# NTSB GAA16CA527: Swearingen SA226, N127WD, Farmingdale, NY, June 20, 2016 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · No injuries · Data collection · Final report - Date: June 20, 2016, 17:58 local (21:58 UTC) - Place: Farmingdale, NY - Coordinates: 40.728889, -73.41333 (estimated) - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=40.7289&lon=-73.4133&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/550) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Landing-flare/touchdown: Abnormal runway contact](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/090) - Highest injury: No injuries - Injuries: 2 uninjured - Status: Completed, report June 20, 2017 - Report: Approved by Office Director - NTSB office: General Aviation Accidents - Parties: FAA - NTSB case key (mKey): 94377 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=GAA16CA527 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/94377/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=94377 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/GAA16CA527 ## Probable cause The pilot-in-command’s failure to extend the landing gear before landing and his failure to use the Before Landing checklist. Contributing to the accident was the pilots’ failure to maintain a sterile cockpit during landing. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Landing gear system: gear extension and retract sys](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023230): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Not used/operated (probable cause); cases with it: [Swearingen SA226-T(B), 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023230/cases.md?model=8780406), [All aircraft, 418 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023230/cases.md) - [Use of equip/info: use of checklist](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063030): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Swearingen SA226-T(B), 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063030/cases.md?model=8780406), [All aircraft, 336 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063030/cases.md) - [Use of equip/info: use of equip/system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063015): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Swearingen SA226-T(B), 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063015/cases.md?model=8780406), [All aircraft, 1,397 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063015/cases.md) - [Action: lack of action](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041030): Personnel issues › Action/decision · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Swearingen SA226-T(B), 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041030/cases.md?model=8780406), [All aircraft, 792 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041030/cases.md) - [Communication (personnel)](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063500): Personnel issues › Task performance · Flight crew (probable cause); cases with it: [Swearingen SA226-T(B), 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063500/cases.md?model=8780406), [All aircraft, 17 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063500/cases.md) - [Attention/monitoring: task monitoring/vigilance](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02021520): Personnel issues › Psychological · Flight crew; cases with it: [Swearingen SA226-T(B), 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02021520/cases.md?model=8780406), [All aircraft, 330 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02021520/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Landing-flare/touchdown: Abnormal runway contact](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/090) (defining event); cases with it: [Swearingen SA226-T(B), 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/090/sequence.md?model=8780406), [All aircraft, 1,514 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/090/sequence.md) - [Landing-landing roll: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Swearingen SA226-T(B), 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=8780406), [All aircraft, 10,154 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md) ## Analysis According to the pilot in command (PIC), he was conducting an instructional flight for his "new SIC (second in command)," who was seated in the left seat. He reported that they had flown two previous legs in the retractable landing gear-equipped airplane. He recalled that, during the approach, they discussed the events of their previous flights and had complied with the airport control tower's request to "keep our speed up." During the approach, he called for full flaps and retarded the throttle to flight idle. The PIC asserted that there was no indication that the landing gear was not extended because he did not hear a landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. He added that the landing gear position lights were not visible because the SIC's knee obstructed his view of the lights. He recalled that, following the flare, he heard the propellers hit the runway and that he made the decision not to go around because of unknown damage sustained to the propellers. The airplane touched down and slid to a stop on the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage bulkheads, longerons, and stringers. The SIC reported that the flight was a training flight in visual flight rules conditions. He noted that the airspace was busy and that, during the approach, he applied full flaps, but they failed to extend the landing gear. He added that he did not hear the landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. The Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Safety Inspector that examined the wreckage reported that, during recovery, the pilot extended the nose landing gear via the normal extension process. However, due to significant damage to the main landing gear (MLG) doors, the MLG was unable to be extended hydraulically or manually. He added that an operational check of the landing gear warning horn was not accomplished because the wreckage was unsafe to enter after it was removed from the runway. The landing gear warning horn was presented by an aural tone in the cockpit and was not configured to be heard through the pilots' noise-cancelling headsets. When asked, the PIC and the SIC both stated that they could not remember who read the airplane flight manual Before Landing checklist. ## Factual narrative According to the pilot in command (PIC), he was conducting an instructional flight for his "new SIC (second in command)," and seated in the left seat. He reported that they had flown two previous legs in the retractable landing gear-equipped airplane. During the approach, he recalled that they discussed the events of their previous flights and had complied with the airport control tower's request to "keep our speed up". During the approach, he called for full flaps and retarded the throttle to flight idle. The PIC asserted that there was no indication that the landing gear was not extended, as he did not hear a landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise cancelling headset. He added that the landing gear position lights were not visible because the knee of SIC obstructed his view of the lights. He recalled that following the flare he heard the airplane propellers hit the runway, and he made the decision not to go-around because of the unknown damage sustained to the propellers. The airplane touched down, and slid to a stop on the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage bulkheads, longerons and stringers. The SIC reported that the flight was a training flight in VFR conditions. He noted that the airspace was busy, and during the approach he applied full flaps, but they failed to extend the landing gear. He added that he did not hear the landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise cancelling headset. The Federal Aviation Administration, Aviation Safety Inspector that examined the wreckage reported that during recovery the pilot extended the nose landing gear via the normal extension process. However, due to significant damage to the main gear doors, the main landing gear was unable to be extended hydraulically or manually. He added that an operational check of the landing gear warning horn, was not accomplished because the wreckage was unsafe to enter after it was removed from the runway. Both pilots were wearing noise canceling headsets, and the landing gear warning horn is presented by an aural tone in the cockpit, and is not configured to be heard through the crew's headsets. When asked, the PIC and the SIC both stated that they could not remember who read the airplane flight manual (AFM) before landing checklist. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N127WD](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N127WD-2019-05-04), registration cancelled 2019-05-04, S/N T-297, built 1978 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: SWEARINGEN SA226 (T(B)) - Registry model: [Swearingen SA226-T(B)](https://openairdocs.org/model/swearingen-sa226-t-b) (registry code 8780406) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [AiResearch TPE331 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/airesearch-tpe331-series) (registry code 01514, turbo-prop) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: T-297 - Year built: 1978 - Airframe hours: 4500 - Engines: Garrett TPE33110U501G 950 horsepower turbo jet; Garrett TPE33110U501G 950 horsepower turbo jet - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Instructional, Part 91 - Operator: Ponderosa Air LLC - Registered owner: Ponderosa Air LLC - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: Annual, March 15, 2016 - Departed: HPN, Westchester, NY - Destination: FRG, Farmingdale, NY - Airport: FRG, Republic, runway 19, 5,516 × 150 ft, asphalt - Equipment: Auto-pilot, Electronic multifunction display, Angle of attack indicator, Onboard weather, Stall warning system, ADS-B ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 68; injuries: none; commercial; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 2, without waivers/limitations; last flight review April 29, 2016; seat: left; restraint: 3-point; flight hours: 11,450 total, 410 in this make and model, 11,175 as pilot in command, 85 in the last 90 days, 21 in the last 30 days - Co-pilot; age 45; injuries: none; flight instructor, airline transport, commercial; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, without waivers/limitations; last flight review April 24, 2016; seat: right; restraint: 3-point; flight hours: 1,300 total, 5 in this make and model, 10,000 as pilot in command, 300 in the last 90 days, 100 in the last 30 days, 10 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 210° at 7 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 48 °F, dew point 36 °F - Altimeter: 29.82 inHg - Observed at: KFRG ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20160620013579A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20160620013579A), Jun 20, 2016: Swearingen SA226-T(B), Farmingdale, NY, Substantial damage. On Monday June 20, 2016 at approximately 17:58, N127WD , a merlin Swearingen SA226-T(b), landed gear up on runway 19 while landing at republic airport in… ## Docket (4 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on May 15, 2017, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=94377. 3.0 MB in all. - Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 - PIC (item 1, .PDF, 1.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40452206&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1%20-%20PIC-Master.PDF - Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 - SIC (item 2, .PDF, 491 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40452207&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1%20-%20SIC-Master.PDF - FAA Inspector's Statement (item 3, .PDF, 438 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40452208&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=FAA%20Inspector%27s%20Statement-Master.PDF - Photos (Courtesy of FAA) (item 4, .PDF, 2 photos, 266 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40452209&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photos%20(Courtesy%20of%20FAA)-Master.PDF From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.