# NTSB LAX00IA127: Boeing 727-232, N516DA, San Francisco, CA, March 14, 2000 - Type: NTSB incident investigation - Classification: Incident · No injuries · Incident investigation · Final report - Date: March 13, 2000, 20:06 local (Mar 14, 2000, 04:06 UTC) - Place: San Francisco, CA - Coordinates: 37.620277, -122.379997 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=37.6203&lon=-122.3800&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Initial climb](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/350) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Highest injury: No injuries - Injuries: 77 uninjured - Status: Completed, report October 31, 2006 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Parties: Air Line Pilots Association, Boeing, Delta Airlines, Federal Aviation Administration, Dowty - NTSB case key (mKey): 48820 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=LAX00IA127 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/48820/pdf - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/LAX00IA127 ## Probable cause failure of the right main landing gear to fully extend for undetermined reasons. ## Sequence of events In NTSB's coding before 2008 (https://www.ntsb.gov/GILS/Documents/codman.pdf). - Airframe/component/system failure/malfunction, takeoff - initial climb - reason for occurrence undetermined (cause) ## Analysis The airplane landed with the right main landing gear partially extended. This was the second leg of the day in the airplane for this crew; the second officer (SO) completed walk around inspections prior to both flights and noted no discrepancies. The captain was hand flying the airplane in the initial takeoff climb, and selected landing gear up passing through 300 to 500 feet above ground level (agl). The red "doors" light illuminated on the front panel and the amber right main gear door light illuminated on the second officer's panel. All attempts to lower the right main gear were unsuccessful, so the captain elected to return to the airport and land with the right main gear extended about 15 degrees. Inspection of the right main landing gear revealed that the safety bar bent down about 20 degrees at the leading edge and 15 degrees at its midpoint. The safety bar's inboard flanges buckled just below the reinforced area. The inner gear door drive rod bent aft about 15 degrees at the upper attachment fitting, and the tube buckled and separated below the four attachment nuts. The outboard section of the clamshell gear door sustained mechanical damage. Examination of the airplane revealed that the door rods were not loose, and all were in good condition. A general inspection of the wheel well revealed no other damage. There was no abnormal wear or movement marks on the up-lock hook, and the hook was properly adjusted. The actuator adjustor plate was properly installed. Delta maintenance technicians installed new clamshell door halves and a new drive rod. They serviced the strut, isolated the right main clamshell gear door, and cycled the gear. Then they cycled the right main wheel with the door. Finally, they cycled all of the landing gear together. All wheels and doors cycled in proper sequence. Metallurgical examination discovered no cracks in the safety plate. There were no fatigue crack arrest marks or corrosion in the fracture faces on the drive rod; it fractured as a result of overstress. A black coating that felt greasy covered the interior side of the outer clamshell door. There was a rectangular scuffmark in the center of the black area, which had its long axis parallel to the longitudinal axis of the airplane. The black coating appeared pushed into a slight ridge along the outer edge of the scuffmark. A small piece of rubber was under a rivet in the middle of the scuffmark. After placing the tire and gear door together to match their positions when the airplane came to rest, the tire did not touch the scuffmark. Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR) examination of the small piece of rubber and samples from the tire and a chock determined that they were all hydrocarbon compounds, but could not distinguish between the samples. Whether the scuffmark and rubber piece came from runway debris or another rubber object could not be determined. ## Factual narrative 1.1 HISTORY OF FLIGHT On March 13, 2000, about 2006 Pacific standard time, Delta Airlines flight 1972, a Boeing 727-232, N516DA, had the right main landing gear fail to fully extend prior to landing at San Francisco, California. Delta Airlines, Inc., was operating the airplane as a scheduled domestic passenger flight under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 121. The airline transport pilot captain, first officer (FO), second officer (SO), 4 flight attendants, and 70 passengers were not injured. The airplane sustained damage to secondary structure. The flight departed San Francisco about 1835 as a nonstop to Salt Lake City, Utah. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed. This was the second leg of the day in the airplane for this crew; their first leg was from Dallas, Texas, to San Francisco. The SO completed walk around inspections at Dallas and San Francisco and noted no discrepancies. The captain was hand flying the airplane in the initial takeoff climb, and selected landing gear up passing through 300 to 500 feet above ground level (agl). The red "doors" light illuminated on the front panel and the amber right main gear door light illuminated on the second officer's panel. The crew notified air traffic control, briefed the passengers, and climbed the airplane to 5,000 feet on vectors to a safe maneuvering area over the ocean. The crew completed their checklists; the captain gave the FO control of the airplane, and briefed the flight attendants. He did not dump fuel to allow maximum time to analyze the situation. The captain contacted Delta maintenance in Atlanta to discuss all available options. The crew completed the emergency procedures in their flight manuals, and discussed cycling the landing gear. Delta procedures did not allow the pilot to cycle the landing gear in this situation with the intent to avoid more complications. The captain selected landing gear down, and green lights illuminated for the nose gear and left main gear, while a red light illuminated for the right main gear. The red "doors" light on the front panel and the amber right main gear door light on the second officer's panel remained illuminated. The SO, who went into the cabin to view the landing gear position through a porthole, reported seeing the clamshell door, the wheel canted down about 10 to 15 degrees, and the ground. The crew attempted manual extension procedures several times with no movement of the wheel. They made preparations for a partial gear landing. The checklist included briefing for an emergency evacuation. The captain declared an emergency with air traffic control. The captain called the lead flight attendant up to the cockpit, and explained the problem. The lead flight attendant briefed the other flight attendants. The flight attendants reviewed their procedures and briefed the passengers and divided the required duties. The flight crew depressurized the cabin. After announcing their intentions to the passengers, the flight crew shook the airplane to try and loosen the gear. The attempt was unsuccessful. The captain resumed control of the airplane, returned to the airport, and flew an instrument landing system (ILS) to a visual approach. He acquired the airport at the outer marker. He aligned the airplane slightly left of centerline in case the airplane pulled to the right. He pulled about 20 degrees of spoiler for better roll authority, and did not use the thrust reversers. He applied left aileron to hold the right wing up as long as possible, and the wing stayed off of the ground until about 110 knots. He used slight pressure on the left brake, and said that the airplane went straight ahead. The airplane stopped smoothly about 3 feet right of centerline. The tower said that there were no signs of fire, and the captain noticed crash and rescue personnel around the airplane. The captain ordered an evacuation, completed the evacuation checklist, and pulled the T handles. The flight crew then assisted with the evacuation. 1.2 DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT The right wing leading edge slats, right flaps, right wing tip, and right main gear doors sustained damage. 1.3 PERSONNEL INFORMATION 1.3.1 Captain The captain held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane multiengine land rating. He held type ratings for the DC-9, B737, and B727. He also held a certified flight instructor's (CFI) certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land and glider. He held a first-class medical certificate issued on January 21, 2000, with no limitations or waivers. He had 19,021 hours total time; 1,695 hours in this make and model, and 183 hours logged in the last 90 days. 1.3.2 First Officer The first officer held a commercial pilot certificate with multiengine land and instrument ratings. He held a first-class medical issued on October 18, 1999, with no limitations or waivers. He had 9,979 hours total time; 6,231 were in this make and model with 171 hours logged in the last 90 days. 1.3.3 Second Officer The second officer held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane multiengine land rating. He had type ratings for the CL65 and EMB120. He held a flight engineer's certificate. He held a first-class medical certificate issued on October 18, 1999, with no limitations or waivers. He had 8,095 hours total time. 1.4 AIRCRAFT INFORMATION 1.4.1 Airframe The airplane was a Boeing 727-232, serial number 21432. The operator reported a total airframe time of 63,246.5 hours. The airplane was maintained on a continuous airworthiness program, and the last inspection occurred on March 8, 2000, approximately 42 hours prior to the mishap. The three engines were Pratt and Whitney JT8D-15A models, rated at 15,000 pounds of thrust each. Serial numbers for engines 1, 2, and 3, respectively, were: 700797, 687501, and 695292. 1.4.2 Landing Gear System 1.4.2.1 Overview The main gear doors close over the wheel well opening when the landing gear are retracted or extended by the normal hydraulic system. Hydraulic power normally operates the wheel well doors. Mechanical linkage from the landing gear operates the wing doors, which close over the shock strut aperture only when the gear is retracted. A safety bar mechanism completely opens the wheel well doors upon manual extension or with a malfunction of the power operating system. There is a release mechanism, which allows opening of the doors for servicing. Only hydraulic action closes the wheel well doors. 1.4.2.2 Main Gear Doors The doors consist of two parts, an inner door hinged to the keel beam and an outer door hinged to the outer edge of the inner door. The door actuator and actuation beam connect to a large bracket on the inner door. The outboard end of the actuator pivots in the actuator beam. The actuator beam connects to the structure via a swinging link and an adjustable rod. Hinges raise the outer door when its inner door closes. Each end of the outer door has a radius rod installed between the outboard edges of the door, which raises the outer end into position as the door closes. The gear sequence control rod attaches to a bracket mounted on the aft end of the inner door near the hinge line. 1.4.2.3 Wing Doors The wing doors are hinged to the lap inner rail. An actuator rod is attached to a support fitting mounted on the door center rib. The opposite end of the actuator rod attaches to the shock strut. A hook mechanism supports the wing doors in the closed position, and prevents them from drooping during high-speed flight. Correct sequence of operation is ensured since the main gear doors open and close only when the main gear conveying the wing doors are locked in the up or down positions. 1.4.3 Safety Bar Mechanism The door safety bar mechanism is in each main gear wheel well. It will comple ## Aircraft - Registration: [N516DA](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N516DA-2003-03-18), registration cancelled 2003-03-18, S/N 21432, built 1978 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: Boeing 727-232 - Registry model: [Boeing 727-232](https://openairdocs.org/model/boeing-727-232) (registry code 1384082) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Pratt & Whitney JT8D-9 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/pratt-whitney-jt8d-9-series) (registry code 52048, turbo-jet) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 21432 - Airframe hours: 63246.5 - Engines: Pratt & Whitney JT8D-15A 15000 lbs thrust turbo fan; Pratt & Whitney JT8D-15A 15000 lbs thrust turbo fan; Pratt & Whitney JT8D-15A 15000 lbs thrust turbo fan - Damage: Minor damage - Flight: Part 121 - Operator: Delta Airlines, Inc. - Registered owner: Wilmington Trust Co. Trustee - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Transport - Last inspection: Continuous airworthiness, March 1, 2000, 42.1 hours before - Departed: SFO, SAN FRANCISCO, CA - Destination: SLC, SALT LAKE CITY, UT - Flight plan: IFR - Airport: SFO, San Francisco Intl, runway 28R, 11,870 × 200 ft, asphalt ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 49; injuries: none; flight instructor, airline transport; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, without waivers/limitations; last flight review July 1, 1999; seat: left; flight hours: 19,021 total, 1,695 in this make and model - Co-pilot; age 44; injuries: none; commercial; airplane ratings: multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, without waivers/limitations; last flight review February 1, 2000; seat: right; flight hours: 9,979 total, 6,231 in this make and model - Flight engineer; age 33; injuries: none; airline transport; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: unknown; seat: rear; flight hours: 8,095 total ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Night/dark - Wind: 260° at 18 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 54 °F, dew point 52 °F - Altimeter: 30.18 inHg - Observed at: SFO ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20000314013049A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20000314013049A), Mar 14, 2000: Boeing 727232, San Francisco, CA, No damage. (-23) Received report of accident approx 2320 hrs. Spoke with lax ops center duty officer, bruce nelson. No preliminary accident report. Unable to ascertain… From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.