# NTSB ERA23FA352: Eurocopter EC135, N109BC, Pompano Beach, FL, August 28, 2023 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Fatal · Class 3 · Field · Final report - Date: August 28, 2023, 08:44 local (12:44 UTC) - Place: Pompano Beach, FL · Residence - Coordinates: 26.240252, -80.122249 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=26.2403&lon=-80.1222&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Initial climb](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/350) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Initial climb: Fire/smoke (non-impact)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/150) - Highest injury: Fatal - Injuries: 2 fatal, 1 serious, 1 minor; on the ground: 1 fatal - Status: Completed - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 3 - NTSB office: Eastern Region Aviation - Parties: Metro Aviation, Airbus Helicopters, FAA AVP-100, FAA/FSDO, Safran Helicopter Engines - NTSB case key (mKey): 192950 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ERA23FA352 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/192950/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=192950 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA23FA352 ## Probable cause An inflight fire outside of the engine firewalls, likely from overheating of the No. 1 engine for undetermined reasons, which resulted in a partial tailboom separation. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Not determined](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/05000000): Not determined › Not determined · Unknown/Not determined (probable cause); cases with it: [Eurocopter Deutschland EC135T1, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/05000000/cases.md?model=5620026), [All aircraft, 2,247 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/05000000/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Initial climb: Fire/smoke (non-impact)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/150) (defining event); cases with it: [Eurocopter Deutschland EC135T1, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/150/sequence.md?model=5620026), [All aircraft, 504 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/150/sequence.md) - [Approach: Part(s) separation from AC](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/338); cases with it: [Eurocopter Deutschland EC135T1, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/338/sequence.md?model=5620026), [All aircraft, 563 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/338/sequence.md) - [Uncontrolled descent: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Eurocopter Deutschland EC135T1, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=5620026), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md) ## Analysis The helicopter was dispatched to pick up a victim from an automobile accident. Electronic devices onboard the helicopter recorded that about 67 seconds after liftoff, the No. 1 electronic engine control unit reported a simultaneous double N1 and double N2 failure. While this failure would have been expected to result in a “FADEC FAIL” cockpit caution, the pilot did not recall seeing or hearing any cockpit caution or warning indications. This condition would also have frozen the fuel control unit to the fuel flow at the time of the failure until the end of the flight, which was 123 l/h, consistent with a climb power setting. The reason for the failure could not be determined. About 90 seconds after liftoff, at 300 to 400 ft above ground level, the pilot heard a “bang” from the rear of the helicopter and noticed that the turbine outlet temperature (TOT) was rising on the No. 1 engine, but still within limits. He set the No.1 engine throttle to idle, declared an emergency to air traffic control, and reversed direction to return to the airport. Unbeknownst to the pilot, due to the FADEC FAIL condition, setting the engine throttle to idle would have had no effect on fuel flow, but rather the engine twist grip would need to be manipulated to manually control fuel flow to that engine. Despite this condition, fuel flow maintained at that level would not be expected to result in an overtemperature condition in the engine. The pilot next scanned the cockpit instrument panel and noticed that the No.1 engine fire button had illuminated. He stated that he pressed the button to activate the fire suppression system; however, the TOT continued to rise near 1,000° C (maximum limit 895°C) on the No. 1 engine. The pilot subsequently heard a second “bang” (about 90 seconds after the first “bang”) and was unable to control the helicopter. It spun and descended into an apartment building. Review of witness video revealed an in-flight fire near the area of the No. 1 engine exhaust and the air conditioner condenser fans. The tailboom partially separated in flight and the helicopter descended in a right spin. Examination of the No. 1 engine revealed that five turbine blades had fractured consistent with overheat fatigue from temperatures in excess of 1,295° C. There was no evidence of fire within the No. 1 engine compartment prior to ground impact; however, exhaust gases in excess of 1,000° C could have been a factor in the initiation of the inflight airframe fire outside of the No. 1 engine compartment. Specifically, a fiberglass air conditioner housing and composite tailboom fuselage were located near the No.1 engine exhaust. While the composite fuselage offered more fire resistance than the fiberglass housing, neither were certified to withstand temperatures in excess of 1,000° C. While the No. 1 engine fire warning light could provide indications of fires within the engine compartment, this fire was outside the engine compartment. As such, the pilot had no cautionand warning indicators of an inflight fire that may have forced a land immediately action, therefore, his decision to return to the airport was reasonable, rather than risk an off-airport emergency landing to a confined area with one engine inoperative. The No. 1 emergency fuel shutoff valve was in the open position. In the cockpit, the No. 1 engine fire button’s breakable safety wire was found unbroken and the button did not exhibit inward deformation. Although the pilot stated that he pressed the fire button, he likely did not. Additionally, the fire suppression system was for inside the engine compartment and would not have extinguished a fire outside of the engine compartment, but pressing the button would have closed the fuel shutoff valve for the No. 1 engine. In summary, the accident was the result of an inflight fire in the vicinity aft of the helicopter’s No. 1 engine exhaust, near the air conditioner condenser fans, and the origin of the fire was likely the result of the engine overheating. The only plausible explanations the investigation could determine for only the No. 1 engine to overheat were foreign object debris, blockage of the No. 1 engine air inlet, or hot gas or combustible fluid ingestion. Because the wreckage was subjected to a postimpact fire, the source of the overtemperature could not be determined. ## Factual narrative The helicopter was manufactured in 1999 and powered by two Turbomeca Arrius 2B1, 670-turboshaft-horsepower engines. It was maintained under a manufacturer’s approved inspection program. Its most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on May 23, 2023. At that time, the airframe had accrued 5,557.1 total hours. The engines had accrued 5,327.2 hours since new (2,251.3 hours since overhaul in 2016). The helicopter was operated about 24 hours from the time of the most recent inspection until the accident. An air conditioner was installed on the helicopter under supplemental type certificate on August 1, 2023, about 16 flight hours prior to the accident flight. On August 28, 2023, about 0844 eastern daylight time, a Eurocopter (Airbus Helicopters) Deutschland GMBH EC135T1, N109BC, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Pompano Beach, Florida. The commercial pilot sustained minor injuries. One paramedic onboard and a resident of an apartment building were fatally injured, while a second paramedic onboard was seriously injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air medical flight. The pilot reported that the helicopter was dispatched to transport a patient from the scene of an automobile accident. About 90 seconds after liftoff and during initial climb, west of Pompano Beach Airpark (PMP), Pompano Beach, Florida, about 300 to 400 ft above ground level, the pilot heard a “bang” from the rear of the helicopter and noticed that the turbine outlet temperature (TOT) was rising on the No. 1 engine, but was still within limits. Prior to the “bang,” the pilot did not recall seeing or hearing any cockpit caution or warning indicators. He set the No.1 engine throttle to idle, declared an emergency to air traffic control, and reversed direction to return to the airport. He scanned the cockpit instrument panel and noticed that the No.1 engine fire button had illuminated. The pilot further stated that he pressed the button to activate the fire suppression system; however, the TOT continued to rise near 1,000° C on the No. 1 engine (maximum limit 895°C). The pilot subsequently heard a second “bang” and was unable to control the helicopter. It spun and descended into an apartment building. Review of witness video revealed an in-flight fire near the area of the No. 1 engine exhaust, and air conditioner condensing fans. The inflight fire spread to the central area near the tail boom attach point. Subsequently, the tailboom partially separated inflight and the helicopter descended in an uncontrolled right spin. The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for rotorcraft helicopter and instrument helicopter. He also held a second-class medical certificate. The pilot reported 3,895 hours of total helicopter experience, of which 272 hours were in the same make and model as the accident helicopter. He had been flying for the operator for over four years. The wreckage came to rest on its left side,facing south, through the roof of a one-story apartment building. A postcrash fire consumed a majority of the airframe. The tailboom was located about 30 ft south of the main wreckage and its fenestron (tailrotor) remained intact. All four main rotor blades separated near the blade root, consistent with impact damage. Both engines and their respective electronic engine control units (EECUs) were retained for further examination and data download. Additionally, the No. 1 engine fuel shutoff valve assembly was also retained for further examination. The No. 1 engine was further examined at the manufacturer’s facility. The examination revealed that five turbine blades had fractured below the blade platform. Metallurgical examination of the separated turbine blades revealed their inner walls exhibited dissolution of material precipitates (microstructural transformation) consistent with an overheating condition beyond 1,295° C and fatigue cracking due to excessive temperatures. There was no evidence of fire inside the No. 1 engine; however, the exhaust gases in excess of 1,000° C were consistent with an ignition source. Specifically, a fiberglass air conditioner housing and composite tailboom fuselage were located near the No.1 engine exhaust. While the composite fuselage offered more fire resistance than the fiberglass housing, neither were certified to withstand temperatures in excess of 1,000° C. (For more information, see the Airworthiness Group Chair’s Factual Report, Powerplants Group Chair’s Factual report, and Materials Laboratory Report in the public docket for this investigation.) Review of data downloaded from the No. 1 engine EECU revealed a simultaneous double N1 and double N2 failure recorded about 67 seconds after liftoff, and about 25 seconds before the pilot heard the first “bang.” This failure would result in a “FADEC FAIL” cockpit caution and would freeze the fuel control unit (FCU) at the fuel flow at the time of the failure, which was 123 l/h. Postaccident examination and testing of the FCU resolver revealed that it remained in a 123 l/h position. The reason for the failure could not be determined. Consequently, setting the engine throttle to idle will have no effect on fuel flow, but rather the engine twist grip must be manipulated to manually control fuel flow to that engine. Computed Tomography scanning of the No. 1 emergency fuel shutoff valve revealed that it was in the open position. Examination of the cockpit revealed that the No. 1 and No. 2 engine fire buttons’ breakable safety wire were found unbroken and the the buttons did not exhibit inward deformation. Examination of the No. 1 engine air inlet did not reveal any blockages; however, that area had been subject to a postcrash fire. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N109BC](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N109BC), registered now, S/N 0139, built 1999 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: EUROCOPTER EC135 (T1) - Registry model: [Eurocopter Deutschland EC135T1](https://openairdocs.org/model/eurocopter-deutschland-ec135t1) (registry code 5620026) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Turbomeca ARRIUS-2B1](https://openairdocs.org/engine/turbomeca-arrius-2b1) (registry code 60015, turbo-shaft) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Helicopter - Serial number: 0139 - Year built: 1999 - Airframe hours: 5557 - Engines: Turbomeca Arrius 2B1 670 horsepower turbo shaft; Turbomeca Arrius 2B1 670 horsepower turbo shaft - Damage: Destroyed - Fire: In-Flight - Flight: Part 135 - Operator: Broward County Sheriffs Office - Registered owner: Broward County Sheriffs Office - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: 100 hour, May 23, 2023, 24 hours before - Flight plan: Company VFR - Airport: PMP, Pompano Beach Airpark, runway 6, 4,001 × 150 ft, asphalt - Equipment: Video recording device, Satellite tracking device, ADS-B ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 37; injuries: minor; commercial, private; airplane ratings: single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane, helicopter; medical: class 2, without waivers/limitations; last flight review June 9, 2023; seat: right; restraint: 4-point; toxicology performed; flight hours: 4,035 total, 272 in this make and model, 3,750 as pilot in command, 16 in the last 90 days, 6 in the last 30 days, 1 in the last 24 hours - Cabin crew; age 50; injuries: fatal; seat: left; restraint: 4-point; toxicology performed - Cabin crew; age 29; injuries: serious; seat: rear; restraint: 4-point; toxicology performed ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 190° at 7 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: 7,000 ft broken - Temperature: 88 °F, dew point 75 °F - Altimeter: 29.81 inHg - Observed at: PMP, 1 nm away - METAR: KPMP 281253Z 19007KT 10SM FEW024 BKN070 31/24 A2981 ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20230828022749A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20230828022749A), Aug 28, 2023: Eurocopter Deutschland Gmbh EC135T1, Pompano Beach, FL, Destroyed, 2 fatal. A Eurocopter Deutschland Gmbh EC135T1, N109BC, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Pompano Beach, Florida. The commercial pilot sustained… ## Docket (25 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on September 11, 2025, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=192950. 481 MB in all. - Pilot/operator aircraft accident report, NTSB form 6120.1 (item 1, PDF, 11 pages, 1.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18754171&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Completed%20NTSB%206120%20Form%20-%20Operator%20Accident%20Report_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Transcript of initial pilot interview (courtesy bcso) (item 2, PDF, 8 pages, 132 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18807573&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Pilot%20Initial%20Interview%20Transcript_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Transcript of initial paramedic interview (courtesy bcso) (item 3, PDF, 8 pages, 136 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18807897&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Paramedic%20Initial%20Interview%20Transcript-Rel.pdf - Memorandum for the record - pilot interview (item 4, PDF, 5 pages, 149 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18772595&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Memorandum%20For%20The%20Record%20-%20Pilot%20Interview-Rel.pdf - Pilot supplemental written statement (October 2023) (item 5, PDF, 5 pages, 934 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18773696&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Pilot%20Supplemental%20Written%20Statement%20(October%202023)-Rel.pdf - Excerpt from FAA report of aircraft accident (pmp timeline) (item 6, PDF, 1 page, 23 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18755119&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=PMP%20Timeline%20(FAA%20Report%20of%20Aircraft%20Accident)-Rel.pdf - Excerpt from ATC audio - pmp tower at 1241Z (3 minutes, 44 seconds; MP3, 593 kb) (item 7, MP3, 607 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18755129&FileExtension=mp3&FileName=PMP%20Tower%201241Z-Rel.mp3 - Memorandum for the record - powerplants attachment 2 release permission (item 8, PDF, 1 page, 64 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18986623&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=MFR-Rel.pdf - Google earth file (kmz) of ADS-B plot (item 9, KMZ, 11 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18754191&FileExtension=kmz&FileName=N109BC%2020230828_A0263F_525781049_ADSB-Rel.kmz - Bcso witness/security video compilation (MP4; 16 minutes, 35 seconds; 208MB) (item 10, MP4, 213 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18773912&FileExtension=mp4&FileName=BCSO%20Video%20Compilation-Rel.mp4 - Airworthiness group chairman's factual report (item 11, PDF, 43 pages, 37 photos, 7.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18772742&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Airworthiness%20Group%20Chair%27s%20Factual%20Report%20(ERA23FA352)-Rel.pdf - Airworthiness group chairman's factual report - attachment 1 (item 12, PDF, 31 pages, 10.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18772577&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Airworthiness%20Group%20Chair%27s%20Factual%20Report%20-%20Attachment%201%20(ERA23FA352)-Rel.pdf - Airworthiness group chairman's factual report - attachment 2 (item 13, PDF, 2 pages, 992 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18773159&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Airworthiness%20Group%20Chair%27s%20Factual%20Report%20-%20Attachment%202%20(ERA23FA352)_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Airworthiness group chairman's factual report - attachment 3 (item 14, PDF, 65 pages, 34.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18773037&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Airworthiness%20Group%20Chair%27s%20Factual%20Report%20-%20Attachment%203%20(ERA23FA352)_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Powerplant group chair's factual report (item 15, PDF, 105 pages, 9.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18799670&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ERA23FA352_Arrius%202B1_Powerplant%20Factual%20Report_FINAL-Rel.pdf - Powerplants factual report - attachment 1 (item 16, PDF, 4 pages, 285 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18800597&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Powerplants%20Factual%20Report%20-%20Attachment%201-Rel.pdf - Powerplants factual report - attachment 2 (item 17, PDF, 13 pages, 4.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18799441&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Powerplants%20Factual%20Report%20-%20Attachment%202-Rel.pdf - Shutoff valve computed tomography factual report (item 18, PDF, 40 pages, 5.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=16572774&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ERA23FA352%20Shutoff%20Valve%20CT%20factual%20Report%20-%20Final-Rel.pdf - Materials laboratory-materials laboratory report 24-032 fire group factual (item 19, PDF, 20 pages, 17 photos, 6.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18462385&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=24-032%20Fire%20Factual%20final-Rel.pdf - Video study - text (item 20, PDF, 5 pages, 1.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19101544&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=EC135_Video_Study_TEXT_DOCKET-Rel.pdf - Video study - attachment 1 (item 21, PDF, 2,539 pages, 127 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19103222&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=VIDEO_N109BC_Ball_Fields_Westbound_Eastbound_Impact_Camera_Pompano_Beach_FL-Rel.pdf - Video study - attachment 2 (item 22, PDF, 491 pages, 55.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19103232&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=VIDEO_N109BC_Annie_Gillis_Park_Camera_Pompano_Beach_FL-Rel.pdf - Statement of party representatives to NTSB investigation (item 23, PDF, 11 pages, 402 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18755499&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Party%20Forms_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Release of aircraft wreckage, NTSB form 6120.15 (item 24, PDF, 1 page, 115 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18755139&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Wreckage%20Release_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Bea comments (item 25, PDF, 4 pages, 262 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19859889&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=BEA%20Comments-Rel.pdf From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.