# NTSB NYC03FA164: Hawker T Mk 7A, Pittston, PA, July 22, 2003 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Fatal · Field investigation · Final report - Date: July 22, 2003, 08:59 local (12:59 UTC) - Place: Pittston, PA - Coordinates: 41.315834, -75.735275 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=41.3158&lon=-75.7353&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Initial climb](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/350) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Highest injury: Fatal - Injuries: 1 fatal - Status: Completed, report October 28, 2004 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Parties: Rolls-Royce, Federal Aviation Administration - NTSB case key (mKey): 57535 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=NYC03FA164 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/57535/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=57535 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/NYC03FA164 ## Probable cause The pilot's failure to abort the takeoff, after the engine experienced a partial power loss for undetermined reasons. Factors were the pilot's improper preflight planning by his failure to determine if the airplane was airworthy, and the operators inadequate maintenance on the airplane, the use of non-certificated mechanics to perform the work on the airplane, and his failure to ensure the airplane met the minimum standards necessary for flight. ## Sequence of events In NTSB's coding before 2008 (https://www.ntsb.gov/GILS/Documents/codman.pdf). - Loss of engine power(partial) - mech failure/malf, takeoff - initial climb - reason for occurrence undetermined - fuel system - contamination,water - aborted takeoff - not performed, pilot in command (cause) - preflight planning/preparation - improper, pilot in command (contributing factor) - maintenance - inadequate, company/operator management (contributing factor) - Forced landing, descent - emergency - In flight collision with terrain/water, descent - emergency - terrain condition - open field ## Analysis The pilot of the Hawker Hunter performed three aborted takeoffs in the 4 days that preceded the accident flight. A witness reported that each time, the pilot reported the brakes were dragging. The pilot also reported the engine was running "cool", but was OK. On the fourth attempted takeoff, witnesses reported the engine did not sound as loud as they expected and the airplane appeared slow. At the end of the 7,500 foot runway, the airplane abruptly pitched up, became airborne with wings rocking from side to side, and then disappeared below the level of the runway. The airplane impacted in an open field, below the level of the runway, in a nose high attitude and traveled into a wooded area. The pilot initiated ejection; however, the canopy did not separate from the airplane and the seat went through it. Three of the four canopy locks were found still locked. Water was found in the fuel filter. The airplane had received a replacement engine a month earlier, but was not signed off as airworthy. When the engine was ground run after the change, it was found to not meet two separate acceleration tests. The owner reported the maintenance records were on the airplane; however, none were found, and he never produced any documents to determine the airworthiness of the airplane. The last known annual inspection occurred 13 months prior to the flight. The airplane had been in non-preserved storage for over a year. The owner had de-registered the airplane with the FAA, with the intent of moving it to Canada; however, he had not applied for Canadian registration. After each aborted takeoff, the airplane was worked on by two non-certificated mechanics. ## Factual narrative HISTORY OF FLIGHT On July 22, 2003, at 0859 eastern daylight time, an unregistered Hawker Hunter T Mk. 7A, was destroyed when it struck terrain in Pittston, Pennsylvania, after it departed from Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport (AVP), Avoca, Pennsylvania. The airplane was owned and operated by Northern Lights Aerobatic Team, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The certificated commercial pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the positioning flight. No flight plan had been filed for the flight that was destined for Burlington International Airport (BTV), Burlington, Vermont, and was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. The owner reported that the purpose of the flight was to position the airplane from Wilkes-Barre, to Burlington, where he planned to apply for an import certificate to bring the airplane into Canada. The owner further reported that he had not applied to Transport Canada, for a Canadian registration and airworthiness certificate. The pilot had performed three aborted takeoffs in the 4 days that preceded the accident flight. The people on scene during the aborted takeoffs and accident flight were the owner, and two non-certificated mechanics. The air/ground communication tapes received from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), control tower were reviewed, and transcripts prepared for each aborted takeoff. Each aborted takeoff was preceded by the departure of a Piper Navajo, PA-31-350, Canadian registration C-GULM, which was registered to the operator. The Navajo was piloted by the owner, and in addition carried the two non-certificated mechanics. Each flight was announced as a flight of two, proceeding to Burlington in visual meteorological conditions. The first aborted takeoff occurred on July 18, with the airplane using runway 04. The pilot reported the engine was a little cool, but there were no problem with it. He did report that the brakes appeared to be dragging. Air was subsequently found in the brake lines, and they were bleed. The second aborted takeoff occurred on July 19, 2004, with the airplane using runway 04. The pilot used the drag chute; however, the airplane overran the departure end of the runway. Again the pilot reported no problems with the engine, and that the brakes were dragging. A check of the airplane revealed the brake cables in the cockpit were out of adjustment, and they were adjusted. The assistant airport director reported that after the second aborted takeoff, he was called to the airport due to an observed fuel leak on the Hawker Hunter. He stated: "...[the pilot] stated that the anti-skid system, called the 'Maxarrets' system, had started to cycle or pulse at high speed giving him the feeling that the brakes were cycling 'on-off' at this higher speed without input from the pilot. At that time, I directly expressed my concern that this abort was a close call and I asked the pilot if he realized that we had very little RSA [runway safety area] and that even if he went over the end at 1 mph he was in trouble as it was a substantial drop off. His response was that he would worry about flying the aircraft, or 'I'll fly the aircraft...' and I[assistant airport director] should worry about, or be concerned about airport matters. The pilot said that the brake system was the problem and that his mechanics were coming back to address the problem that evening. He did express his frustration with the fact that he had apparently had several aborts or attempts to depart and that he had commercial tickets to get back home as he has other commitments and that this ferry flight was dragging out. He said he had rescheduled his commercial tickets at least twice and had current departure reservations in hand. He said he would have departed commercially except that the aircraft owner had asked that he stick with it and give it another try. He definitely was ready to leave one way or the other...." The third aborted takeoff occurred on July 21, 2003, with the airplane using runway 22. The pilot reported the engine was OK, and the brakes were dragging. The airplane was examined, and nothing was found. No further maintenance was performed on the airplane. The pilot then performed a high speed taxi, and said that he would take the airplane the next morning. On the day of the accident, a FAA operations inspector reported that he had a general conversation with the pilot earlier in the morning. At one point, the FAA inspector asked the pilot if he knew how long it had been since the airplane had flown. The pilot reported that he thought it was 2 or 3 months. The FAA inspector reported that he turned to a mechanic who was familiar with the airplane and the mechanic reported that it had been over a year. At that point, the pilot exhibited a facial expression that the FAA inspector interpreted as surprise. The conversation terminated shortly thereafter, and the two parted company. The FAA inspector reported that he was left with a feeling that the pilot was confident that the airplane was airworthy, and that he could handle any emergency, which might arise in the flight. The pilot added that he had made several high-speed aborts, the reason for which were not specified. The airplane taxied to runway 22 for departure as the second airplane in a flight of two. The radio communications for both airplanes was being handled by the pilot of the Navajo, which was the lead airplane for the flight. At 0856:46, the pilot of the Navajo reported that he was ready for departure, and that the Hawker Hunter would back taxi for departure. The flight was cleared for takeoff at 0856:48. At 0859:54, the pilot of the Navajo transmitted: "...scranton tower declaring an emergency, we have a hunter, it is down." The pilot of the Navajo returned for landing. However, he was held until the runway was checked, after which he was cleared to land. The takeoff on runway 22 was observed by several witnesses. They were consistent in reporting that the engine did not sound as loud as they expected; the airplane did not seem to be accelerating like they expected, and the airplane did not rotate until it was near the end of the runway. One witness, also a pilot, reported the nose of the Hawker Hunter came up abruptly to between 20 and 30 degrees, and the airplane became airborne. However, once airborne, the wings started to rock from side to side, and then the airplane disappeared from view as it descended below the level of the terrain, beyond the departure end of the runway. Additional witnesses saw the airplane in a nose high pitch attitude as it descended toward terrain near the accident site. One witness described the pitch attitude of the airplane as near a normal take off when first observed. As he continued to watch, the pitch of the airplane continued to increase to about 30 degrees nose up as the airplane continued to descend. The witness said he could hear the engine running. The airplane descended below his view, and then he heard a loud bang, and saw smoke and flames rising from a wooded area. A non-certificated mechanic onboard the Navajo reported that he observed the takeoff roll, and when the airplane was about halfway down the runway, it appeared to slow, as if the pilot was aborting the takeoff, and then as it moved further down the runway, the airplane appeared to be accelerating again. The airplane appeared slow as it approached the end of the runway, and then he saw the nose come up. As the airplane passed the departure end of the runway, he saw the pilot make a shallow left turn to avoid the opposite direction approach lights that were located beyond the departure end of the runway. He saw the airplane intact as it went into the woods except for the drop tanks, and then he saw a big ball of fire. He never observed the ejection seat come out the airplane. An FAA airworthiness inspector reported that a ## Aircraft - Registration: UNREG (not matched to a registry record) - Reported make and model: Hawker T Mk 7A - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 41H695333 - Airframe hours: 4789 - Engines: Rolls-Royce Avon Mark 122 7575 lbs thrust turbo jet - Damage: Destroyed - Fire: On-Ground - Flight: Positioning, Part 91 - Registered owner: Northern Lights Aerobatic Team - Airworthiness certificate: Special, Experimental (Special) - Last inspection: Annual, June 1, 2002, 0 hours before - Departed: AVP, Avoca, PA - Destination: BTV, Burlington, VT - Airport: AVP, Wilkes-Barre/Scranton Arpt, runway 22, 7,501 × 150 ft, asphalt ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 66; injuries: fatal; commercial; airplane ratings: single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 2, valid medical--w/ waivers/lim; seat: left; toxicology performed; flight hours: 6,574 total, 235 in this make and model, 6,574 as pilot in command ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 230° at 5 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: 10,000 ft broken - Temperature: 68 °F, dew point 64 °F - Altimeter: 29.80 inHg - Observed at: AVP, 1 nm away ## Docket (32 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on May 5, 2004, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=57535. 10.1 MB in all. - Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 (item 1, .PDF, 438 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408815&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1-Redacted.PDF - Witness Statements (item 2, .PDF, 216 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408816&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Witness%20Statements-Redacted.PDF - Interview Summaries (item 3, .PDF, 286 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211475&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Interview%20Summaries-Master.PDF - ATC transcripts prepared by NTSB (item 4, .PDF, 325 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211477&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=ATC%20transcripts%20prepared%20by%20NTSB-Master.PDF - ATC transcirpt prepared by FAA and controller statements (item 5, .PDF, 262 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408809&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=ATC%20transcirpt%20prepared%20by%20FAA%20and%20controller%20statements-Redacted.PDF - Wreckage Diagram (item 6, .PDF, 22 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211480&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Wreckage%20Diagram-Master.PDF - Email sent to operator (item 7, .PDF, 73 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408808&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Email%20sent%20to%20operator-Redacted.PDF - Summary of interviews by Canadian TSB (item 8, .PDF, 122 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408813&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Summary%20of%20interviews%20by%20Canadian%20TSB-Redacted.PDF - Pilot application for Hawker Hunter letter of authorization (LOA) (item 9, .PDF, 110 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408807&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%20application%20for%20Hawker%20Hunter%20letter%20of%20authorization%20(LOA)-Redacted.PDF - Pilot flight time summary (item 10, .PDF, 55 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211485&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%20flight%20time%20summary-Master.PDF - FAA history on Hawker Hunter N614XL (item 11, .PDF, 451 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408804&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=FAA%20history%20on%20Hawker%20Hunter%20N614XL-Redacted.PDF - N614XL inspection program (item 12, .PDF, 123 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408802&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=N614XL%20inspection%20program-Redacted.PDF - N614XL Experimental Operating Limitations (item 13, .PDF, 260 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408800&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=N614XL%20Experimental%20Operating%20Limitations-Redacted.PDF - Record of hangar rental for engine change and record of last servicing (item 14, .PDF, 223 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408797&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Record%20of%20hangar%20rental%20for%20engine%20change%20and%20record%20of%20last%20servicing-Redacted.PDF - Engine change documentation supplied by A & P mechanic who supervised installation (item 15, .PDF, 824 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408806&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Engine%20change%20documentation%20supplied%20by%20A%20%26%20P%20mechanic%20who%20supervised%20installation-Redacted.PDF - Rolls-Royce engine examination report (item 16, .PDF, 2.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211491&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Rolls-Royce%20engine%20examination%20report-Master.PDF - Checklist found in pilot's Hawker Hunter book (item 17, .PDF, 286 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211492&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Checklist%20found%20in%20pilot%27s%20Hawker%20Hunter%20book-Master.PDF - Hawker Hunter air crew manual (excerpted) (item 18, .PDF, 417 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211493&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Hawker%20Hunter%20air%20crew%20manual%20(excerpted)-Master.PDF - Agreement of Sale (item 19, .PDF, 87 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408795&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Agreement%20of%20Sale-Redacted.PDF - Avoca, PA (AVP) - METARS (item 20, .PDF, 85 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211495&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Avoca,%20PA%20(AVP)%20-%20METARS-Master.PDF - NTSB Parties to Investigation (item 21, .PDF, 49 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408793&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=NTSB%20Parties%20to%20Investigation-Redacted.PDF - Wreckage Release (item 22, .PDF, 42 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40408791&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Wreckage%20Release-Redacted.PDF - Pilot's toxicology report (item 23, .PDF, 49 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211497&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%27s%20toxicology%20report-Master.PDF - Initial touchdown, looking in direction of travel (item 24, .PDF, 342 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211498&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Initial%20touchdown,%20looking%20in%20direction%20of%20travel-Master.PDF - Close-up of debris along initial touchdown path (item 25, .PDF, 339 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211499&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Close-up%20of%20debris%20along%20initial%20touchdown%20path-Master.PDF - Airplane nose cone and curved plexiglas (item 26, .PDF, 337 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211500&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Airplane%20nose%20cone%20and%20curved%20plexiglas-Master.PDF - Tail of airplane, registration number visible on vertical stabilizer (item 27, .PDF, 336 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211501&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Tail%20of%20airplane,%20registration%20number%20visible%20on%20vertical%20stabilizer-Master.PDF - Front of engine (item 28, .PDF, 341 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211502&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Front%20of%20engine-Master.PDF - Canopy ring (item 29, .PDF, 310 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211503&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Canopy%20ring-Master.PDF - Ejection seat - lower D ring not in stowed position (item 30, .PDF, 442 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211504&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Ejection%20seat%20-%20lower%20D%20ring%20not%20in%20stowed%20position-Master.PDF - Cockpit, instrument panel (item 31, .PDF, 350 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211505&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Cockpit,%20instrument%20panel-Master.PDF - Backside of cockpit (item 32, .PDF, 329 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40211506&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Backside%20of%20cockpit-Master.PDF From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.