# NTSB GAA18CA020: Cessna 150, N22092, Pottsville, PA, October 22, 2017 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · No injuries · Data collection · Final report - Date: October 22, 2017, 18:15 local (22:15 UTC) - Place: Pottsville, PA - Coordinates: 40.705276, -76.377502 (estimated) - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=40.7053&lon=-76.3775&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Unknown](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/990) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Unknown: Flight control sys malf/fail](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/333) - Highest injury: No injuries - Injuries: 2 uninjured - Status: Completed, report January 11, 2018 - Report: Approved by Office Director - NTSB office: General Aviation Accidents - Parties: FAA - NTSB case key (mKey): 96234 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=GAA18CA020 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/96234/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=96234 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/GAA18CA020 ## Probable cause The failure of the right rudder cable and subsequent loss of directional control during landing. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Flight control system: rudder control system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022720): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Failure (probable cause); cases with it: [Cessna 150H, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022720/cases.md?model=2071818), [All aircraft, 93 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01022720/cases.md) - [Wind: windshear](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034020): Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena · Effect on operation; cases with it: [Cessna 150H, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034020/cases.md?model=2071818), [All aircraft, 90 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034020/cases.md) - [Wind: updraft](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034030): Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena · Effect on operation; cases with it: [Cessna 150H, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034030/cases.md?model=2071818), [All aircraft, 14 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034030/cases.md) - [Wind: downdraft](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034035): Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena · Effect on operation; cases with it: [Cessna 150H, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034035/cases.md?model=2071818), [All aircraft, 178 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034035/cases.md) - [Performance/control parameters: directional control](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062020): Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability · Attain/maintain not possible; cases with it: [Cessna 150H, 9 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062020/cases.md?model=2071818), [All aircraft, 3,958 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01062020/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Unknown: Flight control sys malf/fail](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/333) (defining event); cases with it: [Cessna 150H, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/333/sequence.md?model=2071818), [All aircraft, 410 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/333/sequence.md) - [Landing: Other weather encounter](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/400); cases with it: [Cessna 150H, 5 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/400/sequence.md?model=2071818), [All aircraft, 1,127 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/400/sequence.md) - [Landing: Loss of control on ground](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/230); cases with it: [Cessna 150H, 11 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/230/sequence.md?model=2071818), [All aircraft, 4,585 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/230/sequence.md) - [Landing: Runway excursion](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/300); cases with it: [Cessna 150H, 6 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/300/sequence.md?model=2071818), [All aircraft, 3,643 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/300/sequence.md) - [Landing: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) ](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470); cases with it: [Cessna 150H, 27 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md?model=2071818), [All aircraft, 10,189 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/470/sequence.md) ## Analysis The pilot reported that, during approach, the automatic weather observation station at the destination airport reported that the wind was from 170° at 12 knots. He added that there was "very massive choppy wind, including what could have been windshear, updrafts, and downdrafts." During the landing roll on runway 11, a wind gust blew the airplane off the runway to the left. The pilot attempted to recover, but the airplane impacted a ditch. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector reported that a postaccident examination revealed that the rudder cable that passed along the left side of the fuselage was separated into three pieces. The rudder cable was covered in debris, which contained red fibers. The rudder cable was splayed and exhibited signatures consistent with tension overload. The airplane's illustrated parts catalog contained a diagram titled, "Rudder Control System Installation," which displayed the cable along the left side of the fuselage cross over the right side of the airplane, in the tailcone section, and connect to the right side of the rudder horn, which provided right rudder authority. The airplane's most recent inspection was an annual, which was conducted 6 months before the accident flight. The FAA inspector interviewed the mechanic who performed the most recent annual inspection, and the mechanic reported that, during inspections, he used manufacturer data and FAA Advisory Circular, AC 43.13-1B, "Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices – Aircraft Inspection and Repair." He further reported, multiple times, that he should probably "tighten up" his inspections. AC 43.13-1B contained a section titled, "Cable System Inspection," which stated the following: "Aircraft cable systems are subject to a variety of environmental conditions and deterioration. Wire or strand breakage is easy to visually recognize. Other kinds of deterioration such as wear, corrosion, and/or distortion are not easily seen; therefore, control cables should be removed periodically for a more detailed inspection. At each annual or 100-hour inspection, all control cables must be inspected for broken wire strands. Any cable assembly that has one broken wire strand located in a critical fatigue area must be replaced." It further stated the following: "Close inspection in these critical fatigue areas, must be made by passing a cloth over the area to snag on broken wires. This will clean the cable for visual inspection, and detect broken wires if the cloth snags on the cable." It is likely that the red fibers found on the rudder cable were from a red cloth used to inspect the rudder cable during the annual inspection. It is also likely that, sometime during the flight or landing sequence, the right rudder cable separated, whichsubsequently restricted the pilot's ability to recover from the loss of control during landing. ## Factual narrative The pilot reported that, during approach, the automatic weather observation station at the destination airport reported that the wind was from 170° at 12 knots. He added that there was "very massive choppy wind, including what could have been windshear, updrafts, and downdrafts". During the landing roll on runway 11, a wind gust blew the airplane off the runway to the left. The pilot attempted to recover, but the airplane impacted a ditch. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector reported that, during a postaccident examination, the rudder cable that passed along the left side of the fuselage was separated into three pieces. The rudder cable was covered in debris, which contained red fibers. The rudder cable was splayed and exhibited signatures consistent with tension overload. The airplane's illustrated parts catalog contained a diagram, titled "Rudder Control System Installation". This diagram displayed the cable along the left side of the fuselage cross over the right side of the airplane, in the tailcone section, and connect to the right side of the rudder horn, which provided right rudder authority. The airplane's most recent inspection was an annual, conducted 6 months prior to the accident flight. The FAA inspector interviewed the mechanic who performed the most recent annual inspection. During the interview, the mechanic reported that, during inspections, he uses manufacturer data and the FAA advisory circular, AC 43.13-1B. He further reported, multiple times, that he should probably "tighten up" his inspections. The FAA's advisory circular, AC 43.13-1B, titled "Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices – Aircraft Inspection and Repair", contains a section titled "Cable System Inspection", which stated: "Aircraft cable systems are subject to a variety of environmental conditions and deterioration. Wire or strand breakage is easy to visually recognize. Other kinds of deterioration such as wear, corrosion, and/or distortion are not easily seen; therefore, control cables should be removed periodically for a more detailed inspection. At each annual or 100 hour inspection, all control cables must be inspected for broken wires strands. Any cable assembly that has one broken wire strand located in a critical fatigue area must be replaced." It further stated: "Close inspection in these critical fatigue areas, must be made by passing a cloth over the area to snag on broken wires. This will clean the cable for visual inspection, and detect broken wires if the cloth snags on the cable." ## Aircraft - Registration: [N22092](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N22092-2019-03-20), registration cancelled 2019-03-20, S/N 15068059, built 1967 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: CESSNA 150 (H) - Registry model: [Cessna 150H](https://openairdocs.org/model/cessna-150h) (registry code 2071818) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Continental 0-200 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/continental-0-200-series) (registry code 17020, reciprocating) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 15068059 - Year built: 1967 - Engines: CONT MOTOR O-200 SERIES 100 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Personal, Part 91 - Operator: Pocono Mountains Flying Club Inc - Registered owner: Pocono Mountains Flying Club Inc - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Utility - Last inspection: Annual, April 14, 2017 - Departed: MPO, MOUNT POCONO, PA - Destination: ZER, Pottsville, PA - Airport: ZER, Schuylkill County /Joe Zerbey, runway 11, 4,599 × 75 ft, asphalt - Equipment: Unknown ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 25; injuries: none; private; airplane ratings: single-engine land; medical: class 3, with waivers/limitations; seat: left; restraint: lap only; flight hours: 83 total, 82 in this make and model, 29 as pilot in command, 35 in the last 90 days, 13 in the last 30 days, 2 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: calm - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 43 °F, dew point 43 °F - Altimeter: 30.37 inHg - Observed at: KMUI, 18 nm away ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20171022014949A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20171022014949A), Oct 22, 2017: Cessna 150H, Pottsville, PA, Substantial damage. During landing attempt, pilot lost control of aircraft resulting in accident on the left side of the runway abeam the 1000 foot markers. Cross winds were… ## Docket (5 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on December 11, 2017, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=96234. 6.8 MB in all. - Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 (item 1, .PDF, 3.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40458676&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1-Master.PDF - Illustrated Parts Catalog - Rudder (item 2, .PDF, 139 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40458679&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Illustrated%20Parts%20Catalog%20-%20Rudder-Master.PDF - FAA Record of Converstation - Mechanic (item 3, .PDF, 418 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40458697&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=FAA%20Record%20of%20Converstation%20-%20Mechanic-Master.PDF - Accident Photos (item 4, .PDF, 2.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40458698&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Accident%20Photos-Master.PDF - Logbook Entry (item 5, .PDF, 485 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40458702&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Logbook%20Entry-Master.PDF From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.