# NTSB ERA24LA227: Brallier Scott Glasair I, N446KW, Gulf of Mexico, FL, May 26, 2024 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Fatal · Class 3 · Limited · Final report - Date: May 25, 2024, 21:55 local (May 26, 2024, 01:55 UTC) - Place: Gulf of Mexico, FL · ~10 nm east-northeast of Alligator Point, Florida in 13-15 feet of water. - Coordinates: 29.91185, -84.19295 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=29.9119&lon=-84.1929&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Enroute](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/400) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Enroute-cruise: Loss of visual reference](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/402) - Highest injury: Fatal - Injuries: 1 fatal - Status: Completed, report August 19, 2026 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 3 - NTSB office: Eastern Region Aviation - Parties: FAA/FSDO, Lycoming Engines - NTSB case key (mKey): 194311 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ERA24LA227 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/194311/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194311 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA24LA227 ## Probable cause The non-instrument-rated pilot’s loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation while flying over water in dark night conditions. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s decision to conduct the overwater flight in conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Info processing/decision: identification/recognition](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041510): Personnel issues › Action/decision · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Brallier Scott GLASAIR I, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041510/cases.md?model=05630W0), [All aircraft, 559 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041510/cases.md) - [Environmental issues](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03020000): Environmental issues › Physical environment · Awareness of condition; cases with it: [Brallier Scott GLASAIR I, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03020000/cases.md?model=05630W0), [All aircraft, 24 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03020000/cases.md) - [Performance/control parameters: altitude](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062012): Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability · Not attained/maintained (probable cause); cases with it: [Brallier Scott GLASAIR I, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062012/cases.md?model=05630W0), [All aircraft, 1,310 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062012/cases.md) - [Perception/orientation/illusion: spatial disorientation](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02022025): Personnel issues › Psychological · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Brallier Scott GLASAIR I, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02022025/cases.md?model=05630W0), [All aircraft, 358 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02022025/cases.md) - [Planning/preparation](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02061000): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Brallier Scott GLASAIR I, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02061000/cases.md?model=05630W0), [All aircraft, 113 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02061000/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Enroute-cruise: Loss of visual reference](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/402) (defining event); cases with it: [Brallier Scott GLASAIR I, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/402/sequence.md?model=05630W0), [All aircraft, 242 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/402/sequence.md) - [Enroute-cruise: Loss of control in flight](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240); cases with it: [Brallier Scott GLASAIR I, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md?model=05630W0), [All aircraft, 5,002 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md) - [Uncontrolled descent: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Brallier Scott GLASAIR I, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=05630W0), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md) ## Analysis The non-instrument rated pilot departed on a cross-country flight in dark night visual meteorological conditions (VMC). The flight was uneventful while over land, but flight track data showed that, after proceeding over the Gulf of Mexico, the airplane’s heading began to vary, and the airplane entered a slight right turn. The pilot was issued an air traffic control frequency change, which the pilot read back correctly, and shortly thereafter the airplane entered a left turn that continued more than 810°. The airplane then entered multiple heading changes followed by a steep descent, the pilot declared mayday, and the airplane impacted the water. Another pilot flying in the area of the accident site around the time of the accident reported that it was “really really black” and “very hazy.” Review of weather information for the area of the accident site revealed few to broken clouds with bases around 4,000 ft and tops around 16,000 ft. The pilot did not obtain preflight weather information from Leidos Flight Service or ForeFlight, and the extent of his preflight planning could not be determined. Postaccident examination of the flight controls for roll, pitch, and yaw, as well as the engine and its systems, including the engine-driven vacuum pump, revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Additionally, disassembly examination of the attitude indicator and electrically-operated turn coordinator revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. A friend of the pilot reported that the airplane’s autopilot had recently been upgraded, but that the pilot was “having some problems with it.” The autopilot switch was found in the Off position, and the airplane’s heading and altitude changes observed in flight track data were consistent with the pilot hand-flying the airplane. Autopsy of the pilot revealed evidence of cardiovascular disease, which was associated with some increased risk of an impairing or incapacitating cardiovascular event, such as heart attack or stroke. Although such an event cannot be excluded by autopsy evidence alone, there is no evidence that such an event occurred. While ethanol was detected at a very low level in cavity blood, it was not detected in vitreous fluid. This evidence indicates that some or all of the small amount of the detected ethanol may have been from postmortem sources rather than alcohol consumption, and that alcohol effects likely did not contribute to the accident. The dark night conditions and the lack of available cultural lighting due to the airplane’s location over the water provided an environment conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The pilot’s decision to embark on the flight into such conditions without an instrument rating and without the benefit of a fully functional autopilot increased his susceptibility to the effects of spatial disorientation. The airplane was established in a right bank at the time the pilot was issued a frequency change, and changing thefrequency would have required him to divert his attention to the transceiver. Shortly thereafter, the airplane entered a left turn and eventually, a steep descent, which ended in impact with the water. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the pilot experiencing the effects of the Coriolis illusion, which resulted in spatial disorientation and a loss of airplane control. ## Factual narrative Spatial Disorientation According to FAA-H-8083-15B, Instrument Flying Handbook, the Coriolis Illusion occurs when a pilot has been in a turn long enough for the fluid in the ear canal to move at the same speed as the canal. A movement of the head in a different plane, such as looking at something in a different part of the flight deck, may set the fluid moving and create the illusion of turning or accelerating on an entirely different axis. This action causes the pilot to think the aircraft is doing a maneuver it is not. The disoriented pilot may maneuver the aircraft into a dangerous attitude in an attempt to correct the aircraft’s perceived attitude. The airplane’s maintenance records were not located. A friend of the pilot reported that the airplane’s autopilot had been upgraded within the past year, but that the pilot was, “having some problems with it.” On May 25, 2024, about 2155 eastern daylight time, an experimental, amateur-built Glasair 1 airplane, N446KW, was destroyed when it descended into the Gulf of Mexico about 10 nautical miles east-northeast of Alligator Point, Florida. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Flight track data and air traffic control (ATC) audio information revealed that the pilot departed Destin Executive Airport (DTS), Destin, Florida, about 2101, with an intended destination of Zephyrhills, Florida. After takeoff, the airplane proceeded east-southeast while receiving visual flight rules flight following services. As the airplane proceeded over the Gulf of Mexico, it completed multiple slight heading and altitude changes. Between 2148:57 and 2149:18, when the airplane was about 5 nautical miles past the shoreline, it flew on an east-northeasterly heading at an altitude about 6,700 ft, after which it began turning to the right. At 2149:23, while flying on an east-southeasterly heading, the pilot was issued an air traffic control frequency change, which he correctly read back. The airplane continued the right turn to a south-southeasterly direction before entering a left turn. The airplane continued turning left, and at 2154:09, the pilot broadcast a mayday call on the frequency he had been instructed to change to and advised the controller that the flight was going down in Apalachee Bay. One final communication from the pilot occurred at 2154:38, immediately before water impact. That communication, which was heard by another pilot, indicated that the airplane was about to contact the water. Figure 1 shows the final portion of the airplane’s flight track. Figure 1. The airplane’s flight track during the final portion of the flight. About 2156, the controller asked the pilot who had heard the accident pilot’s last broadcast to overfly the last known position of the accident airplane. While proceeding to the area, the pilot reported that he was unable to see anything and that it was “really really black” and “very hazy,”but he could see lights on the shoreline. Before departing the area, he stated to the controller, “…glad I’ve got an autopilot out here because out in the bay as you’re turning its ah really hard to see anything.” An alert notice for the missing airplane was issued by the FAA at 2216 and the Leon County Sheriff’s Office, Wakulla County Sheriff’s Office, and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) were notified for search and rescue. The next day, at 0028, during a search conducted by the USCG and Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, the wreckage of the airplane was discovered in 13 to 15 feet of water. A postmortem examination of the pilot was performed by District Two Medical Examiner’s Office, Tallahassee, Florida. The cause of death was listed as basilar skull fractures and traumatic brain jury due to blunt trauma of the head and neck. The manner of death was accident. Toxicology testing performed by the FAA’s Forensic Services Laboratory revealed negative results for carboxyhemoglobin and drugs of abuse. Ethanol (11 mg/dL) was detected in the cavity blood specimen, but was not detected in the vitreous specimen. The 82-year-old pilot’s autopsy identified some evidence of hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, including intermittent coronary artery plaque without significant narrowing and moderate aortic plaque. Ethanol is the intoxicating alcohol in beer, wine, and liquor, and, if consumed, can impair judgment, psychomotor performance, cognition, and vigilance. FAA regulation imposes strict limits on flying after consuming ethanol, including a prohibition on piloting a civil aircraft while having a blood ethanol level of 0.04 g/dL or greater. Alcohol consumption is not the only possible source of ethanol in postmortem specimens. Ethanol sometimes may be produced by microbes in a person’s body tissues and fluids after death. Postmortem ethanol production is made more likely by traumatic injury, which can spread microbes. Typically, vitreous fluid is the specimen type best protected against microbial contamination and therefore is less susceptible to postmortem ethanol production than other specimen types. Review of weather information revealed no frontal boundaries, low-pressure systems, or weather echoes in the vicinity of the accident site. The 2200 High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) model sounding for the approximate location of the accident site identified a mostly conditionally unstable environment from the surface through 14,000 ft, with two stable layer areas approximately 500 ft thick around 2,250 ft and around 5,000 ft. The complete Rawinsonde Observation program (RAOB) indicated a 500-ft-thick cloud layer around 4,000 ft. No icing was indicated below 14,000 ft. Animation of the visible satellite imagery on the date of the accident during the evening and through sunset indicated cloud cover moving southward. There were no non-convective or convective SIGMET advisories valid for the accident site at theaccident time. Few to broken cloud cover at the accident site location with cloud bases around 4,000 ft and cloud tops above 16,000 ft were noted. At the time of the accident, the sun and moon were below the horizon. A pilot reported encountering haze about 11 minutes before the accident when flying at 2,000 ft, 5 miles east-southeast of Tallahassee Municipal Airport (TLH). A search of archived information indicated that the accident pilot did not request weather information from Leidos Flight Service or ForeFlight. It is unknown what weather information, if any, the accident pilot checked or received before or during the accident flight. FAA records indicated that the pilot did not hold an instrument rating. His pilot logbook was not located, and his recent flight experience could not be determined. Examination of the recovered wreckage revealed that the aft fuselage, with the empennage still attached, was separated from the remainder of the fuselage structure just aft of the instrument panel. The wings and carry-through structure had also separated from the fuselage. Flight control continuity was established from the rudder, elevator, and ailerons through breaks in the system to their respective flight controls. The wing flaps were in the 0° (retracted) position, which matched the flap handle, and all landing gear were in the Up position, which also matched the position of the landing gear selector handle. The rudder and both elevators remained attached. The left elevator displayed minimal damage; the right elevator’s lower panel was impact-separated from the rest of the right elevator. The manifold pressure gauge and the tachometer displayed off-scale low values. The airspeed indicator needle was frozen around 190 knots. The vacuum-driven attitude indicator displayed a nose-down pitch attitude and left bank. The electric turn coordinator displayed a left bank. The directional gyro indicated 202°, and the vertical speed indicator was frozen at a 600-ft-per-minute rate of descent. Disassembly examination of the attitude indicator and the turn coordinator revealed slight rotational scoring of internal components of both instruments, consistent with operation at the time of impact and no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The switches for the navigation lights, electric fuel pump, and turn coordinator were on, while the autopilot switch was off. Examination of the engine powertrain, ignition, lubrication, fuel supply system, and fuel metering systems revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Disassembly examination of the engine-driven vacuum pump revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N446KW](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N446KW), registered now, S/N 1474R, built 2011 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: BRALLIER SCOTT GLASAIR I (NO SERIES) - Registry model: [Brallier Scott GLASAIR I](https://openairdocs.org/model/brallier-scott-glasair-i) (registry code 05630W0) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Lycoming O-320-E2D](https://openairdocs.org/engine/lycoming-o-320-e2d) (registry code 42123, 4 cycle) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane, amateur-built - Serial number: 1474R - Year built: 2011 - Engines: Lycoming O-320-E2D 200 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Destroyed - Flight: Personal, Part 91 - Airworthiness certificate: Special, Experimental (Special) - Departed: DTS, Destin, FL - Destination: ZPH, Zephyrhills, FL - Equipment: Auto-pilot, ADS-B ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 82; injuries: fatal; private; airplane ratings: single-engine land; medical: class 3, with waivers/limitations; seat: left; toxicology performed; flight hours: 600 total ## Weather - Conditions: Night/dark - Wind: 260° at 3 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 82 °F, dew point 72 °F - Altimeter: 29.91 inHg - Observed at: KTLH, 30 nm away - METAR: KTLH 260153Z 26003KT 10SM FEW065 SCT250 28/22 A2991 RMK AO2 SLP127 ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20240525006499A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20240525006499A), May 25, 2024: Brallier Scott GLASAIR I, Perry, FL, Destroyed, 1 fatal. On may 26th 2024 at approximately 0100Z, a single engine glasair departed destin FL (kdts) enroute to zephryhills (kzph). ATC lost radar data and the pilot… ## Docket (19 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on August 19, 2026, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194311. 75.2 MB in all. - Fuel records (item 1, PDF, 3 pages, 4.4 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19833556&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Fuel%20Records_Redacted-Rel.pdf - NTSB memorandum for record - witness account of pilot and aircraft information (item 2, PDF, 1 page, 159 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19833197&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Memorandum%20For%20Record%20-%20Information%20Provided%20by%20Shawn%20Mack-Rel.pdf - Weather factual report (item 3, PDF, 27 pages, 3.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17484816&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ERA24LA227_weatherfactualSuffernfinal-Rel.pdf - Weather attachment 1 (item 4, GIF, 15.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17484806&FileExtension=gif&FileName=attachment1_animation_2156to0026_SAT_VIShaze_CODNEXLAB-GOES-East-local-FL_Panhandle-02-00_26Z-20240526_map-id_noBar-31-1n-10-100-Rel.gif - Weather attachment 2 (item 5, GIF, 43.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17485052&FileExtension=gif&FileName=attachment2_animation_SAT_airmass_2101to0236utc_CODNEXLAB-GOES-East-local-FL_Panhandle-airmass-02_36Z-20240526_map-id_noBar-26-1n-10-100-Rel.gif - Weather attachment 3 (item 6, PDF, 2 pages, 1.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17483742&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment3_QuickGuide_AirMassRGB_GOESR_NASA_SPoRT_20180820-Rel.pdf - FAA alert notice (item 7, PDF, 1 page, 65 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20599928&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=FINAL%20Memo%20For%20Record%20-%20ALNOT%20v01-Rel.pdf - FAA chronological summary of flight communications (item 8, PDF, 5 pages, 124 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19833276&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=FAA%20Chrono%20Summary%20of%20Flight%20Comms-Rel.pdf - NTSB prepared partial transcription of communications (item 9, PDF, 5 pages, 82 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19871915&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=NTSB%20Prepared%20Partial%20Transcription%20of%20Communications-Rel.pdf - Memorandum for record - R29 additional communication transmissions from R29 controller and N2134L (item 10, PDF, 2 pages, 71 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20550307&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=FINAL%20Memo%20For%20Record%20-%20R29%20Audio%20Request%20For%20Assistance%20v02-Rel.pdf - Memorandum for record - flight track graphics (item 11, PDF, 3 pages, 4 photos, 485 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20597206&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ERA24LA227%20-%20MFR%20-%20Flight%20Track%20Graphics-Rel.pdf - Passur opsvue raw data used to create flight track graphics (item 12, CSV, 17 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20597564&FileExtension=csv&FileName=ERA24LA227%20-%20N446KW%20-%20OpsVue%20Track%20Data-Rel.csv - Wreckage summary (item 13, PDF, 16 pages, 13 photos, 1.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20600061&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=FINAL%20Wreckage%20Exam%20Summary_ERA24LA227_v05-Rel.pdf - Toxicological report (item 14, PDF, 1 page, 634 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19830835&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Scanned%20Tox%20Report_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Toxicological report - axis forensic toxicology (item 15, PDF, 2 pages, 1.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20548613&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Axis%20Forensic%20Toxicology%20Report_Redacted-Rel.pdf - NTSB medical officer reports review factual summary (item 16, PDF, 1 page, 68 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20553557&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=FINAL%20Memo%20For%20Record%20-%20Medical%20Officer%20Factual%20Information%20v02-Rel.pdf - Statement of party representatives to NTSB investigation (item 17, PDF, 9 pages, 348 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19870423&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Lycoming%20Party%20Form%20w%20Attachments_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Release of aircraft wreckage, NTSB form 6120.15, and NTSB evidence control form (item 18, PDF, 2 pages, 887 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19838941&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Wreckage%20Release%20%26%20ECF%20Forms_Redacted-Rel.pdf - FAA-H-8083-15B - instrument flying handbook (excerpt) (item 19, PDF, 2 pages, 1.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20653565&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Excerpts%20Fm%20FAA-H-8083-15B%20Instrument%20Flying%20Handbook%20(002)-Rel.pdf From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.