# NTSB LAX99LA175: Matter GLASAIR-SH-2R, N6DM, St. Johns, AZ, May 8, 1999 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Minor injuries · Limited investigation · Final report - Date: May 8, 1999, 07:50 local (14:50 UTC) - Place: St. Johns, AZ - Coordinates: 34.560775, -109.330947 (estimated) - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=34.5608&lon=-109.3309&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Enroute](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/400) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Highest injury: Minor injuries - Injuries: 2 minor - Status: Completed, report December 5, 2000 - Report: Approved by Office Director - NTSB case key (mKey): 46269 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=LAX99LA175 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/46269/pdf - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/LAX99LA175 ## Probable cause The pilot misjudging the distance/altitude while on final approach to the runway, which resulted in a landing overrun. Factors were the pilot's failure to position the flap switch to the neutral position after takeoff, resulting in the continuous running and overheating of the flap motor, and the pilot's decision to shut down the engine. ## Sequence of events In NTSB's coding before 2008 (https://www.ntsb.gov/GILS/Documents/codman.pdf). - Airframe/component/system failure/malfunction, cruise - electrical system,electric wiring - arcing (contributing factor) - flt control syst,wing flap control - overtemperature (contributing factor) - flaps - inadvertent activation, pilot in command (contributing factor) - Overrun, landing - roll - powerplant - switched off (contributing factor) - in-flight planning/decision - improper, pilot in command (contributing factor) - distance/altitude - misjudged, pilot in command (cause) - proper touchdown point - not attained, pilot in command (cause) - On ground/water collision with object, landing - roll - object - fence ## Analysis The pilot was about 35 minutes into a planned cross-country flight when he smelled a smoke odor from the cockpit area, and began to see smoke coming from a the switch which controls the flap motor. The pilot decided to land, and elected to turn off the electrical power and shut down the engine. The pilot said he misjudged the approach to runway 3, so he turned the power back on, restarted the engine, and set up for an approach to runway 32. After determining that the landing was assured, he again turned off the electrical and engine power and glided to a landing on runway 32. During the landing, he overshot the touchdown point, overran the runway surface, and collided with an airport boundary fence. Subsequent examination of the airplane revealed that the wire splices leading to the flap motor were touching each other and arcing, causing the smoke in the cockpit. Additionally, the three-position flap motor switch was examined. In the down position the switch is spring loaded to return to neutral; however, in the flaps up position, the switch must be physically returned to the neutral position. There are no limit stop proximity switches in the system and the motor will continue to run in either the up or down directions if the cockpit switch is in other than the neutral position. The flap motor had continued to run after the pilot retracted the flaps after takeoff, but did not reposition the switch to the neutral position. The overheated flap motor was another source of heat and smoke in the cockpit. ## Factual narrative On May 8, 1999, at 0750 hours mountain standard time, an amateur built experimental Matter Glasair-SH-2R, N6DM, collided with a fence during a landing overrun on runway 3 at the St. Johns, Arizona, airport. The aircraft sustained substantial damage. The aircraft was owned and operated by the pilot under 14 CFR Part 91 when the accident occurred. The private pilot and passenger sustained minor injuries. The pilot did not file a flight plan for the personal cross-country flight. The flight originated at Payson, Arizona, at 0700, and was destined for Pampa, Texas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The pilot stated he was about 35 to 40 minutes into the flight at 12,000 feet in cruise flight when he smelled a smoke odor from the cockpit area, and began to see smoke coming from a microswitch for the flap motor. He stated that he elected to pull the flap motor circuit breaker when he noticed that the flap motor area under the passenger's seat was hot to the touch. He then turned off all electrical power. He said his passenger became excited and he elected to land at St. Johns to investigate the problem. He turned the power back on the airplane to extend the gear and make an announcement with his landing intentions, and to get runway information. He said he was told that the winds were "calm." He stated in the pilot/operator report that he set up an emergency descent from 11,500 feet direct to St. Johns airport, with all power to the engine and airplane turned off, and subsequently misjudged the approach to runway 3. He then turned power back on and restarted the engine and gained altitude for an approach to runway 32. After he determined landing was assured, he turned off the fuel and landed on runway 32. During the landing attempt he subsequently overshot the touchdown point, overran the runway, and collided with an airport boundary fence. The pilot estimated that he ran off the runway going about 30 mph, and that the airplane fell about 6 to 10 feet vertically down an embankment landing on the nose gear. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Airworthiness Inspector who examined the aircraft at the request of the Safety Board said that two wire splices, which were connected to the flap motor, were touching each other and had caused the smoke. The wire splice area was charred and discolored from the heat. The inspector determined that there was no fire damage to the airplane. Additionally, the three-position flap motor switch was examined. In the down position the switch is spring loaded to return to neutral once finger pressure is removed. In the flaps up position, the switch must be physically returned to the neutral position. There are no limit stop proximity switches in the system and the motor will continue to run in either the up or down directions if the cockpit switch is in other than the neutral position. The FAA inspector determined that the heat came from the flap motor continuing to run after the pilot retracted the flaps after takeoff, but did not reposition the switch to the neutral position. ## Aircraft - Registration: N6DM (not matched to a registry record) - Reported make and model: MATTER GLASAIR-SH-2R (GLASAIR-SH) - Category: Airplane, amateur-built - Serial number: 510MR - Airframe hours: 104 - Engines: Lycoming O-320-D2A 160 horsepower reciprocating - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Personal, Part 91 - Registered owner: James P. Garrett - Airworthiness certificate: Special, Experimental (Special) - Last inspection: Annual, April 3, 1999, 6 hours before - Departed: E69, PAYSON, AZ - Destination: PPA, PAMPA, TX - Airport: SJN, St. Johns Air Park, runway 32, 5,322 × 15 ft, asphalt ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 63; private; airplane ratings: single-engine land; medical: class 3, valid medical--w/ waivers/lim; seat: left; flight hours: 900 total, 31 in this make and model, 821 as pilot in command, 6 in the last 90 days, 6 in the last 30 days, 1 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Visibility: 25 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 55 °F, dew point 37 °F - Altimeter: 30.00 inHg - Observed at: GUP, 78 nm away ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 19990508004819A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/19990508004819A), May 8, 1999: Amtr GLASAIRSH2R, St Johns, AZ, Substantial damage. Acft overshot the rwy on landing and crashed into a fence, other circumstances ae unknown. (From .19) on may 8, 1999, at 0750 hours mountain standard time, an… From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.