# NTSB ERA24FA261: Piper PA28, N515DH, Siler City, NC, June 14, 2024 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Fatal · Class 3 · Field · Final report - Date: June 14, 2024, 12:48 local (16:48 UTC) - Place: Siler City, NC - Coordinates: 35.696578, -79.501358 (estimated) - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=35.6966&lon=-79.5014&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Approach](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/500) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Approach-VFR pattern crosswind: Aerodynamic stall/spin](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/241) - Highest injury: Fatal - Injuries: 2 fatal - Status: Completed, report September 10, 2026 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 3 - NTSB office: Eastern Region Aviation - Parties: Piper, Lycoming Engines, FAA/FSDO - SAIBs cited in the narratives: [SAIB CE-09-35](https://openairdocs.org/saib/CE-09-35) (OpenAirDocs) - NTSB case key (mKey): 194471 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ERA24FA261 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/194471/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194471 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA24FA261 ## Probable cause The flight instructor’s failure to maintain airplane control during a low-speed, low-altitude left turn after encountering an undetermined issue during takeoff, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall at an altitude too low for recovery. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Performance/control parameters: angle of attack](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062042): Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability · Capability exceeded (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-28-140, 14 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062042/cases.md?model=7102802), [All aircraft, 990 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062042/cases.md) - [Temp/humidity/pressure: conducive to carburetor icing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03031030): Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena · Unknown/Not determined; cases with it: [Piper PA-28-140, 10 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03031030/cases.md?model=7102802), [All aircraft, 435 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03031030/cases.md) - [Use of equip/info: aircraft control](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040): Personnel issues › Task performance · Instructor/check pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-28-140, 103 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040/cases.md?model=7102802), [All aircraft, 9,295 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Initial climb: Abrupt maneuver](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/270); cases with it: [Piper PA-28-140, 4 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/270/sequence.md?model=7102802), [All aircraft, 346 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/270/sequence.md) - [Approach-VFR pattern crosswind: Aerodynamic stall/spin](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/241) (defining event); cases with it: [Piper PA-28-140, 21 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/241/sequence.md?model=7102802), [All aircraft, 1,529 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/241/sequence.md) - [Uncontrolled descent: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Piper PA-28-140, 137 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=7102802), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md) ## Analysis The flight instructor and student pilot were performing touch-and-go landings at a nearby airport. A second flight instructor for the same operator, who was flying another airplane in the same traffic pattern, observed the accident airplane perform a touch-and-go landing. As the second airplane approached the left base leg of the traffic pattern, the accident flight crew asked for his position and then requested, “Can you extend, we’re having an issue.” There were no further communications from the accident airplane. A witness near the runway reported that the accident airplane looked like it was “flying sideways” during takeoff. As it climbed east of the runway, the airplane “almost rolled over on its side and went into a nosedive” before impacting the ground. A postimpact fire ensued. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Although the weather conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to serious carburetor icing at glide power, the propeller damage and static tachometer indication were consistent with the engine’s production of cruise power at impact. According to ADS-B data, the track resumed near the departure end of the runway 10 ft above ground level (agl) and a groundspeed of 66 kts. During the next 25 seconds, the accident airplane climbed and turned about 90° to the left. The final ADS-B target showed the airplane about 185 ft agl at a groundspeed of 71 knots (kts) before the track data ended near the accident site. Postmortem toxicology testing of specimens from the flight instructor was consistent with recent use of cannabis and morphine. Both substances can adversely affect cognitive and psychomotor performance, and the medical review determined that the instructor’s use of these substances, particularly in combination, posed a hazard to flight safety. However, because the potential combined effects could not be predicted and postmortem concentrations could not reliably establish the extent of impairment at the time of the accident, whether drug effects contributed to the accident could not be determined. Weather conditions were conducive to serious carburetor icing at glide power, and carburetor icing could have accounted for the issue reported by the flight instructor. However, no witness reported engine roughness or a loss of engine power, and impact and thermal damage prevented determination of the carburetor and induction-system configurations. Additionally, the engine was likely producing cruise power at impact. Therefore, whether carburetor icing may have contributed to the reported issue could not be determined. Although the nature of the issue reported by the flight instructor could not be determined, the airplane subsequently entered a low-speed, low-altitude left turn during the initial climb, which increased the airplane’s stall speed; the flight instructor subsequently exceeded theairplane’s critical angle of attack, resulting in an accelerated aerodynamic stall at an altitude too low for recovery. ## Factual narrative FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (CE-09-35) – “Carburetor Icing Prevention,” states that: “…pilots should be aware that carburetor icing doesn't just occur in freezing conditions, it can occur at temperatures well above freezing temperatures when there is visible moisture or high humidity. Icing can occur in the carburetor at temperatures above freezing because vaporization of fuel, combined with the expansion of air as it flows through the carburetor, (Venturi Effect) causes sudden cooling, sometimes by a significant amount within a fraction of a second. Carburetor ice can be detected by a drop in rpm in fixed pitch propeller airplanes and a drop in manifold pressure in constant speed propeller airplanes. In both types, usually there will be a roughness in engine operation.” According to FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin CE-09-35 (Carburetor Icing Prevention), pilots should be aware that carburetor icing doesn’t just occur in freezing conditions: it can occur at temperatures well above freezing temperatures when there is visible moisture or high humidity. Icing can occur in the carburetor at temperatures above freezing because vaporization of fuel, combined with the expansion of air as it flows through the carburetor (Venturi effect), causes sudden cooling, sometimes by a significant amount within a fraction of a second. Carburetor ice can be detected by a drop in rpm in fixed pitch propeller airplanes and a drop in manifold pressure in constant speed propeller airplanes. In both types, usually there will be a roughness in engine operation. The bulletin goes on to say, in part, that there are some steps a pilot can take to prevent, recognize, and respond to carburetor icing. To prevent carburetor icing, the pilot should: o Assure the proper functionality of the carburetor heat during the ground (Before Takeoff) check. o Use carburetor heat on approach and descent when operating at low power settings, or in conditions where carburetor icing is probable. To recognize carburetor icing, the warning signs are: o A drop in rpm in fixed pitch propeller airplanes. o A drop in manifold pressure in constant speed propeller airplanes. o In both types, usually there will be a roughness in engine operation. The pilot should respond to carburetor icing by applying full carburetor heat immediately. The engine may run rough initially for short time while ice melts. The above recommendations are general suggestions. The pilot should consult the airplane flight manual or the pilot's operating handbook for the proper use of carburetor heat. According to the Piper PA-28-140 pilot’s operating handbook (POH), with the flaps retracted, the stall speeds at bank angles of 45°, 50°, and 60° were 76 mph (66 kts), 80 mph (69 kts), and 92 mph (80 kts), respectively. The POH further stated that, in the event of a loss of engine power during takeoff, the pilot should land straight ahead if sufficient runway remains for a normal landing. Ifinsufficient runway remains, the POH instructs the pilot to maintain a safe airspeed and make only a shallow turn, if necessary, to avoid obstructions. On June 14, 2024, at 1248 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-140 airplane, N515DH, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Siler City, North Carolina. The flight instructor and student pilot were fatally injured. The airplane was operated by Executive Flight Training and Services LLC as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. Another flight instructor for the same operator was flying a second airplane in the traffic pattern at Siler City Municipal Airport (SCR) at the time of the accident. Both the flight instructor and his student provided written statements, and their versions of events were consistent throughout. The accident airplane entered the downwind leg of the traffic pattern for runway 22 as the flight instructor and his student climbed on the upwind leg after performing a touch-and-go landing. The flight instructor in the second airplane said he adjusted his subsequent traffic pattern for “spacing” and that his airplane was about midfield on the downwind leg when he watched the accident airplane in a touch-and-go landing. The flight instructor in the second airplane stated that, as his airplane approached the left base leg of the traffic pattern, the accident flight crew asked for his airplane’s position over the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) and then requested, “Can you extend, we’re having an issue?” The student pilot’s recollection of the transmission was, “We are having issues, can we land?” Both the flight instructor and the student pilot said there were no further transmissions from the accident airplane. They heard “hot mic[rophone]” and “background” noises over the radio but no discernible voices or other sounds, including a stall horn. According to the student pilot, 30 to 45 seconds elapsed between the request for a position report and the background noises from the accident airplane. The flight instructor of the second airplane stated that he watched the accident airplane’s altitude readout on his ADS-B display “get lower and lower.” When he banked his airplane for a “more clear view,” he and his student saw smoke rising from the trees near the accident site. A witness who was baling hay in the grassy area near the runway stated that he saw the accident airplane take off. He reported that the airplane “looked different,” describing it as “flying sideways.” As it climbed east of the runway, the airplane “almost rolled over on its side and went into a nosedive” before impacting the ground. The witness then observed rising black smoke. ADS-B track data from the FAA showed that the accident airplane departed Raleigh Executive Jetport at Sanford-Lee County Airport (TTA), Sanford, North Carolina, about 1229 and entered the SCR traffic pattern about 1246. The data depicted the accident airplane on the downwind leg at about1,100 ft mean sea level (msl) and a ground speed of about 90 kts. The airplane turned and slowed on the left base leg to the low 80-kt range and then entered the final approach leg, slowing to the low 70-kt range before the ADS-B track data was lost. About 1 minute later, the track data resumed near the runway’s departure end at 625 ft msl and a ground speed of 66 kts. Over the next 25 seconds, the airplane turned about 90° to the left. The final two targets showed altitudes of 700 ft and 800 ft msl and ground speeds of 65 kts and 71 kts, respectively, before the track data ended. (See figure.) The airport elevation at SCR is 615 ft msl. Figure: ADS-B Flight Track Data. Times are shown in coordinated universal time (UTC). Student Pilot The North Carolina Office of the Chief Medical Examiner performed the student pilot’s autopsy and listed his cause of death as multiple blunt force injuries, and manner of death was accident. The postmortem toxicological testing of specimens from the student pilot by the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory did not detect any drugs, ethanol, or carboxyhemoglobin. Flight Instructor The North Carolina Office of the Chief Medical Examiner performed the flight instructor’s autopsy and listed the cause of death as multiple blunt force injuries and manner of death as accident. The postmortem toxicological testing of specimens from the flight instructor by the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory detected delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (delta-9-THC) at 3.2 ng/mL in cavity blood and at 3.6 ng/g in liver tissue. 11-hydroxy-tetrahydrocannabinol (11-hydroxy-THC) was detected at 6 ng/g in liver tissue and was not detected in cavity blood. Carboxy-delta-9-THC was detected at 31 ng/mL in cavity blood and at 855.2 ng/g in liver tissue. Morphine was detected at 2 ng/mL in cavity blood and at 6 ng/g in liver tissue. Delta-9-THC is the primary psychoactive chemical in cannabis, including marijuana, hashish, and cannabis edibles. Delta-9-THC may be inhaled or ingested recreationally by users seeking mind-altering effects. It may also be used medicinally, such as to treat illness-associated nausea and appetite loss. Psychoactive effects of delta-9-THC vary depending on the user, dose, and route of administration, and may impair motor coordination, reaction time, decision-making, problem solving, and vigilance. The instantaneous level of delta-9-THC in a living person’s blood does not directly predict impairing effects. Interpretation of postmortem levels of delta-9-THC is further complicated by the fact that such levels may differ from antemortem levels. Published FAA guidance indicates that marijuana use by pilots is unacceptable, regardless of state medical and recreational marijuana laws. 11-hydroxy-THC is a psychoactive metabolite of delta-9-THC that undergoes further metabolism to the non-psychoactive metabolite carboxy-delta-9-THC. Morphine is an opioid drug that may be used to treat pain. The drug’s adverse effects may includediminished cognitive and psychomotor function. Morphine medication often carries a warning that the drug may impair the mental or physical abilities needed to perform potentially hazardous activities such as driving a car or operating machinery, and that users should be warned not to drive or operate dangerous machinery unless they are tolerant to the effects of the drug and know how they will react to it. The FAA instructs aviation medical examiners not to issue medical certificates to pilots who use opioid medications regularly, although medical certificates may be issued in cases of occasional opioid use for time-limited conditions that are nonrecurrent or recurrent and resolved (and not otherwise disqualifying). Regardless, the FAA states that a pilot should not fly after using an opioid medication until adequate time has elapsed for the drug to be eliminated from circulation. Therapeutic levels of morphine medication in the blood of living people typically range from about 10-100 ng/mL; however, comparing morphine levels in postmortem cavity blood and tissue specimens to reference ranges in living people is unreliable. In addition to being used as a medication or illicitly, morphine may result from metabolism of other drugs, including heroin, an illicit opioid, and codeine, a medication that may be used to treat pain, cough, or diarrhea. Neither drug was detected in this case. The instructor’s autopsy report did not note any evidence of postaccident medical intervention. The potential combined effects of cannabis and morphine could not be predicted. The recorded temperature and dew point near the accident site were about 84.2°F and 68°F, respectively. According to a carburetor-icing probability chart, the temperature and dew point corresponded to the “serious icing – glide power” range. The flight instructor held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. He held a flight instructor certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine. His FAA first-class medical certificate was issued May 13, 2022, without limitations. The flight instructor did not report any medications or medical concerns to the aviation medical examiner. The operator’s chief managing director reported that the accident flight instructor received his flight instructor rating on November 14, 2023, and that the operator hired him as a flight instructor that same month. The chief managing director reported that the instructor’s logbooks were incomplete. He used the available pilot logbook and company records to estimate that the flight instructor had accrued 682 hours of total flight experience. He accrued a total of 297 hours in the accident airplane make and model, of which 246.8 hours were accrued while providing flight instruction. The operator did not provide any additional flight records. The student pilot was issued an FAA first-class medical certificate on December 18, 2023. Theoperator reported that the student pilot had accrued about 25 total hours of flight experience. The accident site was located in wooded terrain about 2,260 ft southeast of the departure end of runway 22. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane came to rest in its initial impact crater at an elevation of 562 ft, oriented on a magnetic heading of 330°, and was mostly consumed by a postimpact fire that extended to the empennage. The leading edges of both wings displayed uniform crushing across their entire spans. The engine was exposed, and the attached propeller was buried in the impact crater. The engine accessories were destroyed by fire. The engine controls and the majority of the instrument panel were destroyed. The recording tachometer was thermally damaged, with its indicator needle static at about 2,300 rpm. Flight control cable continuity was confirmed from the cockpit to the respective flight control surfaces. The flap lever exhibited impact and thermal damage, and the flaps were observed in the retracted position. The stabilator trim jackscrew was extended above the drum with approximately five threads exposed, which corresponded to a neutral trim setting. The fuel primer plunger was stowed and locked. Both fuel tanks were destroyed by impact and thermal damage. The fuel strainer bowl was covered in soot, and the surrounding structure was impact-damaged. No liquid was observed in the strainer bowl, and the fuel strainer screen was free of blockage. The electric fuel pump was thermally damaged and could not be tested. The fuel selector handle was consumed by fire. The fuel selector valve was impact- and thermally damaged, which allowed the valve shaft to rotate freely in the valve housing. The positions of the fuel selector valve and handle at the time of impact could not be determined. Examination of the engine revealed that the rear-mounted accessories were destroyed by fire. The carburetor was thermally damaged and partially separated from the engine. The induction alternate air box was crushed, and its position could not be determined because of thermal and impact damage. The intake tubes, exhaust tubes, and the exhaust muffler were partially crushed. The crankshaft flange was bent, and the starter ring gear support was fragmented. The propeller spinner was impact crushed. The engine was suspended from a lift and partially disassembled to facilitate examination. The exhaust tubes were cut and the muffler removed. The propeller and starter ring gear support were removed, and the bent portion of the crankshaft flange was cut away to allow the crankshaft to be rotated through 360°. The engine crankshaft was rotated using a tool inserted in the engine accessory case vacuum pump drive pad. Continuity of the crankshaft to the rear gears and to the valvetrain components was confirmed. Compression and suction were attained from all four cylinders. Borescope examination of the cylinder interiors revealed no anomalies. Thepropeller was attached to the engine crankshaft flange. Both propeller blades exhibited longitudinal twisting, chordwise abrasions, and varying degrees of aft deformation. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N515DH](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N515DH-2024-10-09), registration cancelled 2024-10-09, S/N 28-25331, built 1969 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: PIPER PA28 (140) - Registry model: [Piper PA-28-140](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-28-140) (registry code 7102802) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Lycoming O-320-E2A](https://openairdocs.org/engine/lycoming-o-320-e2a) (registry code 42120, 4 cycle) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 28-25331 - Year built: 1969 - Airframe hours: 5882.6 - Engines: Lycoming O-320-E2D 150 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Destroyed - Fire: On-Ground - Flight: Instructional, Part 91 - Registered owner: Executive Flight Training & Services LLC - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: 100 hour, June 6, 2024, 74.6 hours before - Departed: TTA, Sanford, NC - Destination: Same as departure - Airport: KSCR, Siler City Municipal Airport, runway 22, 5,000 × 75 ft, asphalt - Equipment: ADS-B, Stall warning system ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Flight instructor; age 25; injuries: fatal; commercial, flight instructor; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, without waivers/limitations; last flight review January 4, 2024; seat: right; toxicology performed; flight hours: 682 total, 297 in this make and model, 605 as pilot in command, 139.3 in the last 90 days, 60 in the last 30 days, 6 in the last 24 hours - Student pilot; age 19; injuries: fatal; student; medical: class 1, without waivers/limitations; toxicology performed; flight hours: 22.5 total, 3 in this make and model ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: calm - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 84 °F, dew point 68 °F - Altimeter: 29.96 inHg - Observed at: SCR, 0.5 nm away - METAR: KSCR 141645Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM CLR 29/20 A2996 RMK AO2 T02870196 ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20240614006799A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20240614006799A), Jun 14, 2024: Piper PA-28-140, Siler City, NC, Destroyed, 2 fatal. Aircraft had just performed touch and go at Siler City airport and was beginning climbout when they radioed another training aircraft that they were having a… ## Docket (17 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on September 10, 2026, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194471. 38.7 MB in all. - NTSB 6120 1 form (item 1, PDF, 11 pages, 2.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20777868&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=NTSB%20Form%206120%201_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Mor-summary of witness statements (item 2, PDF, 3 pages, 237 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20781244&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=MOR%20Summary%20of%20Witness%20Statements_Redacted-Rel.pdf - FAA record of conversation flight school owner (item 3, PDF, 2 pages, 292 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20742085&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Record%20of%20Conversation%20Flight%20School%20Owner_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Flight instructor logbook excerpts (item 4, PDF, 6 pages, 3.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20767316&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Flight%20Instructor%20Logbook_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Operator provided pilot summary (item 5, PDF, 1 page, 1.4 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20767500&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Operator%20Pilot%20Summary_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Airplane POH excerpts (item 6, PDF, 5 pages, 715 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20767622&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=POH%20Excerpts-Rel.pdf - Maintenance records (item 7, PDF, 14 pages, 22.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20741907&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Maintenance%20Records_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Carburetor icing probability graph (item 8, PDF, 4 pages, 280 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20742106&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Carburetor%20Icing%20Probability%20Graph%20CE-09-35-Rel.pdf - Aircraft track plots (item 9, PDF, 2 pages, 1.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20741830&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Aircraft%20Track%20Plots-Rel.pdf - Google earth flight track (item 10, KML, 110 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20767632&FileExtension=kml&FileName=Google%20Earth%20Flight%20Track-Rel.kml - Tabular data (item 11, CSV, 9 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20741840&FileExtension=csv&FileName=Tabular%20Data-Rel.csv - Photo array (item 12, PDF, 5 pages, 2.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20742739&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Photo%20Array-Rel.pdf - Examination summary (item 13, PDF, 11 pages, 2.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20783529&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Examination%20Summary-Rel.pdf - Student pilot toxicology report (item 14, PDF, 1 page, 152 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20742759&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Student%20Toxicology%20Report_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Instructor toxicology report (item 15, PDF, 1 page, 185 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20742917&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Instructor%20Toxicology%20Report_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Statement of party representatives to NTSB investigation (item 16, PDF, 11 pages, 522 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20743138&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Party%20Representative%20Forms_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Wreckage release form (item 17, PDF, 1 page, 110 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20743539&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Wreckage%20Release%20Form_Redacted-Rel.pdf From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.