# NTSB ERA22LA310: Cubcrafters CC11-160, N55JV, Findlay, OH, July 3, 2022 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · No injuries · Class 3 · Limited · Final report - Date: July 3, 2022, 09:30 local (13:30 UTC) - Place: Findlay, OH · Soy Bean Field - Coordinates: 41.002437, -83.589526 (estimated) - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=41.0024&lon=-83.5895&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Takeoff](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/300) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Takeoff: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330) - Highest injury: No injuries - Injuries: 1 uninjured - Status: Completed - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 3 - NTSB office: Eastern Region Aviation - Parties: FAA/FSDO - NTSB case key (mKey): 105470 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ERA22LA310 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/105470/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=105470 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA22LA310 ## Probable cause The pilot/mechanic’s inadequate inspection of the faulty horizontal stabilizer trim switch, which resulted in an uncommanded trim movement during the takeoff roll, which resulted in an aborted takeoff, and subsequent nose over. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Flight control system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022700): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Inadequate inspection (probable cause); cases with it: [Cubcrafters CC11-160, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022700/cases.md?model=060006N), [All aircraft, 65 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022700/cases.md) - [Inspection: preflight inspection](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02061510): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Cubcrafters CC11-160, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02061510/cases.md?model=060006N), [All aircraft, 551 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02061510/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Prior to flight: Aircraft inspection event](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/050); cases with it: [Cubcrafters CC11-160, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/050/sequence.md?model=060006N), [All aircraft, 229 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/050/sequence.md) - [Takeoff: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330) (defining event); cases with it: [Cubcrafters CC11-160, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330/sequence.md?model=060006N), [All aircraft, 994 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330/sequence.md) - [Takeoff-rejected takeoff: Nose over/nose down](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/096); cases with it: [Cubcrafters CC11-160, 10 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/096/sequence.md?model=060006N), [All aircraft, 2,287 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/096/sequence.md) ## Analysis The pilot, who was also a mechanic, purchased the airplane after it had been involved in an accident. The pilot completed major repairs and a conditional inspection on the airplane and planned to complete the first test flight from a soybean farm field near his residence. He taxied the airplane to the field and completed a normal run-up. He then operated the electric horizontal stabilizer trim, via the rocker switch on the control stick, to the takeoff position (full nose up) as indicated on the primary flight display (PFD). When the trim indicator reached the takeoff position, he removed his thumb from the trim switch and initiated the takeoff roll. The airplane accelerated normally, and he moved the control stick aft to rotate however, a heavy nose down pressure was felt. He immediately aborted the takeoff and, in his effort to slow the airplane, it nosed over. The left wing and empennage sustained substantial damage. Examination of the horizontal stabilizer trim position found that it was set to a full nose down position, as observed at the control surface and on the PFD trim indication. Examination of the trim rocker switch found that it would operate the trim actuator; however, when the switch was released, it would not return to the neutral position as designed. In order to stop the trim movement from continuing to run until it reached its maximum nose up/down limit, the switch was required to be moved to the center position, which would stop the trim movement. It is likely that the stabilizer trim continued to operate towards the nose down position during the takeoff roll, after the pilot had released his thumb from the switch, which resulted in the pilot feeling a heavy nose down force during the takeoff. There was no evidence that the pilot/mechanic evaluated the rocker switch’s proper operation during the major repairs and recent conditional inspection. Had he inspected the switch for proper movement, it is likely that he would have detected the faulty condition of the switch, and the accident likely would have been prevented. ## Factual narrative On July 3, 2022, about 0930 eastern daylight time, a Cub Crafters CC11 160 airplane, N55JV, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Findlay, Ohio. The commercial pilot was not injured. The airplane was operated by the pilot as a flight test conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The pilot reported that the airplane was involved in an accident in 2020 (in which he was not the pilot). He purchased the airplane and made extensive repairs to return it to an airworthy condition. This accident flight was the first test flight since the previous accident. The pilot taxied from his property to an adjacent off-airport soybean farm field and performed a run-up without issue. He then operated the electric horizontal stabilizer trim via the rocker switch on the control stick, to the “nose up position” as indicated on the primary flight display (PFD). He then moved the trim back in a nose down direction towards the neutral takeoff position. When the trim indicator reached the takeoff position, he removed his thumb from the trim switch and initiated the takeoff roll. The airplane accelerated normally, and he moved the control stick aft to rotate; however, he felt a “very heavy” nose down pressure on the control stick. He immediately aborted the takeoff and, in his effort to slow the airplane, it nosed over. The left wing and empennage sustained substantial damage. A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector examined the airplane after it was moved from the accident site. The horizontal stabilizer trim position found at the flight control surface and as indicated on the PFD was consistent with a full nose down setting. The pilot reported that shortly after the accident he observed this trim setting as well. Examination and tests of the trim rocker switch found that it would move the horizontal stabilizer; however, when the switch was released, it would not return to the neutral position as designed. In order to stop the trim movement, the switch needed to be moved to the center position, or else it would continue until the maximum nose up/down limit was reached. The airplane’s operating manual described that pitch trim was accomplished via an electric servo which moved the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer up and down, changing the angle of incidence. The servo was actuated with a rocker switch located on the control stick. Review of maintenance records found that the accident pilot was the mechanic who completed the major repair and alteration and the most recent conditional inspection. The repairs were completed and signed off on June 27, 2022. According to the FAA inspector who interviewed the mechanic/pilot, he was unable to provide evidence or indication that the trim switch had been inspected for proper operation during the most recent repairs or preflight prior to the flight test. The airplane was involved in an accident on September 18, 2020 (National TransportationSafety Board investigation identification number CEN20CA404). The trim system was not reported as a factor in the accident. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N55JV](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N55JV), registered now, S/N CC11-00392 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: CUBCRAFTERS INC CC11-160 (NO SERIES) - Registry model: [Cubcrafters CC11-160](https://openairdocs.org/model/cubcrafters-cc11-160) (registry code 060006N) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Titan OX-340CC](https://openairdocs.org/engine/titan-ox-340cc) (registry code 59470, 4 cycle) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: CC11-00392 - Year built: 2015 - Airframe hours: 442.3 - Engines: TITAN OX-4300CC-B3J3N4/D8B002 180 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Flight test, Part 91 - Operator: C & J Air Inc - Registered owner: C & J Air Inc - Airworthiness certificate: Special, Experimental light sport (Special) - Last inspection: Condition, June 27, 2022, 0.3 hours before - Destination: Same as departure - Airport: NONE, None - Equipment: Stall warning system, ADS-B, Auto-pilot, Electronic primary flight display ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 71; injuries: none; commercial; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: basicmed; last flight review November 15, 2020; seat: front; restraint: 5-point; flight hours: 18,000 total, 35 in this make and model, 17,700 as pilot in command, 20 in the last 90 days, 15 in the last 30 days ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 60° at 6 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 79 °F, dew point 57 °F - Altimeter: 30.15 inHg - Observed at: KFDY, 4 nm away - METAR: KFDY 031353Z AUTO 06006KT 10SM CLR 26/14 A3015 RMK AO2 SLP200 T02610139 ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20220703011669A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20220703011669A), Jul 3, 2022: Cubcrafters Inc CC11-160, Findlay, OH, Substantial damage. On July 3, 2022 around 9:30 am [privacy data omitted]was taking off in [privacy data omitted] a cub crafters CC11-160 model. [privacy data omitted] Was taking… ## Other investigations on N55JV (1) From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. - [NTSB CEN20CA404](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/CEN20CA404), Sep 18, 2020: Cubcrafters CC11 (N55JV), Larkspur, CO, substantial damage. Probable cause: The pilot’s failure to maintain control of the airplane while taking off in gusting quartering tailwind conditions. ## Docket (5 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on November 15, 2023, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=105470. 8.7 MB in all. - Pilot/operator aircraft accident report, NTSB form 6120.1 (item 1, PDF, 9 pages, 960 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=15749128&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=NTSB%206120_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Memo for record (FAA inspector) (item 2, PDF, 2 pages, 157 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=15749013&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Memo%20for%20Record%20(FAA%20Inspector)-Rel.pdf - Pilot statement (item 3, PDF, 1 page, 462 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=15748733&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Pilot%20Statement%20-%20Redacted-Rel.pdf - Investigative photographs (item 4, PDF, 8 pages, 7 photos, 4.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=15749318&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Photo%20Array%20-%20ERA22LA310-Rel.pdf - Operating manual - maintenance records (item 5, PDF, 7 pages, 2.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=15749138&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operating%20Manual%20-%20Maintenance%20Records%20-%20Redacted-Rel.pdf From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.