# NTSB LAX00FA229: McDonnell Douglas DC-9-51, N649HA, Lihue, Kauai, HI, June 15, 2000 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Minor injuries · Field investigation · Final report - Date: June 14, 2000, 17:10 local (Jun 15, 2000, 03:10 UTC) - Place: Lihue, Kauai, HI - Coordinates: 21.97611, -159.338882 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=21.9761&lon=-159.3389&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/550) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Highest injury: Minor injuries - Injuries: 2 minor, 137 uninjured - Status: Completed, report May 30, 2003 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Parties: ALPA, Hawaiian Airlines, WP-FSDO - NTSB case key (mKey): 51199 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=LAX00FA229 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/51199/pdf - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/LAX00FA229 ## Probable cause The first officer's delayed and misjudged landing flare resulting in a tail strike and hard landing. Contributing factors were his relative inexperience flying the type of airplane, and the captain's and the first officer's failure to adhere to required company procedures and Federal Aviation Regulations. ## Sequence of events In NTSB's coding before 2008 (https://www.ntsb.gov/GILS/Documents/codman.pdf). - Hard landing, landing - flare/touchdown - flare - delayed, copilot/second pilot (cause) - flare - misjudged, copilot/second pilot (cause) - lack of experience, copilot/second pilot (contributing factor) - procedures/directives - not followed, copilot/second pilot (contributing factor) - procedures/directives - not followed, pilot in command (contributing factor) - light condition - daylight ## Analysis The airplane landed hard during the touchdown, damaging structural members in the lower aft fuselage. The captain authorized the first officer to fly the route between Honolulu and Lihue during which no mechanical abnormalities were experienced. Approaching Lihue, daytime visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and the first officer continued as the flying pilot. He established the airplane on a 3-degree descent profile toward the runway, with stabilized engine thrust and with a stabilized rate of descent. The digital flight data recorder (DFDR) indicates that, about 1 second before touchdown, the airplane's rate of descent was approximately 384 feet per minute, which was higher than normal, and the pitch attitude was at 8 degrees nose up. The hard landing and tail strike dislodged several passenger cabin oxygen masks from their ceiling storage compartments, and it also resulted in deformation to the aft empennage that was not immediately apparent. Subsequently, the DFDR readout indicated that during the impact sequence the airplane's maximum recorded vertical acceleration was 2.33 g's. The flight crew reported not observing damage to the airframe during a post-flight walk around, whereupon they departed with passengers and thereafter made several additional flights. During the follow-up maintenance examination, the airplane's tail bumper compression indicator was found in the normal (horizontal) position, having been compressed about 2 7/8 inches. By design, tail strikes that result in 3 or more inches of compression to the tail bumper reposition its indicator from a horizontal to a vertical position. This serves as an additional visual aid alerting personnel of the severity of the tail strike event. The first officer had completed his initial operating experience (IOE) training and had been released to fly the line 5 days prior to the accident. However, according to the Hawaiian Airlines Flight Operations Manual, and associated Federal Aviation Regulations, because he only had about 61 of the requisite 100 hours of DC-9 flying experience, he was not authorized to land at the Lihue Airport. Additionally, he was obligated to so inform the captain of his limitation. ## Factual narrative HISTORY OF FLIGHT On June 14, 2000, about 1710 Hawaiian standard time, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-51, N649HA, operated by Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., as flight number 193, made a hard landing, striking its tail, on runway 35 at the Lihue Airport, Lihue, Hawaii. The airplane was substantially damaged. There were a total of 139 persons on board the airplane. Neither the airline transport certificated captain, the first officer, nor the three flight attendants were injured. Two of the 134 passengers received minor injuries. The flight was being performed under 14 CFR Part 121. Daytime visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight originated from Honolulu, Hawaii, about 1643, as a nonstop domestic passenger flight to Lihue. The flight's scheduled arrival time at Lihue was 1635. The captain reported, that on the day of the accident, he and the first officer were scheduled to fly three round trips to Lihue and a round trip to Kona, Hawaii. The captain flew the first flight to Lihue, and the first officer flew back to Honolulu. The captain indicated that the first officer "made a good landing in Honolulu." On the second flight to Lihue (the accident flight), the first officer was at the controls. The flight departed from Honolulu about 40 minutes behind schedule. The captain further reported that the takeoff, en route, and approach portions of the flight were normal. No evidence of any mechanical malfunction or flight control anomalies was noted during the flight. During the approach to Lihue, the first officer made "appropriate corrections" to maintain the glide slope. Approaching the airport, at 1702:31, the captain received an air traffic control clearance to perform a VOR/DME runway 35 instrument approach. At 1704:31, the crew reported having the field in sight, and at 1705:48, the airplane was cleared to land. In Hawaiian Airline's (the operator's) completed "Aircraft Accident Report," the operator indicated that the initial approach was conducted in accordance with the standards established in the approved "Flight Crew Operating Manual," including a Vref of 127 KIAS and use of the instrument landing system/precision approach path indicator (ILS/PAPI) as backup. The applicable crosswind corrections were applied. The final approach segment was commenced with stabilized engine thrust and with a stabilized rate of descent. The captain performed the duties of safety pilot, completing checklists, acknowledging tower instructions, and making required call-outs. The operator additionally reported that the approach terminated in a "higher-than-normal, although not excessive," deck angle, and an abnormally high rate of sink from 50 feet above ground level to touchdown. The resulting hard landing caused portions of the aft fuselage to come in contact with the runway. According to the captain, the landing was firmer than routine but he would not consider it to have been a "hard landing." A Hawaiian Airlines flight attendant occupied the fourth flight attendant jump seat because the airplane was completely full. The flight attendant reported that the flight seemed normal until the "hard landing" occurred, which really shook him up. He was "alarmed by the loud sound of metal impacting the ground," and the seat belt shoulder harness kept him from becoming airborne. Several oxygen compartments opened resulting in oxygen masks hanging from the ceiling. The flight attendant then disembarked from the tailcone stairway exit. Upon looking at the outside airplane structure, the attendant "noticed the safety skid plate device (was) badly scraped and around the panel, liquid (was) dripping." In preparation for their next flight, the captain performed a walk around visual inspection of the airplane. The captain reported that the "tail bumper compression indicator was safety wired and in its normal position." Thereafter, passengers boarded the airplane and they flew to Honolulu. The captain additionally reported that at Honolulu he "called maintenance out as a prudent matter of practice." He explained to the mechanics that the first officer had landed "firmer than routine," and he asked the mechanics to inspect the airplane and to paint the tail bumper if needed. The captain also reported that he did not enter a write-up in the logbook, "as there was no damage to the airplane and the tail bumper indicator pin was up, safetied and in its normal position in Honolulu as it was in Lihue." The first officer similarly reported that he had performed a walk around inspection of the airplane following his firm landing, and no obvious damage was noted. The last four flights for the day in the airplane were routine. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Captain. The captain possessed an airline transport pilot certificate and had approximately 11,725 hours total flight time. He possessed a type rating in the DC-9, and had about 6,678 hours of flying time as captain in the airplane. During the preceding 90 and 30 days, he had flown the airplane for 240 and 63 hours, respectively. The captain was not a designated check airman in the DC-9. First Officer. The first officer possessed an airline transport pilot certificate, and he had approximately 8,895 hours total flight time. He was not type rated in the DC-9. His total time flying the DC-9 was 61 hours, which was all obtained within 90 days of the accident flight. The first officer was type rated in the Embraer EMB-110. Hawaiian Airline's Director of Flight Safety and Compliance reported to the National Transportation Safety Board investigator that the company had evaluated the first officer throughout his training. The company opined that, by the conclusion of his required training, the pilot's performance had met the minimum acceptable standards to be released for line flying. The company noted, however, that the pilot's performance had been problematic. He had required about twice the number of hours in training, including landing practice, than the average pilot undergoing initial operating experience (IOE) training. The first officer satisfactorily completed the IOE line check in the DC-9 on June 9, 2000. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane was manufactured in 1976. By the accident date, its airframe's total time was about 43,780.23 hours. The airplane had 64,951 total cycles. The operator's management personnel reported that the airplane's weight and balance were within prescribed limits during the accident flight. The airplane's maintenance log indicated that the number one (left) thrust reverser was inoperative and maintenance action was deferred in accordance with the Hawaiian Airlines DC-9 approved minimum equipment list. The cockpit was accordingly placarded. The flight crew had operated the airplane in this condition on three previous legs. As described in the airplane's "Flight Crew Operating Manual" and related publications, the DC-9 is equipped with a tail bumper compression indicator. The indicator is attached to the bumper assembly by a hinge, and it is located next to a skid assembly, which is connected to a pneumatic strut in the aft belly of the airplane. The tail bumper compression indicator should normally be in the horizontal position. If the tail bumper has contacted the ground and has been compressed 3 inches or more, the indicator will be driven toward the vertical position. In this event a structural inspection of the airframe is necessary. If the indicator is not in the normal horizontal position, a visual check for damage to the tail bumper skid should be made. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION About 1655, Lihue's automatic terminal information service reported "Information Alpha" was in effect. In part, it stated that the weather was as follows: "wind zero seven zero at niner visibility one zero few clouds at four thousand five hundred temperature ## Aircraft - Registration: [N649HA](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N649HA-2013-08-08), registration cancelled 2013-08-08, S/N 47715, built 1976 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: McDonnell Douglas DC-9-51 - Registry model: [Mcdonnell Douglas DC-9-51](https://openairdocs.org/model/mcdonnell-douglas-dc-9-51) (registry code 3022051) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Pratt & Whitney JT8D-17 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/pratt-whitney-jt8d-17-series) (registry code 52049, turbo-jet) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 47715 - Airframe hours: 43780 - Engines: Pratt & Whitney JT8D-17 16000 lbs thrust turbo fan - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Part 121 - Registered owner: Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Transport - Last inspection: Continuous airworthiness, May 21, 2000, 124 hours before - Departed: HNL, HONOLULU, HI - Destination: LIH - Flight plan: IFR - Airport: LIH, Lihue, runway 35, 6,500 × 150 ft, asphalt ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 42; injuries: none; airline transport, flight instructor; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, valid medical--no waivers/lim.; last flight review March 27, 2000; seat: left; flight hours: 11,725 total, 9,839 in this make and model, 6,678 as pilot in command, 240 in the last 90 days, 63 in the last 30 days, 4 in the last 24 hours - Co-pilot; age 42; injuries: none; airline transport, flight engineer; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 2, without waivers/limitations; last flight review March 30, 2000; seat: right; flight hours: 8,895 total, 61 in this make and model, 6,655 as pilot in command, 61 in the last 90 days, 47 in the last 30 days, 1 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 70° at 9 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 81 °F, dew point 70 °F - Altimeter: 30.01 inHg - Observed at: LIH ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20000614013569A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20000614013569A), Jun 14, 2000: Doug DC951, Lihue, HI, No damage. (-23) The first officer did not fly the approved landing profile,which resulted in a hard landing and a tailstrike, that caused enough damage for this to be… From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.