# NTSB LAX06FA277: Raytheon Hawker 800XP, N879QS, Smith, NV, August 28, 2006 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Minor injuries · Field investigation · Final report - Date: August 28, 2006, 15:06 local (22:06 UTC) - Place: Smith, NV - Coordinates: 38.844722, -119.497222 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=38.8447&lon=-119.4972&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Enroute](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/400) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Highest injury: Minor injuries - Injuries: 3 minor, 3 uninjured - Status: Completed, report March 20, 2008 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Parties: IBT 1108/Hawker ERT, NetJets, Inc., Federal Aviation Administration, Raytheon Aircraft Company, NTSB, WP-FSDO-Reno, NV - Safety recommendations: Yes - NTSB case key (mKey): 64423 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=LAX06FA277 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/64423/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=64423 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/LAX06FA277 ## Probable cause (aircraft 2) The failure of the glider pilot to utilize his transponder and the high closure rate of the two aircraft, which limited each pilot's opportunity to see and avoid the other aircraft. ## Probable cause (aircraft 1) The failure of the glider pilot to utilize his transponder and the high closure rate of the two aircraft, which limited each pilot's opportunity to see and avoid the other aircraft. ## Sequence of events In NTSB's coding before 2008 (https://www.ntsb.gov/GILS/Documents/codman.pdf). - Midair collision, descent - normal - transponder - not used, pilot of other aircraft (cause) - Midair collision, cruise - normal - transponder - not used, pilot in command (cause) ## Analysis (aircraft 2) The Hawker and the glider collided in flight at an altitude of about 16,000 feet above mean sea level about 42 nautical miles south-southeast of the Reno/Tahoe International Airport (RNO), Reno, Nevada, which was the Hawker's destination. The collision occurred in visual meteorological conditions in an area that is frequently traversed by air carrier and other turbojet airplanes inbound to RNO and that is also popular for glider operations because of the thermal and mountain wave gliding opportunities there. Before the collision, the Hawker had been descending toward RNO on a stable northwest heading for several miles, and the glider was in a 30-degree, left-banked, spiraling climb. According to statements from the Hawker's captain and the glider pilot, they each saw the other aircraft only about 1 second or less before the collision and were unable to maneuver to avoid the collision in time. Damage sustained by the Hawker disabled one engine and other systems; however, the flight crew was able to land the airplane. The damaged glider was uncontrollable, and the glider pilot bailed out and parachuted to the ground. Because of the lack of radar data for the glider's flight, it was not possible to determine at which points each aircraft may have been within the other's available field of view. Although Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) require all pilots to maintain vigilance to see and avoid other aircraft (this includes pilots of flights operated under instrument flight rules, when visibility permits), a number of factors that can diminish the effectiveness of the see-and-avoid principle were evident in this accident. For example, the high closure rate of the Hawker as it approached the glider would have given the glider pilot only limited time to see and avoid the jet. Likewise, the closure rate would have limited the time that the Hawker crew had to detect the glider, and the slim design of the glider would have made it difficult for the Hawker crew to see it. Although the demands of cockpit tasks, such as preparing for an approach, have been shown to adversely affect scan vigilance, both the Hawker captain, who was the flying pilot, and the first officer reported that they were looking out the window before the collision. However, the captain saw the glider only a moment before it filled the windshield, and the first officer never saw it at all. Although the Hawker was equipped with a traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS)-II capable of generating vertical resolution (collision avoidance) advisories (RA), the glider's Mode C transponder was turned off (and, therefore, not detectable by the Hawker's equipment) because the glider pilot wanted to reserve battery power for radio use. Although transponder installation is not required on gliders, FARs require that any person operating a transponder-equipped aircraft must use the transponder. Had the glider pilot turned on his transponder, the Hawker's TCAS-II likely would have depicted the glider on the flight crew's monitor and would have generated an RA to alert the crewmembers and prompt them to deviate their course in time to prevent the accident. According to Reno Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) personnel, it is not uncommon for arriving and departing air traffic to receive TCAS RAs because of transponder-equipped gliders operating in the area. In a 30-day interval before the accident, the facility recorded four such TCAS RA events reported by pilots. Each event involved a conflict with transport-category airplane operated under 14 CFR Part 121 and a glider. In addition to the TCAS benefits, the accident glider's Mode C transponder, if turned on, would have provided position and altitude information to air traffic control (ATC) personnel who could have used that information to provide separation services and traffic advisories to the Hawker crew. Reno TRACON personnel reported that, although they can sometimes see primary radar returns for what they suspect are nontransponder-equipped gliders, they did not see any primary returns from the accident glider before this collision. Further, even when ATC personnel detect primary returns, they cannot ascertain the type or altitude of the aircraft. Review of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database revealed that, since 1988, there have been more reports of near midair collisions (NMACs) involving air carrier/corporate jet traffic and gliders in the vicinity of RNO than any other airport area. Because ASRS reports are voluntary, it is possible that other NMAC events occurred but were unreported. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has long been aware of the potential for a collision involving a glider and air carrier traffic in the vicinity of RNO. More than 10 years before this accident, Reno Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) personnel concluded that, on the basis of many NMAC reports, FAA inspectors' observations of traffic conflicts, and other information, the increasing glider operations in the departure and arrival areas around RNO represented an "extremely dangerous situation," especially because many gliders were not equipped with transponders, were difficult for air carrier flight crews to see, and were flown by pilots who were not communicating with ATC. On April 11, 1997, the Reno FSDO manager submitted a memorandum to the FAA's Office of Accident Investigation, Recommendation and Analysis Division that detailed these concerns and suggested a number of solutions, including mandatory transponder installation in gliders. In response to the concerns, the FAA published a notice to airmen cautioning pilots about glider soaring operations 30 to 50 miles south of RNO and took action that resulted in revisions to the San Francisco Sectional Aeronautical Chart and five of the RNO-published instrument procedures to include caution boxes to warn pilots of extensive glider activity. However, the FAA elected not to implement the transponder recommendation. ## Analysis (aircraft 1) The Hawker and the glider collided in flight at an altitude of about 16,000 feet above mean sea level about 42 nautical miles south-southeast of the Reno/Tahoe International Airport (RNO), Reno, Nevada, which was the Hawker's destination. The collision occurred in visual meteorological conditions in an area that is frequently traversed by air carrier and other turbojet airplanes inbound to RNO and that is also popular for glider operations because of the thermal and mountain wave gliding opportunities there. Before the collision, the Hawker had been descending toward RNO on a stable northwest heading for several miles, and the glider was in a 30-degree, left-banked, spiraling climb. According to statements from the Hawker's captain and the glider pilot, they each saw the other aircraft only about 1 second or less before the collision and were unable to maneuver to avoid the collision in time. Damage sustained by the Hawker disabled one engine and other systems; however, the flight crew was able to land the airplane. The damaged glider was uncontrollable, and the glider pilot bailed out and parachuted to the ground. Because of the lack of radar data for the glider's flight, it was not possible to determine at which points each aircraft may have been within the other's available field of view. Although Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) require all pilots to maintain vigilance to see and avoid other aircraft (this includes pilots of flights operated under instrument flight rules, when visibility permits), a number of factors that can diminish the effectiveness of the see-and-avoid principle were evident in this accident. For example, the high closure rate of the Hawker as it approached the glider would have given the glider pilot only limited time to see and avoid the jet. Likewise, the closure rate would have limited the time that the Hawker crew had to detect the glider, and the slim design of the glider would have made it difficult for the Hawker crew to see it. Although the demands of cockpit tasks, such as preparing for an approach, have been shown to adversely affect scan vigilance, both the Hawker captain, who was the flying pilot, and the first officer reported that they were looking out the window before the collision. However, the captain saw the glider only a moment before it filled the windshield, and the first officer never saw it at all. Although the Hawker was equipped with a traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS)-II capable of generating vertical resolution (collision avoidance) advisories (RA), the glider's Mode C transponder was turned off (and, therefore, not detectable by the Hawker's equipment) because the glider pilot wanted to reserve battery power for radio use. Although transponder installation is not required on gliders, FARs require that any person operating a transponder-equipped aircraft must use the transponder. Had the glider pilot turned on his transponder, the Hawker's TCAS-II likely would have depicted the glider on the flight crew's monitor and would have generated an RA to alert the crewmembers and prompt them to deviate their course in time to prevent the accident. According to Reno Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) personnel, it is not uncommon for arriving and departing air traffic to receive TCAS RAs because of transponder-equipped gliders operating in the area. In a 30-day interval before the accident, the facility recorded four such TCAS RA events reported by pilots. Each event involved a conflict with transport-category airplane operated under 14 CFR Part 121 and a glider. In addition to the TCAS benefits, the accident glider's Mode C transponder, if turned on, would have provided position and altitude information to air traffic control (ATC) personnel who could have used that information to provide separation services and traffic advisories to the Hawker crew. Reno TRACON personnel reported that, although they can sometimes see primary radar returns for what they suspect are nontransponder-equipped gliders, they did not see any primary returns from the accident glider before this collision. Further, even when ATC personnel detect primary returns, they cannot ascertain the type or altitude of the aircraft. Review of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database revealed that, since 1988, there have been more reports of near midair collisions (NMACs) involving air carrier/corporate jet traffic and gliders in the vicinity of RNO than any other airport area. Because ASRS reports are voluntary, it is possible that other NMAC events occurred but were unreported. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has long been aware of the potential for a collision involving a glider and air carrier traffic in the vicinity of RNO. More than 10 years before this accident, Reno Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) personnel concluded that, on the basis of many NMAC reports, FAA inspectors' observations of traffic conflicts, and other information, the increasing glider operations in the departure and arrival areas around RNO represented an "extremely dangerous situation," especially because many gliders were not equipped with transponders, were difficult for air carrier flight crews to see, and were flown by pilots who were not communicating with ATC. On April 11, 1997, the Reno FSDO manager submitted a memorandum to the FAA's Office of Accident Investigation, Recommendation and Analysis Division that detailed these concerns and suggested a number of solutions, including mandatory transponder installation in gliders. In response to the concerns, the FAA published a notice to airmen cautioning pilots about glider soaring operations 30 to 50 miles south of RNO and took action that resulted in revisions to the San Francisco Sectional Aeronautical Chart and five of the RNO-published instrument procedures to include caution boxes to warn pilots of extensive glider activity. However, the FAA elected not to implement the transponder recommendation. ## Factual narrative (aircraft 2) "THIS CASE WAS MODIFIED MARCH 5, 2008." 1.1 HISTORY OF FLIGHT On August 28, 2006, at 1506 Pacific daylight time, a Raytheon Aircraft Company Hawker 800XP transport airplane, N879QS, and a Schleicher ASW27-18 glider, N7729, collided in midair about 10 miles west-northwest of Smith, Nevada. Both airplanes sustained substantial damage. The Hawker flight crew (both airline transport pilots) sustained minor injuries, while their three passengers were not injured. The glider pilot (a private pilot) received minor injuries. The Hawker 800XP was fractionally owned by different corporations and managed by NetJets Aviation, Inc., of Columbus, Ohio. Its flight was being conducted under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 Subpart K as an executive/corporate flight. The glider was registered to a private individual and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 as a personal flight. An instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the Hawker, which began its flight from Carlsbad, California, at 1400, and was destined for Reno, Nevada. No flight plan had been filed for the glider, which was on a local flight that had departed Minden, Nevada, at 1300. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the collision. 1.1.1 Hawker 800XP Flight Crew Statements According to interviews conducted by the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC), the flight crew indicated that they were cleared by air traffic control from 16,000 feet to 11,000 feet. The captain was the flying pilot and the first officer was working the radios. Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) transferred the flight to Reno approach control just prior to the collision. The first officer tuned in the Reno approach control radio frequency and looked out the right cockpit window. He then heard the captain shout and the audio tone for the autopilot, and noted that the captain had pushed the control yoke down and to the right. As he was turning his head to see what was going on, he observed the captain's side of the instrument panel "explode." The captain reported that they were cleared to descend and as she looked outside she noted something out of the corner of her eye to the left. As she looked to the left, she noted a glider filling the windshield. She moved the control yoke down and to the right in an attempt to avoid hitting the glider. The first officer and captain reported that the cockpit was noisy with wind after the collision, and the captain's headset had been knocked off. The first officer attempted to communicate with Reno controllers but had difficulty. The captain recovered the airplane as the first officer communicated to Reno that they had some sort of structural problem (he later learned that they had collided with a glider) and declared an emergency. The crew asked for vectors to the Reno airport as their instrument panel was severely damaged by the impact. As the flight progressed north, they spotted an airport and asked air traffic controllers if the RNO airport was at their 11 o'clock. The controllers responded by indicating that the airport was at their 11 o'clock at 20 miles. The crew continued to the airport they observed (Carson City, Nevada, CXP) and elected to land. As the flight neared CXP, the flight crew noted that the right engine shut down as a result of the impact. The flight crew entered a left downwind for runway 9 and the landing gear would not extend normally. The flight crew overshot final for runway 9 due to the terrain limiting the available length of the downwind leg and attempts to maintain an adequate airspeed to control the airplane. Then, they entered the downwind leg for runway 27. As the captain slowed the airplane for final approach she asked the first officer to assist in controlling the airplane's bank and pitch attitudes. The airplane touched down on the runway centerline, with the landing gear retracted, and came to rest uneventfully. The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), which recorded the captain and first officer's communications with air traffic control, and with one another, as they descended toward RNO. The last clearance received from Oakland ARTCC was for them to descend to flight level (FL) 220, then, at pilot discretion, maintain 16,000 feet. The captain and first officer then discussed the descent and/or approach, and at 1506:19, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a gasp on the captain's microphone followed by unusual electronic sounds. The recording ended at that point, at 1506:24. 1.1.2 Glider Pilot Statement On the morning of the accident, the glider pilot received a flight review in a DG-505 glider and then flew his first flight in the accident glider. He started his second flight in the accident glider at 1300. He intended on thermal flying for about 5 hours and wanted to stay in the local area to familiarize himself with the accident glider. He flew around the local area and entered a thermal on the southwest side of Mt. Seagul. He entered a 30-degree left bank spiraling climb at 50 knots. During the climb, as the glider turned toward the south, the pilot saw a jet aircraft heading toward him. He estimated that one second passed between the time he noted the jet aircraft and the time they collided. He said he may have entered a slight nose down control input, but it wasn't enough to avoid the collision. The Hawker jet impacted the right wing of the glider near the right outboard wing joint (the glider had a 4-piece wing with two inboard sections and two outboard sections). The glider entered a flat spin after the impact, so the pilot elected to remove the cockpit canopy and bail out. After removing the canopy, the pilot checked his ripcord location, unbuckled his restraint system, and bailed out of the glider. The pilot pulled the ripcord and the parachute successfully opened. During his descent, he observed the glider spiral to the ground below him and noted that the left wing and inboard section of the right wing remained attached to the fuselage. He landed uneventfully, but sustained minor injuries when the parachute dragged him along the ground. The pilot waited near his landing area for 1.5 hours before he began walking toward Carson Valley. After 2 hours and 10 minutes of walking along a dirt road, he was picked up by local authorities. 1.2 PERSONNEL INFORMATION 1.2.1 Hawker Flight Crew Information The captain held an airline transport pilot certificate with a multi-engine airplane rating and type ratings in Cessna 500 and Hawker Siddeley HS-125 airplanes. She also held a commercial pilot certificate for single-engine airplanes. She was issued a first-class medical certificate on April 17, 2006, with no limitations. According to the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120.1/2) submitted by NetJets Aviation, Inc., the captain accumulated a total of 6,134 total flight hours, of which 1,564 hours were accrued in Hawker 800XP airplanes. The captain was wearing sunglasses at the time of the event. The first officer held an airline transport pilot certificate for multi-engine airplanes and type ratings in Beech 400, Hawker Siddeley HS-125, and Mitsubishi MU-300 airplanes. He also held a commercial pilot certificate for single-engine airplanes. He was issued a first-class medical certificate on May 16, 2006, with a limitation indicating he must wear corrective lenses. According to the 6120.1/2 Form, he accumulated 3,848 total flight hours, of which 548 hours were accrued in the Hawker 800XP. The first officer was wearing corrective glasses, with sunshades clipped over the glasses, at the time of the event. 1.2.2 Glider Pilot Information The glider pilot was a Japanese national, and had last flown in the Minden area in 2000. He held a private pilot certificate with a glider rating. He obtained the equivalent of a second-class medical certificate on Ju ## Factual narrative (aircraft 1) "THIS CASE WAS MODIFIED ON MARCH 5, 2008." 1.1 HISTORY OF FLIGHT On August 28, 2006, at 1506 Pacific daylight time, a Raytheon Aircraft Company Hawker 800XP transport airplane, N879QS, and a Schleicher ASW27-18 glider, N7729, collided in midair about 10 miles west-northwest of Smith, Nevada. Both airplanes sustained substantial damage. The Hawker flight crew (both airline transport pilots) sustained minor injuries, while their three passengers were not injured. The glider pilot (a private pilot) received minor injuries. The Hawker 800XP was fractionally owned by different corporations and managed by NetJets Aviation, Inc., of Columbus, Ohio. Its flight was being conducted under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 Subpart K as an executive/corporate flight. The glider was registered to a private individual and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 as a personal flight. An instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the Hawker, which began its flight from Carlsbad, California, at 1400, and was destined for Reno, Nevada. No flight plan had been filed for the glider, which was on a local flight that had departed Minden, Nevada, at 1300. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the collision. 1.1.1 Hawker 800XP Flight Crew Statements According to interviews conducted by the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC), the flight crew indicated that they were cleared by air traffic control from 16,000 feet to 11,000 feet. The captain was the flying pilot and the first officer was working the radios. Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) transferred the flight to Reno approach control just prior to the collision. The first officer tuned in the Reno approach control radio frequency and looked out the right cockpit window. He then heard the captain shout and the audio tone for the autopilot, and noted that the captain had pushed the control yoke down and to the right. As he was turning his head to see what was going on, he observed the captain's side of the instrument panel "explode." The captain reported that they were cleared to descend and as she looked outside she noted something out of the corner of her eye to the left. As she looked to the left, she noted a glider filling the windshield. She moved the control yoke down and to the right in an attempt to avoid hitting the glider. The first officer and captain reported that the cockpit was noisy with wind after the collision, and the captain's headset had been knocked off. The first officer attempted to communicate with Reno controllers but had difficulty. The captain recovered the airplane as the first officer communicated to Reno that they had some sort of structural problem (he later learned that they had collided with a glider) and declared an emergency. The crew asked for vectors to the Reno airport as their instrument panel was severely damaged by the impact. As the flight progressed north, they spotted an airport and asked air traffic controllers if the RNO airport was at their 11 o'clock. The controllers responded by indicating that the airport was at their 11 o'clock at 20 miles. The crew continued to the airport they observed (Carson City, Nevada, CXP) and elected to land. As the flight neared CXP, the flight crew noted that the right engine shut down as a result of the impact. The flight crew entered a left downwind for runway 9 and the landing gear would not extend normally. The flight crew overshot final for runway 9 due to the terrain limiting the available length of the downwind leg and attempts to maintain an adequate airspeed to control the airplane. Then, they entered the downwind leg for runway 27. As the captain slowed the airplane for final approach she asked the first officer to assist in controlling the airplane's bank and pitch attitudes. The airplane touched down on the runway centerline, with the landing gear retracted, and came to rest uneventfully. The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), which recorded the captain and first officer's communications with air traffic control, and with one another, as they descended toward RNO. The last clearance received from Oakland ARTCC was for them to descend to flight level (FL) 220, then, at pilot discretion, maintain 16,000 feet. The captain and first officer then discussed the descent and/or approach, and at 1506:19, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a gasp on the captain's microphone followed by unusual electronic sounds. The recording ended at that point, at 1506:24. 1.1.2 Glider Pilot Statement On the morning of the accident, the glider pilot received a flight review in a DG-505 glider and then flew his first flight in the accident glider. He started his second flight in the accident glider at 1300. He intended on thermal flying for about 5 hours and wanted to stay in the local area to familiarize himself with the accident glider. He flew around the local area and entered a thermal on the southwest side of Mt. Seagul. He entered a 30-degree left bank spiraling climb at 50 knots. During the climb, as the glider turned toward the south, the pilot saw a jet aircraft heading toward him. He estimated that one second passed between the time he noted the jet aircraft and the time they collided. He said he may have entered a slight nose down control input, but it wasn't enough to avoid the collision. The Hawker jet impacted the right wing of the glider near the right outboard wing joint (the glider had a 4-piece wing with two inboard sections and two outboard sections). The glider entered a flat spin after the impact, so the pilot elected to remove the cockpit canopy and bail out. After removing the canopy, the pilot checked his ripcord location, unbuckled his restraint system, and bailed out of the glider. The pilot pulled the ripcord and the parachute successfully opened. During his descent, he observed the glider spiral to the ground below him and noted that the left wing and inboard section of the right wing remained attached to the fuselage. He landed uneventfully, but sustained minor injuries when the parachute dragged him along the ground. The pilot waited near his landing area for 1.5 hours before he began walking toward Carson Valley. After 2 hours and 10 minutes of walking along a dirt road, he was picked up by local authorities. 1.2 PERSONNEL INFORMATION 1.2.1 Hawker Flight Crew Information The captain held an airline transport pilot certificate with a multi-engine airplane rating and type ratings in Cessna 500 and Hawker Siddeley HS-125 airplanes. She also held a commercial pilot certificate for single-engine airplanes. She was issued a first-class medical certificate on April 17, 2006, with no limitations. According to the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120.1/2) submitted by NetJets Aviation, Inc., the captain accumulated a total of 6,134 total flight hours, of which 1,564 hours were accrued in Hawker 800XP airplanes. The captain was wearing sunglasses at the time of the event. The first officer held an airline transport pilot certificate for multi-engine airplanes and type ratings in Beech 400, Hawker Siddeley HS-125, and Mitsubishi MU-300 airplanes. He also held a commercial pilot certificate for single-engine airplanes. He was issued a first-class medical certificate on May 16, 2006, with a limitation indicating he must wear corrective lenses. According to the 6120.1/2 Form, he accumulated 3,848 total flight hours, of which 548 hours were accrued in the Hawker 800XP. The first officer was wearing corrective glasses, with sunshades clipped over the glasses, at the time of the event. 1.2.2 Glider Pilot Information The glider pilot was a Japanese national, and had last flown in the Minden area in 2000. He held a private pilot certificate with a glider rating. He obtained the equivalent of a second-class medical certificate o ## Aircraft 1 - Registration: N879QS (not matched to a registry record) - Reported make and model: Raytheon Hawker 800XP - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 258379 - Airframe hours: 6727 - Engines: Garrett TFE 731 4750 lbs thrust turbo fan; Garrett TFE 731 turbo fan - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Executive/Corporate, Part 91 subpart K - Operator: NetJets Aviation, Inc. (as Program Manager) - Registered owner: c/o NetJets Sales Inc. - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Transport - Last inspection: AAIP, August 1, 2006 - Departed: CRQ, Carlsbad, CA - Destination: RNO, Reno, NV - Flight plan: IFR - Airport: runway 27, 5,906 × 75 ft, asphalt ## Aircraft 2 - Registration: [N7729](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N7729), registered now, S/N 29008, built 2006 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: Schleicher ASW27-18 - Registry model: [Schleicher ASW27-18](https://openairdocs.org/model/schleicher-asw27-18) (registry code 3801500) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [NONE](https://openairdocs.org/engine/none) (registry code 00000, none) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Glider - Serial number: 29008 - Airframe hours: 150 - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Personal, Part 91 - Operator: Akihiro Hirao - Registered owner: E. J. Indrebo - Airworthiness certificate: Special, Experimental (Special) - Last inspection: Annual, July 1, 2006, 50 hours before - Departed: MEV, Minden, NV ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot, aircraft N879QS; age 38; injuries: minor; commercial, airline transport; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, without waivers/limitations; last flight review April 1, 2006; seat: left; toxicology performed; flight hours: 6,134 total, 1,564 in this make and model - Co-pilot, aircraft N879QS; age 35; injuries: minor; commercial, airline transport; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, with waivers/limitations; last flight review February 1, 2006; seat: right; toxicology performed; flight hours: 3,848 total, 548 in this make and model - Pilot, aircraft N7729; age 57; injuries: minor; private; last flight review August 1, 2006; seat: center; flight hours: 455 total, 3 in this make and model ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 280° at 11 knots, gusting 17 - Visibility: 20 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 93 °F, dew point 25 °F - Altimeter: 30.01 inHg - Observed at: RNO, 46 nm away ## FAA reports on this event (2) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20060828018491A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20060828018491A), Aug 28, 2006: Raythn HAWKER800XP, Smith, NV, Substantial damage. (-23) A Hawker 800-XP jet was on an IFR, FAR part 91K flight from kcrq (carlsbad, CA) to krno (reno, Nevada) at 16000 feet. The aircraft had just changed… - [Accident 20060828018492A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20060828018492A), Aug 28, 2006: Schler ASW2718, Smith, NV, Destroyed. (-23) [privacy data omitted] pilot stated he was catching thermals over pine nut ridge at 16,000 to 17,000 MSL and southwest of seagul mountain. He said he was… ## Docket (28 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on October 1, 2007, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=64423. 17.4 MB in all. - Cockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Specialist's Summary Factual Report of Investigation (item 1, .PDF, 67 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40283292&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Cockpit%20Voice%20Recorder%2012%20-%20Specialist%27s%20Summary%20Factual%20Report%20of%20Investigation-Master.PDF - Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 (Glider Pilot) (item 2, .PDF, 317 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40392939&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1%20(Glider%20Pilot)-Redacted.PDF - Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 (Net Jets) (item 3, .PDF, 589 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282763&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1%20(Net%20Jets)-Redacted.PDF - Record of Conversation - Chipman (item 4, .PDF, 18 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282765&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Record%20of%20Conversation%20-%20Chipman-Redacted.PDF - Record of Conversation - Dizio (item 5, .PDF, 11 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282766&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Record%20of%20Conversation%20-%20Dizio-Master.PDF - Record of Conversation - Hirao (item 6, .PDF, 30 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282767&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Record%20of%20Conversation%20-%20Hirao-Redacted.PDF - Record of Conversation - Merchant (item 7, .PDF, 27 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282768&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Record%20of%20Conversation%20-%20Merchant-Redacted.PDF - Record of Conversation - Saunders (item 8, .PDF, 25 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282769&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Record%20of%20Conversation%20-%20Saunders-Redacted.PDF - Radar Image (item 9, .PDF, 952 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40285381&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Radar%20Image-Master.PDF - Reno Tracon TCAS Statements (item 10, .PDF, 242 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40285380&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Reno%20Tracon%20TCAS%20Statements-Master.PDF - Honeywell Report (item 11, .PDF, 493 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282770&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Honeywell%20Report-Master.PDF - Glider Pilot Briefing (item 12, .PDF, 236 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282771&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Glider%20Pilot%20Briefing-Master.PDF - NOS Approach and Departure Charts (item 13, .PDF, 973 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282772&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=NOS%20Approach%20and%20Departure%20Charts-Master.PDF - Previous Briefing Chart (item 14, .PDF, 2.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282773&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Previous%20Briefing%20Chart-Master.PDF - New Cockpit Card (item 15, .PDF, 125 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282778&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=New%20Cockpit%20Card-Master.PDF - FAA Recommendations (item 16, .PDF, 909 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40392941&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=FAA%20Recommendations-Redacted.PDF - NMAC Between C560 and Glider (item 17, .PDF, 85 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282788&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=NMAC%20Between%20C560%20and%20Glider-Master.PDF - SSA Petition for Transponder Relief (item 18, .PDF, 269 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282793&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=SSA%20Petition%20for%20Transponder%20Relief-Redacted.PDF - Article - Transponder (item 19, .PDF, 519 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40392943&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Article%20-%20Transponder-Redacted.PDF - Article - Air Sailing News (item 20, .PDF, 2.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40392944&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Article%20-%20Air%20Sailing%20News-Redacted.PDF - Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation (item 21, .PDF, 327 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282799&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Statement%20of%20Party%20Representatives%20to%20NTSB%20Investigation-Redacted.PDF - Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 (item 22, .PDF, 97 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282800&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Release%20of%20Aircraft%20Wreckage,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.15-Redacted.PDF - Image 1. Hawker. (item 23, .PDF, 1.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282801&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%201.%20%20Hawker.-Master.PDF - Image 2. Front view of Hawker. (item 24, .PDF, 977 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282802&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%202.%20%20Front%20view%20of%20Hawker.-Master.PDF - Image 3. Hawker - Right wing damage. (item 25, .PDF, 996 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282803&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%203.%20%20Hawker%20-%20Right%20wing%20damage.-Master.PDF - Image 4. Hawker - Cockpit. (item 26, .PDF, 1.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282804&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%204.%20%20Hawker%20-%20Cockpit.-Master.PDF - Image 5. Hawker - Nose damage. (item 27, .PDF, 1.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282805&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%205.%20%20Hawker%20-%20Nose%20damage.-Master.PDF - Image 6. Hawker - Nose with glider pieces. (item 28, .PDF, 936 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40282806&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Image%206.%20%20Hawker%20-%20Nose%20with%20glider%20pieces.-Master.PDF From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.