# NTSB WPR24LA265: Bell 407, N20BH, Raft River, ID, August 3, 2024 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · Minor injuries · Class 3 · Limited · Final report - Date: August 2, 2024, 21:07 local (Aug 3, 2024, 03:07 UTC) - Place: Raft River, ID - Coordinates: 42.531213, -113.23015 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=42.5312&lon=-113.2301&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Enroute](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/400) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Enroute-cruise: Electrical system malf/failure](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/332) - Highest injury: Minor injuries - Injuries: 4 minor - Status: Completed, report June 10, 2026 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 3 - NTSB office: Western Pacific Region - Parties: Rolls Royce, Brainerd Helicopters, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Bell Textron, FAA Flight Standards District Office, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department of the Interior - NTSB case key (mKey): 194840 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=WPR24LA265 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/194840/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194840 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/WPR24LA265 ## Probable cause The pilot’s misdiagnosis of an erroneous engine instrument indication and his subsequent decision to enter an autorotation, which resulted in a hard landing due to degraded visual cues and low ambient light conditions. Contributing to the accident were the erroneous engine indications likely caused by an undetermined electrical supply disruption; time pressure, pilot fatigue, and plan continuation bias as daylight diminished and the crew aimed to complete the flight; and cognitive overload from multiple airframe and engine caution indications. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Indicating/recording systems: instrument wiring](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023197): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Malfunction (probable cause); cases with it: [Bell 407, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023197/cases.md?model=1182206), [All aircraft, 3 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023197/cases.md) - [Info processing/decision: identification/recognition](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041510): Personnel issues › Action/decision · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Bell 407, 3 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041510/cases.md?model=1182206), [All aircraft, 559 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02041510/cases.md) - [Pressures/demands: time/schedule pressure](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03042010): Environmental issues › Task environment · Effect on personnel (probable cause); cases with it: [Bell 407, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03042010/cases.md?model=1182206), [All aircraft, 10 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03042010/cases.md) - [Cognitive limitation: cognitive overload](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02023015): Personnel issues › Psychological · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Bell 407, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02023015/cases.md?model=1182206), [All aircraft, 9 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02023015/cases.md) - [Light condition: low light](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03036015): Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena · Contributed to outcome (probable cause); cases with it: [Bell 407, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03036015/cases.md?model=1182206), [All aircraft, 36 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03036015/cases.md) - [Terrain](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03021000): Environmental issues › Physical environment · Ability to respond/compensate (probable cause); cases with it: [Bell 407, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03021000/cases.md?model=1182206), [All aircraft, 267 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/03021000/cases.md) - [Alertness/Fatigue: fatigue due to work schedule](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02013520): Personnel issues › Physical · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Bell 407, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02013520/cases.md?model=1182206), [All aircraft, 25 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02013520/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Enroute-cruise: Electrical system malf/failure](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/332) (defining event); cases with it: [Bell 407, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/332/sequence.md?model=1182206), [All aircraft, 182 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/332/sequence.md) - [Enroute-cruise: Emergency descent initiated](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/130); cases with it: [Bell 407, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/130/sequence.md?model=1182206), [All aircraft, 42 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/130/sequence.md) - [Emergency descent: Off-field or emergency landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/440); cases with it: [Bell 407, 8 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/440/sequence.md?model=1182206), [All aircraft, 3,365 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/440/sequence.md) - [Landing-flare/touchdown: Hard landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/092); cases with it: [Bell 407, 13 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/092/sequence.md?model=1182206), [All aircraft, 2,102 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/092/sequence.md) ## Analysis The pilot of the helicopter departed on the final stage of a multi leg public use contract flight to reposition a helitack crew. The U.S. Forest Service (USFS) contract specified that operations were restricted to day visual meteorological conditions; the planned arrival time at the destination was about 30 minutes after sunset and just short of the 14-hour limit of the pilot’s duty day. Review of onboard video recordings revealed that, about 18 minutes after takeoff while in level flight, the measured gas temperature (MGT) exceeded the limits allowed for cruise flight. The overtemperature indication triggered a “CHECK INSTR” annunciation and an exceedance recorded by the MGT gauge, which could only be reset by a mechanic after the flight. Following this, the pilot then appeared to reduce engine power and continued the flight. About 30 minutes later, the barrier inlet filter caution light illuminated. The pilot found this indication unusual, because the filter had been serviced the week prior. He activated the filter bypass system and continued with the flight. Due to arrival time constraints, the crew discussed the option of diverting to an alternate airport and staying there overnight; however, they ultimately decided to continue to the destination. Shortly thereafter, the MGT gauge began to indicate a temperature increase into the yellow range and then the red range, accompanied by another “CHECK INSTR” warning. The pilot perceived this indication, and the helicopter’s response as he began to troubleshoot, as evidence of an engine overspeed condition, and he chose to initiate a precautionary landing to an open field nearby. Review of the cockpit video, however, revealed that none of the other engine gauges corroborated the high MGT reading, consistent with an erroneous MGT indication. When his control inputs failed to arrest the perceived overspeed or restore normal engine response, the pilot entered an autorotation to a closer cornfield. The autorotation was conducted during the diminishing ambient light conditions of dusk. The lighting conditions, combined with the height of the corn, obscured the pilot’s depth perception and limited his ability to accurately judge the timing of the landing flare, resulting in a hard landing. Impact forces were sufficient to cause separation of the main transmission, fragmentation of drive system components, and extensive secondary damage to the engine, including fragmentation of the turbine wheels after hard-body ingestion. Postaccident examination revealed no evidence of pre-impact mechanical failure, fatigue, or thermal distress of the engine, and review of the engine control unit’s (ECU) non-volatile memory did not reveal any event indicative of an engine overspeed, overtemperature, or associated malfunction. Bench testing of the MGT gauge did not reveal any anomalies, and despite the in-flight display irregularities, the gauge recorded only one exceedance, which appeared to match the initialovertemperature indication observed earlier in the flight. However, the erroneous displays observed during the flight could be simulated during bench testing by lowering and then restoring the unit’s electrical supply voltage. Therefore, the condition was likely caused by an undetermined disruption in the electrical supply to the MGT gauge. The accident sequence was initiated by compounding operational stressors. The accident occurred at the end of a long duty day for the pilot, who likely was beginning to feel the effects of fatigue, and the flight was conducted at a time of day that would have created significant time pressure. The pilot then allowed the engine to operate above normal MGT levels, possibly to expedite arrival. Although power was reduced and the flight continued, the overtemperature indication further increased the pilot’s cognitive workload, and the need for a mechanic to intervene later would have been an additional stressor. The unexpected barrier inlet filter annunciation that followed likely increased the pilot’s anxiety, and although a diversion was discussed, the prospect of an overnight stop and the resulting logistical impacts contributed to plan continuation bias. Subsequent anomalous MGT indications became the triggering event that overwhelmed the pilot, who misdiagnosed the symptoms as a developing engine problem that he likely attributed to the earlier issues. ## Factual narrative The helicopter was equipped with an Appareo Vision 1000 cockpit image recording device mounted to the cabin roof. The unit contained an internal camera and a GPS receiver that captured time, position, altitude, and speed. The unit also had a self-contained real-time inertial measuring unit capable of recording 3-axis acceleration and derived pitch, roll, and yaw data. The unit was sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Division for data extraction and a video group reviewed the data. Review of the video showed that the pilot was seated in the right seat, with a crew member in the left seat. The recording began about 7 minutes before takeoff after an uneventful engine start. The helicopter departed at 1947:41. Engine gauge indications for the next 10 minutes as the helicopter flew northeast were within the normal operating parameters, with MGT remaining just below the 727° C maximum continuous operating range. At 2005:47, the MGT gauge began to show an increase in temperature into the takeoff range and the display began to flash, accompanied a short time later by a brief illumination of the “CHECK INSTR” light on the annunciator panel. MGT then briefly dropped back to 727° C, after which it began to climb. About 30 seconds later it had reached 736° C. The CHECK INSTR light then came back on and remained illuminated for the rest of the flight. The pilot then pointed to the MGT gauge, as it dropped down to 710° C. The flight proceeded while making heading and altitude changes to avoid terrain, and after 30 minutes, the barrier filter alert could be seen reflected in the passenger’s helmet. The pilot reached for the overhead panel, and at 2102:29, he turned on the instrument panel lights as the sky grew darker. At 2106:16, the MGT radial and numeric indicator began to display missing and random segments, and the temperature began to climb. (see figure 1.) The HYD SYSTEM light briefly illuminated for 1 second, and there was no corresponding change in the other engine parameters. About 20 seconds later, MGT had reached 840° C, and the vertical speed indicator was showing a 1,200 ft per minute (fpm) descent rate. The airspeed slowed to 115 kts, torque dropped to 43.6%, and gas generator speed (NG) dropped to 91.7%, while power turbine speed (NP) and main rotor speed (NR) remained constant at 100%. The MGT gauge then appeared to perform a built-in-test, or BIT check, where all segments of the display illuminated. (see figure 1.) By the time the unit had come back online, it was showing a temperature of just below 500° C on both the segmented display and radial indicator. Figure 1 – MGT rising with missing segments (left). BIT check (right) By this time, the helicopter had descended to 5,000 ft mean sea level (780 ft above ground level [agl]) and was descending at a rate of 750 fpm, at an airspeed of 97 kts. The torque gauge indicated 6.4%, and both NP and NR were still at 100%. About 5 seconds later, at 2105:53 with NP remaining at 100%, NR increased to103% and both the ambient noise pitch and volume increased consistent with increasing rotor rpm, followed by the illumination of the rpm light. At this time, NR was 107% and NP was 100%, with MGT indicating 475° C. By the time the helicopter had descended to about 120 ft agl, the rotor rpm light illuminated accompanied by the aural low rotor rpm tone. NR was at 94% as the helicopter began to pitch up in a manner consistent with it beginning a flare, and a few seconds later the helicopter violently impacted the ground. On August 2, 2024, about 2107 mountain daylight time, a Bell 407 helicopter, N20BH, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Raft River, Idaho. The pilot and three passengers sustained minor injuries. The helicopter was operated as a public aircraft in support of the USFS. The helicopter was privately owned, and the flight originated under the Bureau of Land Management’s use of a USFS Exclusive Use flight service contract. The purpose of the flight was to transport three USFS helitack crew members from Gerlach, Nevada, to their base at Pocatello, Idaho, with intermediate stops at Winnemucca and Elko, Nevada. The pilot reported that the first two legs were uneventful, and that the accident occurred on the final leg. On the day of the accident, sunset at Pocatello was 2049. The terms of the contract limited operations to day VFR only. The crew planned to arrive at 2120; however, according to the pilot, they were given permission to arrive as late as 2125, which was possible as long as he maintained a groundspeed of 120 knots while enroute. The pilot stated that, about 55 minutes after departing Elko, the barrier inlet air filter light started to flicker. The filter had been serviced the week prior, and although the helicopter had been flying in a dusty and smoky environment since then, he thought such an activation was premature. A short time later, the filter light transitioned from flickering to on, and the pilot activated the filter bypass system by pressing the “FILTER” light switch. Due to arrival time restraints, the crew then discussed the option of diverting and completing the flight the following morning but chose to continue to Pocatello. The pilot reported that, a few minutes later, he noticed the engine MGT starting to rise into the yellow band of the gauge. In response, he reduced power and began to descend. However, the MGT continued to rise, and at an altitude between 1,000 and 1,500 ft, it continued to climb past the gauge redline. The pilot decided to make a precautionary power-on landing and began looking for a suitable landing area. As he was maneuvering the helicopter toward a grass field, he determined that the engine was starting to overspeed. The pilot raised the collective control twice to try to arrest the overspeed, but the engine did not respond, so he decided to perform an autorotation into an adjacent corn field. Due to the corn's unknown height, the pilot was unable to determinethe optimal time to initiate the flare, and the helicopter landed hard after dropping from about 5 ft above the ground. The pilot reported that immediately after landing, the engine came back on for about 10 seconds and was shaking the aircraft and crew violently. The pilot reported 3,855 total hours of flight experience, including 69 hours in the 90 days preceding the accident, and 26.8 hours of flight time during the previous 7 days. He had accumulated 908 hours in the Bell 407 and was issued an interagency pilot qualification card by the USFS on June 10, 2024. On the day of the accident, the pilot was dispatched from the Pacific time zone, where his duty day began at 0700. Crew duty days are limited to 14 hours; a 14-hour duty day starting at 0700 PDT would have concluded by 2200 MDT. MGT Indicator Gauge The helicopter’s MGT gauge screen was composed of a segmented radial temperature indicator with color-coded bands, along with a series of seven-segment displays that indicated the temperature numerically along with the exceedance status. (see figure 2.) On power-up or under conditions where the unit sensed a software or hardware anomaly, it was designed to perform a BIT, which included an illumination of all display segments. Figure 2 - MGT Gauge The gauge, in correspondence with the flight manual’s engine operating guidance, indicated a continuous operating temperature of 100 to 727° C with a green band. The 5-minute takeoff range temperature was between 727° and 779° C and denoted by a yellow band. The maximum takeoff temperature was 779° C and indicated by a red bar. The transient, 12-second range was between 780° and 843° C with the upper limit bound with a red triangle, and the maximum start and shutdown range, which was not to exceed 10 seconds above 843° C or 1 second at 927° C, was indicated by a red circle. The design of the unit was such that if the temperature was in the yellow takeoff region (727° to 779° C) for 4 ½ minutes the segments of the display would flash as a warning. If this temperature condition continued for an additional 30 seconds, the numeric display would show an “E” indicating that an exceedance had been logged in non-volatile memory (NVM). An amber CHECK INSTR caution light would also illuminate on the annunciator panel if an MGT exceedance was about to or had occurred. An exceedance would also be logged into if the temperature climbed into the transient range (780° to 843° C) for more than 10 seconds, or if it ever entered the transient upper limit. Once the exceedance flag was triggered, the “E” indication remained on the screen until a mechanic reset it using specialized software. MGT Indicator Gauge Examination The unit was examined and tested at an FAA-certified overhaul facility, in accordance with an approved test protocol, and no anomalies were noted. It was found that by lowering the input supply voltage to around 6 volts direct current (VDC), the unit would exhibit the increasing MGT behavior observedduring the accident sequence. Once it had dropped below 6VDC, the unit would display random characters in a manner almost identical to that observed before the accident. With the restoration of supply power to the nominal 28VDC, the unit restarted and performed a BIT check, consistent with that observed during the accident flight. (see figure 3) Figure 3 – Increasing MGT (left), increasing with random segments (center), BIT check (right). The unit’s memory was accessed using the standard maintenance software, and one exceedance had been recorded (the unit can record 50 exceedances). This exceedance was for 737° C and lasted 5 seconds. It was recorded on the day of the accident and appeared to be consistent with when the CHECK INSTR light came on and stayed on after the overtemperature indication during the initial cruise phase of the flight. MGT Gauge Airframe Installation The MGT indication system comprised the indicator mounted to the center instrument panel, which was supplied with electrical power via a 3-amp circuit breaker mounted to the overhead panel. The MGT signal was captured by 3 thermocouples connected in parallel and mounted to the engine exhaust section. The thermocouples provided data to both the MGT instrument and the ECU. On the airframe, the MGT circuit breaker was found in the closed (pressed) position. The circuit breaker performed appropriately when tested, and the entire electrical supply and ground wiring for the MGT system were examined and tested. No short or open circuits were observed, all cannon plugs and connector fittings were intact and free of corrosion, and there was no evidence of electrical arcing, thermal damage, or exposed conductors through cable chafing. Engine Examination Examination of the Rolls-Royce M250-C47B engine revealed evidence of hard body ingestion and engine uncontainment. All impeller inducer blades exhibited impact damage, tears/rips, missing material, and distortion, while the exducer blades exhibited shiny contact wear consistent with contact with the compressor shroud housing. The engine exhaust duct, exhaust collector support, horizontal firewall shield assembly, and right compressor discharge tube exhibited varying degrees of pockmarks and exit holes. Looking through the exit hole in the exhaust collector support, the stage 4 turbine wheel was observed, with all blades fractured transversely at their roots. The engine was examined and disassembled at the facilities of Rolls-Royce under the supervision of engineers from the NTSB. Examination revealed continuity between the compressor and accessory gearbox, but not with the gas producer turbine. The tie bolt, which secures the gas producer stages 1 and 2 wheels together, was found fractured, as was the turbine-to-compressor coupling shaft that connects the gas producer turbine to the accessory gearbox. The No. 6 roller bearing inner race and power turbine coupling shaft, which connects to the power turbine-to-pinion gear shaft, was alsofractured. The turbine shaft-to-pinion gear coupling was fractured and no longer coupled to the inside spur teeth of the helical gear, but remained seized within the helical gear bore. All the blades on stages 1, 2, and 3 turbine wheels were present and fractured transversely across the airfoil; the stage 4 turbine wheel blades were fractured at the platform. Both the gas producer and power turbine exhibited extensive rotational damage throughout, consistent with stationary and rotating parts/components circumferentially and longitudinally contacting one another. The gas producer turbine and power turbine components were submitted for material analysis. No parts were found with any pre-existing anomalies or fatigue fractures; all damage appeared consistent with secondary damage following loss of axial and radial control of the components during the ground impact sequence. Engine Control Unit The engine was equipped with a dual-channel ECU, manufactured by Triumph Engine Control Systems. The ECU included an incident recording feature, which was intended to provide data in support of engine troubleshooting and maintenance. The system was designed to activate after a successful engine start, then continuously record data every 1.2 seconds over a 12-second loop, resulting in a stream of the last 10 sets of data. When an incident was detected, the 10 sets of data recorded pre-incident were saved, directly followed by an additional 40 sets of post-incident data. Each data set included critical parameters such as engine history, discrete words, fault words, and key control inputs. The unit sustained impact damage during the accident sequence; however, the integrity of its recording components was established. The data extract revealed no events that would have met the threshold to trigger the incident recorder. Four undated limit peak events were recorded, none of which appeared to be related to the accident flight. The helicopter came to rest in a cornfield about 41 miles southwest of Pocatello. At the accident site, the surrounding corn stalks were about 6 ft tall. The helicopter was in a level attitude, with the main skids splayed outward such that the cabin belly was resting on the ground. The main rotor transmission assembly detached from the airframe and had rotated left and dropped down into the cabin compartment. The engine, which sat behind the main transmission, remained attached to the airframe. The engine output drive shaft and associated couplings had failed forward of the engine, resulting in fragments of the surrounding structure and drive components being propelled up into the inlet plenum. Three of the four main rotor blades remained attached at the hub, and the fourth was partially attached and bent opposite the direction of rotation. Two blades were shattered about midspan, with their remaining fragments located within the immediate vicinity of the accident site. The tail rotor and associated gearbox had detached and were locatedabout 30 ft from the main wreckage. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N20BH](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N20BH), registered now, S/N 53242, built 1998 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: BELL 407 - Registry model: [Bell 407](https://openairdocs.org/model/bell-407) (registry code 1182206) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Allison 250-C47 series](https://openairdocs.org/engine/allison-250-c47-series) (registry code 03029, turbo-shaft) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Helicopter - Serial number: 53242 - Year built: 1998 - Airframe hours: 10475 - Engines: ALLISON 250-C47 600 horsepower turbo shaft - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Positioning, Public use - Operator: Brainerd Helicopter Services - Registered owner: Chemair Helicopters Inc - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: Annual, January 5, 2024, 127.2 hours before - Departed: EKO, Elko, NV - Destination: PIH, Pocatello, ID - Flight plan: Company VFR - Airport: None - Equipment: Onboard weather, Satellite tracking device, Video recording device, ADS-B, Handheld GPS, Data recorder, Auto-pilot ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 54; injuries: minor; commercial; instrument ratings: helicopter; medical: class 2, without waivers/limitations; last flight review May 31, 2024; seat: right; restraint: 4-point; flight hours: 3,855 total, 908 in this make and model, 3,572 as pilot in command, 69 in the last 90 days, 7 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Dusk - Wind: calm - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Lowest ceiling: none - Temperature: 81 °F, dew point 55 °F - Altimeter: 30.11 inHg - Observed at: KBYI, 24 nm away - METAR: KBYI 030253Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM CLR 27/13 A3011 RMK AO2 SLP148 T02720133 55008 ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20240802014069A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20240802014069A), Aug 2, 2024: Bell 407, Burley, ID, Substantial damage. At approximately 55 minutes and 110 miles after departure from elko and 38 minutes and 77 miles out from pocatello, the barrier inlet air filter light started… ## Docket (14 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on June 11, 2026, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194840. 25.9 MB in all. - Powerplant group chairman's factual report (item 1, PDF, 47 pages, 8.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18986389&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=WPR24LA265%20Bell%20407-RR%20250%20uncontained%20failure%20-%20factual-Rel.pdf - Onboard image, audio, and data recorder - specialist's factual report (item 2, PDF, 17 pages, 1.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20481926&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=WPR24LA265_Appareo%20Video%20Report_final-Rel.pdf - Onboard image, audio, and data recorder report - attachment 2 (video data) (item 3, CSV, 8 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20495416&FileExtension=csv&FileName=Attachment%202%20-%20WPR24LA265%20Video%20Parameter%20Table-Rel.csv - Onboard image, audio, and data recorder report - attachment 1 (recorded data) - OBS (item 4, CSV, 816 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19256046&FileExtension=csv&FileName=Attachment%201%20-%20Recorded%20Data-Rel.csv - Passenger-provided statements (item 5, PDF, 1 page, 134 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20268756&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Passenger-Provided%20statements-Rel.pdf - Pilot/operator aircraft accident report, NTSB form 6120.1 (item 6, PDF, 14 pages, 8.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20268181&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=r_6120.1-Rel.pdf - Pilot updated statement (item 7, PDF, 2 pages, 76 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20411911&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Pilot%20Updated%20Statement-Rel.pdf - Mgt indicator exam (item 8, PDF, 7 pages, 4 photos, 508 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20288642&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=FINAL-MGT%20Factual%20Exam%20Report-Rel.pdf - Mgt airframe installation exam (item 9, PDF, 3 pages, 105 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20288500&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=MGT%20Airframe%20Factual%20Exam%20Report-Rel.pdf - Flight manual excerpts (item 10, PDF, 1 page, 413 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20268920&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=MGT%20Limits-Rel.pdf - Barrier inlet filter flight manual supplement (item 11, PDF, 14 pages, 3.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20289583&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=r_AFS-BH407-IBF-KIT-FMS_Rev_E_2015%20FEB%2012_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Statement of party representatives to NTSB investigation (item 12, PDF, 4 pages, 1.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20269193&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=r_Parties_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Release of aircraft wreckage, NTSB form 6120.15 (item 13, PDF, 1 page, 247 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20269203&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=r_Release-of-Wreckage-WPR24LA065_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Evidence control forms (item 14, PDF, 3 pages, 778 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=20271260&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Evidence%20Forms-Rel.pdf From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.