# NTSB ERA24LA163: Evektor-Aerotechnik A S Harmony LSA, N469JA, Seffner, FL, April 4, 2024 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Serious injuries · Class 3 · Limited · Final report - Date: April 4, 2024, 15:37 local (19:37 UTC) - Place: Seffner, FL · Residential yard - Coordinates: 27.968003, -82.286151 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=27.9680&lon=-82.2862&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Enroute](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/400) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Enroute: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330) - Highest injury: Serious injuries - Injuries: 1 serious, 1 minor - Status: Completed - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 3 - NTSB office: Eastern Region Aviation - Parties: Rotech Flight Safety Inc., FAA/FSDO, Jet Access Group, Inc., Air Accidents Investigation Institute of the Czech Republic - NTSB case key (mKey): 194035 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ERA24LA163 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/194035/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194035 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA24LA163 ## Probable cause The improper installation of the fuel line that connected the fuel pump to the four-way distributor, which resulted in fuel starvation when the line became disconnected. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Fuel system: fuel distribution](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022820): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Malfunction (probable cause); cases with it: [Evektor-Aerotechnik A S HARMONY LSA, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022820/cases.md?model=0600080), [All aircraft, 141 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022820/cases.md) - [Personnel issues](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02060000): Personnel issues › Task performance · Other (probable cause); cases with it: [Evektor-Aerotechnik A S HARMONY LSA, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02060000/cases.md?model=0600080), [All aircraft, 137 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02060000/cases.md) - [Manufacture/production](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04013000): Organizational issues › Development · Manufacturer (probable cause); cases with it: [Evektor-Aerotechnik A S HARMONY LSA, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04013000/cases.md?model=0600080), [All aircraft, 17 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/04013000/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Enroute: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330) (defining event); cases with it: [Evektor-Aerotechnik A S HARMONY LSA, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330/sequence.md?model=0600080), [All aircraft, 994 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330/sequence.md) - [Landing: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Evektor-Aerotechnik A S HARMONY LSA, 3 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=0600080), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md) ## Analysis The airplane was on the final leg of a flight to reposition it to its home base. This was the fourth flight since the airplane had been reassembled after it was manufactured, disassembled, and shipped. The pilot reported a normal takeoff, and during the initial climb the airplane performed normally. Upon reaching 2,200 ft mean sea level (msl), the airplane lost all engine power. The pilot turned back toward the airport and attempted to restart the engine multiple times without success. At 800 ft msl, the pilot deployed the whole airplane parachute system. The airplane descended under the parachute canopy until it impacted a tree, became inverted, and impacted the ground. The impact resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage, vertical stabilizer, and both wings. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the fuel line going from the electrical fuel pump outlet to the four-way distributor was disconnected at the four-way distributor and was leaking fuel. The factory-installed clamp remained attached to the disconnected fuel line and was observed to be further down the fuel line than the other fuel lines that remained attached to the four-way distributor. If the fuel line was seated properly, the clamp would have only been at the last ridge on the fitting. After examining the fuel line, the line was reinstalled onto the four-way distributor, and a new clamp was installed. An engine test run was performed, and the engine operated normally at all rpm settings except for idle, which was to be expected due to the propeller blades having been shortened to facilitate the test run. Except for the disconnected fuel line, no anomalies or mechanical failures were found with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation of the engine. Given this information, it is likely that during the climb the fuel line slipped off the four-way distributor valve and starved the engine of fuel. This is consistent with, and a likely result of, the fuel line and clamp being installed too low on the four-way distributor valve fitting, which resulted in the line being able to slide off the fitting during engine operation. There were no logbook entries documenting that the fuel line or the four-way distributor valve had been adjusted or reinstalled since the airplane was manufactured; however, there were minor differences between the condition of the fuel system as found after the accident vs. the condition of the system as documented by pre-delivery photographs taken by the airframe manufacturer. Given the lack of maintenance documentation, it could not be determined when any maintenance, modification, or other alterations of the fuel system could have occurred between when the airplane was manufactured and the accident flight. ## Factual narrative On April 04, 2024, at 1537 eastern daylight time, an Evektor-Aerotechnik Harmony LSA, N469JA, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Seffner, Florida. The pilot sustained minor injuries, and the passenger was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight. The airplane was recently manufactured, disassembled, shipped, and then reassembled at the Sebring Regional Airport, Sebring, Florida. According to the operator, the pilot was performing the final positioning flight, which was from Tampa Executive Airport (VDF), Tampa, Florida to Page Field Airport (FMY), Fort Myers, Florida. This was the fourth flight since the airplane had been reassembled after it was manufactured, disassembled, and shipped. The pilot reported that he performed a normal takeoff and there were no irregularities or alert messages from the engine monitoring system during the departure. About 5 minutes after departure, at an altitude of about 2,200 ft msl, the engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot turned back toward the airport and attempted to restart the engine 3 times; however, engine power did not return. The pilot declared an emergency to air traffic control and at 800 ft, deployed the airplane’s whole airframe parachute system. The system operated normally and during the descent, the airplane impacted a tree, became inverted, and impacted terrain in a residential area. According to the mechanic who had reassembled the airplane after shipment from the manufacturer, the assembly process involved reinstalling the wings, the horizontal stabilizer, the rudder, and the propeller. The mechanic reported topping off the coolant, checking the engine oil, and performing a visual inspection of the engine. The mechanic stated that the only maintenance on the fuel system during the assembly process was to reinstall the fuel lines at the wing roots and to perform a visual inspection and leak check of the fuel system. The mechanic reported that he didn’t find any anomalies during the reassembly process or the initial test flights. Postaccident examination of the airplane at the accident site revealed that the airplane had sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. It was observed that the fuel pump assembly outlet fuel line going to the four-way fuel distributor was disconnected at the four-way fuel distributor fitting. The fuel line was leaking fuel and was capped by first responders to prevent further fuel leakage. The fuel selector was found in the “LEFT” fuel tank position. The fuel was drained from both wing fuel tanks, and it was found that there was sufficient fuel in either tank for engine operation. The airplane was recovered, and a detailed examination of the airframe and engine was performed. Flight control continuity was established for the elevator and rudder from the cockpit controls to the control surfaces. Aileron and flap control continuity wasestablished through breaks consistent with recovery cuts. The flap handle was found in the retracted position. A detailed examination of the fuel system was performed before an engine test run. Low pressure air was blown into both wing fuel outlet and return lines going to the fuel tanks. The fuel outlet lines, and fuel return lines were clear of any obstructions. The top engine cowling was removed and the disconnected fuel line that went from the fuel pump assembly to the four-way distributor was examined. There were no signs of impact damage to the fuel pump assembly, four-way fuel distributor, or the fuel line. The putty that was used by the first responders to prevent fuel leakage was removed from the fuel line and the four-way fuel distributor. The four-way fuel distributor was consistent with the correct part when referencing the Evektor Harmony LSA manuals that were current at the time of the accident. The fuel line was visually examined, and the crimp-style hose clamp was found to be secured to the fuel hose. The fuel hose was placed adjacent to the four-way fuel distributor end, and the clamp appeared to be aligned to the last ridge of the fuel distributor fitting. The hose clamp on the disconnected fuel line appeared to have more hose from the clamp to the end of the hose when compared with the other fuel lines that were connected to the four-way fuel distributor. The clamp was removed, and the indentation of the fuel hose was consistent with the clamp being compressed the correct amount. The fuel line was reinstalled and secured with a new clamp. The fuel selector was placed in the “LEFT” position, a fuel tank was connected to the left side of the airframe fuel system and the fuel boost pumps were operated. Fuel was observed to travel through the left side fuel system to the left side fuel return. The fuel tank was connected to the right side of the airframe fuel system and the fuel selector was switched to the “RIGHT” position. The fuel pumps were turned on and fuel was observed to flow from the fuel tank to the return fuel system. No fuel leaks were observed during the fuel system test. The engine ignition system was undamaged, and the ignition leads and wiring harness remained secure at all its connections. The engine cooling system was installed correctly and there were no signs of a coolant leak. The air filter was clean and was in good physical condition. The cylinders, crankcase, and gearbox were all undamaged and there were no signs of oil leaks. The three blade, fixed-pitch, composite propeller remained attached to the propeller shaft and all three propeller blades remained in the hub. One of the propeller blades was impact damaged and had broken off about 6 inches from the hub. All the propeller blades were cut at the propeller hub to facilitate an engine run. A fuel tank was connected to the left side of the airframe’s fuel system and the fuel selector valve was placed in the “LEFT” position. The engine was started on thefirst attempt using the normal procedures. The engine was operated at various rpm settings and the engine performed normally at all rpm settings above idle. At idle, the engine would stumble and start to lose power; however, this was consistent with the engine running with no load, as all the propeller blades were cut at the propeller hub. The airframe manufacturer provided photographs of the engine installation before it was shipped to a dealer in the United States. Comparison of those photographs to the condition of the airplane after the accident included a zip tie that had been installed between two of the fuel lines, and safety wire securing the fire sleeve to another fuel line that was missing. The airplane was equipped with a Garmin display unit capable of recording engine and flight parameters. A review of the data revealed that several flights, including the accident flight, were recorded. The accident flight started recording at 1504:16 and the recording ended at 1522:15. From the start of the accident flight recording, until 1519:43, the engine data revealed normal rpm, manifold pressure, fuel pressure, fuel flow, coolant temperature, and exhaust gas temperature (EGT) indications. Between 1519:43 and 1519:49, the engine rpm, fuel pressure, and fuel flow dropped rapidly to levels that were consistent with the engine no longer producing power. Subsequently, all of the EGTs began to drop synchronously. At 1919:54, an increase of engine rpm to 350 rpm was recorded, shortly followed by a drop back to 0 rpm. There were 3 more spikes of engine rpm to 350 rpm. The engine data for each of these rpm spikes showed that the fuel pressure and fuel flow did not increase during any of them. Further review of the data revealed that the battery and main buss voltage remained within normal operating range for a 12-volt system and that at the time of the loss of engine power, the left fuel tank contained 11 gallons of fuel, and the right fuel tank contained 8 gallons of fuel. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N469JA](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N469JA), registered now, S/N 20232220, built 2023 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: EVEKTOR-AEROTECHNIK A S HARMONY LSA - Registry model: [Evektor-Aerotechnik A S HARMONY LSA](https://openairdocs.org/model/evektor-aerotechnik-a-s-harmony-lsa) (registry code 0600080) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Rotax 912 IS series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/rotax-912-is-series) (registry code 55593, 4 cycle) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 20232220 - Year built: 2023 - Airframe hours: 0 - Engines: ROTAX 912 IS 100 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Positioning, Part 91 - Operator: Jet Access Group, Inc., doing business as Jet Access Aviation - Registered owner: Skyhawk Leasing LLC - Airworthiness certificate: Special, Special light-sport (Special) - Last inspection: Annual, March 20, 2024 - Departed: VDF, Tampa, FL - Destination: FMY, Fort Myers, FL - Equipment: Auto-pilot, Airframe parachute, ADS-B, Stall warning system, Onboard weather, Electronic primary flight display, Electronic multifunction display ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 25; injuries: minor; flight instructor, commercial; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, without waivers/limitations; last flight review January 23, 2023; seat: right; restraint: 4-point; flight hours: 1,427 total, 123 in this make and model, 1,320 as pilot in command, 116 in the last 90 days, 24 in the last 30 days ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 290° at 10 knots, gusting 16 - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 79 °F, dew point 45 °F - Altimeter: 29.90 inHg - Observed at: PCM, 7 nm away - METAR: METAR KPCM 041935Z AUTO 29010G16KT 255V315 10SM CLR 26/07 A2990 RMK AO2= ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20240404003169A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20240404003169A), Apr 4, 2024: Evektor-Aerotechnik A S HARMONY LSA, Seffner, FL, Substantial damage. Aircraft departed kvdf enroute kfmy while on company acceptance flight. Five minutes into flight at 2500 feet the engine ceased operation. PIC attempted three… ## Docket (13 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on September 11, 2025, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194035. 26.8 MB in all. - Pilot/operator aircraft accident report, NTSB form 6120.1 (item 1, PDF, 11 pages, 2.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18789772&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=01%20NTSB_6120_N469JA_Signed_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Mor - A&P mechanic (assembler) (item 2, PDF, 2 pages, 85 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18796094&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Art%20Tarola%20-%20MOR-Rel.pdf - Maintenance manual excerpt - fuel system (item 3, PDF, 68 pages, 3.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18790288&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=AMM%20Fuel%20System%20Excerpt-Rel.pdf - ERA24LA163 accident site examination report (item 4, PDF, 6 pages, 1.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18790202&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ERA24LA163%20On%20Scene%20Examination-Rel.pdf - ERA24LA163 wreckage examination report (item 5, PDF, 7 pages, 1.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18790916&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ERA24LA163%20Wreckage%20Examination%20Report-Rel.pdf - Maintenance logbooks excerpts (item 6, PDF, 15 pages, 2.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18796479&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Maintenance%20Logbook%20Excerpts_Redacted2-Rel.pdf - Investigation photographs (item 7, PDF, 9 pages, 3.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18790298&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Investigation%20Photographs-Rel.pdf - Cockpit display - recorded flight data - specialist's factual report (item 8, PDF, 9 pages, 2.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18678598&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ERA24LA163%20Cockpit%20Display%20-%20Recorded%20Flight%20Data%20-%20Specialist%27s%20Factual%20Report-Rel.pdf - Attachment 1 to cockpit display - recorded flight data - specialist's factual report (item 9, CSV, 11.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18678789&FileExtension=csv&FileName=ERA24LA163%20Attachment%201%20to%20Cockpit%20Display%20-%20Recorded%20Flight%20Data%20-%20Specialist%27s%20Factual%20Report-Rel.csv - Jet access party form (item 10, PDF, 14 pages, 178 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18790392&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=MK_NTSB_Investigation_Party_Form_Redacted-Rel.pdf - NTSB wreckage release form (item 11, PDF, 2 pages, 114 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18793698&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ERA24LA163%20Release%20of%20Wreckage_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Evidence control form - maintenance logbooks (item 12, PDF, 1 page, 61 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18789744&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Maintenance%20Logbooks%20Evidence%20Control%20Form_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Gdu evidence control form (item 13, PDF, 1 page, 61 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18789994&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Garmin%20GDU%20Evidence%20Control%20Form_Redacted-Rel.pdf From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.