# Airbus All Operators Telex A330-27A3185

Copy: No revision named ("U.S. DOT/FAA - Service Information - 2"), 7 pages: PDF https://openairdocs.org/files/sha256/6d/db/6ddbe79593b6a67177cec80c520e22d03f92de05a4884da3e543f4f762d9e65d; text https://openairdocs.org/service-documents/airbus/aot-a330-27a3185/file/6ddbe79593b6.md. Rights: © Airbus S.A.S. Filed by the FAA in regulations.gov docket FAA-2012-0995; AD 2012-25-10 incorporates this document by reference. Not covered by OpenAirDocs’ CC0 dedication.

## Details

- Manufacturer: [Airbus](https://openairdocs.org/service-documents/airbus.md)
- Type: Other document (All Operators Telex)
- Number: A330-27A3185
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/service-documents/airbus/aot-a330-27a3185

## ADs that cite it (3) (OpenAirDocs)

Newest first, with the revision each names, as OpenAirDocs read it from the AD's text.

- [AD 2024-08-05](https://openairdocs.org/ad/2024-08-05.md), effective Jul 19, 2024: No revision named
- [AD 2014-15-09](https://openairdocs.org/ad/2014-15-09.md), effective Sep 5, 2014: No revision named
- [AD 2012-25-10](https://openairdocs.org/ad/2012-25-10.md), effective Jan 31, 2013: No revision named

Also cited in [3 proposed ADs](https://openairdocs.org/service-documents/airbus/aot-a330-27a3185/proposed.md).

## Text (7 pages)

Rights: © Airbus S.A.S. Filed by the FAA in regulations.gov docket FAA-2012-0995; AD 2012-25-10 incorporates this document by reference. Not covered by OpenAirDocs’ CC0 dedication. Each page's text from the PDF; open the PDF at a page with #page=N.

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AOT_27A3185_00[1].txt
ALL OPERATORS TELEX   -   ALL OPERATORS TELEX
SUBJECT:  ATA 27 – SPOILER SERVO CONTROLS – LOSS OF THE HYDRAULIC LOCKING 
FUNCTION
OUR REF: AOT A330-27A3185 dated 04 January 2012
1. AIRCRAFT AFFECTED
All A330-300 in-service aircraft fitted with MZ-type Spoiler Servo Controls 
(SSC), Part Number (PN) MZ4339390-12 or PN MZ4306000-12.
2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION
- Ref.1: Liebherr Component Maintenance Manual (CMM) 27-64-52 Figure 4 
Item 210 – Blocking Valve
- Ref.2: Liebherr CMM 27-64-52 Figure 4 Item 140 – Maintenance Operator 
Mechanism
- Ref.3: Liebherr CMM 27-64-52 Figure 4 Item 190 – Seal
- Ref.4: Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A330-27-3110 - Flight Controls - 
Spoiler - Introduce operator mechanism cover
- Ref.5:  EASA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2008-0160 – Flight Controls – 
Spoiler Servo Control Maintenance Cover – Identification / Modification
- Ref.6: FAA AD 2009-18-20
- Ref.7: Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) Task 27-64-00-710-802 – 
Operational Test of the Hydraulic Locking Function on the Spoiler Servo 
Control
- Ref.8: AMM 27-64-52 PB 401 – Servo Control – Spoiler 2,3,4,5,6 – Removal 
/ Installation
- Ref.9: AMM 27-64-51 PB 401 – Servo Control – Spoiler 1 – Removal / 
Installation 
- Ref.10: Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) item 29-09-01 – HYD G(B)(Y) 
ELEC PUMP FAULT Alert, dated 16 December 2011
- Ref.11: MMEL item 29-20-04 – Yellow Auxiliary Hydraulic power 
(Electrical Pump), dated 16 December 2011
- Ref.12: Airbus Reporting Sheet RS-SEEL6-2011-686000
- Ref.13: Liebherr-Aerospace Information Notice reference AER/CS/1107-13
- Ref.14: Airbus Technical Follow Up (TFU) 27.64.00.013 – Spoiler SC MZ 
type – Loss Of Hydraulic Locking Function
3. REASON
3.1. FACTS
Two operators have reported several spoilers not remaining in the retracted 
position after manual depressurization of the corresponding hydraulic 
circuit during test flights.
Subsequent checks on ground confirmed that, for each affected spoiler 
surface:
- The spoiler was fitted with one MZ-type SSC (PN MZ4339390-12 or PN 
MZ4306000-12)
- The maintenance operator mechanism of the SSC was confirmed in the 
‘O’ (Operation) position (hydraulic locking function operative). 
Nevertheless, the spoiler surface could be manually extended.
3.2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
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AOT_27A3185_00[1].txt
Each aircraft is fitted with six pairs of spoilers, identified from 
position 1 (inboard) to 6 (outboard). 
Each SSC is controlled by a single flight control computer and supplied by 
one hydraulic circuit:
- Positions 1 (13CS1/13CS2) and 5 (17CS1/17CS2) supplied by Green (G) 
circuit.
- Positions 2 (14CS1/14CS2) and 3 (15CS1/15CS2) supplied by Blue (B) 
circuit.
- Positions 4 (16CS1/16CS2) and 6 (18CS1/18CS2) supplied by Yellow (Y) 
circuit.
SSCs installed in position 1 are not interchangeable with the remaining 2 
to 6 SSC positions since the length of the stroke is different.
Each SSC is fitted with a blocking valve ref.1, whose purpose is to ensure 
the hydraulic locking function. This prevents the extension of the spoiler 
in case of hydraulic depressurization:
- If the depressurization occurs when the spoiler is retracted, the SSC 
remains locked in position.
- If the depressurization occurs when the spoiler is extended, the 
blocking valve allows the retraction under aerodynamic loads.
In addition to the blocking valve ref.1, the SSC is fitted with a 
maintenance operator mechanism ref.2, which allows the de-activation of the 
locking function for maintenance purposes. 
During normal operation, the maintenance operator mechanism is set to the 
‘O’ (Operation) position, and the hydraulic locking function is operative. 
When the maintenance operator mechanism is set to the ‘M’ (Maintenance) 
position, the hydraulic locking function is de-activated, and the spoiler 
can be manually extended for maintenance purposes.
3.3. INVESTIGATIONS
3.3.1 SHOP FINDINGS
The investigation of the affected SSCs at Liebherr revealed that the loss 
of the hydraulic locking function was due to an internal leakage caused by 
a sheared seal ref.3. This seal is installed at the left end of the 
blocking valve ref.1.
3.3.2 PREVIOUS MODIFICATION
From 2008 to 2010, all MZ-type SSCs were modified to the current PN 
MZ4339390-12 (position 1) and PN MZ4306000-12 (position 2 to 6) as per 
ref.4 Airbus SB. This modification was mandated by ref.5 and ref.6 ADs.
3.3.3 SUSPECTED ROOT CAUSE
Most MZ-type SSCs were modified on-wing. During this on-wing modification, 
the ref.2 maintenance operator mechanism was removed, allowing a possible 
untimely migration of the ref.1 blocking valve out of its groove.
It is suspected that this untimely migration is the root cause for the 
sheared ref.3 seal events.
3.4. CONSEQUENCES
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AOT_27A3185_00[1].txt
As long as the corresponding hydraulic circuit is pressurized, this failure 
has no impact on the operation of the spoilers.
Nevertheless, in case of loss of the hydraulic locking function, the SSC is 
no longer able to remain in the retracted position in the event of a 
depressurization of the related hydraulic circuit. Therefore, the spoiler 
surface would extend up to the zero-hinge moment position, which mainly 
depends on the aircraft speed and on the Flap/Slat configuration.
This failure mode (internal leakage) cannot be detected by the flight 
control computers monitoring, and will remain as hidden until the 
associated hydraulic system is depressurized in flight. Should an untimely 
deflection in flight occur, this is announced to the crew via the ECAM 
warning F/CTL SPLR FAULT and the F/CTL Page on the System Display.
On ground, only the application of the test of the hydraulic locking 
function as per AMM ref.7 ensures the identification of faulty SSCs.
3.5. AIM
The aim of this AOT is to confirm the reliable functioning of the MZ-type 
SSCs currently installed on aircraft by means of a one-time test as per the 
new ref.7 AMM task.
It is anticipated that this AOT will be rendered mandatory by an EASA AD.
4. REQUIRED ACTION
4.1. PLANNING AND MANPOWER
The following corrective plan needs to be performed, as per paragraph 4.2, 
on all in-service affected aircraft:
- Within 90 days from receipt of this AOT:
* Identification of the concerned aircraft
* Test of the MZ-type SSC(s)
- In case of findings:
* Corrective actions to be accomplished before further flight on the 
SSCs related to the Blue hydraulic circuit
* Corrective actions to be accomplished within 24 months on the SSCs 
related to the Yellow and Green hydraulic systems
- Reporting within 30 days after accomplishment of the corrective 
actions
Spare units are not affected by the requirements of this AOT, because the 
hydraulic locking function is tested after any shop repair prior to EASA 
Form 1 issuance. 
Consequently:
- This AOT is only applicable to MZ-type SSC(s) already installed on 
in-service aircraft at the time of issuance of this AOT
- Aircraft which are not fitted with any MZ-type SSC are not affected 
by this AOT
The application of this AOT requires:
- Five man-hours and one hour elapsed time for the application of the 
ref.7 AMM task 
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AOT_27A3185_00[1].txt
- Additional three man-hours per SSC replacement.
4.2. DESCRIPTION
4.2.1. IDENTIFICATION/TEST OF AFFECTED AIRCRAFT
Within 90 days from receipt of this AOT:
1.Identify all aircraft fitted with at least one MZ-type SSC. Note that:
- PN MZ 4339390-12 is installed in positions 1 only.
- PN MZ 4306000-12 is installed in positions 2 to 6.
The two following procedures are approved for the identification:
- Use the data from operator approved records.
- Read the data by visual inspection on aircraft.
On aircraft which are not fitted with any MZ-type SSC, no further action 
is required by this AOT.
2.At each position fitted with a MZ-type SSC, perform the test of the 
hydraulic locking function as per ref.7 AMM.
4.2.2 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
1.On Blue hydraulic circuit, for MZ-type SSC in position 2 and 3 (14CS1, 
14CS2, 15CS1, 15CS2):
- If the test is successful: No further action is required
- If the test fails: BEFORE FURTHER FLIGHT, interchange with a 
successfully tested unit from another circuit or replace with a spare 
part the faulty SSC(s), as per ref.8 AMM.
2.On Green hydraulic circuit, for MZ-type SSC in position 1 and 5 (13CS1, 
13CS2, 17CS1, 17CS2):
- If the test is successful: No further action is required
- If the test fails, or if an unsuccessfully tested SSC is installed in 
position 5 after interchange with Blue circuit: Within 24 months from 
AOT receipt, replace the faulty SSC(s) with a spare part as per ref.8 
or ref.9 AMM.
3.On Yellow hydraulic circuit, for MZ-type SSC in position 4 and 6 (16CS1, 
16CS2, 18CS1, 18CS2):
- If the test is successful: No further action is required
- If the test fails, or if an unsuccessfully tested SSC is installed 
after interchange with Blue circuit:
* Within 24 months from AOT receipt, replace the faulty SSC(s) with 
a spare part as per ref.8 AMM provided that, before replacement of 
the faulty SSC(s), the affected aircraft is not dispatched with 
the Yellow Electric Motor Pump (Y EMP) inoperative as per ref.10 
and ref.11 MMEL.
* Once all the faulty MZ-type SSC(s) are removed from the Yellow 
hydraulic circuit:
- Dispatch capability with the Y EMP inoperative is restored 
as per ref.10 and ref.11 MMEL.
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AOT_27A3185_00[1].txt
- Report the retrofit completion as per paragraph 4.2.3.
CAUTION: In order to prevent the installation of faulty units on non-
affected aircraft, only the interchange between positions of the same 
aircraft is acceptable.
ADVICE: Due to spare restriction (refer to 4.3): 
- It is acceptable to interchange with a unit successfully tested from 
another circuit of the same airplane, or to replace with a spare part, 
the faulty SSC(s) identified in positions 2 and 3 (14CS1, 14CS2, 15CS1, 
15CS2).
- It is acceptable to install or to keep installed unsuccessfully tested 
SSC(s) in positions 1, 4, 5, and 6. This approach allows:
* Up to two SSCs PN MZ4339390-12 without hydraulic locking capability 
per aircraft.
* Up to six SSCs PN MZ4306000-12 without hydraulic locking capability 
per aircraft.
4.2.3 DATA REPORTING
Step 1
For all aircraft fitted with at least one MZ-type SSC, within 30 days after 
accomplishment of the test as per paragraph 4.2.1, report the test results 
to the Airbus contact given in paragraph 7 by means of the Reporting Sheet 
ref.12.
Step 2
For all aircraft fitted with at least one unsuccessfully tested SSC on the 
Yellow hydraulic circuit, within 30 days after replacement of the faulty 
SSC(s) of the Yellow circuit as per paragraph 4.2.2, report the retrofit 
completion to the Airbus contact given in paragraph 7 by means of Reporting 
Sheet ref.12.
4.3. MATERIAL - TOOLING
No specific tooling is required for the inspection.
Concerning spares, Liebherr-Aerospace is currently facing a difficult 
supply chain situation on SSC PN 1386x and 1387x –current production 
standard– due to the fire damage suffered by Liebherr-Aerospace 
manufacturing plant in Brazil (ref.13).
Airbus and Liebherr-Aerospace will increase the spares stock, planned to 
reach 60 units by June 2012. Nevertheless, the current number of available 
spares remains insufficient to provide advanced spare parts to all 
operators prior to application of this AOT. 
Consequently, spare units will be supplied on AOG basis to operators if and 
only if more than six SSCs PN MZ4306000-12 are found faulty on the same 
aircraft and no spares are available at the operator’s warehouse.
Spare units have been positioned in Singapore, Europe and the USA in order 
to reduce the delivery lead-time. AOG orders should be addressed to:
Region: Europe, Africa, Middle East
Liebherr-Aerospace Lindenberg GmbH (LLI) 
Phone: +49 8381 46 4868
e-mail: spares.lli@liebherr.com 
24 Hrs/7 Days Spares AOG Hotline: +49 171 852 7304
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AOT_27A3185_00[1].txt
Region: Americas
Liebherr-Aerospace Saline, Inc (LSL)
Phone: +1 734 944 6378
e-mail: keith.turczyn@liebherr.com
24 Hrs/7 Days Spares AOG Hotline: +1 313 580 7262
Region: Asia-Pacific
Liebherr-Aerospace Singapore Pte. Ltd. (LSI)
Phone: +65 6265 2305
e-mail: charles.loke@liebherr.com
24 Hrs/7 Days Spares AOG Hotline: +65 9625 1607
According to the feedback as per paragraph 4.2.3, Airbus and Liebherr-
Aerospace will establish a replacement plan of the faulty SSCs fitted on 
Green and Yellow hydraulic circuits.
Throughout this AOT campaign, loan units will be used to cover the spare 
needs during the turnaround time of the faulty SSC(s) in-shop repair. 
Process will be monitored by Airbus and planned in accordance with 
operators’ situation and availability. 
5. FURTHER ACTION
Follow-up of this AOT will be ensured by means of ref.14 TFU that will be 
issued by the end of January, 2012.
6. AOT APPROVAL
The technical content of this AOT has been approved under EASA Design 
Organization Approval EASA.21J.031.
The content of this AOT is expected to be rendered mandatory by the 
Airworthiness Authorities.
7. REPORTING / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Operators are requested to acknowledge receipt of this AOT within 48 hours 
after receipt to:
Mlle Laetitia BONNET, SEEL
Phone number: +33 (0)5 67 19 24 40
Fax number:   +33 (0)5 61 93 32 73
E-mail: laetitia.bonnet@airbus.com
This acknowledgement can be made through the Airbus RCSR office when 
available.
Questions about the technical content of this AOT, and inspection results, 
with or without findings, are to be sent to Airbus Customer Services, 
Engineering and Technical Support, attention of:
Mr. Daniel LOPEZ FERNANDEZ, SEEL6
Phone number: +33 (0)5 61 93 04 52
Fax number:   +33 (0)5 61 93 32 73
E-mail:  daniel.lopez-fernandez@airbus.com
Best Regards,
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AOT_27A3185_00[1].txt
P.GOURDON
VICE PRESIDENT A330/A340 PROGRAMME
CUSTOMER SERVICES DIRECTORATE
If you do not need to receive AOT any more, or if other people in your 
organization need to be added to the distribution, please advise your 
Airbus Customer Services contact accordingly. 
AOT’s attachments (if any) can be downloaded from AirbusWorld via AirN@v / 
Engineering.
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