# NTSB ERA25LA223: Piper PA22, N6804B, Hebron, OH, June 7, 2025

- Type: NTSB accident investigation
- Classification: Accident · No injuries · Class 4 · Limited · Final report
- Date: June 7, 2025, 13:09 local (17:09 UTC)
- Place: Hebron, OH · At Turn Around Area/near Approach end of runway 01
- Coordinates: 39.957964, -82.540863 (estimated)
- Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=39.9580&lon=-82.5409&mi=10
- Phase of flight: [Landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/550) (OpenAirDocs' grouping)
- Defining event: [Landing-landing roll: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330)
- Highest injury: No injuries
- Injuries: 2 uninjured
- Status: Completed, report April 30, 2026
- Report: Approved by Office Director
- Investigation class: Class 4 - Basic report with no Prelim publish
- NTSB office: Eastern Region Aviation
- Parties: FAA FSDO
- NTSB case key (mKey): 200286
- NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=ERA25LA223
- NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/200286/pdf
- NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=200286
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/ERA25LA223

## Probable cause

The airplane owner and pilot’s intentional allowance of unapproved maintenance and maintenance personnel’s failure to adequately maintain or service the brake system, which resulted in a total loss of brake pressure.

## Findings

NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause.

- [Landing gear system: landing gear brakes system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023240): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Failure (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-22-150, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023240/cases.md?model=7102210), [All aircraft, 92 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023240/cases.md)
- [Maintenance: modification/alteration](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062030): Personnel issues › Task performance · Maintenance personnel (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-22-150, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062030/cases.md?model=7102210), [All aircraft, 69 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062030/cases.md)
- [Maintenance: unauthorized maint/repair](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062040): Personnel issues › Task performance · Unknown/Not determined; cases with it: [Piper PA-22-150, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062040/cases.md?model=7102210), [All aircraft, 14 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062040/cases.md)
- [Maintenance: unauthorized maint/repair](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062040): Personnel issues › Task performance · Maintenance personnel (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-22-150, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062040/cases.md?model=7102210), [All aircraft, 14 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062040/cases.md)
- [Maintenance: unauthorized maint/repair](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062040): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Piper PA-22-150, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062040/cases.md?model=7102210), [All aircraft, 14 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02062040/cases.md)

## Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened.

- [Landing-landing roll: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330) (defining event); cases with it: [Piper PA-22-150, 6 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330/sequence.md?model=7102210), [All aircraft, 994 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/330/sequence.md)
- [Landing-landing roll: Dragged wing/rotor/float/other](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/093); cases with it: [Piper PA-22-150, 5 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/093/sequence.md?model=7102210), [All aircraft, 319 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/093/sequence.md)

## Analysis

The pilot reported that the brakes functioned normally during taxi, and pretakeoff checks, with no anomalies noted. The flight was uneventful, and he entered the traffic pattern at his destination airport. After touchdown, he retracted the flaps, reduced engine power, and applied the brakes, and the airplane initially decelerated as expected. With about one-third of the runway remaining, total brake pressure was lost. He determined that insufficient runway remained to execute a go-around, so he elected to perform “S” turns in an attempt to slow the airplane. As the airplane approached the end of the runway, he applied right rudder to avoid a runway overrun. During the ensuing turn, the left wing impacted the ground, which resulted in substantial damage to the wing. The mechanic who completed the most recent annual inspection of the airplane reported that, 10 days before the accident, he had installed a new brake booster in accordance with a supplemental type certificate (STC). The STC kit did not include the required “screw-vent”, so the mechanic temporarily installed a brake bleeder valve and instructed the owner not to fly the airplane before the correct screw-vent was installed. The brakes were bled multiple times, operationally checked, the maintenance logbook was signed, and the airplane was returned to service. The pilot reported that, 5 days before the accident, the brakes were inoperative due to a lack of pressure during an attempted taxi. He stated that a local mechanic sanded the brake caliper and replaced the O rings/packing; however, no maintenance logbook entry was made, and the mechanic denied performing the work. The mechanic did report that he had examined the airplane, provided advice to the pilot, and observed several discrepancies, including a missing screw vent. Following the reported maintenance, the pilot stated that an operational check of the brakes was conducted with no anomalies noted. Postaccident examination of the brake system by an FAA airworthiness inspector revealed a significant amount of air in the system and no brake pressure. After the brakes were bled and an operational check was conducted, brake engagement did not occur until the final 10% of brake handle travel, and full brake effectiveness was not achieved. The examination also identified the presence of an unapproved part and incomplete compliance with the supplemental type certificate. Additionally, evidence indicated that undocumented maintenance had been performed following installation of the STC. Due to either an unapproved part, undocumented maintenance, and incomplete compliance with the STC, it is likely that the air in the brake system was a result of inadequate maintenance.

## Aircraft

- Registration: [N6804B](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N6804B), registered now, S/N 22-4099, built 1956 (OpenAirDocs)
- Reported make and model: PIPER PA22 (150)
- Registry model: [Piper PA-22-150](https://openairdocs.org/model/piper-pa-22-150) (registry code 7102210) (OpenAirDocs)
- Registry engine: [Lycoming 0-320 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/lycoming-0-320-series) (registry code 41508, reciprocating) (OpenAirDocs)
- Category: Airplane
- Serial number: 22-4099
- Year built: 1956
- Airframe hours: 1005
- Engines: LYCOMING O-320 SERIES 150 horsepower reciprocating
- Damage: Substantial damage
- Flight: Personal, Part 91
- Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal; Standard, Utility
- Last inspection: Annual, May 28, 2025
- Destination: LHQ, Lancaster, OH
- Airport: 9OA5, Buckeye, runway 19, 2,764 × 25 ft, asphalt
- Equipment: ADS-B

## Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

- Pilot; age 39; injuries: none; private; airplane ratings: single-engine land; medical: class 3, with waivers/limitations; last flight review November 18, 2024; seat: left; restraint: 4-point; flight hours: 145 total, 56 in this make and model

## Weather

- Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day
- Wind: calm
- Visibility: 3 statute miles
- Temperature: 75 °F, dew point 63 °F
- Altimeter: 29.88 inHg
- Observed at: VTA, 5 nm away
- METAR: KVTA 071654Z AUTO 00000KT 3SM HZ FEW038 SCT048 24/17 A2988 RMK AO2 SLP111 T02390167

## Docket (7 files)

The files NTSB released with the investigation on April 30, 2026, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=200286. 13.9 MB in all.

- Pilot/operator aircraft accident report, NTSB form 6120.1 (item 1, PDF, 10 pages, 4.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20048778&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=6120-Recd%206_12_2025_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Record of NTSB conversations (item 2, PDF, 26 pages, 7 photos, 2.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20063474&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Record%20of%20NTSB%20Conversations_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- FAA 337 form for brake system modification (item 3, PDF, 2 pages, 2.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20063484&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=FAA%20337%20For%20Brake%20System%20Modification_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast (ADS-B) tabular data (item 4, XLSX, 3.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20049595&FileExtension=xlsx&FileName=20250607_A9061D_590107172_ADSB-Rel.xlsx
- FAA inspector statement (item 5, PDF, 1 page, 51 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20049007&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=FAA%20Inspector%20Statement-Rel.pdf
- Investigative photographs (item 6, PDF, 4 pages, 3 photos, 849 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20063941&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Investigative%20Photograph%20v01-Rel.pdf
- Release of aircraft wreckage, NTSB form 6120.15 (item 7, PDF, 1 page, 120 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20049295&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Fully%20Exctd%20Wreckage%20Release%20Form_Redacted-Rel.pdf

From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

---
OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.
