# NTSB ERA23FA136: Piper PA-22-150, N3410Z, Blue Ridge, GA, March 5, 2023 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Fatal · Class 3 · Field · Final report - Date: March 5, 2023, 11:14 local (16:14 UTC) - Place: Blue Ridge, GA · Heavy Brush - Coordinates: 34.852222, -84.383056 (estimated) - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=34.8522&lon=-84.3831&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Initial climb](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/350) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Initial climb: Fuel starvation](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/191) - Highest injury: Fatal - Injuries: 1 fatal - Status: Completed - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 3 - NTSB office: Eastern Region Aviation - Parties: Lycoming Engines, Piper, FAA/FSDO - NTSB case key (mKey): 106817 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ERA23FA136 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/106817/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=106817 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA23FA136 ## Probable cause A loss of engine power due to fuel starvation due to the improper positioning of the fuel selector. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Fuel system: fuel selector/shutoff valve](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022823): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Unintentional use/operation (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-22-150, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022823/cases.md?model=7102210), [All aircraft, 176 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022823/cases.md) - [Fluids: fuel](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01071010): Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware · Fluid management (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-22-150, 9 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01071010/cases.md?model=7102210), [All aircraft, 1,695 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01071010/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Initial climb: Fuel starvation](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/191) (defining event); cases with it: [Piper PA-22-150, 5 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/191/sequence.md?model=7102210), [All aircraft, 733 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/191/sequence.md) - [Emergency descent: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Piper PA-22-150, 41 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=7102210), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md) ## Analysis The pilot’s flight instructor reported that the pilot, who had not flown for several years, was planning on practicing traffic pattern work in preparation for a flight review. The instructor observed the airplane take off and climb to about 200 ft, at which time the engine sounded as if it was losing power. The airplane made a left turn toward a field and collided with a tree. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that, although there was fuel system damage, the fuel caps remained secured. Several gallons of fuel was recovered from both tanks. First responders reported the fuel selector was observed positioned between the right tank and the “both" setting. According to the manufacturer of the fuel selector, this would restrict fuel flow. The fuel selector was examined and functioned as designed, with no mechanical anomalies. The pilot’s instructor reported the fuel selector was located by the pilot’s leg and that, due to the pilot’s size, his leg rested on the selector. Although the engine sustained impact damage, no preimpact mechanical anomalies were found that would have precluded normal engine operation. It is likely that the loss of engine power was a result of the mispositioning of the fuel selector valve. ## Factual narrative On March 5, 2023, about 1114 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-22-150, N3410Z, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Blue Ridge, Georgia. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. According to a witness, who was the pilot’s flight instructor, on the day of the accident, the pilot planned to conduct some airport traffic pattern work. This was the first flight of the day for the pilot and the second time he departed from Blue Ridge Skyport Airport (57GA), Blue Ridge, Georgia. The flight instructor stated that he had been working with the pilot for a couple of months “to get him back up to speed with his flying.” He said the pilot had not flown in many years and was working toward a flight review signed off. The flight instructor stated, “57GA was a difficult airport to land at,” and the routine was for the pilot to take off from 57GA to conduct pattern work and land at Martin Campbell Field Airport (1A3), Copperhill, Tennessee. The flight instructor would then drive over to 1A3 to meet the pilot and fly the airplane back to 57GA. The flight instructor stated that he had provided 3.9 hours of instruction to the pilot before the accident occurred. On the day of the accident, the flight instructor said that the pilot took off from runway 18 and climbed to an altitude of about 200 ft. During the climb out the flight instructor said the airplane engine sounded as though it was losing power. He watched as the airplane made a left turn toward a field before the airplane descended and collided with a tree. He ran to the end of the runway and observed the airplane suspended in a tree and contacted the local authorities. An autopsy of the pilot was performed by The Georgia Bureau of Investigation, State of Georgia, Office of the Medical Examiner. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death was blunt force injuries, and the manner of death was accident. Toxicology testing performed at the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory found no drugs of abuse. A review of the pilot’s logbook records revealed that the pilot had a total of 151 flight hours. Further review showed that from years 1988 to 1990, the pilot accumulated a total of 90 flight hours in the PA-22. The pilot’s logbook showed a total of 7 flight hours in 2023 (all in the accident airplane make and model). The wreckage was located about 500 ft to the left of the departure end of runway 18 at 57GA and was removed from the tree for examination. All flight control surfaces were impact-damaged and still attached to the airframe. The flight controls inside of the cockpit were impact damaged. Flight control cable continuity to the flight control surfaces was established. The engine separated from the airframe and was located about 30 ft in front of the fuselage. The cockpit engine controls were impact damaged. An unquantified amount of fuel was observed leaking from both fuel tanks. Thefuel system sustained impact damage; however, the fuel caps were found to be securely locked. Recovery personnel drained several gallons of fuel from both tanks after removing the wings from the fuselage. No fuel was present in the broken lines from the fuel pump to the carburetor. The fuel strainer was opened, and the screen was clean and unobstructed. The lever-action pump operated normally when manually activated. Photos taken by first responders showed the fuel selector positioned between the “Right” tank and “Both” tank positions. According to the fuel selector's manufacturer, if the selector is in the 45° position, it will shut off fuel flow. inspection of the fuel selector revealed no anomalies that would prevent normal operation. The pilot’s instructor reported the fuel selector was located by the pilot’s leg and that, due to the pilot’s size, his leg rested on the selector. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N3410Z](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N3410Z-2023-10-27), registration cancelled 2023-10-27, S/N 22-7309, built 1960 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: PIPER PA-22-150 - Registry model: [Piper PA-22-150](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-22-150) (registry code 7102210) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Lycoming 0-320 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/lycoming-0-320-series) (registry code 41508, reciprocating) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 22-7309 - Year built: 1960 - Airframe hours: 3865 - Engines: Lycoming O-320-A2B 150 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Instructional, Part 91 - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: 100 hour, March 4, 2022 - Airport: 57GA, Blue Ridge Skyport, runway 18, 3,100 × 100 ft, asphalt - Equipment: None ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 65; injuries: fatal; private; airplane ratings: single-engine land; medical: class 3; last flight review March 4, 2023; seat: left; restraint: 3-point; toxicology performed; flight hours: 151 total, 97 in this make and model, 7 in the last 90 days ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 90° at 7 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 61 °F, dew point 34 °F - Altimeter: 30.24 inHg - Observed at: DZJ, 20 nm away - METAR: KDZJ 051615Z AUTO 09007KT 020V110 10SM CLR 16/01 A3024 RMK AO2 T01610011 ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20230305019889A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20230305019889A), Mar 5, 2023: Piper PA-22-150, Blue Ridge, GA, Destroyed, 1 fatal. On March 5, 2023, Piper PA-22-150 departed on a local part 91 flight from Blue Ridge skypark (57GA) at around 1114 local time to martin campbell field airport… ## Docket (11 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on March 19, 2025, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=106817. 1.2 GB in all. - Memorandum for record - flight instructors statement (item 1, PDF, 2 pages, 69 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18400594&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=MOR%20CFI%20accident%20statement%20FA136-Rel.pdf - Pilot logbook excerpts (item 2, PDF, 43 pages, 359 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18400181&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Pilots%20Logs_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Memorandum for record - dakota cub aircraft (item 3, PDF, 1 page, 63 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18399992&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=MOR%20Dakota%20Cub%20fuel%20selector%20FA136-Rel.pdf - Fuel selector valve assembly installation instructions (item 4, PDF, 4 pages, 50.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18400503&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Fuel%20Selector%20STC%20FA136_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Maintenance records (item 5, PDF, 21 pages, 748 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18399755&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=MX%20records_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Wreckage examination summary (item 6, PDF, 5 pages, 139 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18415050&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=NTSB%20Examination%20Summary%20FA136-Rel.pdf - Investigation photographs (item 7, PDF, 7 pages, 4.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18399740&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Investigative%20Photos%20FA136-Rel.pdf - Memorandum for record - description and photo of fuel selector (item 8, PDF, 2 pages, 490 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18434735&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=MOR%20Fuel%20Selector%20Photo%20FA136-Rel.pdf - Toxicological report (item 9, PDF, 1 page, 138 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18403323&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Tox%20FA136_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Release of aircraft wreckage, NTSB form 6120.15 (item 10, PDF, 1 page, 551 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18407073&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Wreckage%20Release%20FA136_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Statement of party representatives to NTSB investigation (item 11, PDF, 23 pages, 873 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18415429&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Certification-of-Party-Representation-Form-and-Guidance%20FA136_Redacted-Rel.pdf From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.