# NTSB ERA23LA253: Beech V35A, N8074R, Statesboro, GA, June 1, 2023 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Minor injuries · Class 3 · Limited · Final report - Date: June 1, 2023, 14:55 local (18:55 UTC) - Place: Statesboro, GA - Coordinates: 32.48275, -81.736944 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=32.4828&lon=-81.7369&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Enroute](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/400) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Enroute-cruise: Flight control sys malf/fail](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/333) - Highest injury: Minor injuries - Injuries: 1 minor - Status: Completed - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 3 - NTSB office: Eastern Region Aviation - Parties: FAA/FSDO, Garmin Aviation, Southeast Avionics - NTSB case key (mKey): 192287 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ERA23LA253 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/192287/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=192287 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA23LA253 ## Probable cause Maintenance personnel’s improper installation of the pitch servo bridle cable clamp, which led to binding in the elevator control system that restricted aft yoke movement during the landing approach. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Auto flight system: autopilot system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022210): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Malfunction (probable cause); cases with it: [Beech V35A, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022210/cases.md?model=1151544), [All aircraft, 28 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022210/cases.md) - [Maintenance: installation](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062035): Personnel issues › Task performance · Maintenance personnel (probable cause); cases with it: [Beech V35A, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062035/cases.md?model=1151544), [All aircraft, 371 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062035/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Enroute-cruise: Flight control sys malf/fail](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/333) (defining event); cases with it: [Beech V35A, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/333/sequence.md?model=1151544), [All aircraft, 410 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/333/sequence.md) - [Approach: Loss of control in flight](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240); cases with it: [Beech V35A, 6 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md?model=1151544), [All aircraft, 5,002 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md) - [Approach: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Beech V35A, 4 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=1151544), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md) ## Analysis The pilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to test the newly installed autopilot servos and calibrate the fuel flow sensor. The pilot stated that the control surfaces moved as expected during the preflight inspection. Near the end of the flight, the autopilot did not turn to a programmed waypoint. The pilot disconnected the autopilot and took over manual control of the airplane but was unable to prevent an unintended nose-down pitch. Despite verifying the autopilot disconnection, the yoke was unresponsive and the airplane continued to descend on the final approach, striking a light pole about 1,000 ft short of the runway threshold before impacting the ground. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the pitch servo bridle cable clamp had not been properly installed, which resulted in the cable binding when the yoke was pulled aft. The installer had not verified that the required clearance was maintained and did not perform the necessary post-installation control movement checks as specified in the autopilot’s installation instructions. The incorrect positioning of the bridle cable clamp resulted in restricted elevator control, which prevented the pilot from recovering from the nose-down condition during the approach. ## Factual narrative On June 1, 2023, about 1455 eastern daylight time, a Beech V35A, N8074R, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Statesboro County Airport (TBR), Statesboro, Georgia. The pilot sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that he was testing the function of newly installed servos for the Garmin GFC-500 autopilot and calibrating the fuel flow sensor. During the preflight inspection, he moved the yoke and checked all control surface movements. He programmed the flight director, setting a cruising altitude of 3,000 ft with a pitch climb between 5° and 7°. During the takeoff roll, the pilot noted the controls felt "slightly heavy" and adjusted the ruddervator trim to nose-up using the electric trim switch. After liftoff, he engaged the autopilot, and the airplane climbed and maintained 3,000 ft. Throughout the flight, the pilot issued heading change commands via the GFC-500 display. After about an hour, the pilot programmed the autopilot to descend to 2,000 ft in preparation for landing at TBR. However, the autopilot failed to intercept the waypoint he had set. He disconnected the autopilot and assumed manual control. While on approach, he noticed the airplane was descending to an altitude lower than intended. He applied power, but the nose suddenly pitched down. Despite verifying that the autopilot was disconnected, he was unable to move the yoke aft. The airplane continued descending and he struggled to regain control. On the final approach, the airplane impacted a light pole about 1,000 ft short of the runway threshold before colliding with the ground and coming to a stop. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed an anomaly with the pitch servo bridle cable installation. The bridle cable clamp’s swaged ball fitting was positioned at the 1 o’clock position with the yoke in a full-forward position. However, installation instructions in the GFC 500 Installation Manual Addendum specified that the swaged ball should be at 1 o’clock with the yoke in the neutral position—defined as 4.5 inches aft of the instrument panel, per the Bonanza 35 Series Shop Manual, Page 3-6C (Elevator Rigging Procedure, Serials D-5726 and after). This installation resulted in the bridle cable clamp being positioned on the upper elevator cable such that it would bind against the former rib at flight station (F.S.) 179 when the yoke was pulled aft. Further examination determined that the installer did not verify the required .5- to 1-inch clearance between the bridle cable clamp and F.S. 179 when the elevator was in the full-up position, as specified in the installation manual addendum. Additionally, the installer did not follow the required procedures outlined in the GFC 500 Autopilot with ESP Part 23 AML Installation Manual, paragraph 4.2.1 (Page 45), which required: 1. Moving the flight controls through their full range of travel after servoinstallation and cable tensioning. 2. Ensuring that flight control surfaces move freely from stop to stop. 3. Verifying that no binding or restriction of flight controls resulted from the servo installation. 4. Confirming that servo cables, cable clamps, and main flight control cables maintained adequate clearance from adjacent structures and feed-through holes throughout the full range of motion. During an interview, the personnel from the maintenance facility who performed the installation acknowledged that the GFC-500 installation had been performed incorrectly. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N8074R](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N8074R), registered now, S/N D-8982, built 1969 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: BEECH V35A - Registry model: [Beech V35A](https://openairdocs.org/model/beech-v35a) (registry code 1151544) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Continental IO-520 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/continental-io-520-series) (registry code 17032, reciprocating) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: D-8982 - Year built: 1969 - Airframe hours: 6929 - Engines: Continental TSIO-520D 300 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Personal, Part 91 - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: Annual, May 30, 2023 - Destination: Same as departure - Airport: TBR, Statesboro-Bulloch County, runway 32, 6,000 × 101 ft, asphalt - Equipment: Electronic primary flight display, Onboard weather, Stall warning system, ADS-B, Auto-pilot, Electronic multifunction display ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 38; injuries: minor; private, flight instructor, commercial; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 2; seat: left; restraint: lap only; flight hours: 110 total, 2 in this make and model, 1,039 as pilot in command, 158 in the last 90 days, 45 in the last 30 days ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 85 °F - Altimeter: 29.00 inHg - Observed at: TBR ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20230601022169A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20230601022169A), Jun 1, 2023: Beech V35A, Statesboro, GA, Substantial damage. The aircraft departed Statesboro-Bullock regional airport for a test flight following an annual inspection and the installation of new avionics equipment which… ## Docket (10 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on June 4, 2025, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=192287. 27.4 MB in all. - Pilot/operator aircraft accident report, NTSB form 6120.1 (item 1, PDF, 11 pages, 2.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18615021&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=6120%20LA253_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Pilot's statement (item 2, PDF, 3 pages, 28 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18614948&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=N8074R%20Accident%20-Rel.pdf - Gfc 500 installation manual excerpts (item 3, PDF, 4 pages, 769 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18734380&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=GFC%20500%20installation%20excerpts%20LA253-Rel.pdf - Supplemental type certificate-SA01866WI (item 4, PDF, 3 pages, 143 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18615571&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=SA01866WI-Rel.pdf - Wreckage examination summary (item 5, PDF, 2 pages, 95 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18772243&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Examination%20Summary%20LA253-Rel.pdf - Memorandum for record - telephone interview, southeast aviation manager (item 6, PDF, 1 page, 64 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18762290&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=MOR%20SE%20Aviation%20LA253-Rel.pdf - Memorandum for record - video file description (item 7, PDF, 1 page, 62 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18619102&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=MOR%20video%20file%20LA253-Rel.pdf - Video file (item 8, MOV, 20.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18618841&FileExtension=MOV&FileName=IMG_0364-Rel.MOV - Statement of party representatives to NTSB investigation (item 9, PDF, 11 pages, 3.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18619410&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Party%20Forms%20signed%20LA253_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Investigative photos (item 10, PDF, 4 pages, 920 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18616822&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Investigative%20Photos%20LA253-Rel.pdf From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.