# NTSB GAA17CA061: Beech 95B55, N180GA, Plattsburgh, NY, November 14, 2016 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · No injuries · Data collection · Final report - Date: November 14, 2016, 15:30 local (20:30 UTC) - Place: Plattsburgh, NY - Coordinates: 44.668334, -73.473609 (estimated) - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=44.6683&lon=-73.4736&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Approach](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/500) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Approach-VFR pattern final: Loss of control in flight](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240) - Highest injury: No injuries - Injuries: 2 uninjured - Status: Completed, report January 18, 2017 - Report: Approved by Office Director - NTSB office: General Aviation Accidents - Parties: FAA - NTSB case key (mKey): 94355 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=GAA17CA061 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/94355/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=94355 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/GAA17CA061 ## Probable cause The pilot's failure to maintain the proper airspeed and his exceedance of the airplane's critical angle-of-attack during a single-engine approach, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall at an altitude too low for the flight instructor to recover. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Performance/control parameters: angle of attack](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062042): Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability · Capability exceeded (probable cause); cases with it: [Beech 95-B55 (T42A), 3 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062042/cases.md?model=1152706), [All aircraft, 990 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062042/cases.md) - [Use of equip/info: aircraft control](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Beech 95-B55 (T42A), 17 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040/cases.md?model=1152706), [All aircraft, 9,295 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063040/cases.md) - [Performance/control parameters: airspeed](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062010): Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability · Not attained/maintained (probable cause); cases with it: [Beech 95-B55 (T42A), 4 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062010/cases.md?model=1152706), [All aircraft, 1,681 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062010/cases.md) - [Performance/control parameters: engine out control](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062025): Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability · Not attained/maintained; cases with it: [Beech 95-B55 (T42A), 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062025/cases.md?model=1152706), [All aircraft, 35 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062025/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Approach-VFR pattern final: Simulated/training event](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/600); cases with it: [Beech 95-B55 (T42A), 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/600/sequence.md?model=1152706), [All aircraft, 173 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/600/sequence.md) - [Approach-VFR pattern final: Miscellaneous/other](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/900); cases with it: [Beech 95-B55 (T42A), 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/900/sequence.md?model=1152706), [All aircraft, 1,556 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/900/sequence.md) - [Approach-VFR pattern final: Attempted remediation/recovery](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/060); cases with it: [Beech 95-B55 (T42A), 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/060/sequence.md?model=1152706), [All aircraft, 1,422 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/060/sequence.md) - [Approach-VFR pattern final: Loss of control in flight](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240) (defining event); cases with it: [Beech 95-B55 (T42A), 16 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md?model=1152706), [All aircraft, 5,002 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/240/sequence.md) - [Approach-VFR pattern final: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Beech 95-B55 (T42A), 22 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=1152706), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md) ## Analysis The flight instructor of the multi-engine airplane reported that during a full-feathered, single-engine practice instrument approach in visual meteorological conditions, the pilot extended the flaps and the airspeed dropped about 20-30 knots. He further reported that the pilot added power to the operating engine and the airplane "veered" to the left and "lost more altitude resulting in a stalled condition". The flight instructor took control of the airplane, reduced power to idle on the operating engine, attempted to level the wings, and the airplane impacted the airport ramp area with "excessive vertical speed". The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings, both ailerons, and fuselage. The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. The Federal Aviation Administration has published the Airplane Flying Handbook FAA-H-8083-3B (2016). This handbook discusses multi-engine landings and spin awareness and states in part: Landings The final approach should be made with power and at a speed recommended by the manufacturer; if a recommended speed is not furnished, the speed should be no slower than the single-engine best rate-of-climb speed (VYSE) until short final with the landing assured, but in no case less than critical engine-out minimum control speed (VMC). Some multiengine pilots prefer to delay full flap extension to short final with the landing assured. This is an acceptable technique with appropriate experience and familiarity with the airplane. Spin Awareness In order to spin any airplane, it must first be stalled. At the stall, a yawing moment must be introduced. In a multiengine airplane, the yawing moment may be generated by rudder input or asymmetrical thrust. It follows, then, that spin awareness be at its greatest during VMC demonstrations, stall practice, slow flight, or any condition of high asymmetrical thrust, particularly at low speed/high AOA (angle of attack). Single-engine stalls are not part of any multiengine training curriculum. For spin avoidance when practicing engine failures, the flight instructor should pay strict attention to the maintenance of proper airspeed and bank angle as the student executes the appropriate procedure. The instructor should also be particularly alert during stall and slow flight practice. Forward center-of-gravity positions result in favorable stall and spin avoidance characteristics, but do not eliminate the hazard. ## Factual narrative The flight instructor of the multi-engine airplane reported that during a full-feathered, single-engine practice instrument approach in visual meteorological conditions, the pilot extended the flaps and the airspeed dropped about 20-30 knots. He further reported that the pilot added power to the operating engine and the airplane "veered" to the left and "lost more altitude resulting in a stalled condition". The flight instructor took control of the airplane, reduced power to idle on the operating engine, attempted to level the wings, and the airplane impacted the airport ramp area with "excessive vertical speed". The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings, both ailerons, and fuselage. The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. The Federal Aviation Administration has published the Airplane Flying Handbook FAA-H-8083-3B (2016). This handbook discusses multi-engine landings and spin awareness and states in part: Landings The final approach should be made with power and at a speed recommended by the manufacturer; if a recommended speed is not furnished, the speed should be no slower than the single-engine best rate-of-climb speed (VYSE) until short final with the landing assured, but in no case less than critical engine-out minimum control speed (VMC). Some multiengine pilots prefer to delay full flap extension to short final with the landing assured. This is an acceptable technique with appropriate experience and familiarity with the airplane. Spin Awareness In order to spin any airplane, it must first be stalled. At the stall, a yawing moment must be introduced. In a multiengine airplane, the yawing moment may be generated by rudder input or asymmetrical thrust. It follows, then, that spin awareness be at its greatest during VMC demonstrations, stall practice, slow flight, or any condition of high asymmetrical thrust, particularly at low speed/high AOA (angle of attack). Single-engine stalls are not part of any multiengine training curriculum. For spin avoidance when practicing engine failures, the flight instructor should pay strict attention to the maintenance of proper airspeed and bank angle as the student executes the appropriate procedure. The instructor should also be particularly alert during stall and slow flight practice. Forward center-of-gravity positions result in favorable stall and spin avoidance characteristics, but do not eliminate the hazard. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N180GA](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N180GA-2019-01-14), registration cancelled 2019-01-14, S/N TC-2053, built 1977 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: BEECH 95B55 - Registry model: [Beech 95-B55 (T42A)](https://openairdocs.org/model/beech-95-b55-t42a) (registry code 1152706) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Continental I0-470 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/continental-i0-470-series) (registry code 17027, reciprocating) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: TC-2053 - Year built: 1977 - Airframe hours: 4348.2 - Engines: CONT MOTOR 460-L 260 horsepower reciprocating; CONT MOTOR 460-L 260 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Instructional, Part 91 - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: Annual, June 30, 2016 - Departed: BTV, BURLINGTON, VT - Destination: BTV, BURLINGTON, VT - Airport: PBG, Plattsburgh Intl, runway 17, 11,759 × 200 ft, asphalt - Equipment: Electronic primary flight display, ADS-B, Auto-pilot ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Flight instructor; age 54; injuries: none; flight instructor, commercial; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 2, with waivers/limitations; last flight review December 5, 2015; seat: left; restraint: 3-point; flight hours: 2,079 total, 87 in this make and model, 2,046 as pilot in command, 17 in the last 90 days, 2 in the last 30 days - Pilot; age 64; injuries: none; flight instructor, commercial; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine sea, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 2, with waivers/limitations; last flight review November 11, 2016; seat: right; restraint: 3-point; flight hours: 3,180 total, 6 in this make and model, 3,160 as pilot in command, 263 in the last 90 days, 63 in the last 30 days ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 140° at 9 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 55 °F, dew point 32 °F - Altimeter: 29.92 inHg - Observed at: KPBG, 1 nm away ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20161114023549A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20161114023549A), Nov 14, 2016: Beech 95-B55 (T42A), Plattsburg, NY, Destroyed. During multiengine instruction on short final for runway 17 with the left engine shutdown, the aircraft airspeed became low. Adding power to the right engine… ## Docket (4 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on December 7, 2016, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=94355. 4.3 MB in all. - Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 (item 1, .PDF, 3.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40447189&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1-Master.PDF - Memorandum for Record - Telephone Interview, Flight Instructor (item 2, .PDF, 191 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40447190&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Memorandum%20for%20Record%20-%20Telephone%20Interview,%20Flight%20Instructor-Master.PDF - Memorandum for Record - Telephone Interview, Pilot (item 3, .PDF, 124 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40447191&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Memorandum%20for%20Record%20-%20Telephone%20Interview,%20Pilot-Master.PDF - Accident Photo (Courtesy of Airport Manager) (item 4, .PDF, 1 photo, 344 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40447192&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Accident%20Photo%20(Courtesy%20of%20Airport%20Manager)-Master.PDF From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.