# NTSB ERA23LA221: Aeronca 7DC-CONV, N3058E, Fort Mill, SC, May 5, 2023 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · No injuries · Class 3 · Limited · Final report - Date: May 5, 2023, 07:45 local (11:45 UTC) - Place: Fort Mill, SC - Coordinates: 34.929167, -80.866944 (estimated) - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=34.9292&lon=-80.8669&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Enroute](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/400) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Enroute-descent: Fuel related](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/190) - Highest injury: No injuries - Injuries: 2 uninjured - Status: Completed - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 3 - NTSB office: Eastern Region Aviation - Parties: FAA/FSDO - SAIBs cited in the narratives: [SAIB CE-09-35](https://openairdocs.org/saib/CE-09-35) (OpenAirDocs) - NTSB case key (mKey): 114701 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ERA23LA221 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/114701/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=114701 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA23LA221 ## Probable cause The pilot’s failure to apply carburetor heat before initiating a descent in conditions conducive to the development of carburetor icing, which resulted in a partial loss of engine power due to carburetor ice. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Temp/humidity/pressure: conducive to carburetor icing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03031030): Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena · Effect on equipment (probable cause); cases with it: [Aeronca 7DC-CONV, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03031030/cases.md?model=2110117), [All aircraft, 435 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03031030/cases.md) - [Action: delayed action](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041025): Personnel issues › Action/decision · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Aeronca 7DC-CONV, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041025/cases.md?model=2110117), [All aircraft, 894 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041025/cases.md) - [Ice/rain protection system: intake anti-ice, deice](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023020): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Incorrect use/operation (probable cause); cases with it: [Aeronca 7DC-CONV, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023020/cases.md?model=2110117), [All aircraft, 108 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023020/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Enroute-descent: Fuel related](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/190) (defining event); cases with it: [Aeronca 7DC-CONV, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/190/sequence.md?model=2110117), [All aircraft, 361 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/190/sequence.md) ## Analysis The pilot and passenger departed and climbed the airplane to about 2,000 ft mean sea level. Due to traffic at the intended destination, the pilot chose to instead descend and follow a river toward another airport. Upon reaching his desired altitude over the river, the pilot leveled the airplane and applied engine power, but reported that there was “no thrust.” He adjusted the throttle, the mixture, applied carburetor heat, and cycled the magnetos without a change in engine speed. The engine continued to run at 1,000 rpm. The pilot completed a forced landing to the river, where the airplane touched down in shallow water, nosed over, and came to rest inverted. Examination of the airplane at the site revealed substantial damage but no preimpact anomalies that would prevent normal operation. After recovery, the engine and its accessories were dried, the impact-damaged propeller was replaced, and fuel was plumbed directly to the carburetor due to an impact-damaged fuel line. The engine started and ran smoothly and continuously at various power settings until the test run was discontinued. Review of weather information in the area of the accident site revealed conditions conducive to the development of carburetor icing at glide and cruise power. In both his interview and his written statement, the pilot stated that he applied carburetor heat only after detecting the loss of engine power. Based on the available information, it is likely that the engine developed carburetor icing during the pilot’s descent toward the river, which resulted in a partial loss of engine power. ## Factual narrative On May 5, 2023, about 0745 eastern daylight time, an Aeronca 7DC-CONV, N3058E, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident in Fort Mill, South Carolina. The private pilot and pilot-rated passenger were not injured. The airplane was operated a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot was interviewed by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aviation safety inspector and provided a written statement. The pilot described a “normal” preflight inspection, engine start, run-up, taxi, departure, and climb to about 2,000 ft mean sea level, where he established a heading toward his planned destination. Because of radio and airplane traffic at the destination airport, he amended his destination, and decided to descend and follow a river toward another airport. The pilot reported that after descending about 1,000 ft, he leveled the airplane, “…applied power and there was no thrust.” He adjusted the throttle, the mixture, “pulled the carb heat,” and cycled the magnetos without a change in engine speed. The engine continued to run at 1,000 rpm. The pilot originally selected an open area of fields and golf courses for the forced landing, but decided to land in the river when he determined that the airplane would not reach the open area. The airplane touched down in shallow water, nosed over, and came to rest inverted. The pilot and his passenger each egressed the airplane without injury. Examination of the airplane at the site revealed damage to the rudder, wing attachment points and their associated attachment bolts. During recovery of the airplane, control continuity was established from the flight controls to all flight control surfaces. The airplane was recovered to the operator’s facility and prepared for an engine test run. The impact-damaged propeller was removed, and a propeller of the same make and model was installed. The spark plugs were removed, and water was drained from the cylinders. The plugs were dried, cleared of debris, and reinstalled. The magneto timing was confirmed, and the magnetos were removed, dried, and reinstalled in their as-found positions. The fuel line that ran between the fuel selector valve and the firewall beneath the instrument panel was fractured due to overstress, so a fuel container was plumbed into the carburetor for the test run. A fresh battery was installed in the airplane, and the starter was excited using battery power. The engine started with fuel plumbed through the primer port of the carburetor, idled and accelerated smoothly, and ran continuously until the engine was stopped using the mixture control in the cockpit. While the engine ran, a magneto check and a carburetor heat control check were performed satisfactorily at 1,700 rpm. The engine was then restarted with fuel supplied through the main fuel supply port, and the tests were repeated satisfactorily. The engine was then accelerated into the “green arc” before it was stopped again using the mixturecontrol. According to the carburetor icing probability chart contained in FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) CE-09-35, Carburetor Icing Prevention, the atmospheric conditions reported by the pilot at the point of departure and those recorded at a station about 10 miles west of the accident site were conducive to the development of carburetor icing at glide and cruise power. In both his interview and his written statement, the pilot stated that he applied carburetor heat only after detecting the loss of engine power. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N3058E](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N3058E), registered now, S/N 7AC-6647, built 1946 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: AERONCA 7DC-CONV - Registry model: [Aeronca 7DC-CONV](https://openairdocs.org/model/aeronca-7dc-conv) (registry code 2110117) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Continental C85-12](https://openairdocs.org/engine/continental-c85-12) (registry code 17124, reciprocating) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 7AC-6647 - Year built: 1946 - Airframe hours: 3815.3 - Engines: Continental C85-12 85 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Personal, Part 91 - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: Annual, September 13, 2022 - Departed: KEQY, Monroe, NC - Destination: KUZA, Rock Hill, SC - Equipment: Electronic flight bag or handheld device ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 29; injuries: none; private; airplane ratings: single-engine land; medical: class 1, without waivers/limitations; seat: front; restraint: 3-point; flight hours: 124 total, 14 in this make and model, 79 as pilot in command, 18 in the last 90 days, 5 in the last 30 days ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 40° at 3 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 52 °F, dew point 46 °F - Altimeter: 30.17 inHg - Observed at: KUZA, 10 nm away - METAR: KUZA 051154Z AUTO 04003KT 10SM CLR 11/08 A3017 RMK AO2 SLP212 T01110078 10111 20067 53025 ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20230505006079A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20230505006079A), May 5, 2023: Aeronca 7DC-CONV, Fort Mill, SC, Substantial damage. The aircraft departed keqy on a sightseeing flight. After climbing up and departing the traffic pattern, the pilot and his passenger decided to descend to… ## Docket (5 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on October 3, 2024, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=114701. 4.9 MB in all. - Pilot/operator aircraft accident report, NTSB form 6120.1 (item 1, PDF, 11 pages, 3.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17341118&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=NTSB%20Form%206120_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Memorandum for record a�� telephone interview, pilot (FAA) (item 2, PDF, 2 pages, 233 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17355801&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=FAA%20ROC%20with%20Pilot-Rel.pdf - Report from A&P mechanic (item 3, PDF, 2 pages, 257 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17341840&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ERA23LA221%20Engine%20Run_Redacted-Rel.pdf - FAA SAIB CE-09-35 (item 4, PDF, 3 pages, 216 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17341970&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=CE-09-35-Rel.pdf - Photo of accident site (item 5, PDF, 1 page, 772 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17341345&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ERA23LA221%20Photo-Rel.pdf From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.