# NTSB LAX96FA004: Beech A-36, N3066W, Beaver Dam, AZ, October 7, 1995

- Type: NTSB accident investigation
- Classification: Accident · Fatal · Field investigation · Final report
- Date: October 7, 1995, 12:12 local (19:12 UTC)
- Place: Beaver Dam, AZ
- Coordinates: 36.899787, -113.94049 (estimated)
- Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=36.8998&lon=-113.9405&mi=10
- Phase of flight: [Maneuvering](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/450) (OpenAirDocs' grouping)
- Highest injury: Fatal
- Injuries: 3 fatal
- Status: Completed, report May 29, 1996
- Report: Approved by Office Director
- NTSB case key (mKey): 29237
- NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=LAX96FA004
- NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/29237/pdf
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/LAX96FA004

## Probable cause

The pilot's improper use of the fuel selector valve, which resulted in fuel starvation; and her failure to maintain adequate airspeed while maneuvering, which resulted in an inadvertent stall.

## Sequence of events

In NTSB's coding before 2008 (https://www.ntsb.gov/GILS/Documents/codman.pdf).

- Loss of engine power(total) - nonmechanical, maneuvering
  - fluid,fuel - starvation (cause)
  - fuel tank selector position - improper use of, pilot in command (cause)
- Forced landing, emergency descent/landing
- Loss of control - in flight, emergency descent/landing
  - airspeed - not maintained, pilot in command (cause)
  - stall - inadvertent, pilot in command (cause)
- In flight collision with terrain/water, descent - uncontrolled

## Analysis

The pilot was competing in an air race and made a low pass over the destination airport.  During the low pass, the airplane sustained a loss of engine power and crashed into an open desert area during the emergency descent/landing. The aircraft impacted in a near vertical nose-down and a 60-degree right wing down attitude.  Wreckage examination revealed the fuel selector valve was positioned to the right tank. The right tank, although compromised, did not contain any fuel. The fuel line from the engine fuel pump to the fuel injector control unit did not contain any fuel. The left fuel tank contained fuel.

## Factual narrative

History of Flight

On October 7, 1995, at 1212 hours mountain standard time, a Beech A-36, N3066W, lost power and crashed while making a low pass over runway 01 at the Mesquite Airport, Mesquite, Nevada.  The crash site is at Beaver Dam, Arizona, about 1/2 mile north-northeast of Mesquite Airport.  The pilot was completing a visual flight rules air race.  The airplane, registered to and operated by the pilot, was destroyed.  The certificated commercial pilot and the two passengers (the right seat passenger was doing navigation duties and held a private pilot certificate) sustained fatal injuries.  Visual meteorological conditions prevailed.  The flight originated at Van Nuys Airport, Van Nuys, California, at 0946 hours.

Race officials told National Transportation Safety Board investigators that the pilot was participating in the Valley Air Derby air race sponsored by the Van Nuys Chapter of the 99's - a lady pilot organization.  The officials said that air race participants were required to fly over various airports until reaching Mesquite Airport, the race ending airport.

The consensus of the ground witnesses was that the pilot was flying over runway 01 at Mesquite Airport at 200 feet above ground level (agl) at a high rate of speed.  The engine backfired  and sputtered momentarily.  When the airplane was over the departure end of the runway, it began to oscillate about the lateral axis (nose up and down).  It then entered a right banking turn and nosed down.  Moments later, the witnesses saw a cloud of dirt rising from the crash site.

Some ground witnesses reported seeing a "vapor trail" or exhaust gasses emanating from the airplane.   Other witnesses said that the airplane's nose pitched up during the right turn and described the rapid descent as a stall.

The accident coordinates are:  38 degrees, 50.10 minutes north latitude and 114 degrees, 03.31 minutes west longitude.

Crew Information

First Pilot

The first pilot (occupying the left front seat) held a    commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine    land and instrument airplane ratings.  She also held a    third-class medical certificate dated February 1, 1995;    the certificate contained a "must have glasses available    for near vision" limitation endorsement.

Safety Board investigators recovered one of the pilot's    flight hours logbook.  The initial logbook entry was made    on November 22, 1992, and the last entry was made on    October 2, 1995.  The logbook flight hours entries    corresponded with the airplane's hobbsmeter until the    hobbsmeter failed.  The entries then corresponded with the    tachometer hourmeter.

The flight hours listed on page 3 of this report were    obtained from the referenced logbook and the pilot's last    medical application form.  The pilot showed on the last    medical application form that she accrued 3,200 hours.     The logbook entries after February 1, 1995, show that the    pilot logged 95 flight hours.  The combined flight hours    indicate that the pilot accrued 3,295 hours, of which at    least 308 hours were flown in the accident airplane.     During the preceding 90 days of the accident, the pilot    accrued 33 hours.

The pilot satisfactorily completed a biennial flight    review (BFR) as required by 14 CFR 61.56 on November 11,    1993.  The BFR was flown in the accident airplane.  She    also complied with the general recency experience    requirements of current federal air regulations

Right Front Seat Passenger

Race officials told investigators that the race rules    require a second pilot or navigator.  The right front seat    passenger was the navigator.

The right front seat passenger held a private pilot    certificate with an airplane single-engine land,    multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings.  FAA    records show that the certificate was issued to the pilot    based on a foreign (British) pilot certificate and a    special medical flight test.  The pilot received his last    third-class medical certificate on July 30, 1990; the    certificate contained a "must have available glasses for    near vision limitation endorsement."  A third-class    medical certificate is valid for 24 calendar months.

Safety Board investigators found the passenger's flight    hours logbook.  The initial entry was made on January 15,    1984; the last entry was dated July 25, 1989.  The logbook    examination showed that the passenger carried forward    6,149.2 hours from previous flying.

The logbook examination also showed that the pilot accrued    6,154.8 hours.  He accrued 627.8 hours in single-engine    airplanes, of which 25.4 hours were flown in the accident    airplane [6.3 hours as pilot-in-command (PIC) and 19.1    hours as second-in-command (SIC)].  The remaining flight    hours were logged in multiengine airplanes.

According to current federal air regulations, a pilot    cannot log any SIC flight time unless the airplane type    certificate requires two pilots.  If the flight is    conducted under 14 CFR Part 135 or Part 121 and the    operations specifications require two pilots, a pilot can    log SIC flight time.  The Beech A-36 does not require two    pilots and the flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

The passenger's last BFR was accomplished on December 13,    1988.  The BFR was flown in a Cessna 152.

Aircraft Information

Safety Board investigators recovered the airplane's maintenance logbooks (airframe, engine, & propeller) at the accident site.  The airframe logbook examination showed that the last annual inspection was accomplished on the airframe and engine on July 14, 1995.  The airplane accrued 4,838.36 hours at the time of the inspection (1,604.56 hours on the recording tachometer hourmeter).  The airplane accrued 33 hours since the inspection at the time of the accident.  There were no fuel system problems noted in the logbook.

A maintenance facility installed the "zero time" factory remanufactured engine on the airplane on February 13, 1992, according to a supplementary type certificate (STC) SA2682NM.  The engine was installed at a tachometer hourmeter time of 1,076.34 hours.  The engine accrued 528.22 hours at the time of the inspection and 560.74 hours at the time of the accident.

The fuel injector nozzles were cleaned at the time of the inspection.

The propeller was overhauled on March 29, 1994.  All new blades were installed when it was overhauled.  The propeller was installed at a tachometer hourmeter reading of 1,475.0 hours.  The propeller accrued 162.08 hours at the time of the accident.

According to the Beech A-36 Pilots Operating Handbook (POH) before starting checklist, the pilot should check the fuel valve operation and "select tank more nearly full."  The before landing checklist requires the pilot to "select tank more nearly full."

The airplane was equipped with the 80-gallon capacity (74-gallon usable) optional fuel system.  According to the POH fuel system description and schematic, the fuel vapor return line is routed through the fuel selector which routes the unused return fuel to the selected tank.  Each wing is equipped with a fuel anti-siphon check valve.

The POH engine failure checklist states, in part:

Landing straight ahead is usually advisable.  If    sufficient altitude is available for maneuvering,    accomplish the following:

1.  Fuel Selector Valve - SELECT OTHER TANK           (Check to feel detent)       2.  Auxiliary Fuel Pump - ON       3.  Etc...

The following notation is listed:

The most probable cause of engine failure would be       loss of fuel flow, improper functioning of the       ignition system, or blockage of the induction       system.

If No Restart

1.  Select most favorable landing site.       2.  See EMERGENCY LANDING procedure       3.  The use of landing gear is dependent on the terrain

## Aircraft

- Registration: [N3066W](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N3066W-1996-01-25), registration cancelled 1996-01-25, S/N E489 (OpenAirDocs)
- Reported make and model: BEECH A-36
- Registry model: [Beech A36](https://openairdocs.org/model/beech-a36) (registry code 1151604) (OpenAirDocs)
- Category: Airplane
- Serial number: E-489
- Airframe hours: 4871
- Engines: CONTINENTAL IO-550-B-4 285 horsepower reciprocating
- Damage: Destroyed
- Flight: Part 91
- Registered owner: Ilse H. De Vries
- Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal
- Last inspection: Annual, July 14, 1995, 33 hours before
- Departed: VNY, VAN NUYS, CA
- Destination: 67L
- Airport: 67L, Mesquite Airport, runway 1, 5,100 × 75 ft, asphalt

## Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

- Pilot; age 67; commercial; airplane ratings: single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 3, valid medical--w/ waivers/lim; seat: left; toxicology performed; flight hours: 3,295 total, 308 in this make and model, 33 in the last 90 days, 17 in the last 30 days, 3 in the last 24 hours

## Weather

- Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day
- Wind: calm
- Visibility: 20 statute miles
- Lowest ceiling: none
- Temperature: 81 °F
- Altimeter: 29.00 inHg

## FAA reports on this event (1)

The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs).

- [Accident 19951007036229A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/19951007036229A), Oct 7, 1995: Beech A36, Mesquite, NV, Destroyed, 3 fatal. During air race. Low pass. Engine backfired on climbout. Lost control. Stalled. Possible low fuel unporting.

From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

---
OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.
