# NTSB ERA12LA373: Faltin John R Rotorway Exec 162F, N8707E, Smoketown, PA, May 31, 2012

- Type: NTSB accident investigation
- Classification: Accident · Minor injuries · Limited investigation · Final report
- Date: May 30, 2012, 20:10 local (May 31, 2012, 00:10 UTC)
- Place: Smoketown, PA
- Coordinates: 40.04, -76.201667 (estimated)
- Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=40.0400&lon=-76.2017&mi=10
- Phase of flight: [Maneuvering](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/450) (OpenAirDocs' grouping)
- Defining event: [Maneuvering-hover: Loss of control in flight](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240)
- Highest injury: Minor injuries
- Injuries: 1 minor
- Status: Completed, report March 24, 2014
- Report: Approved by Office Director
- NTSB office: Eastern Region Aviation
- Parties: FAA/FSDO
- NTSB case key (mKey): 83806
- NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ERA12LA373
- NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/83806/pdf
- NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=83806
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA12LA373

## Probable cause

A loss of control during a post-maintenance test flight due to improper tracking of the helicopter’s main rotor blades by the pilot/aircraft builder.

## Findings

NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause.

- [Main rotor system: main rotor blade system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01046210): Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor · Incorrect service/maintenance (probable cause); cases with it: [Faltin John R ROTORWAY EXEC 162F, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01046210/cases.md?model=05621XM), [All aircraft, 60 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01046210/cases.md)
- [Maintenance](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062000): Personnel issues › Task performance · Owner/builder (probable cause); cases with it: [Faltin John R ROTORWAY EXEC 162F, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062000/cases.md?model=05621XM), [All aircraft, 143 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062000/cases.md)

## Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened.

- [Prior to flight: Aircraft maintenance event](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/040); cases with it: [Faltin John R ROTORWAY EXEC 162F, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/040/sequence.md?model=05621XM), [All aircraft, 484 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/040/sequence.md)
- [Maneuvering-hover: Loss of control in flight](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240) (defining event); cases with it: [Faltin John R ROTORWAY EXEC 162F, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md?model=05621XM), [All aircraft, 5,002 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md)
- [Uncontrolled descent: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Faltin John R ROTORWAY EXEC 162F, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=05621XM), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md)

## Analysis

According to the pilot/owner/builder of the experimental amateur-built helicopter, he had recently finished performing maintenance on the helicopter, which included tracking its rotor system. He then positioned the helicopter in front of his hangar and proceeded to perform an operational check, before attempting to hover the helicopter. Immediately upon entering the hover, the pilot felt a large amount of vibration in the cyclic control and the helicopter began moving to the left. The pilot pushed the cyclic control right in an effort to stop the left movement of the helicopter, but the control input was ineffective. The pilot then increased the helicopter's altitude to avoid a collision with nearby obstacles and attempted to maneuver to an open grass area. Realizing that the rotor rpm had decayed, he reduced the collective pitch and increased engine power. The helicopter then entered a settling-with-power flight condition and impacted a taxiway located between two hangars. During a telephone interview conducted about 2 weeks after the accident, the pilot stated that the loss of control that precipitated the accident was most likely due to improper tracking of the helicopter's main rotor blades, related to the method of leveling the blades he had used during the helicopter's most recent maintenance. A postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed that the cyclic control cross tube had separated from its attachment point at the left side of the fuselage, adjacent to a break in a repair weld of the fuselage's tubular frame. Detailed examination of the fracture surface revealed that while the weld was of a generally poor quality, the fracture exhibited features consistent with a failure in bending overload. Given the nature of the failure, it is most likely that the weld fractured during the impact sequence.

## Factual narrative

On May 30, 2012, about 2010 eastern daylight time, am experimental amateur-built Rotorway Exec 162F, N8707E, was substantially damaged during a hard landing at Smoketown Airport (S37), Smoketown, Pennsylvania. The commercial pilot/owner/builder of the helicopter incurred minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local flight. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. According to the pilot, he had recently finished performing maintenance on the helicopter, which included tracking its rotor system following removal of the main rotor blades. He then positioned the helicopter in front of his hangar and proceeded to perform an operational check before attempting to hover the helicopter. Immediately upon entering the hover, the pilot felt a large amount of vibration in the cyclic control and the helicopter began moving to the left. The pilot pushed the cyclic control right in an effort to stop the left movement of the helicopter, but the control input was ineffective. The pilot then climbed the helicopter to avoid a collision with several nearby posts and the hangar, and attempted to maneuver to an open grass area. Realizing that the rotor rpm had decayed, he reduced the collective pitch and increased engine power. The helicopter then entered "settling with power" and impacted a taxiway located between two hangars. Federal Aviation Administration inspectors examined the helicopter following the accident. During the examination the inspectors found that the helicopter's tubular steel frame had fractured in two locations. Each location was the site of a weld repair, which according to the pilot, were performed following a previous hard landing in 2006. The inspectors also found that the cyclic control cross tube had disconnected from its pivot point on the left side of the fuselage frame, just aft of one of the previously observed separations in the frame. The inspectors reported no other evidence of any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions or failures. The portions of the tubular frame encompassing the fractures were sectioned from the wreckage and forwarded to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for detailed examination. The first two halves of tubular frame pieces examined were located adjacent to the left front skid attachment point. The tube pieces exhibited a branched circumferential fracture that followed several external porous weld deposits, arc strikes, areas of burn-through, and two cross-drilled holes. The tube weldment exhibited fracture features consistent with a failure in bending overstress. The second set of structural tubing was recovered from the engine mount area, and was fractured through the filet weld deposit where a square tube was joined to a round tube. The thermal discoloration of the paint and the morphology of the weld deposit in the vicinity of the fracture were consistent with weld deposit overlay over an existingfilet weld. The weld deposit in the region of the fracture exhibited undercut, incomplete fusion, overlap, insufficient throat, burn-through, and poor filet formation. The fracture of the weld exhibited features consistent with failure due to bending overstress. During a telephone interview conducted by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector several weeks after the accident, the pilot stated that he believed that the loss of control that had precipitated the accident was due to improper main rotor blade tracking, and specifically, related to the method of leveling the blades he had utilized during the helicopter's most recent maintenance.

## Aircraft

- Registration: [N8707E](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N8707E-2015-02-02), registration cancelled 2015-02-02, S/N F6203, built 2006 (OpenAirDocs)
- Reported make and model: FALTIN JOHN R ROTORWAY EXEC 162F
- Registry model: [Faltin John R ROTORWAY EXEC 162F](https://openairdocs.org/model/faltin-john-r-rotorway-exec-162f) (registry code 05621XM) (OpenAirDocs)
- Registry engine: [Amateur-built UNKNOWN ENG](https://openairdocs.org/engine/amateur-built-unknown-eng) (registry code 99999) (OpenAirDocs)
- Category: Helicopter, amateur-built
- Serial number: F6203
- Year built: 2006
- Airframe hours: 200
- Engines: Rotorway International RI 162F 150 horsepower reciprocating
- Damage: Substantial damage
- Flight: Personal, Part 91
- Airworthiness certificate: Special, Experimental (Special)
- Last inspection: Condition, December 6, 2011
- Departed: S37, Smoketown, PA
- Destination: S37, Smoketown, PA
- Airport: S37, Smoketown Airport

## Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

- Pilot; age 62; injuries: minor; private; medical: class 3, with waivers/limitations; last flight review September 11, 2010; seat: left; flight hours: 159 total, 100 in this make and model

## Weather

- Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day
- Wind: 210° at 4 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Lowest ceiling: none
- Temperature: 75 °F, dew point 61 °F
- Altimeter: 29.72 inHg
- Observed at: LNS, 6 nm away

## FAA reports on this event (1)

The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs).

- [Accident 20120530010139A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20120530010139A), May 30, 2012: Faltin John R ROTORWAY EXEC 162F, Smoketown, PA, Destroyed. Improper weld repair on the main frame tubing caused the cyclic control rod to disconnet, limiting right cyclic control input to the rotor system.

## Docket (5 files)

The files NTSB released with the investigation on February 4, 2014, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=83806. 1.8 MB in all.

- Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 (item 1, .PDF, 372 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40401771&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1-Redacted.PDF
- Pilot Interview Summaries (Courtesy of FAA) (item 2, .PDF, 677 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40401772&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%20Interview%20Summaries%20(Courtesy%20of%20FAA)-Redacted.PDF
- Photo 1 - Wreckage from Front Left (Photo Courtesy of FAA) (item 3, .PDF, 69 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40401773&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%201%20-%20Wreckage%20from%20Front%20Left%20(Photo%20Courtesy%20of%20FAA)-Master.PDF
- Photo 2 - Disconnected Control Tube (Photo Courtesy of FAA) (item 4, .PDF, 152 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40401774&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%202%20-%20Disconnected%20Control%20Tube%20(Photo%20Courtesy%20of%20FAA)-Master.PDF
- Materials Laboratory Factual Report 13-055 (with 3 embedded images) (item 5, .PDF, 3 photos, 575 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40401872&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Materials%20Laboratory%20Factual%20Report%2013-055%20(with%203%20embedded%20images)-Master.PDF

From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

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