# NTSB ERA10LA485: Beech 58, N86BR, Rainelle, WV, September 18, 2010 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Minor injuries · Limited investigation · Final report - Date: September 18, 2010, 17:15 local (21:15 UTC) - Place: Rainelle, WV - Coordinates: 37.970554, -80.806114 (estimated) - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=37.9706&lon=-80.8061&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Enroute](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/400) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Enroute-cruise: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330) - Highest injury: Minor injuries - Injuries: 5 minor - Status: Completed, report December 1, 2011 - Report: Approved by Office Director - NTSB office: Eastern Region Aviation - Parties: FAA/FSDO - NTSB case key (mKey): 77333 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ERA10LA485 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/77333/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=77333 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA10LA485 ## Probable cause The improper rigging of the fuel selector by maintenance personnel, which resulted in a total loss of engine power. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Maintenance: repair](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062015): Personnel issues › Task performance · Maintenance personnel (probable cause); cases with it: [Beech 58, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062015/cases.md?model=1152740), [All aircraft, 99 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062015/cases.md) - [Maintenance/inspections: return to service](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01010530): Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service · Incorrect service/maintenance (probable cause); cases with it: [Beech 58, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01010530/cases.md?model=1152740), [All aircraft, 14 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01010530/cases.md) - [Fuel system: fuel selector/shutoff valve](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022823): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Inadequate inspection; cases with it: [Beech 58, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022823/cases.md?model=1152740), [All aircraft, 176 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022823/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Enroute-cruise: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330) (defining event); cases with it: [Beech 58, 6 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330/sequence.md?model=1152740), [All aircraft, 994 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330/sequence.md) - [Enroute-cruise: Fuel starvation](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/191); cases with it: [Beech 58, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/191/sequence.md?model=1152740), [All aircraft, 733 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/191/sequence.md) - [Enroute-cruise: Loss of engine power (total)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/341); cases with it: [Beech 58, 3 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/341/sequence.md?model=1152740), [All aircraft, 3,820 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/341/sequence.md) - [Emergency descent: Off-field or emergency landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/440); cases with it: [Beech 58, 3 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/440/sequence.md?model=1152740), [All aircraft, 3,365 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/440/sequence.md) - [Emergency descent: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Beech 58, 19 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=1152740), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md) ## Analysis According to the pilot, while in cruise flight, the right engine lost power. He attempted to move the left fuel selector to the crossfeed position in an attempt to restart the right engine, but the fuel selector knob would not turn clockwise to that position. Shortly thereafter, the left engine lost power. The pilot feathered both propellers and set the airplane up for its best glide angle in an attempt to reach the closest airport. His attempts to restart the engines during the descent were unsucessful. The pilot made a forced landing in the backyard of a private residence, and the airplane collided with a house, sustaining substantial damage. A postaccident examination of the fuel system revealed that the fuel selectors were indicating "on" for both fuel tanks, and the left fuel selector knob would not rotate clockwise to the crossfeed position. When the left fuel selector valve was disassembled, it was found to be rigged incorrectly. In the “on” position, the valve should have drawn fuel from the left and right fuel tanks. Instead, it drew fuel from the right tank only. The right fuel tank was found to be empty of all usable fuel. A review of the airplane's maintenance records revealed that the left fuel selector was removed, resealed, and reinstalled prior to the accident. ## Factual narrative On September 18, 2010, at 1715 eastern daylight time, a Beech 58, N86BR, was substantially damaged during a forced landing following a total loss of engine power near Rainelle, West Virginia. The certificated commercial pilot and four passengers received minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight which departed Morgantown Municipal Airport (MGW), Morgantown, West Virginia at 1645, and was destined for Bluefield, West Virginia. The non-scheduled passenger flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. According to the pilot, while in cruise flight at 8,000 feet mean sea level, an uncommanded right engine shutdown occurred. He attempted to move the left fuel selector to the crossfeed position in an attempt to restart the right engine, but the fuel selector knob would not turn clockwise to the crossfeed position. Shortly thereafter, the left engine shut down. He feathered both propellers and set the airplane up for its best glide angle in an attempt to reach the closest airport. Repeated attempts were made to restart the engines during the descent, but neither engine would restart. Due to the rate of descent, the pilot determined he would not be able to reach a nearby airport and made a forced landing in the backyard of a private residence. The airplane slid for approximately 60 feet before making contact with the back side of a house. According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, an on-scene examination of the airplane revealed that all major structural components of the airplane were located at the accident site. Flight control continuity was established to the ailerons, and the rudder and elevator control cables were broken and exhibited signs of overstress failure. The landing gear were extended, and were separated from the aircraft. The wing flaps were found in the extended position. The engine and propeller controls were jammed and continuity could not be established due to impact damage. The pilot did not report any flight control or propeller control anomalies during the accident flight. Examination of the three-bladed constant speed propellers revealed that both propellers remained attached to their respective engines at the accident site. Examination of the left engine propeller revealed that there was no evidence that it had been rotating at the time of the accident and that it was in the feathered position. Examination of the right propeller revealed that there was no evidence that the propeller was rotating under engine power and that it was not feathered. No flight control anomalies were noted during the on-scene examination. An examination of the fuel system revealed that the fuel selectors were indicating “On” for both fuel tanks. It was verified that the left fuel selector knob would not rotate clockwise to the crossfeed position. The left fuel selector was disassembled, and it was determinedthat the left fuel selector valve was rigged incorrectly in the crossfeed position. Further examination of the left fuel selector knob revealed that when in the "On" position, indicating that the left engine was drawing fuel from the left fuel tank, fuel was actually drawing from the right tank. A review of the aircraft maintenance records revealed that the left fuel selector was removed on September 8, 2010, resealed and reinstalled during maintenance and approved for return to service. Examination of the right fuel selector knob revealed no anomalies. Further examination of the airframe revealed that the fuel caps were found closed and locked. The right and left fuel tanks were accessed through the access panels at their respective wing roots. The right tank was found to have no usable fuel remaining in the tank. The right fuel tank system was not breached during the accident and there was no evidence of fuel leakage from the right fuel tank at the accident site. The left main fuel tank was breached at the leading edge of the left wing, outboard of the engine, as a result of contact with the house. Evidence of a fuel leak of an unknown quantity was observed on the ground due to dead grass in the immediate vicinity of impact with the house. There was also a small amount of leakage under the left wing where the airplane came to rest. The remaining fuel was drained from the left fuel tank by the FAA inspector prior to movement of the airplane. The recovered fuel totaled approximately 5 gallons. The left and right fuel tank sending units were moved through their full range of motion from empty to full and back to empty. The cockpit-mounted left and right fuel level indicator movements were coordinated with the movement of the floats for each respective tank; both indicators were indicating empty at the accident site. The left and right wing-mounted sight gage floats were also moved through their full range of motion and both indicated appropriately from empty to full. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N86BR](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N86BR-2011-04-20), registration cancelled 2011-04-20, S/N TH-1072, built 1979 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: BEECH 58 - Registry model: [Beech 58](https://openairdocs.org/model/beech-58) (registry code 1152740) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Continental IO-520 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/continental-io-520-series) (registry code 17032, reciprocating) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: TH-1072 - Airframe hours: 5321 - Engines: CONT MOTOR IO 550 C 285 horsepower reciprocating; CONT MOTOR IO 550 C 285 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Part 135 - Operator: Albatross Aircraft Sales Inc - Registered owner: Albatross Aircraft Sales Inc - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: Annual, September 8, 2010, 5 hours before - Departed: MGW, Morgantown, WV - Destination: BLF, Bluefield, WV - Flight plan: IFR ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 32; injuries: minor; flight instructor, commercial; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 2, without waivers/limitations; last flight review April 13, 2010; seat: left; flight hours: 3,787 total, 208 in this make and model, 3,731 as pilot in command, 107 in the last 90 days, 3 in the last 30 days ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 82 °F, dew point 45 °F - Altimeter: 30.23 inHg - Observed at: BLF, 20 nm away ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20100918047239A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20100918047239A), Sep 18, 2010: Beech 58, Rainelle, WV, Destroyed. The airplane crashed in the backyard of a residence after encountering an un-commanded dual engine shut down while in cruise flight at 8000' MSL. According to… ## Docket (14 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on October 25, 2011, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=77333. 8.0 MB in all. - Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120 (item 1, .PDF, 2.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353799&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120-Redacted.PDF - Reports from Federal Agencies-FAA statement (item 2, .PDF, 1.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353800&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Reports%20from%20Federal%20Agencies-FAA%20statement-Redacted.PDF - Other Pertinent Forms and Reports-Fuel system description (item 3, .PDF, 542 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353802&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Other%20Pertinent%20Forms%20and%20Reports-Fuel%20system%20description-Master.PDF - Other Pertinent Forms and Reports-Fuel distribution maintenance (item 4, .PDF, 386 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353804&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Other%20Pertinent%20Forms%20and%20Reports-Fuel%20distribution%20maintenance-Master.PDF - Other Pertinent Forms and Reports-Fuel system general maintenance (item 5, .PDF, 56 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353805&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Other%20Pertinent%20Forms%20and%20Reports-Fuel%20system%20general%20maintenance-Master.PDF - Other Pertinent Forms and Reports-Fueling records (item 6, .PDF, 453 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353810&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Other%20Pertinent%20Forms%20and%20Reports-Fueling%20records-Redacted.PDF - Photo 1-FAA photo- main wreckage (item 7, .PDF, 415 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353861&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%201-FAA%20photo-%20main%20wreckage-Master.PDF - Photo 2-FAA Photo-Skid marks and airplane against house (item 8, .PDF, 659 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353862&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%202-FAA%20Photo-Skid%20marks%20and%20airplane%20against%20house-Master.PDF - Photo 3-FAA Photo-Fuel Selector handles (item 9, .PDF, 516 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353863&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%203-FAA%20Photo-Fuel%20Selector%20handles%20-Master.PDF - Photo 4-FAA Photo-Left fuel selector (item 10, .PDF, 229 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353864&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%204-FAA%20Photo-Left%20fuel%20selector-Master.PDF - Photo 5-FAA photo-Left fuel selector opened (item 11, .PDF, 321 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353865&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%205-FAA%20photo-Left%20fuel%20selector%20opened-Master.PDF - Photo 6-FAA photo-Left fuel selector cable position (item 12, .PDF, 261 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353866&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%206-FAA%20photo-Left%20fuel%20selector%20cable%20position-Master.PDF - Photo 7-FAA photo-Left fuel selector cable improper rigging (item 13, .PDF, 263 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353867&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%207-FAA%20photo-Left%20fuel%20selector%20cable%20improper%20rigging-Master.PDF - Photo 8-FAA photo-Left fuel selector cable improper rigging 2 (item 14, .PDF, 258 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40353868&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%208-FAA%20photo-Left%20fuel%20selector%20cable%20improper%20rigging%202-Master.PDF From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.