop%20Governor%20Report-Master.PDF - Hartzell Report (item 15, .PDF, 340 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256479&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Hartzell%20Report-Master.PDF - Excerpts of Airframe Records (item 16, .PDF, 253 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256480&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Excerpts%20of%20Airframe%20Records-Redacted.PDF - Excerpts of Left Engine Records (item 17, .PDF, 148 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256481&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Excerpts%20of%20Left%20Engine%20Records-Redacted.PDF - Excerpts of Left Prop Records (item 18, .PDF, 98 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256482&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Excerpts%20of%20Left%20Prop%20Records-Redacted.PDF - Excerpts of Right Engine Records (item 19, .PDF, 392 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256483&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Excerpts%20of%20Right%20Engine%20Records-Redacted.PDF - Excerpts of Right Prop Records (item 20, .PDF, 62 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256484&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Excerpts%20of%20Right%20Prop%20Records-Redacted.PDF - Pilot Logbook (item 21, .PDF, 16.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256494&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%20Logbook-Redacted.PDF - Operator's Pilot Records (item 22, .PDF, 1.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40396840&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operator%27s%20Pilot%20Records-Redacted.PDF - Operator's Pilot Record for Passenger (item 23, .PDF, 36 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256496&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operator%27s%20Pilot%20Record%20for%20Passenger-Redacted.PDF - Excerpts of Airplane Flight Manual (item 24, .PDF, 108 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256497&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Excerpts%20of%20Airplane%20Flight%20Manual-Master.PDF - MHIA Performance Calculations (item 25, .PDF, 28 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256498&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=MHIA%20Performance%20Calculations-Master.PDF - Cargo Manifest (item 26, .PDF, 148 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256499&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Cargo%20Manifest-Master.PDF - Fuel Receipts (item 27, .PDF, 150 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256500&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Fuel%20Receipts-Redacted.PDF - Excerpts of Operator's Pilot Training Program (item 28, .PDF, 860 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256501&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Excerpts%20of%20Operator%27s%20Pilot%20Training%20Program-Master.PDF - Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation (item 29, .PDF, 57 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256502&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Statement%20of%20Party%20Representatives%20to%20NTSB%20Investigation-Redacted.PDF - Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 (item 30, .PDF, 87 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256503&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Release%20of%20Aircraft%20Wreckage,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.15-Redacted.PDF - Toxicological Report - Pilot (item 31, .PDF, 51 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40396841&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Toxicological%20Report%20-%20Pilot-Redacted.PDF - Toxicological Report - Passenger (item 32, .PDF, 48 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40396842&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Toxicological%20Report%20-%20Passenger-Redacted.PDF - View of Accident Site (NTSB) (item 33, .PDF, 1.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256445&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Accident%20Site%20(NTSB)-Master.PDF - View of Main Wreckage (DCC) (item 34, .PDF, 620 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256446&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Main%20Wreckage%20(DCC)-Master.PDF - View of Main Wreckage (Honeywell) (item 35, .PDF, 1.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256447&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Main%20Wreckage%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - View of Main Wreckage (Honeywell) (item 36, .PDF, 1.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256448&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Main%20Wreckage%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - View of Main Wreckage (Honeywell) (item 37, .PDF, 1.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256449&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Main%20Wreckage%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - View of Empennage (Honeywell) (item 38, .PDF, 1.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256450&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Empennage%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - View of Empennage (Honeywell) (item 39, .PDF, 1.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256451&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Empennage%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - View of Ground Scar (Honeywell) (item 40, .PDF, 1.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256452&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Ground%20Scar%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - View of Main Wreckage (Honeywell) (item 41, .PDF, 1.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256453&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Main%20Wreckage%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - View of Left Engine and Propeller (Honeywell) (item 42, .PDF, 1.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256454&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Left%20Engine%20and%20Propeller%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - View of Right Engine (Honeywell) (item 43, .PDF, 1.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256455&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Right%20Engine%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - View of Right Engine (Honeywell) (item 44, .PDF, 1.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256456&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Right%20Engine%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - View of Cockpit (Honeywell) (item 45, .PDF, 1.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256457&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Cockpit%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - View of Pilot Instrument Panel (Honeywell) (item 46, .PDF, 1.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256458&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Pilot%20Instrument%20Panel%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - View of Cockpit Controls (DCC) (item 47, .PDF, 691 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256459&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=View%20of%20Cockpit%20Controls%20(DCC)-Master.PDF - Left Engine Second-Stage Compressor Housing (Honeywell) (item 48, .PDF, 811 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256460&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Left%20Engine%20Second-Stage%20Compressor%20Housing%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - Left Engine Propeller Shaft (Honeywell) (item 49, .PDF, 2.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256461&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Left%20Engine%20Propeller%20Shaft%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - Right Engine First-Stage Compressor Impeller (Honeywell) (item 50, .PDF, 1.4 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256462&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Right%20Engine%20First-Stage%20Compressor%20Impeller%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - Right Engine Second-Stage Compressor Impeller Shroud (Honeywell) (item 51, .PDF, 2.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256463&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Right%20Engine%20Second-Stage%20Compressor%20Impeller%20Shroud%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF - Left and Right Engine Oil Pump Transfer Tubes (Honeywell) (item 52, .PDF, 804 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40256464&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Left%20and%20Right%20Engine%20Oil%20Pump%20Transfer%20Tubes%20(Honeywell)-Master.PDF From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.