# NTSB WPR24LA278: Cirrus Design SF50, N727VB, Watsonville, CA, August 10, 2024 - Type: NTSB accident investigation - Classification: Accident · No injuries · Class 3 · Limited · Final report - Date: August 9, 2024, 17:50 local (Aug 10, 2024, 00:50 UTC) - Place: Watsonville, CA - Coordinates: 36.934802, -121.79107 - Nearby events: https://openairdocs.org/map.md?lat=36.9348&lon=-121.7911&mi=10 - Phase of flight: [Landing](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-phases/550) (OpenAirDocs' grouping) - Defining event: [Landing-landing roll: Landing gear collapse](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/094) - Highest injury: No injuries - Injuries: 2 uninjured - Status: Completed, report December 10, 2025 - Report: Approved by Office Director - Investigation class: Class 3 - NTSB office: Western Pacific Region - Parties: Federal Aviation Administration, Cirrus Aircraft - NTSB case key (mKey): 194931 - NTSB case page: https://web.ntsb.gov/investigations/?ntsbnumber=WPR24LA278 - NTSB report (PDF, downloads): https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/194931/pdf - NTSB docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194931 - Page: https://openairdocs.org/ntsb/WPR24LA278 ## Probable cause The pilot’s inadvertent use of the landing gear control handle instead of the flaps selector switch during the landing rollout, which resulted in the collapse of the nose landing gear. ## Findings NTSB's coded findings; those marked are part of the probable cause. - [Use of equip/info: use of equip/system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063015): Personnel issues › Task performance · Pilot (probable cause); cases with it: [Cirrus Design SF50, 2 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063015/cases.md?model=2130010), [All aircraft, 1,391 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/02063015/cases.md) - [Landing gear system](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023200): Aircraft › Aircraft systems · Unintentional use/operation (probable cause); cases with it: [Cirrus Design SF50, 1 case](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023200/cases.md?model=2130010), [All aircraft, 113 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-findings/01023200/cases.md) ## Sequence of events The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event best describes what happened. - [Landing-landing roll: Landing gear collapse](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/094) (defining event); cases with it: [Cirrus Design SF50, 4 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/094/sequence.md?model=2130010), [All aircraft, 1,787 cases](https://openairdocs.org/ntsb-events/094/sequence.md) ## Analysis The pilot reported that during the landing roll, about the time that he was applying the brakes, the nose landing gear collapsed. Having no training on what to do in this scenario, he cycled the landing gear by raising then lowering the landing gear control handle. Postflight inspection revealed substantial to the undercarriage near the nose landing gear bay. Stored onboard central maintenance computer (CMC) data showed that before touchdown the airplane was properly configured for landing with the flaps at 100%; the nose and both main landing gear were down and locked. After touchdown and during the landing roll, while both weight-on-wheels switches were temporarily unloaded, the landing gear handle was raised and then lowered, which unlocked the nose gear and allowed it to collapse. Additionally, both main landing gear became unlocked, but re-locked before they could collapse. After the nose gear collapse, the gear handle indicated an unexplained 4-second anomaly by indicating neither up nor down, then indicating down. Postaccident examination and a landing gear swing test revealed no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. A missing nose landing gear locking spring from the nose gear assembly was not causal to the accident. The flaps selector switch was located below the landing gear control handle. Further review of CMC data showed that the operators of the airplane often raise the flaps within seconds after touchdown, which was about the time that the nose landing gear collapsed. Although the pilot was familiar with the airplane and had accrued about 102 flight hours within the past 90 days, it is likely that the pilot inadvertently raised the landing gear control handle during the landing roll instead of selecting the flap selector switch to 0%. ## Factual narrative On August 9, 2024, about 1750 Pacific daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corp. SF50, N727VB, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Watsonville, California. The pilot and passenger were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight. According to the pilot, he and a passenger departed the Ogden-Hinkley Airport (OGD) Ogden, Utah, destined for the Watsonville Municipal Airport (WVI) Watsonville, California; he stated that the enroute portion of the flight was uneventful. Upon arrival at WVI, the pilot prepared for landing by lowering the landing gear, confirming that there were three green landing gear indications in the multi-function display (MFD), and confirmed that flaps were set to 100%. The airplane touched down about 80 to 85 knots and the landing was normal. The airplane did not bounce or get light on the wheels after it touched down, and there was no period where only one main landing gear was on the runway. About the time that he began to apply the brakes, the nose landing gear collapsed. Having no training on the event that was occurring, the pilot raised then lowered the landing gear handle with no effect on the already collapsed nose gear. The pilot maintained directional control until the airplane came to a stop. Postflight inspection revealed substantial damage to the undercarriage of the composite fuselage near the nose gear bay, as shown in figure 1. Figure 1. View of the substantial damage to the undercarriage. (Photo courtesy of FAA) The airplane was equipped with a CMC that recorded, in part, landing gear data, flaps position, wheel speed, and weight-on-wheels (WOW) data, all in one-second intervals. A review of ADS-B and downloaded CMC data from the airplane revealed that, at 1250:28 while the airplane was about 1,250 ft from the approach threshold of the runway, the flaps were at 100%, the landing gear handle indicated down, and the nose gear and left and right main landing gear were down and locked. Fourteen seconds later, the airplane touched down, as indicated by the left and right wheel speed increasing from 0 to about 1501 rpm and 1488 rpm respectively. One second later, the WOW data indicated a load on the left and right main landing gear. Two seconds later, the WOW data indicated no load on either landing gear, the gear handle indicated in the down position, and the landing gear indicated down and locked. At 1250:47, the gear handle indicated in the up position and the WOW switches indicated no load; the left and right main landing gear indicated down but not locked, and the nose gear indicated down and locked. At the same time, the hydraulic pack was enabled, and the landing gear was directed up. One second later, the nose gear also indicated down but not locked. At the same time, the left WOW switch indicated no load, and the right WOW switch indicated a load. The hydraulic pack remained enabled, and the landing gear continued to bedirected up. At 1250:49, the gear handle indicated down; the nose gear indicated not down and not locked. The left and right main landing gear indicated down but not locked. The hydraulic pump was enabled, and the gear was not directed up. The airplane indicated a 12.5° nose-down attitude. From 1250:50 until 1250:54, the gear handle indicated neither up nor down. One second later the gear handle indicated down. A review of the CMC data for the last twelve flights revealed that flap retraction from 100% to 0% occurred anywhere from 2 seconds after touchdown to 70 seconds after touchdown, with 8 out of 10 times being within 2 to 5 seconds after touchdown. The accident flight recorded no flap retraction. A postaccident examination of the airframe and landing gear revealed one of the two nose landing gear (NLG) locking springs was absent from the nose gear assembly, as illustrated in figure 2. Figure 2. Illustration of the nose landing gear showing the two NLG locking springs. (Image courtesy of Cirrus Design Corporation) According to the manufacturer, the NLG locking springs are installed to assist the gear into the locked position during an alternate/freefall extension, and the second spring is strictly for redundancy. According to the SF50 Pilot’s Information Manual, the landing gear control handle is located at the center instrument panel, in between the primary flight display and the multi-function display. The three-position flap selector switch is located at the center consol forward and to the right of the thrust lever. The flaps are UP, 50% and 100%. (See figure 3.) Figure 3. Illustration of the SF50 cockpit showing the landing gear control handle location and the flaps selector switch location. (Illustration courtesy of Cirrus Design Corporation) The airplane was stabilized using floor jacks and a tail stand. A functional test of the landing gear revealed no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the landing gear that would have precluded normal operation. A review of maintenance records revealed the airplane underwent an annual inspection on April 10, 2024, which included a check of the landing gear. No anomalies were noted. The pilot reported 4,300 total flight hours experience, which included 443.4 hours flying experience in the SF50. He had accrued 102.5 hours in the SF50 within the last 90 days, 50.9 hours within the last 30 days, and 4.0 hours in the last 24 hours. ## Aircraft - Registration: [N727VB](https://openairdocs.org/aircraft/N727VB), registered now, S/N 0430, built 2023 (OpenAirDocs) - Reported make and model: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SF50 - Registry model: [Cirrus Design SF50](https://openairdocs.org/model/cirrus-design-sf50) (registry code 2130010) (OpenAirDocs) - Registry engine: [Williams FJ33-5A](https://openairdocs.org/engine/williams-fj33-5a) (registry code 66015, turbo-fan) (OpenAirDocs) - Category: Airplane - Serial number: 0430 - Year built: 2023 - Airframe hours: 344 - Engines: WIlliams FJ33-5A 1846 lbs thrust turbo fan - Damage: Substantial damage - Flight: Business, Part 91 - Airworthiness certificate: Standard, Normal - Last inspection: 100 hour, July 1, 2024, 40 hours before - Departed: OGD, Ogden, UT - Destination: Same as departure - Flight plan: IFR - Airport: WVI, Watsonville Municipal Airport, runway 20, 4,502 × 149 ft, asphalt - Equipment: ADS-B, Airframe parachute, Angle of attack indicator, Auto-pilot, Data recorder, Electronic flight bag or handheld device, Electronic multifunction display, Electronic primary flight display, Onboard weather, Stall warning system, Video recording device ## Flight crew As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names. - Pilot; age 53; injuries: none; airline transport, commercial; airplane ratings: single-engine land, multi-engine land; instrument ratings: airplane; medical: class 1, without waivers/limitations; last flight review September 1, 2023; seat: left; restraint: 3-point; flight hours: 4,300 total, 443.4 in this make and model, 3,800 as pilot in command, 102.5 in the last 90 days, 50.9 in the last 30 days, 4 in the last 24 hours ## Weather - Conditions: Visual (VMC), Day - Wind: 160° at 8 knots - Visibility: 10 statute miles - Temperature: 66 °F, dew point 55 °F - Altimeter: 29.92 inHg - Observed at: KWVI - METAR: KWVI 100103Z AUTO 16008KT 10SM FEW006 19/13 A2992 RMK AO2 T01890128 $ ## FAA reports on this event (1) The FAA's own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date (OpenAirDocs). - [Accident 20240809012789A](https://openairdocs.org/incident/20240809012789A), Aug 9, 2024: Cirrus Design Corp SF50, Watsonville, CA, Substantial damage. On August 9th, 2024 at 1815 local time an SF-50 landed at Watsonville airport under day VMC conditions and skidded off of the runway with the nose landing gear… ## Docket (14 files) The files NTSB released with the investigation on December 10, 2025, on NTSB's docket system: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194931. 46.0 MB in all. - Pilot/operator aircraft accident report, NTSB form 6120.1 (item 1, PDF, 11 pages, 2.8 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18506693&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Doc%20Aug%2019,%202024,%2012_55_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Pilot's statement (item 2, PDF, 2 pages, 92 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18559119&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ROC%20-%20Scott%20Frank_Pilot-Rel.pdf - Interview Cirrus regional field service manager (item 3, PDF, 1 page, 86 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18559247&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=ROC%20-%20Rob%20Pickering_Cirrus%20AIrcraft-Rel.pdf - Email regarding the nose landing gear spring (item 4, PDF, 1 page, 1.1 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18784370&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Spring%20Details_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Maintenance records excerpts (item 5, PDF, 3 pages, 2.3 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18783842&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Maintenance%20Writeups%20All_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Gear swing report (item 6, PDF, 2 pages, 176 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18822078&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Gear%20Swing%20Report_Redacted-Rel.pdf - ADS-B data (item 7, KMZ, 467 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18816801&FileExtension=kmz&FileName=20240809_A9BF6A_560517234-Rel.kmz - ADS-B excel data (item 8, XLSX, 11.7 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18816247&FileExtension=xlsx&FileName=20240809_A9BF6A_560517234_ADSB-Rel.xlsx - Photos for WPR24LA278 (item 9, PDF, 4 pages, 880 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18508785&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Photos%20for%20WPR24LA278-Rel.pdf - Manufacturer's report on airplane data download (item 10, PDF, 4 pages, 1.5 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18782920&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Combined%20Report%20from%20Cirrus-Rel.pdf - Airframe stored data 2024_08_09_222146_kogd_1 (item 11, CSV, 8.6 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18557251&FileExtension=csv&FileName=2024-08-09_222146_KOGD_1-Rel.csv - Airframe stored data 2024_08_09_222146_kogd_2 (item 12, CSV, 15.0 MB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18557179&FileExtension=csv&FileName=2024-08-09_222146_KOGD_2-Rel.csv - Party member certificate (item 13, PDF, 1 page, 686 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18557223&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Party%20Member%20Form%20signed_Redacted-Rel.pdf - Release of aircraft wreckage, NTSB form 6120.15 (item 14, PDF, 1 page, 543 KB): https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=18557628&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=NTSB%206120_15%20signed_Redacted-Rel.pdf From the NTSB's public API. Aircraft are matched to registry aircraft by N-number and event date, checked against the reported serial number, make and model; the registry's history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model. --- OpenAirDocs.org is an independent research project of [Contrail Labs](https://contraillabs.com/). It is not affiliated with the FAA or the NTSB. Source documents are U.S. government works in the public domain.