# NTSB SEA97FA188: Beech 1900C, N3172A, Seattle, WA, August 14, 1997 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Serious injuries · Field investigation · Final report - Date: August 13, 1997, 19:13 local (Aug 14, 1997, 02:13 UTC) - Place: Seattle, WA - Coordinates: 47.440849, -122.279953 (estimated) - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=47.4408&lon=-122.2800&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/550) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Highest injury: Serious injuries - Injuries: 1 serious - Status: Completed, report June 11, 1999 - Report: Approved by Office Director - NTSB case key (mKey): 42509 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=SEA97FA188 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/42509/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=42509 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/SEA97FA188 ## Probable cause A stall/mush condition resulting from an aft center of gravity which was inaccurately provided to the pilot-in-command by contractual cargo-loading personnel. Additional causes were overloading of the aircraft's landing gear and fuel leakage resulting in a post-crash fire. Factors contributing to the accident were the pilot's improper lowering of flaps in an aft CG situation and the inadequate company procedures for cargo loading. ## Sequence of events In NTSB's coding before 2008 (https://www.ntsb.gov/GILS/Documents/codman.pdf). - Hard landing, landing - flare/touchdown - stall/mush (cause) - proper descent rate - not possible, pilot in command - lowering of flaps - initiated, pilot in command (contributing factor) - aircraft weight and balance - inaccurate, dispatcher (cause) - procedure inadequate, other person (contributing factor) - Gear collapsed, landing - roll - landing gear - overload (cause) - Fire, standing - fuel system - leak (cause) - fluid,fuel - fire ## Analysis The Beech 1900C cargo aircraft was loaded with more than 4,962 pounds of cargo during an approximate 20 minute period. No scale was available at the aircraft, forcing loaders to rely on tallying either waybill weights or estimates of total cargo weight and center of gravity (CG) during the brief loading period. Additionally, a strike had shut down a major cargo competitor at the time with substantial cargo overflow to the operator. Post-crash examination determined the cargo load was 656 pounds greater than that documented on the pilot's load manifest, and the CG was between 6.8 and 11.3 inches aft of the aft limit. The airplane behaved normally, according to the pilot, until he initiated full flaps for landing approaching the threshold of runway 34L at the Seattle-Tacoma International airport. At this time, the aircraft's airspeed began to decay rapidly and a high sink rate developed as the aircraft entered into a stall/mush condition. The aircraft then landed hard, overloading the nose and left-main landing gear which collapsed. A post-impact fuel system leak during the ground slide led to a post-crash fire. ## Factual narrative HISTORY OF FLIGHT On August 13, 1997, at 1913 Pacific daylight time, a Beech 1900C, N3172A, registered to and operated by Ameriflight, Inc., and being flown by an airline transport pilot, was destroyed when the aircraft's left main and nose landing gear collapsed following a loss of control and subsequent in-flight collision with the runway on landing at the Seattle Tacoma (SEATAC) International airport, Seattle, Washington. A post-crash fire ensued, damaging the center structure of the aircraft and wing root areas. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions existed at the time, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was in effect. The flight, which had originated from Portland, Oregon, was an unscheduled cargo run which was to have been operated under 14CFR135. N3172A, call sign "AMFlight 262" (AMF262) departed Portland International airport at 1830 on the evening of August 13 en route to the SEATAC International airport. At 1859, the pilot of AMF262 contacted Seattle terminal radar approach control (TRACON) inbound, and advised he was at 10,000 feet. The aircraft was given vectors to SEATAC, a descent to 7,000 feet and, at 1904, was switched to Seattle approach (final) control on frequency 133.65 mHz (refer to ATTACHMENT T-I). At 1905:11, Seattle TRACON (final) contacted AMF262 and requested that the aircraft reduce speed to 210 knots and descend to and maintain 6,000 feet. Over the next four minutes the pilot of AMF262 verified SEATAC airport in sight, was cleared for a visual approach to runway 34L, was advised of traffic preceding him by five miles for the same runway, and was asked to "maintain that speed if you can until about five mile final." At 1909, AMF262 was asked to contact SEATAC air traffic control tower (ATCT) (refer to ATTACHMENT T-II). At 1909:50, the pilot of AMF262 contacted SEATAC ATCT reporting "over the mall for 34 left" (NOTE: "the mall" is located at the 7.5 nautical mile fix south of SEA VORTAC, which in turn, is located at the south end of the SEATAC airport runways). The local controller responded in part with "follow an airbus on a one mile final, caution wake turbulence, wind two seven zero at five, runway three four left cleared to land" and this was acknowledged by the pilot (refer to ATTACHMENTS T-III and RDR-I). Four of the controllers in the SEATAC ATCT facility observed the aircraft crash and two of these controllers reported seeing the aircraft in an "unusual descent" (refer to attached statements C-I through C-IV). Several other witnesses located on the SEATAC airport reported observing the accident. These witnesses reported seeing the aircraft "coming down at the wrong angle, too steep, like a helicopter," at "a high angle of attack and very low airspeed," "aircraft nose high, in approximately a 25 to 30 degree angle of descent, obviously stalled," and that "it looked like the aircraft stalled at about 300-400 ft. AGL (above ground level), and that the C.G. (center of gravity) appeared to be aft because the nose never dipped down after the stall, and the aircraft just pancaked in flat" (refer to attached statements S-I through S-IV). The pilot-in-command (PIC) was interviewed on August 19, 1997, at Harborview Hospital, Seattle, Washington. The PIC reported no mechanical nor communication malfunctions during the flight to Seattle. During the PIC's interview, he reported that the takeoff from Portland was uneventful, the aircraft accelerated normally, becoming airborne after a reasonable ground roll, and the climb performance was as expected. He also reported that the flight to SEATAC was uneventful, he was cleared to land on runway 34L and that although visual conditions existed, he utilized the ILS and normally flew one-half to a full dot above glide slope to avoid potential wake vortex conditions. The PIC reported that his intention was to touch down in the latter third of the touchdown area (the aircraft's destination was the cargo area in the northeast corner of the SEATAC airport - refer to DIAGRAM I). He further reported that his first indication of something out of the ordinary was somewhere between one quarter mile short of the threshold and the physical end of runway 34L. He stated that he had lowered full (landing) flaps and upon full extension noticed a decrease in airspeed below Vref (Vref is defined as any reference speed). Note: Vref speeds for flaps up and flaps landing at selected aircraft weights are provided to the pilot on the "Beech 1900 Normal Procedures Checklist" (refer to ATTACHMENT CL-I, page 2). He also reported that the pitch attitude of the aircraft did not change appreciably with flap extension, and the pitch change seemed to be normal for this event. The PIC reported remembering trying to counteract the airspeed decay by applying nose down elevator but did not remember events beyond that time until attempting to exit the aircraft. He also reported that he did not recall hearing the stall warning horn prior to the accident, and that he was able to trim the aircraft throughout the flight and experienced no pitch trim difficulties. The PIC reported that subsequent to the crash he recalled releasing his restraint system and unlatching and partially opening the cabin door. He observed AFFF (Aqueous Film Forming Foam, a fire fighting agent) entering the aircraft through the cabin door, and then reported that he allowed the door to rock back to a closed position. He also reported that there was smoke in the cockpit which prevented him from seeing the instrument panel. The SEATAC Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) Fire Run Report showed that the ARFF crew was dispatched at 1913:25, responded at 1914:46 and arrived at the site at 1915:36. The fire was knocked down using a turret and hand lines and the pilot was extricated from the cockpit by two ARFF responders. The report also indicated that the forward cabin door was partially open upon arrival of the ARFF team, and that the forward cabin area and door was partially blocked by cargo. OTHER DAMAGE Several runway lights along the west edge of runway 34L were knocked out during the aircraft's ground slide. Additionally, small abrasions and gouges of the runway's paved surface were noted. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The 34 year old PIC had logged approximately 6,370 hours of flight time at the time of the accident, including 4,225 hours of multi-engine flight time and 4,359 hours of PIC time. He had been issued an airline transport pilot certificate June 8, 1997, with a type rating in the BE-1900 aircraft. His most recent medical examination was conducted September 4, 1996, and he was issued a first class certificate with no limitations. The PIC had been hired by Horizon Air on October 2, 1995, and began flying as a first officer in the DeHavilland DHC-8, twin turboprop aircraft. He was subsequently issued a voluntary leave of absence on May 25, 1997, as Horizon Air faced potential reductions of pilots and requested volunteers for such absences. The leave of absence was projected to last six months. The PIC had been trained by Horizon Air in weight and balance procedures for the DHC-8 aircraft prior to his beginning line flights. The PIC was hired by Ameriflight in late May of 1997, underwent Beech 1900 and company training, and began line flights on June 9, 1997. He had logged a total of 106 hours of flight time in the cargo version BE-1900C (all PIC) at the time of the accident. Records maintained by Horizon Air showed the PIC as having logged a total of 1,230 hours of BE-1900 time (397 as pilot-in-command and 833 as second-in-command) as of June 26, 1995. This flight time was in scheduled FAR Part 135 passenger operations for GP Express in the 19 seat passenger version of the Be-1900. The PIC reported during his interview that he had an estimated 1,500 total hours of BE-1900 time (both passenger and cargo versions) ## Aircraft - Registration: [N3172A](https://openairdocs.org/deregistered/N3172A-1998-03-23), registration cancelled 1998-03-23, S/N UB47 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: Beech 1900C - Registry model: [Beech 1900C](https://openairdocs.org/model/beech-1900c) (registry code 1154161) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: UB-47 - Airframe hours: 23892 - Engines: P&W PT6A-65B 1100 horsepower turbo prop - Damage: Destroyed - Fire: On-Ground - Flight: Part 135 - Registered owner: Ameriflight, Inc. - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: AAIP, July 25, 1997, 33 hours before - Departed: PDX, PORTLAND, OR - Destination: SEA - Flight plan: IFR - Airport: SEA, Seattle-Tacoma Intnl, runway 34L, 9,425 × 150 ft, concrete ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 34; airline transport, commercial, flight instructor; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, valid medical--no waivers/lim.; seat: left; toxicology performed; flight hours: 6,370 total, 106 in this make and model, 4,359 as pilot in command, 123 in the last 90 days, 53 in the last 30 days, 1 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 270° at 3 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 79 °F, dew point 61 °F - Altimeter: 29.00 inHg - Observed at: SEA ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 19970813022119A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/19970813022119A), Aug 13, 1997: Beech 1900C, Seattle, WA, Destroyed. Aircraft cleared to land, appeared to stall, dropped 100FT onto runway, crashed and burned. (.4)the Beech 1900C cargo aircraft was loaded with more than 4,962… ## Docket (42 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on January 11, 1999, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=42509. 7.0 MB in all. - Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 (item 1, .PDF, 440 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418415&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Pilot%2FOperator%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Report,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.1-Redacted.PDF - Supplement C (item 2, .PDF, 442 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098102&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Supplement%20C-Master.PDF - Supplement D (item 3, .PDF, 517 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098103&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Supplement%20D-Master.PDF - Supplement I (item 4, .PDF, 265 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098104&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Supplement%20I-Master.PDF - Attachments C I-IV - ATC Personnel Statements (item 5, .PDF, 127 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418416&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachments%20C%20I-IV%20-%20ATC%20Personnel%20Statements-Redacted.PDF - Attachments S I-IV - Record of Telephone Calls (item 6, .PDF, 214 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418417&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachments%20S%20I-IV%20-%20Record%20of%20Telephone%20Calls-Redacted.PDF - Attachment RI-I - Record of Interview (item 7, .PDF, 51 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418418&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachment%20RI-I%20-%20Record%20of%20Interview-Redacted.PDF - Attachments WB I-III - Records of Interview and Investigation (item 8, .PDF, 254 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418419&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachments%20WB%20I-III%20-%20Records%20of%20Interview%20and%20Investigation-Redacted.PDF - Attachment RDR-I - Seattle TRACON (item 9, .PDF, 52 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418420&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachment%20RDR-I%20-%20Seattle%20TRACON-Redacted.PDF - Diagram I (item 10, .PDF, 188 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098111&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Diagram%20%20I-Master.PDF - Charts I (item 11, .PDF, 103 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098112&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Charts%20I-Master.PDF - Attachments T I-III - ATC Transcripts (item 12, .PDF, 186 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418421&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachments%20T%20I-III%20-%20ATC%20Transcripts-Redacted.PDF - Attachment CL - I - Ameriflight Checklist (item 13, .PDF, 207 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098114&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachment%20%20CL%20-%20I%20-%20Ameriflight%20Checklist-Master.PDF - Attachments MRA - FAA Major Repair and Alteration Report (item 14, .PDF, 148 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418422&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachments%20MRA%20-%20FAA%20Major%20Repair%20and%20Alteration%20Report-Redacted.PDF - Attachment CG - I - Weight and Balance (item 15, .PDF, 101 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098116&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachment%20%20CG%20-%20I%20-%20Weight%20and%20Balance-Master.PDF - Attachment LPS - I - Ameriflight Load Planning Sheet (item 16, .PDF, 194 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098117&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachment%20%20LPS%20-%20I%20-%20Ameriflight%20Load%20Planning%20Sheet-Master.PDF - Attachments APV-I and II - Weight and Balance/Equipment List (item 17, .PDF, 118 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418423&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachments%20APV-I%20and%20II%20-%20Weight%20and%20Balance%2FEquipment%20List-Redacted.PDF - Attachments IV-I thru III - Statements (item 18, .PDF, 231 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418424&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachments%20IV-I%20thru%20III%20-%20Statements-Redacted.PDF - Attachments AOM - I - Ameriflight Flight Operations Manual (item 19, .PDF, 413 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098120&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachments%20%20AOM%20-%20I%20-%20Ameriflight%20Flight%20Operations%20Manual-Master.PDF - Attachment DHL-I - DHL Shipment Bill (item 20, .PDF, 150 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418425&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachment%20DHL-I%20-%20DHL%20Shipment%20Bill-Redacted.PDF - Attachment WBC - Weight and Balance Computations (item 21, .PDF, 139 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098122&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachment%20%20WBC%20-%20Weight%20and%20Balance%20Computations-Master.PDF - Attachment CD - I - Notes from Inspection (item 22, .PDF, 170 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098123&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachment%20%20CD%20-%20I%20%20-%20Notes%20from%20Inspection-Master.PDF - Attachment AA-I - Continuity and Operational Test (item 23, .PDF, 45 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418426&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachment%20AA-I%20-%20Continuity%20and%20Operational%20Test-Redacted.PDF - Attachment SF-I - FAA Inspection of Components (item 24, .PDF, 60 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418427&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachment%20SF-I%20-%20FAA%20Inspection%20of%20Components-Redacted.PDF - Attachment AAR - 88/11 (item 25, .PDF, 154 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098126&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Attachment%20%20AAR%20-%2088%2F11-Master.PDF - Ameriflight Facsimile Message from John W. Hazlet, Jr. dated 4/29/99 (item 26, .PDF, 48 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418429&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Ameriflight%20Facsimile%20Message%20from%20John%20W.%20Hazlet,%20Jr.%20dated%204%2F29%2F99-Redacted.PDF - Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation (item 27, .PDF, 532 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418428&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Statement%20of%20Party%20Representatives%20to%20NTSB%20Investigation-Redacted.PDF - Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 (item 28, .PDF, 158 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40418430&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Release%20of%20Aircraft%20Wreckage,%20NTSB%20Form%206120.15-Redacted.PDF - Photo 1. A view of cargo removed from the center and aft areas of the fuselage. No Negative. (item 29, .PDF, 91 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098129&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%201.%20A%20view%20of%20cargo%20removed%20from%20the%20center%20and%20aft%20areas%20of%20the%20fuselage.%20No%20Negative.-Master.PDF - Photo 2. A view of cargo removed from the center and aft areas of the fuselage. No Negative. (item 30, .PDF, 101 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098130&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%202.%20A%20view%20of%20cargo%20removed%20from%20the%20center%20and%20aft%20areas%20of%20the%20fuselage.%20No%20Negative.-Master.PDF - Photo 3. A view of cargo removed from the forward area of the fuselage. No Negative (item 31, .PDF, 97 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098131&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%203.%20A%20view%20of%20cargo%20removed%20from%20the%20forward%20area%20of%20the%20fuselage.%20No%20Negative-Master.PDF - Photo 4. A view of the interior of the cargo compartment subsequent to the removal of the cargo. No Negative (item 32, .PDF, 99 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098132&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%204.%20A%20view%20of%20the%20interior%20of%20the%20cargo%20compartment%20subsequent%20to%20the%20removal%20of%20the%20cargo.%20No%20Negative-Master.PDF - Photo 5. A view looking at the initial ground impact (IGI) on runway 34L north to the aircraft's final resting place (FRP). No Negative (item 33, .PDF, 87 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098133&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%205.%20A%20view%20looking%20at%20the%20initial%20ground%20impact%20(IGI)%20on%20runway%2034L%20north%20to%20the%20aircraft%27s%20final%20resting%20place%20(FRP).%20No%20Negative-Master.PDF - Photo 6. Vew looking 335 drgrees magnetic at the IGI paint transfer smear on the RWY surface. Note the L and R tire marks on the RWY and the propeller slashes slightly north of each. Also note the hydraulic fluid spills near (item 34, .PDF, 90 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098134&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%206.%20Vew%20looking%20335%20drgrees%20magnetic%20at%20the%20IGI%20paint%20transfer%20smear%20on%20the%20RWY%20surface.%20Note%20the%20L%20and%20R%20tire%20marks%20on%20the%20RWY%20and%20the%20propeller%20slashes%20slightly%20north%20of%20each.%20Also%20note%20the%20hydraulic%20fluid%20spills%20near%20-Master.PDF - Photo 7. A view looking 160 degrees magnetic along the edge of the runway pavement. Note the runway distance to go marker "4" ( reverse side shows "5"). Also note the left inboard flap "F" and the nose gear strut "NS" on the (item 35, .PDF, 84 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098135&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%207.%20A%20view%20looking%20160%20degrees%20magnetic%20along%20the%20edge%20of%20the%20runway%20pavement.%20Note%20the%20runway%20distance%20to%20go%20marker%20%224%22%20(%20reverse%20side%20shows%20%225%22).%20Also%20note%20the%20left%20inboard%20flap%20%22F%22%20and%20the%20nose%20gear%20strut%20%22NS%22%20on%20the%20-Master.PDF - Photo 8. A view looking west at the aircraft. Note the rotational damage to the vertical stabilizer and the cargo removed through the main cargo door. No Negative (item 36, .PDF, 98 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098136&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%208.%20A%20view%20looking%20west%20at%20the%20aircraft.%20Note%20the%20rotational%20damage%20to%20the%20vertical%20stabilizer%20and%20the%20cargo%20removed%20through%20the%20main%20cargo%20door.%20No%20Negative-Master.PDF - Photo 9. A view looking north showing the separated nose and left main landing gear, left propeller damage and open cabin door. Note the cargo removed through the cabin door. No Negative (item 37, .PDF, 98 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098137&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%209.%20A%20view%20looking%20north%20showing%20the%20separated%20nose%20and%20left%20main%20landing%20gear,%20left%20propeller%20damage%20and%20open%20cabin%20door.%20Note%20the%20cargo%20removed%20through%20the%20cabin%20door.%20No%20Negative-Master.PDF - Photo 10. A view looking east showing the attached right main landing gear and right propeller damage. No Negative (item 38, .PDF, 96 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098138&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2010.%20A%20view%20looking%20east%20showing%20the%20attached%20right%20main%20landing%20gear%20and%20right%20propeller%20damage.%20No%20Negative-Master.PDF - Photo 11. A close up view of the right engine/wing showing the clockwise twisting deformation of the wing and the attached right main landing gear. Note the extended flap. No Negative (item 39, .PDF, 91 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098139&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2011.%20A%20close%20up%20view%20of%20the%20right%20engine%2Fwing%20showing%20the%20clockwise%20twisting%20deformation%20of%20the%20wing%20and%20the%20attached%20right%20main%20landing%20gear.%20Note%20the%20extended%20flap.%20No%20Negative-Master.PDF - Photo 12. A view looking south showing the fire damage along the right fuselage side aft of the wing. No Negative (item 40, .PDF, 105 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098140&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2012.%20A%20view%20looking%20south%20showing%20the%20fire%20damage%20along%20the%20right%20fuselage%20side%20aft%20of%20the%20wing.%20No%20Negative-Master.PDF - Photo 13. A view looking along the aircrafts longitudinal axis showing the crush area at the rear underside of the fusleage. No Negative (item 41, .PDF, 92 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098141&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2013.%20A%20view%20looking%20along%20the%20aircrafts%20longitudinal%20axis%20showing%20the%20crush%20area%20at%20the%20rear%20underside%20of%20the%20fusleage.%20No%20Negative-Master.PDF - Photo 14. A view showing the improperly placed Brownline "Z-net" deck hook attach fitting (arrow). No Negative (item 42, .PDF, 110 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40098142&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Photo%2014.%20A%20view%20showing%20the%20improperly%20placed%20Brownline%20%22Z-net%22%20deck%20hook%20attach%20fitting%20(arrow).%20No%20Negative-Master.PDF From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.