# NTSB ERA13LA012: Cirrus Design SR22, N80KW, Birmingham, AL, October 6, 2012

- Type: NTSB accident investigation
- Classification: Accident · Serious injuries · Limited investigation · Final report
- Date: October 6, 2012, 12:17 local (17:17 UTC)
- Place: Birmingham, AL
- Coordinates: 33.563888, -86.75222 (estimated)
- Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=33.5639&lon=-86.7522&mi=10
- Phase of flight: [Approach](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/500) (OpenAirDocs' grouping)
- Defining event: [Approach-IFR missed approach: Loss of control in flight](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240)
- Highest injury: Serious injuries
- Injuries: 1 serious, 1 minor
- Status: Completed, report April 25, 2013
- Report: Approved by Office Director
- NTSB office: Eastern Region Aviation
- Parties: FAA/FSDO, Avidyne Corp, Cirrus Aircraft
- NTSB case key (mKey): 85272
- NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ERA13LA012
- NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/85272/pdf
- NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=85272
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA13LA012

## Probable cause

The pilot's failure to maintain airplane control during a missed approach in instrument meteorological conditions. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's overreliance on the autopilot system and his inability to hand-fly the airplane once the autopilot was disconnected.

## Findings

NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause.

- [Action: lack of action](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041030): Personnel issues › Action/decision · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Cirrus Design SR22, 11 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041030/cases.md?model=2130001), [All aircraft, 792 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041030/cases.md)
- [Performance/control parameters: altitude](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062012): Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability · Not attained/maintained (probable cause); cases with it: [Cirrus Design SR22, 10 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062012/cases.md?model=2130001), [All aircraft, 1,310 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062012/cases.md)
- [Performance/control parameters: directional control](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062020): Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability · Not attained/maintained (probable cause); cases with it: [Cirrus Design SR22, 35 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062020/cases.md?model=2130001), [All aircraft, 3,958 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062020/cases.md)
- [Use of equip/info: use of automation](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063010): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Cirrus Design SR22, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063010/cases.md?model=2130001), [All aircraft, 17 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063010/cases.md)
- [Auto flight system: autopilot system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022210): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Incorrect use/operation (probable cause); cases with it: [Cirrus Design SR22, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022210/cases.md?model=2130001), [All aircraft, 28 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022210/cases.md)

## Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened.

- [Approach-IFR missed approach: Loss of control in flight](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240) (defining event); cases with it: [Cirrus Design SR22, 74 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md?model=2130001), [All aircraft, 5,002 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md)
- [Approach-IFR missed approach: Miscellaneous/other](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/900); cases with it: [Cirrus Design SR22, 23 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/900/sequence.md?model=2130001), [All aircraft, 1,556 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/900/sequence.md)
- [Emergency descent: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Cirrus Design SR22, 113 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=2130001), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md)

## Analysis

The airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions, and the pilot intended to fly an instrument landing system approach. Review of non-volatile memory data revealed that the autopilot approach mode was armed as the airplane intercepted the localizer course and was descending toward 2,600 feet mean sea level (msl). At that time, the autopilot was selected to vertical speed (VS) mode with the altitude armed rather than selected to the altitude mode, which is one of the criteria for automatically arming the glideslope (GS) mode later in the approach. About 1 minute later, the autopilot automatically cancelled the VS mode and switched to altitude mode as the airplane reached 2,600 feet msl. However, at that time the airplane was above the glideslope by 53 percent needle deflection. The autopilot will not automatically arm the GS mode unless, in addition to the altitude mode being selected, the airplane is more than 10 percent needle deflection below the glideslope. As a result, the airplane remained above the glideslope until the autopilot was disconnected about 1 minute later. The pilot then attempted to hand-fly a missed approach; however, he was unable to maintain the heading or altitude assigned by air traffic control. He subsequently lost control of the airplane during a turn and elected to deploy the airplane's parachute system. The airplane came to rest in a vacant lot.

## Factual narrative

On October 6, 2012, at 1217 central daylight time, a Cirrus SR22, N80KW, operated by a private individual, was substantially damaged during impact with terrain, after deployment of the Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS), following a loss of control during a missed approach at Birmingham International Airport (BHM), Birmingham, Alabama. The private pilot incurred minor injuries and the passenger was seriously injured. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight that departed Charles B Wheeler Downtown Airport (MKC), Kansas City, Missouri; destined for BHM. The pilot stated that while on the instrument landing system approach to runway 6 at BHM, he reported missed approach at 2,000 feet mean sea level (msl) to the BHM air traffic control tower. The tower controller instructed the pilot to fly the runway heading; however, the pilot reported to the controller that he was unable due to weather. The tower controller then instructed the pilot to fly a heading of 180 degrees and climb to 4,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the instruction and during the turn, lost control of the airplane. He then observed the altimeter indicating a descent through 1,700 feet and elected to deploy the CAPS. The airplane subsequently descended via parachute and came to rest in a commercial parking lot, about 2 miles south of BHM. Review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recorded radio communications between N80KW and BHM tower revealed that after the pilot declared a missed approach, the tower controller instructed the pilot to fly runway heading and climb to 4,000 feet. The pilot replied "Okay, I'm way off of runway heading…" and did not make any mention of not being able to turn due to weather. The controller then instructed the pilot twice to climb to 4,000 feet and make a left turn to 360 degrees as the airplane was approaching an antenna to the south. After a third query, the pilot replied that he was "going, trying to get around." About 20 seconds later, the pilot reported that he was "going down." Examination of the airplane by an FAA inspector revealed substantial damage to the fuselage and a puncture of the left wing near the left main landing gear. The airplane was equipped with an Avidyne primary flight display (PFD), which was forwarded to the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory, Washington, DC. The unit contained non-volatile memory, which was successfully downloaded. Review of the data revealed that the autopilot was engaged shortly after takeoff and remained on until 1215. At 1213, the autopilot approach mode was armed as the airplane was descending to 2,600 feet msl and had intercepted the localizer course. The autopilot was selected to vertical speed (VS) mode with the altitude armed, rather than the altitude mode. At 1214, the VS mode was automatically cancelled (and the autopilotautomatically switched to altitude mode) as the airplane reached 2,600 feet; however, at that time the airplane was above the glideslope (GS) by 53 percent needle deflection. The airplane remained above the GS until the autopilot was disconnected at 1215 and the CAPS was deployed about 1217. According a representative from the PFD manufacturer, the autopilot would automatically arm the GS mode, provided seven criteria were met. Two of the seven criteria were altitude mode engaged and airplane no more than 10 percent needle deflection below GS (airplane above GS). Review of the data did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions with the airplane, nor did the pilot report any. The pilot reported a total flight experience of 1,944.7 hours; of which, 1,450 hours were in the same make and model as the accident airplane. He reported 17 and 75 total hours of actual and simulated instrument experience, respectively. The recorded weather at BHM, at 1153, included an overcast ceiling at 700 feet above ground level (1,350 msl).

## Aircraft

- Registration: [N80KW](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N80KW-2016-01-26), registration cancelled 2016-01-26, S/N 1879, built 2006 (OpenAirDocs)
- Reported make and model: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22
- Registry model: [Cirrus Design SR22](https://openairdocs.org/model/cirrus-design-sr22) (registry code 2130001) (OpenAirDocs)
- Registry engine: [Continental IO-550-N](https://openairdocs.org/engine/continental-io-550-n) (registry code 17215, reciprocating) (OpenAirDocs)
- Category: Airplane
- Serial number: 1879
- Airframe hours: 1612
- Engines: CONT MOTOR IO-550-N 310 horsepower reciprocating
- Damage: Substantial damage
- Flight: Personal, Part 91
- Operator: Billy Sprague
- Registered owner: Two Flyers Llc
- Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal
- Last inspection: Annual, March 20, 2012, 112 hours before
- Departed: MKC, Kansas City, MO
- Destination: BHM, Birmingham, AL
- Flight plan: IFR
- Airport: BHM, Birmingham International, runway 06, 11,998 × 150 ft, asphalt

## Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

- Pilot; age 60; injuries: none; private; airplane ratings: single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 3, without waivers/limitations; last flight review September 23, 2011; seat: left; flight hours: 1,948 total, 1,450 in this make and model, 45 in the last 90 days, 24 in the last 30 days, 0 in the last 24 hours

## Weather

- Conditions: Instrument (IMC), Day
- Wind: 330° at 9 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Lowest ceiling: 700 ft overcast
- Temperature: 64 °F, dew point 61 °F
- Altimeter: 30.07 inHg
- Observed at: BHM, 2 nm away

## FAA reports on this event (1)

The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs).

- [Accident 20121006022639A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20121006022639A), Oct 6, 2012: Cirrus Design Corp SR22, Birmingham, AL, Substantial damage. During IMC approach to runway 06 at Birmingham, AL. (Bhm) pilot declared a missed approach & became disoreinted during a turn; pilot deployed emergency…

## Docket (9 files)

The files NTSB released with the investigation on March 15, 2013, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=85272. 4.4 MB in all.

- Cockpit Displays 17 - Specialist's Factual Report (item 1, .PDF, 2.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40386784&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Cockpit%20Displays%2017%20-%20Specialist%27s%20Factual%20Report-Master.PDF
- Cockpit Displays 17 - Attachment 1 - Tabular Data (CSV) (item 2, ZIP, 584 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40386785&FileExtension=zip&FileName=Cockpit%20Displays%2017%20-%20Attachment%201%20-%20Tabular%20Data%20(CSV)-Master
- Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 (item 3, .PDF, 927 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40383825&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1-Redacted.PDF
- Excerpt From Recorded ATC Communications (item 4, .PDF, 13 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40383792&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Excerpt%20From%20Recorded%20ATC%20Communications-Master.PDF
- Excerpt of Correspondence From PFD Manufacturer Representative (item 5, .PDF, 51 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40386182&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Excerpt%20of%20Correspondence%20From%20PFD%20Manufacturer%20Representative-Redacted.PDF
- Weather Report (item 6, .PDF, 14 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40383793&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Weather%20Report-Master.PDF
- Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation (item 7, .PDF, 467 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40387109&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Statement%20of%20Party%20Representatives%20to%20NTSB%20Investigation-Redacted.PDF
- Evidence Control Form (item 8, .PDF, 66 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40386010&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Evidence%20Control%20Form-Master.PDF
- Photograph # 1: Main Wreckage (Photo Couresy of FAA) (item 9, .PDF, 198 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40386026&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photograph%20%23%201%3A%20%20Main%20Wreckage%20(Photo%20Couresy%20of%20FAA)%20-Master.PDF

From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

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