# NTSB WPR22LA251: Cessna 208B, N877FE, Salt Lake City, UT, July 14, 2022

- Type: NTSB accident investigation
- Classification: Accident · Minor injuries · Class 3 · Limited · Final report
- Date: July 13, 2022, 18:52 local (Jul 14, 2022, 00:52 UTC)
- Place: Salt Lake City, UT
- Coordinates: 40.788393, -111.97777 (estimated)
- Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=40.7884&lon=-111.9778&mi=10
- Phase of flight: [Landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/550) (OpenAirDocs' grouping)
- Defining event: [Landing-aborted after touchdown: Windshear or thunderstorm](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/390)
- Highest injury: Minor injuries
- Injuries: 1 minor
- Status: Completed
- Report: Approved by Office Director
- Investigation class: Class 3
- NTSB office: Western Pacific Region
- Parties: FAA, NATCA
- NTSB case key (mKey): 105474
- NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=WPR22LA251
- NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/105474/pdf
- NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=105474
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/WPR22LA251

## Probable cause

The pilot’s inability to maintain control of the airplane when it encountered a microburst during a landing attempt and a go-around near known thunderstorm activity. Contributing to the accident was an inadequate amount of wind sensors and wind shear detection equipment used by the ATC tower to detect microburst activity at the airport.

## Findings

NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause.

- [Wind: microburst](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034050): Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena · Effect on equipment (probable cause); cases with it: [All aircraft, 10 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03034050/cases.md)
- [Airport facilities/design: ground support/equipment](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03017070): Environmental issues › Operating environment · Contributed to outcome (probable cause); cases with it: [All aircraft, 6 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03017070/cases.md)
- [Airport facilities/design: ground support/equipment](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03017070): Environmental issues › Operating environment · Awareness of condition (probable cause); cases with it: [All aircraft, 6 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03017070/cases.md)

## Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened.

- [Landing-aborted after touchdown: Windshear or thunderstorm](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/390) (defining event); cases with it: [All aircraft, 224 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/390/sequence.md)

## Analysis

The pilot of the cargo flight was aware of thunderstorms west of the destination airport, but he did not use onboard radar during the flight to track the progress of the thunderstorms. Shortly after the pilot checked in on the airport’s air traffic control (ATC) frequency, the controller made a transmission to all aircraft on the frequency to expect light-to-moderate precipitation when abeam the airport. The controller then made another transmission to all aircraft on the frequency about a pilot report (PIREP) regarding a windshear gain of 20 knots on an 8- to 9-mile final approach. The airplane was cleared for a visual approach, and the pilot was instructed to follow and land after a Boeing 757. The pilot reported that he encountered a left quartering headwind while on final approach. The pilot also reported that while the airplane was in the landing flare, the tower reported that the Boeing 757 had encountered windshear while landing. Shortly thereafter, the airplane, while still airborne, started drifting sideways across the runway. The pilot then initiated a go-around because he was unable to maintain directional control of the airplane due to the wind. After adding power and climbing to about 30 ft above ground level (agl), the pilot lowered the left wing to stop the airplane from drifting off the runway centerline. He encountered a “downdraft” that caused the airplane to descend and impact terrain, resulting in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. Thunderstorms were forecast for the airport in several different weather forecast products, to include terminal aerodrome forecast (TAF), graphical forecast for aviation (GFA), and a convective Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET). A convective SIGMET was issued after the pilot had departed and was valid for the accident site. The convective SIGMET forecast an area of thunderstorms with little movement and with cloud tops above flight level 450. A convective SIGMET implies the potential for wind shear, lightning, severe turbulence, among other things. This aviation forecast information was consistent with the weather conditions that the accident flight encountered. Upper air weather information for the destination airport about the time of the accident indicated an unstable environment from the surface to 25,000 ft. The Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) located about 5,000 ft south-southeast of the accident site, about 2 minutes after the accident, reported the windspeed was 29 knots gusting to 48 knots with thunderstorms and light rain. Video imagery a few minutes before and through the time of the accident revealed that virga was descending toward the airport with gusting winds and rain. Microbursts can be found in and beneath convective clouds and can be embedded in heavy rain or virga. Video showed that a microburst encountered the ground about 2 minutes before the airplane landed with gusting surface winds and associated rainfall moving toward the landing runway.The National Weather Service issued three airport weather warnings that were valid at the time of the accident. The first warning was for outflow wind gusts of 30 mph/26 knots or greater. The second and third warnings were for lightning within 5 miles of the airport. Although the pilot was en route to the destination airport when these warnings were issued and would thus not have known about them, the pilot could have had better situational awareness of convective activity along and near the route of flight if he had operated the airplane’s onboard weather radar. The investigation determined that ATC tower at the airport used only the center field/airport wind sensor information for wind information (to be distributed to pilots) and runway configuration. About the time of the accident, the wind sensor that SLC ATC tower used reported a wind gust of 16 knots, whereas the airport’s ASOS was reporting wind between 25 and 29 knots with gusts to 48 knots. The ATC tower wind sensor did not report a wind gust above 25 knots near the accident time, and neither of the airport’s windshear display systems indicated a microburst alert until about 10 minutes after the accident. The circumstances of this accident showed that dangerous weather conditions can impact arriving and departing aircraft operating on the southern part of the airport. Additional wind sensors, if properly positioned on and around the airport and runways, could have identified the microburst activity in enough time for the controller to have provided the information to the pilot before the attempted landing. Wind information from only one sensor would not allow the comparison of wind from other sensors and provide information from the departure and approach ends of the runways.

## Factual narrative

FAA Advisory Circular 00-54, “Pilot Windshear Guide,” dated November 25, 1988, was in effect at the time of the accident but has since been canceled. (The FAA’s website stated that all ACs dealing with weather haven been consolidated into a new handbook in order to streamline access to the FAA’s weather documentation) The guide provided, the following information: Wind variations at low-altitude have long been recognized as a serious hazard to airplanes during takeoff and approach. These wind variations can result from a large variety of meteorological conditions such as: topographical conditions, temperature inversions, sea breezes, frontal systems, strong surface winds, and the most violent forms of wind change--the thunderstorm and rain shower. This document defined windshear as – “any rapid change in wind direction or velocity.” Severe windshear was defined as “a rapid change in wind direction or velocity causing airspeed changes greater than 15 knots or vertical speed changes greater than 500 feet per minute.” Text that followed these definitions stated the following: The primary focus of the Pilot Windshear Guide is directed toward windshear associated with convective weather conditions: thunderstorms, and in particular the most hazardous form of wind shear, the microburst. An appendix addressed the microburst as a windshear threat and stated the following: Identification of concentrated, more powerful downdrafts--known as microbursts--has resulted from the investigation of wind shear accidents and from meteorological research. Microbursts can occur anywhere convective weather conditions (thunderstorms, rain showers, virga) occur. Observations suggest that approximately five percent of all thunderstorms produce a microburst. Downdrafts associated with microbursts are typically only a few hundred to 3,000 ft across. When the downdraft reaches the ground, it spreads out horizontally and may form one or more horizontal vortex rings around the downdraft…. The outflow region is typically 6,000 to 12,000 ft across. The horizontal vortices may extend to over 2,000 ft AGL. A review of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) found that, during the 10 years preceding the accident, none of the reported windshear events involved a Cessna 208 airplane. The most recent Cessna 208 windshear event recorded in ASRS was in 2006. During that event, the controller instructed the airplane to go around due to windshear, but the airplane had already landed. A search of ASRS revealed that, during the 10 years preceding the accident, three windshear-related events at SLC were reported. One of the reports, from an SLC local controller, stated that two go-arounds had to be performed due to windshear and that at least one of them created a “potentially dangerous situation,” with departure traffic. The second report stated that, while on the downwind leg to land on runway 34L, an airplane encountered windshear andexperienced a loss of 2,000 ft. The third report indicated that, while on approach to runway 34L inside the final approach fix, an aircraft entered an area of precipitation, and the wind “immediately sheared” from a tailwind of 40 knots to a crosswind of 38 knots. The aircraft’s airspeed subsequently increased by 40 kts which resulted in a flap overspeed. Both of the pilot submitted ASRS reports did not indicate any windshear alert from the air traffic controller. According to the Corporate Air operations specifications, the CE-208B airplane was authorized to conduct cargo operations in instrument flight rules (IFR) and visual flight rules (VFR) and during the day and night. The accident airplane’s weight and balance were within operational limits for taxi, takeoff, and landing. SLC was located about 3 miles west of Salt Lake City. The airport was serviced by an FAA air traffic control tower that operated 24 hours a day. The airport had four paved landing surfaces designated as 16L/34R, 16R/34L, 17/35, and 14/32. According to postaccident interviews, the tower had only one sensor available, the center field/airport wind sensor, for tactical wind information distribution to pilots and for runway configuration. Additional wind sensors, one for each glideslope, were requested by SLC ATC management in November 2015, but the request was denied in April 2016 for budgetary reasons. On July 13, 2022, about 1852 mountain daylight time, a Cessna 208B airplane, N877FE, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Salt Lake City International Airport (SLC), Salt Lake City, Utah. The pilot sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 cargo flight. The flight was operated as CPT 7727, a Federal Express Corporation feeder flight, which departed from Friedman Memorial Airport (SUN), Hailey, Idaho, about 1729 and climbed to 15,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The en route portion of the flight to SLC was uneventful. About 1817, the airplane began a descent into SLC. About 1823, when the airplane was at 12,000 ft msl, the pilot checked in with Salt Lake Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), and the controller cleared the airplane to descend to 11,000 ft msl and provided waypoints for the approach. About 1835, the controller issued a transmission to all aircraft near SLC to expect light-to moderate precipitation once abeam the airport. About 1844, the controller instructed the pilot to descend to and maintain 9,000 ft msl. About 1845, the pilot reported that the airport was in sight, and the controller told him to expect to land on runway 34R. About 1846, the controller instructed the pilot to follow a heading of 150° and to descend to and maintain 8,000 ft msl. The controller also provided a PIREP to all aircraft in the area, indicating a windshear gain of 20 knots on an 8- to 9 mile final approach. The controller then instructed the pilot to follow a Boeing 757 on final approach forrunway 34R, cautioned him about wake turbulence, and cleared the airplane for the visual approach to runway 34R. The controller then instructed the pilot to contact the SLC tower, and the pilot acknowledged this instruction. About 1848, approach controller and the local controller both transmitted, to all aircraft on frequency, a windshear alert for runway 34L, which was parallel to runway 34R. The alert cited 15-knot loss 2 miles out for arriving airplanes. The pilot contacted the SLC tower, and the local controller instructed the pilot that he was following a Boeing 757 on a 5-mile final approach, reported the wind from 300° at 18 knots with gusts to 29 knots, and cleared the airplane to land on runway 34R. The controller then asked the pilot of an airplane that just departed from runway 34R if they encountered windshear on climbout. The pilot reported no wind shear on climbout but stated that the midfield wind gusts were strong. The controller solicited a PIREP from the Boeing 757 that was ahead of the accident airplane. The 757 crew reported that they encountered windshear of ± 10 knots on final approach. The controller then transmitted to all aircraft on frequency, a windshear alert for runway 34R arrivals and departures, indicating a 15-knot loss over the runway. The pilot reported that he was flaring the airplane when the local controller reported that the Boeing 757 had encountered windshear on landing. The pilot stated that, during the flare, the airplane started going sideways across the runway. The pilot also stated that he “elected to go around” because he was unable to maintain direction control of the airplane due to wind from the left and that he informed the local controller about the go-around. The pilot reported that, after adding power and climbing to about 30 ft agl, he “lowered the left wing” to counteract the drift from the runway centerline. Subsequently, he encountered a “downdraft” that was “pushing” the airplane toward the ground. Surveillance video showed that the airplane impacted terrain off the right side of the runway in a left-wing-low, nose-down attitude. The airplane’s tail came up to a near vertical position and then settled back down. The airplane came to a rest on its belly and right main landing gear; the nose and left main landing gear had collapsed. The pilot reported that he checked the weather on his phone before the flight using Aviation Digital Data Service. The pilot also reported that he reviewed the terminal area forecast, meteorological aerodrome reports, and the radar for the route of the flight. The pilot stated he did not use the onboard weather radar during the flight. He stated that, as the airplane approached SLC, “some weather” was occurring over the mountains to the west of the airport that was moving slowly to the east. He recalled that the automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information for SLC changed a few times, mostly due to barometric pressure updates, and that the wind wasfrom the northwest at 20 to 30 mph. The pilot stated that he was not provided with any wind information after being cleared to land. SLC had an ASOS that was augmented by a certified weather observer. At 1833 (19 minutes before the accident), the following observations were reported: wind from 340° at 16 knots with gusts to 21 knots, visibility 10 miles or greater, thunderstorm, few cumulonimbus clouds at 11,000 ft agl, and broken ceiling at 24,000 ft. The thunderstorm began at 1827, with cumulonimbus clouds southwest moving northeast. At 1854 (2 minutes after the accident), the following ASOS observations were reported: wind from 300° at 29 knots with gusts to 48 knots, visibility 9 miles, thunderstorm with light rain, and broken ceiling at 14,000 ft agl. The thunderstorm began at 1827, ended at 1842, and began again at 1850 with cumulonimbus cloud overhead and moving northeast. The National Weather Service issued three SLC airport weather warnings between 1800 and 1900. The first warning, at 1817, was issued for outflow wind gusts of 30 mph/26 knots or greater. The second warning, at 1826, was issued for lightning within 5 miles of the airport through 1845. The third warning, at 1845, extended the time to 1900 for lightning within 5 miles of the airport. The GFA applicable to the accident site that was valid at 1800 (before the airplane’s departure) indicated VFR surface visibilities, scattered thunderstorms, and a southwest surface wind at 10 knots with gusts to 15 knots. The GFA cloud forecast indicated clouds above the accident site. At 1354, the National Weather Service Storm Prediction Center issued a convective outlook with areas of general thunderstorms forecast for the accident site. Weather radar base reflectivity images between 1836:37 and 1854:11 depicted reflectivity values between 20 and 40 dBZ moving from southwest to northeast over the accident site at the time of the accident. An increase in windspeed toward the accident site was noted at the accident time. In addition, the base reflectivity core, or the main portion of the rainfall from the thunderstorm, descended toward the accident site at the accident time. Fifty lightning flashes were reported within 25 miles of the accident site in the 10 minutes before and after the accident time, with the closest lightning flash occurring 1 mile west of the flight track at 1850:46. Airman’s Meteorological Information (AIRMET) advisory Sierra was issued at 1445 and was valid for the accident site at the accident time. The AIRMET forecast mountain obscuration conditions due to clouds and precipitation. Convective SIGMET advisory 66W was issued at 1755 and was valid for the accident site at the accident time. The SIGMET forecast an area of thunderstorms with little movement and with cloud tops above flight level 450. Convective SIGMETs indicate the potential for windshear, lightning, and severe turbulence, among other hazards. Rain showers and convective clouds can produce downdrafts,microbursts, outflow boundaries, and gust fronts, which can create an environment favorable for unexpected changes in wind direction and speed at the surface. According to the FAA Aeronautical Information Manual, section 7-1-24, microbursts are typically relatively small in area (less than 1 to 2 1/2 miles in diameter) and produce strong divergent winds and downdrafts that can reach 6,000 ft per minute. Microbursts can be found in and beneath convective clouds, usually embedded in heavy rain or in “benign-appearing” virga, (trails of precipitation that fall from the underside of a cloud but evaporated before reaching the surface). If little or no precipitation is occurring at the surface, a ring of blowing dust may be the only visual cue of the microburst Review of video imagery around the accident time revealed that virga was descending toward the accident site with gusting winds and rain. About the time of the accident, the wind sensor that the SLC ATC tower used reported a wind gust of 16 knots. The sensor did not report a gust above 25 knots between 1852 and 1915. In addition, the Integrated Terminal Weather System and windshear displays that the tower used provided no microburst alerts until about 10 minutes after the accident. Corporate Air was founded in 1981 and was headquartered in Billings, Montana. The company owned and operated maintenance facilities and pilot bases in Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, Utah, and Hawaii. The company offered feeder airline cargo service and operated a fleet of about 34 Cessna 208 Caravans on a regularly scheduled basis in the United States and Canada. The Corporate Air Flight Operations Training Manual showed that special operations was a training topic provided during recurrent ground training. Windshear was considered to be a special operation The Corporate Air General Operations Manual, section 3, “Operations,” provided the following about airborne thunderstorm detection equipment: a. For the record, in Corporate Air's…airborne thunderstorm detection equipment is not required by regulation. 1. However, in the event this equipment becomes inoperative, and thunderstorms or other potentially hazardous weather can be expected along the route of the flight, the following actions will be taken by the crew: i. Select a route of flight that will avoid the weather in question. ii. For day operations, select a route of flight to maintain VFR conditions and that allows avoidance of this type of weather visually. iii. Delay the flight until such weather conditions no longer exist along the route of flight. A. Advise Flight Following of your intentions. The Corporate Air Flight Operations Manual, volume 1, “Operating Bulletins,” provided the following guidance about windshear: Wind never blows from a constant direction or speed for more than short periods, even in the most stable conditions. Shear is nothing more than a change in wind component, and since a change in either wind direction or speed changes thecomponent, the airplane is always affected by shear. It is fascinating to observe the continuous display of wind speed and direction on an INS, IRS, or GPS equipped airplane and see the airplane’s response to just half a knot change in wind component. This ever-present kind of shear is benign; it is the sudden and large changes in component that cause the mischief. Shear causes a loss (or gain) of airspeed every time the wind component changes. While shear is often thought of as a horizontal wind effect, vertical wind components are involved as well. Aside from the ’downward’ effect of a downdraft (’microburst,’ ’downburst’), as it nears the ground, it spreads out horizontally, affecting airspeed, thus lift. The manual also provided the following additional information about windshear and microbursts: Low-level shear and microbursts are uniquely associated with thunderstorms, and the following should be considered mandatory. • Never penetrate the outflow of a thunderstorm when below 1,000 ft agl. • When approaching in an area of thunderstorms, NEVER base a go or no-go decision on the word of the guy in front of you who says he had a ’smooth ride.’ And if the guy ahead of you reports a significant airspeed fluctuation due to shear, expect yours to be at least 3 times as bad. • If you are on the ground awaiting takeoff with TRWs in the immediate area, just set the brakes until there is no doubt, no matter how long it takes. The manual provided the following guidance about windshear recovery: Basic TBS20 (The Bug System) Rules: The red bug marks stall speed with 10° flaps on takeoff and 20° on approach and landing, the standard flap positions as specified in the TBS numbers tables. Its use is primarily in wind shear recovery and will be covered in detail under The Red Bug subject below. The Red Bug: The red bug is intended primarily as a reference, so the margin to stall can be visualized when necessary to go below V2 (or VREF) in recovering from strong shear. Wind shear was “discovered” about 25 years ago and triggered substantial changes in training procedures. The basic “industry standard” procedure for recovering from severe “altitude-losing” shear is roughly as follows: • Apply “firewall power” (up against the stop). • Rotate toward a target attitude of 15°. • If descent is not arrested at 15°, slowly increase pitch 20 “The Bug System” attitude until it is. • Do not go below (slower than) stall warning speed. Power Application: • Go to “firewall power.” Target Pitch Attitude: In the industry-standard recovery procedure, the 15° target was chosen since it is easy to remember and is more or less suitable for most types, including the jet transport. However, at lower weights Caravan shear recovery attitudes can go well above 15° at the lower end of the usable climb speed range. TBS attitude PE may be used as the initial target (13° at 8,750 pounds, 19° at 6,000 pounds) even though the table PE is for the 10° flap position. This is justified forthree reasons: 1) the TBS tables give the pilot the specific attitude for the existing weight, 2) firewall power provides an additional margin, and 3) it is used only as an initial target. The “Don’t-Go-Below-Stall Warning” Stricture: To preserve adequate margin, under normal conditions one should not go below V2 or VREF. But that will not make it in severe cases; if you are falling out of the sky, “heroic” action is called for… … using 20° landing flaps provides a substantially greater margin than 30°, one of the primary reasons Corporate Air requires 20° for all normal landings. In any shear that produces descent rates greater than 530 FPM (at 8,750 pounds) the shear can be outclimbed with 20° but not with 30°. Good climb capability exists below VREF—and stall warning (VSW)—down to several knots above stall speed. The climb capability available below VREF (V2 on takeoff) should be “taken out” only as much and as fast as necessary to arrest the descent, much as in a landing flare. Flaps should remain at the landing position (normally 20°) until the descent is arrested and enough climb achieved to clear obstructions. If the descent is not arrested at the target attitude, pitch should be increased— slowly, and in small increments, with a pause after each to evaluate the results— until the descent stops. That attitude then should be held, and as soon as a climb adequate to clear obstructions is achieved, attitude should be reduced—again slowly and in small steps—as appropriate. After IAS reaches VREF and is increasing, flaps may be retracted to 10°, power reduced to normal TAKEOFF TP, and flaps retracted to 0° as after a normal takeoff. Remember, at firewall power actual stall speed will be roughly 10 knots lower than at IDLE, the basic AFM value. However, due to lack of accurate position error data in and near the stall range at low weights, stall speed as defined by the red bug must be considered approximate only. VS10 Stall speed with 10° flaps (the red bug). Primarily a reference for use in wind shear recovery procedures. Corporate Air used FlightSafety Inc. to conduct some ground school and simulator training. Part of that training included windshear and microburst training. Windshear training was conducted in the simulator with the accident pilot several times, with the most recent being November 10, 2021, with a rating of “T” for “trained procedure only.” The following information was provided to the accident pilot: WIND SHEAR: The best wind shear procedure is avoidance. Recognize the indications of potential windshear and then: AVOID. MICROBURSTS: Microbursts are small scale intense downdrafts that spread outward in all directions from the downdraft center as it nears the surface. This can result in both vertical and horizontal wind shears that can be extremely hazardous, especially at low altitudes. The aircraft may encounter a headwind with increasing performance (climb/increased airspeed), followed by a downdraft and tailwind, whichdecreases performance (descent and low airspeeds) to the point that terrain impact can occur. Acceptable Performance Guidelines: • Understand that avoidance is primary. • Ability to recognize potential wind shear situations. • Ability to fly the aircraft to obtain optimum performance. The pilot was hired by Corporate Air in June, 2001, and was current and qualified in accordance with FAA regulations and Corporate Air requirements. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the outboard 6 ft of the right wing was bent up about 30° and that the outboard 5 ft of the left wing was bent up about 5°. The left side of the fuselage was crumpled aft of the cargo loading door. The cockpit was undamaged. The flap lever was in the “UP” position, and the flap jack screw correlated to the flaps “UP” position. The left main strut was bent inward about 45°.

## Aircraft

- Registration: N877FE (not matched to a registry record)
- Reported make and model: CESSNA 208B
- Category: Airplane
- Serial number: 208B0232
- Year built: 1990
- Engines: P&W PT6A SERIES 500 horsepower turbo prop
- Damage: Substantial damage
- Fire: On-Ground
- Flight: Business, Part 135
- Operator: Corporate Air
- Registered owner: Federal Express Corp
- Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal
- Departed: SUN, Hailey, ID
- Destination: Same as departure
- Flight plan: IFR
- Airport: SLC, Salt Lake City Intl, runway 34R, 12,002 × 150 ft, asphalt

## Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

- Pilot; age 60; injuries: minor; airline transport, commercial; airplane ratings: multi-engine land, single-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, with waivers/limitations; last flight review January 26, 2022; seat: left; restraint: 5-point; flight hours: 10,516 total, 6,771 in this make and model, 10,565 as pilot in command, 148 in the last 90 days, 69 in the last 30 days, 3 in the last 24 hours

## Weather

- Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day
- Wind: 300° at 29 knots, gusting 48
- Visibility: 9 statute miles
- Lowest ceiling: 14,000 ft broken
- Temperature: 91 °F, dew point 55 °F
- Altimeter: 29.97 inHg
- Observed at: KSLC, 1 nm away
- METAR: KSLC 140054Z 30029G48KT 9SM -TSRA FEW018 FEW120 BKN140 BKN240 33/13 A2997 RMK AO2 PK WND 32048/0054 LTG DSNT SW RAB51 TSB27E42B50 SLP081 CB OHD MOV NE P0000 T03280128

## FAA reports on this event (1)

The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs).

- [Accident 20220713021829A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20220713021829A), Jul 13, 2022: Cessna 208B, Salt Lake City, UT, Substantial damage. On 07/13/2022, ATC cleared pilot of [privacy data omitted] for visual from the downwind to follow a B-757 on a five-mile final approach to runway 34R at kslc.…

## Docket (59 files)

The files NTSB released with the investigation on August 21, 2024, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=105474. 1.9 GB in all.

- Pilot/operator aircraft accident report, NTSB form 6120.1 (item 1, PDF, 11 pages, 2.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17330742&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=NTSB%206120_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Weather factual report (item 2, PDF, 55 pages, 8.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17387035&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=WPR22LA251_weatherfactualSuffernfinal1_1-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 1 (item 3, PDF, 65 pages, 211 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14927324&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment1_20220713%20KSLC%20ASOS-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 2 (item 4, CSV, 55 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14927861&FileExtension=csv&FileName=attachment2_SLCBY-Rel.csv
- Weather attachment 3 (item 5, CSV, 49 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928124&FileExtension=csv&FileName=attachment3_SLCCF-Rel.csv
- Weather attachment 4 (item 6, CSV, 37 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14927117&FileExtension=csv&FileName=attachment4_SLCNW-Rel.csv
- Weather attachment 5 (item 7, GIF, 14.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14927830&FileExtension=gif&FileName=attachment5_animation_SAT_VIS_0001to0131utc_CODNEXLAB-GOES-East-local-Salt_Lake-02-01_31Z-20220714_usint-map-id-glm_flash_-19-1n-10-100-Rel.gif
- Weather attachment 6 (item 8, GIF, 17.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928267&FileExtension=gif&FileName=attachment6_animation_SAT_Sandwich_0001to0131utc_CODNEXLAB-GOES-East-local-Salt_Lake-02-01_31Z-20220714_usint-map-id-glm_flash_-19-1n-10-100-Rel.gif
- Weather attachment 7 (item 9, GIF, 19.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928313&FileExtension=gif&FileName=attachment7_animationTSLC_reflectivity_0033to0127utc-Rel.gif
- Weather attachment 8 (item 10, GIF, 18.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928705&FileExtension=gif&FileName=attachment8_animationTSLC_velocity_0033to0127utc-Rel.gif
- Weather attachment 9 (item 11, GIF, 497 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928715&FileExtension=gif&FileName=attachment9_animation3d_0030to0100utc-Rel.gif
- Weather attachment 10 (item 12, PDF, 5 pages, 1.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928134&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment10-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 11 (item 13, PDF, 2 pages, 64 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928725&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment11_SLC_Airport_LOA_2018-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 12 (item 14, PDF, 2 pages, 45 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928323&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment12_CWSU_ZLC_Krippner%20S%20T%20A%20T%20E%20M%20E%20N%20T%20_%20AUG%202022_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 13 (item 15, PDF, 23 pages, 2.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928512&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment13_WPR22LA251_Selbig%20interview_final_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 14 (item 16, PDF, 22 pages, 2.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928604&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment14_WPR22LA251_DeSmet%20interview_final_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 15 (item 17, MKV, 409 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928530&FileExtension=mkv&FileName=attachment15_1%23%200029%20GATE-22%20%20N.BOUNDARY@2022-07-14T004459.163Z-Rel.mkv
- Weather attachment 16 (item 18, MKV, 355 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928743&FileExtension=mkv&FileName=attachment16_2%23%201353%20FAA%20TOWER%20S.W.@2022-07-14T004459.151Z-Rel.mkv
- Weather attachment 17 (item 19, MKV, 369 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928373&FileExtension=mkv&FileName=attachment17_3%23%201510%20DEICING%2034R%20OVERVIEW@2022-07-14T004525.865Z-Rel.mkv
- Weather attachment 18 (item 20, ZIP, 8.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14929025&FileExtension=zip&FileName=attachment18_N877FE_202207_13_14-Rel.zip
- Weather attachment 19 (item 21, MP4, 2.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14929224&FileExtension=mp4&FileName=attachment19_animation_STARS-Rel.mp4
- Weather attachment 20 (item 22, MP4, 22.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928950&FileExtension=mp4&FileName=attachment20_PDWB_20220713_1759-Rel.mp4
- Weather attachment 21 (item 23, PDF, 6 pages, 457 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928638&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment21_ITWS_quickrefcards_v9005-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 22 (item 24, PDF, 4 pages, 324 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928960&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment22_ITWS_quickrefcards_v9005_no_TDWR-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 23 (item 25, PDF, 4 pages, 279 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14936842&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment23_itwshistory_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 24 (item 26, PDF, 2 pages, 268 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928682&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment24_CWSU%20LOG%20with%20edits_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 25 (item 27, PDF, 1 page, 134 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928970&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment25_SLC%20Memo%20(1)_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 26 (item 28, PDF, 8 pages, 1.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928980&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment26_SLC-accident_220714-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 27 (item 29, PDF, 2 pages, 111 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928170&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment27_Attachment%201-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 28 (item 30, PDF, 39 pages, 12.9 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14929421&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment28_Attachment%202-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 29 (item 31, PDF, 1 page, 147 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14928801&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment29_Memo%20Style_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Weather attachment 30 (item 32, PDF, 1 page, 151 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14929522&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=attachment30_Memo%20Style_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Garmin SD cards - email report (item 33, PDF, 1 page, 2.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=15164020&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=WPR22LA251%20(Salt%20Lake%20City,%20UT)%20-%20Garmin%20SD%20Cards%20-%20Email%20Report-Rel.pdf
- Engine data recording module - specialist's factual report (item 34, PDF, 7 pages, 528 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=15193349&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=wpr22la251%20adas%20report_final2-Rel.pdf
- Attachment 1 to engine data recording module - specialist's factual report (item 35, CSV, 554 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=15209798&FileExtension=csv&FileName=wpr22la251_attachment1-Rel.csv
- Onboard image, audio and data recorder - specialist's factual report (item 36, PDF, 4 pages, 150 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=15337459&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=wpr22la251%20appareo%20v1000%20report-final1-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - factual report (item 37, PDF, 31 pages, 2.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=16218790&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=WPR22LA251%20-%20Ops%20Group%20Factual%20Report-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 1 - accident pilot transcript (item 38, PDF, 94 pages, 433 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=16217319&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%201%20-%20Accident%20Pilot%20Transcript%20and%20Written%20Statement_Redacted%201_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 2 - corporate air personnel interview transcripts and statements (item 39, PDF, 100 pages, 351 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=16217944&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%202%20-%20Corporate%20Air%20Personnel%20Interviews%20and%20Transcripts_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 3 - other airline pilot statements [excerpts] (item 40, PDF, 3 pages, 56 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=16217958&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%203%20-%20Other%20Airline%20Pilot%20Statement%20excerpts-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 5 - accident pilot training records [excerpts] (item 41, PDF, 13 pages, 3.2 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17323640&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%205%20-%20Accident%20Pilot%20Training%20Records%20%5BExcerpts%5D_Redacted1-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 6 - pilot schedule previous 90 days (item 42, PDF, 6 pages, 98 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17323748&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%206%20-%20Pilot%20Schedule%20Previous%2090-days_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 7 - fuel upload record (item 43, PDF, 2 pages, 95 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17323800&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%207%20-%20Fuel%20Upload%20Record_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 8 - cargo weight documentation (item 44, PDF, 2 pages, 135 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17323399&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%208%20-%20Cargo%20Weight%20Documentation_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 9 - corporate air airplane operating manual [excerpt] (item 45, PDF, 6 pages, 224 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17326984&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%209%20-%20Corporate%20Air%20Airplane%20Operatinig%20Manual%20%5BExcerpts%5D-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 10 - corporate air general operations manual [excerpt] (item 46, PDF, 6 pages, 797 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17323963&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%2010%20-%20Corporate%20Air%20General%20Ops%20Manual%20%5BExcerpts%5D-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 11 - NASA ASRS reports previous 20 years (item 47, PDF, 17 pages, 177 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17323973&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%2011%20-%20ASRS%20Reports-Rel.pdf
- Operational factors - attachment 12 - corporate air flight operations training manual [excerpt] (item 48, PDF, 4 pages, 46 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17324400&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%2012%20-%20Coporate%20Air%20Flight%20Operations%20Training%20Manual%20%5BExcerpt%5D-Rel.pdf
- Air traffic control group chair factual report (item 49, PDF, 18 pages, 1.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17282852&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ATC%20FACTUAL%20REPORT%20WPR22LA251-Rel.pdf
- Air traffic control attachment 1 - interview summaries and transcript (item 50, PDF, 73 pages, 436 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17282070&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%201%20Interview%20Summaries%20and%20Transcript_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Air traffic control attachment 2 - aircraft accident package (item 51, PDF, 55 pages, 6.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17411198&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%202%20Aircraft%20Accident%20Package_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Air traffic control - attachment 3 - local control center audio (item 52, WAV, 81.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17197687&FileExtension=wav&FileName=Attachment%203%20Local%20Control%20Center-Rel.wav
- Air traffic control - attachment 4 - final (f) sector controller audio (item 53, WAV, 174 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17198319&FileExtension=wav&FileName=Attachment%204%20Final%20Sector-Rel.wav
- Air traffic control - attachment 5 - bear (b) radar sector audio (item 54, WAV, 174 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17199863&FileExtension=wav&FileName=Attachment%205%20Bear%20Sector-Rel.wav
- Air traffic control - attachment 6 - slc ATIS recording (item 55, WAV, 114 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17199138&FileExtension=wav&FileName=Attachment%206%20SLC%20ATIS-Rel.wav
- Air traffic control - attachment 7 - ADS-B data (item 56, ZIP, 863 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17199281&FileExtension=zip&FileName=Attachement%207%20ADS-B-Rel.zip
- Air traffic control - attachment 8 - FAA ATC radar data (item 57, ZIP, 37.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17199349&FileExtension=zip&FileName=Attachment%208%20FAA%20ATC%20RADAR%20Data-Rel.zip
- Release of aircraft wreckage, NTSB form 6120.15 (item 58, PDF, 1 page, 297 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17330894&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=N877FE%20-%20Retention-Release-of-Wreckage-Form_Redacted-Rel.pdf
- Air traffic control - attachment 9 - training and administrative supporting documents (item 59, PDF, 33 pages, 3.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=17212674&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Attachment%209%20Training%20and%20Administrative%20Supporting%20Documents_Redacted-Rel.pdf

From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

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