# Airbus All Operators Transmission A57N006-14

## Copies (3)

Copies the FAA filed in AD dockets on regulations.gov, newest revision first. A newer revision may exist.

- Revision 01 ("U.S. DOT/FAA - AOT-A57N006-14REV01"), 19 pages: PDF https://openairdocs.org/files/sha256/16/9a/169a32507b9d150770783f7164ef0b1b6da94524fc27e284c33cc4a555773802; text https://openairdocs.org/service-documents/airbus/aot-a57n006-14/file/169a32507b9d.md. Rights: © Airbus S.A.S. Filed by the FAA in regulations.gov docket FAA-2015-0930; AD 2015-08-08 incorporates this document by reference. Not covered by OpenAirDocs’ CC0 dedication.
- U.S. DOT/FAA - AOT A57N006-14 Rev 00 ("U.S. DOT/FAA - AOT A57N006-14 Rev 00"), 15 pages: PDF https://openairdocs.org/files/sha256/2f/2e/2f2e58dfb3cc22c4b4747dbd1ea5994da1094634ac39a9fde9dad3087f56ddd8; text https://openairdocs.org/service-documents/airbus/aot-a57n006-14/file/2f2e58dfb3cc.md. Rights: © Airbus S.A.S. Filed by the FAA in regulations.gov docket FAA-2015-0087; AD 2015-03-02 incorporates this document by reference. Not covered by OpenAirDocs’ CC0 dedication.
- U.S. DOT/FAA - AOT A57N006-14 Rev 00 ("U.S. DOT/FAA - AOT A57N006-14 Rev 00"), 15 pages: PDF https://openairdocs.org/files/sha256/c2/1a/c21a8468c1ae2ce738a84de93d0c693d6b779283c0c4cbe69e7634111e03f1e9; text https://openairdocs.org/service-documents/airbus/aot-a57n006-14/file/c21a8468c1ae.md. Rights: © Airbus S.A.S. Filed by the FAA in regulations.gov docket FAA-2014-0927; AD 2014-26-53 incorporates this document by reference. Not covered by OpenAirDocs’ CC0 dedication.

## Details

- Manufacturer: [Airbus](https://openairdocs.org/service-documents/airbus.md)
- Type: Other document (All Operators Transmission)
- Number: A57N006-14
- Latest revision known: A57N006-14, Revision 01, dated February 16, 2015 (OpenAirDocs)
- Page: https://openairdocs.org/service-documents/airbus/aot-a57n006-14

## ADs that cite it (3) (OpenAirDocs)

Newest first, with the revision each names, as OpenAirDocs read it from the AD's text.

- [AD 2015-08-08](https://openairdocs.org/ad/2015-08-08.md), effective May 12, 2015: Revision 01
- [AD 2015-03-02](https://openairdocs.org/ad/2015-03-02.md), effective Feb 24, 2015: No revision named
- [AD 2014-26-53](https://openairdocs.org/ad/2014-26-53.md), effective Feb 6, 2015: No revision named

## Text (19 pages)

Revision 01, the newest copy. Rights: © Airbus S.A.S. Filed by the FAA in regulations.gov docket FAA-2015-0930; AD 2015-08-08 incorporates this document by reference. Not covered by OpenAirDocs’ CC0 dedication. Some pages are OCR from a scan. OCR can misread letters and numbers. Each page's text from the PDF; open the PDF at a page with #page=N.

### Page 1

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
 
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01 Page 1 of 19 Date: 16-FEB-2015 
© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
SUBJECT: ATA  57 –  INSPECT LH AND RH BOTTOM SKIN FASTENERS AT MAIN LANDING GEAR 
RIB 5 FOOTPRINT LOCATION FOR MIGRATED OR MISSING FASTENER 
  
 
AIRCRAFT TYPE:  A319,A320 
 
 
OUR REF.:  A57N006-14 Rev 01 dated 16 Feb 2015. 
 
0. REASON FOR REVISION 
 
The revision 01 of this AOT is required to extend the inspection interval from 8 days to 60 days for the 
external area and for the internal inboard side. The 120 days repetitive inspection remains for the 
internal outboard area. A318 references have been r emoved since none of these aircraft type has 
been manufactured with the suspected batch of fasteners. Inspection flow charts have been modified 
to reflect the new intervals and clarify the sequence of actions. Spare parts numbers have been 
clarified.   
The revised paragraphs are indicated between **BEG. REV** and **END REV**. 
 
1. AIRCRAFT AFFECTED 
 
**BEG. REV** 
Applicable to MSN 5817, 5826, 5837, 5848, 5855, 5864, 5875, 5886, 5896, 5910 and all A319 and 
A320 Aircraft delivered from MSN 5918 onwards. 
**END REV** 
 
2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION 
 
2.1 APPENDIX 
AOT A57N006-14 Appendix A: decision tree for the external inspection. 
AOT A57N006-14 Appendix B: decision tree for the internal inspection. 
AOT A57N006-14 Appendix C: reporting sheet. 
 
 
2.2 REFERENCES 
All limitations provided with concession suffix R related to this topic issued on delivered aircraft since 
November 2014 are superseded by this AOT. 
 
**BEG. REV** 
Ref. A: SRM 51-42-11 Paragraph 9 
Ref. B: AMM 57-51-37-000-008 Removal of the Access Door 
Ref. C: AMM 57-51-37-400-008 Installation of the Access Door 
Ref. D: AMM 51-78-00-615-005 Removal of Corrosion Preventive Compound 
Ref. E: AMM 51-78-00-916-001 Application of Temporary Protection System (TPS) 
Ref. F: TFU 57.21.00.012 latest issue. 
Ref. G: EASA AD 2014-0270 & FAA AD 2014-26-53. 
**END REV**

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 
 
 
3. REASON 
 
Inspection of Taperlok fasteners on A320 Family aircraft, located in the joint between the Main 
Landing Gear Support Rib lower flanges & lower wing skins on LH & RH wings, is required to ensure 
continued airworthiness. The inspection program is aimed at detecting Taperloks that have failed. 
 
 
3.1 FACTS 
 
During production of A319, A320 wings a number of taperlok fasteners have been found failed after 
installation. Initial investigations highlight an issue with taperlok fasteners. The fasteners in question 
are located at the bottom skin of the MLG reinforcing plate, wing skin and Gear Support Rib 5 lower 
flange (refer to fig. 1, 2 and 3).  
 
**BEG. REV** 
The taperlok fasteners are installed on A319 & A320 aircraft wings. A318 aircraft are NOT affected as 
no wing assembly have used fasteners coming from suspected batches. A321 aircraft  are NOT 
affected as wing assembly is done using parallel shank fasteners.  
**END REV** 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1- Location of affected fasteners/ External  
  
Affected Area

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 view of inboard (looking outboard) of MLG rib 5 / Internal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 view of outboard (looking inboard) of MLG rib 5 /Internal  
 
 
 
 
 
Area to be 
inspected 
Area to be 
inspected 
Area to be 
inspected

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 
 
 
**BEG. REV** 
  
Figure 4a- Location of affected fasteners heads, lower wing skin view looking up 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4b- Location of affected fasteners nuts/bolt tails, MLG support rib bottom flange upper 
surface, view looking down 
Outboard Inboard 
All fasteners nuts/bolt tails 
identified on the outboard to 
be inspected on a 120 days 
basis 
All fasteners nuts/ bolt tails 
identified on the inboard to 
be inspected on a 60 days 
basis 
All fasteners heads identified as       to be inspected on a 60 days basis 
FORWARD 
OUTBOARD 
Gear support rib installation D572-52180 
LH shown – RH symmetrical 
Gear support rib installation D572-52180 
LH shown – RH symmetrical 
Gear rib 5 web axis 
Inboard Outboard 
External  
Internal 
FORWARD 
OUTBOARD

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 
 
 
**END REV** 
 
 
 
3.2 CONSEQUENCES 
 
Failure of these fasteners may results in a reduction in the design margin of the structure. 
 
 
**BEG. REV** 
 
3.3 AIM 
 
 
The aim of this AOT is to ensure that taperlok fasteners, affected by the failure mode, are identified 
and replaced in order to restore the design margin. 
 
Affected aircraft operators have to perform a Detail Visual Inspection (DVI) of the external surface of 
the LH and RH lower wing surface for migrating or missing fasteners and of the internal side of the 
MLG support rib lower flange for broken fastener tails/nuts (refer to fig. 4a and 4b). 
 
 
 
 
4. SHORT TERM ACTION 
 
For the external inspection: 
 Visually inspect inboard/outboard fastener head. 
 
 
For the internal inspection: 
 Visually inspect inboard /outboard fastener nut/bolt tail. 
 
NOTE: 
- In the event of no more than 1 fastener missing per side, the affected fastener needs to be replaced 
within 120 days as per Ref. A.  
 
- In case of more than one fastener missing per side, the operator has to replace affected fasteners 
before next flight leaving no more than 1 missing fastener. 
 
For both inspection areas, even after fastener replacement, the inspection described in this AOT has 
to be performed at the same intervals until further notice.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 
 
 
4.1 PLANNING AND MANPOWER 
 
 
4.1.1 ACCOMPLISHMENT TIMESCALE 
 
For the external inspection: 
THRESHOLD: No later than 60 days from last inspection as per AD Ref. G or since entry into service.  
GRACE PERIOD: N/A 
INTERVAL: No later than 60 days.  
 
 
 
For the internal inspection: 
 Inboard: 
THRESHOLD: No later than 60 days from last inspection as per AD Ref. G or since entry into service. 
GRACE PERIOD: N/A 
INTERVAL: No later than 60 days.  
 
 Outboard: 
THRESHOLD: No later than 120 days from last inspection or from AD Ref. G first issuance whichever 
occurs later or 120 days since entry into service. 
GRACE PERIOD: N/A 
INTERVAL: No later than 120 days. 
 
Note:  - For the 60 days inspection refer to Appendix A 
          - For the 120 days inspection refer to Appendix B 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2 MANPOWER 
 
The estimated amount of man hours to perform the  DVIs every 60 days is1  hour per aircraft, both 
sides included. 
 
The estimated amount of man hours to perform the DVIs every 120 days is  2 hours per aircraft, both 
sides included. 
 
 
**END. REV** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 DESCRIPTION

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 
 
 
 
4.2.1 ACCESS 
**BEG. REV** 
For the 60 days inspection: 
Support Equipment for access:  
• Access platform 2M (6 FT) adjustable,  
• Safety harness. 
Put an ACCESS PLATFORM 2M (6 FT) in position. The use of magnifying tools may be required.  
  
For the 120 days inspection: 
Support Equipment for access:  
• Access platform 2M (6 FT) adjustable,  
• Safety harness.  
**END REV** 
 
Work Zone and Access Panel:  
• Access Panel 574AB & 674AB (Door entrance of false rear spar area),  
• Warning & safety precautions: 
WARNING: MAKE SURE THAT THE GROUND SAFETY-LOCKS ARE IN POSITION ON THE 
LANDING GEAR.  
WARNING: PUT THE SAFETY DEVICES AND THE WARNING NOTICES IN POSITION BEFORE 
YOU START A TASK ON OR NEAR:  
-     THE FLIGHT CONTROLS  
-     THE FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES  
-     THE LANDING GEAR AND THE RELATED DOORS  
-     COMPONENTS THAT MOVE.  
MOVEMENT OF COMPONENTS CAN KILL OR CAUSE INJURY TO PERSONS 
AND/OR CAN CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE EQUIPMENT.  
CAUTION: BE CAREFUL WHEN YOU DO MAINTENANCE TASKS ON THE WING TRAILING 
EDGE:  
-     DO NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE ELECTRICAL CABLE RACEWAYS.  
-     DO NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE ELECTRICAL CABLE INSTALLATIONS.  
-
     
MAKE SURE THAT THE ELECTRICAL CABLES ARE INSTALLED CORRECTLY. 
INCORRECT INSTALLATION CAN CAUSE DAMAGE.  
 
 
 
Put an ACCESS PLATFORM 2M (6 FT) in position. The use of magnifying tools may be required.  
Perform access as per Ref. B and C. 
 
4.2.2 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS 
 
Do a DVI of the external surface of the LH an RH bottom skin lower wing surface for migrated or 
missing fasteners. 
Do a DVI of the INBOARD/OUTBOARD MLG Support Rib lower flange fasteners and nuts for missing 
nuts / tails. 
 
For typical findings refer to Fig 5a and 5b.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 
 
 
 
Fig. 5a example of finding (migration) 
 
 
Fig. 5b example of finding (nut/tail missing on inboard area)

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 
 
 
4.2.3 FINDINGS 
  
Failed fasteners (broken, migrated, missing) 
Failed tail/nut (broken, missing) 
In case of finding, refer to Appendix A and B. 
 
**BEG. REV** 
If a failed fastener has to be removed the following instructions are to be followed: 
 Mark the orientation of the fastener on the head (i.e. inboard/outboard). 
 Mark the location of the fastener on bolting diagram as per Appendix C.  
 Get access to the area. 
 Remove affected fastener. 
 All effort should be made not to damage the fracture surface of the fastener during removal.  
 The fastener and associated nut/tail is to be returned to Airbus. 
 Report all findings to Airbus as per Appendix C. 
 
Refer to TFU Ref. F for additional guidance for access and fastener replacement. 
 
 
4.3 SPARES AND TOOLING 
 
In case of finding, for fastener replacement Airbus recommends to order the following: 
- Nominal part number. 
- First oversize (as precautionary measure). 
- Associated nut. 
- Washers part number (both thickness). 
- Reamer & installation tooling (as precautionary measure) 
 
 
 
FORWARD 
OUTBOARD 
LH shown – RH symmetrical 
Gear support rib installation D572-52180

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 
 
 
Fig. 6 Identification and location of fasteners at rib 5 attachment. 
 
Fasteners part numbers: 
 
fastener 
identification as 
per Fig 7 
Nominal  1st Oversize 
42 NSA5486-9-25N NSA5487-9-25N 
41 NSA5486-9-26N NSA5487-9-26N 
8-40-43 NSA5486-9-27N NSA5487-9-27N 
2-37-38-39-44-45 NSA5486-9-28N NSA5487-9-28N 
1-18-36 NSA5486-9-29N NSA5487-9-29N 
9-17-19-26-27 NSA5486-9-30N NSA5487-9-30N 
10 NSA5486-9-31N NSA5487-9-31N 
11-23 NSA5486-9-32N NSA5487-9-32N 
21 NSA5486-9-33N NSA5487-9-33N 
7 NSA5486-9-34N NSA5487-9-34N 
      
46 NSA5486-10-22N NSA5487-10-22N 
29-30-31-32 NSA5486-10-28N NSA5487-10-28N 
28 NSA5486-10-29N NSA5487-10-29N 
4-5-6-20-33-34-35 NSA5486-10-30N NSA5487-10-30N 
3-15-25 NSA5486-10-31N NSA5487-10-31N 
13-14-22-24 NSA5486-10-32N NSA5487-10-32N 
12 NSA5486-10-33N NSA5487-10-33N 
16 NSA5486-10-35N NSA5487-10-35N 
 
 
 
Nuts part numbers: 
 
NSA5472-9K7 
NSA5472-10K7

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 
 
 
 
Washers part numbers: 
 
NSA5372-1016AX 
NSA5372-1016BX 
NSA5372-916AX 
NSA5372-916BX 
 
NOTE: 
-1016: washer diameter -10 
-916: washer diameter -9 
AX: washer thickness of 0,8mm 
BX: washer thickness of 1,6mm  
 
Installation tool in case of oversize:  
 
SOA57N00614 
 
Reporting sheets appendix C to be sent to Airbus AOG spares (e-mail: aog.spares@airbus.com) 
with corresponding findings and purchase order. 
 
 
 
 
5. FURTHER INFORMATION 
 
 
5.1 FOLLOW-UP PLAN 
 
This repeat inspection is to be continued until Airbus has defined a terminating action to this AOT.  
Pending the level of finding this AOT may be revised to refine its instructions.  
Refer to TFU Ref. F. for follow up. 
 
 
5.2 IMPACTED DOCUMENTATION 
 
N/A

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 
 
 
 
 
6. AOT APPROVAL 
 
The technical content of this document is approved under the authority of DOA nr. EASA.21J.031.  
This AOT is mandated by the issuance of an EASA Airworthiness Directive Ref. G. 
 
**END REV** 
 
 
7. REPORTING 
 
Questions about this AOT should be sent to the SEES2 department via the on-line TechRequest tool. 
 
Inspection results with findings are to be sent (ref AOT A57N006-14 Appendix C)  to Airbus Customer 
Services engineering as soon as possible, after the AOT application, to the attention of: 
 
Julie BLANCHOT 
Structure Engineer 
Structure Engineering – SEES2  
CUSTOMER SERVICES 
Phone: +33(0)5 61 93 60 20 
Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 36 14 
Mailto: julie.blanchot@airbus.com 
 
Ludovic MENARD 
Outer Wing Product Leader 
Structure Engineering – SEES2  
CUSTOMER SERVICES 
Phone: +33(0)5 67 19 16 36 
Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 36 14 
Mailto: Ludovic.menard@airbus.com 
 
 
 
Best Regards, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jean-Luc MOUYSSET 
VICE PRESIDENT ENGINEERING SUPPORT 
CUSTOMER SERVICES 
Gilles DE CEVINS 
VICE PRESIDENT A320 PROGRAMME 
CUSTOMER SERVICES

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 
 
**BEG. REV** 
AOT A57N006-14 Appendix A: decision tree for the 60 days inspection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inspection of the fastener heads in blue areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inspection of nuts/bolt tails on blue area 
 
NOTE:  
- In case of more than one finding per side, the operator has 
to replace affected fasteners before next flight leaving no 
more than 1 failed fastener until the 4 months inspection. 
  
 View on Gear Rib to Lower Wing Cover, looking up 
 
  
 
View on Gear Rib to Lower Wing Cover, looking down 
 
 
External  
FORWARD 
OUTBOARD 
Internal  
LH shown – RH symmetrical 
LH shown – RH symmetrical 
FORWARD 
OUTBOARD

### Page 14 (OCR)

AIRBUS
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT A57N006-14 Appendix A: decision tree for the 60 days inspection
For notes refer to page 17.
Perform fastener re-installation as per note (b) within 120 days from fastener removal / found missing  every 30 days  in place?  Nut /Tail still  per SRM 51-49-00  Apply Torque check as  NO  missing?  Fastener  NO  Inspect external Fastener Heads and internal inboard nut bolt tail every 60 days
NO
Perform bore protection as per note (a) before next flight  Remove the fastener  NO  migration > 1mm?  Fastener  YES  broken?  bolt tail  Inboard Nut /  YES _  Fastener?  Inboard  YES  migrated?  Fastener
NO  NO
Remove the fastener  YES  migrated?  Fastener  YES
migration  every 30 days for  Inspect the fastener  tall broken?  Inboard Nut/bolt
Remove the fastener
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01  Page 14 of 19  Date: 16-FEB-2015
© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

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AOT A57N006-14 Appendix B: decision tree for the internal 120 days inspection 
 
  
NOTE:  
- In case of more than one finding per side, the operator has 
to replace affected fasteners before next flight leaving no 
more than 1 failed fastener until the 4 months inspection. 
 
View on Gear Rib to Lower Wing Cover, looking down 
 
 
Inspection of nuts/bolt tails on red area 
 
Internal  
LH shown – RH symmetrical 
FORWARD 
OUTBOARD

### Page 16 (OCR)

AIRBUS
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT A57N006-14 Appendix B: decision tree for the internal 120 days inspection
For notes refer to page 17.
Perform fastener re-installation as per note (b) within 120 days from fastener removal / found missing  Remove the fastener  YES  broken?  Nut / bolt tail
Perform bore protection as per note (a) before next flight  NO  Inspect internal outboard nut/ bolt tail every 120 days
migration > 1mm?  Fastener  days for migration  Inspect the fastener every 30  Apply High Speed tape  NO
(C)
YES
before next flight  Remove the fastener  NO
still in place?  Nut / bolt tail  SRM 51-49-00  Apply Torque Check as per  YES  Migration ?  Fastener
YES  NO
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01  Page 16 of 19  Date: 16-FEB-2015
© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

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NOTES:  
a) Protect bore as per the following: 
i. Apply TPS on open hole. 
ii. Apply speed tape on fastener head side: 1 layer of speed tape over the 
affected location and 1 more layer overlapping it at 90°. 
iii. Apply speed tape on bolt tail/nut side. 
iv. On a 60 days basis replace speed tape on fastener head side only and 
re-apply TPS. 
 
b) re-install fastener as per the following: 
i. Re-install the fastener as per Ref. A within 120 days. 
 
c) Apply speed tape as per the following: 
i. For inboard findings: 
i. Apply speed tape on fastener head side: 1 layer of speed tape 
over the affected location and 1 more layer overlapping it at 
90°. 
ii. Apply speed tape on bolt tail/nut side. 
iii. On a 30 days basis replace speed tape on fastener head side 
only. 
ii. For outboard findings: 
i. Apply speed tape on fastener head side: 1 layer of speed tape 
over the affected location and 1 more layer overlapping it at 
90°. 
ii. On a 30 days basis replace speed tape on fastener head side 
only. 
 
d) Airbus recommends to check high speed tape condition and replace 
accordingly. 
 
 
**END REV**

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AOT A57N006-14 Appendix C: reporting sheet 
 
AOT 57N006-14 REPORTING SHEET 
 
A/C MSN 
 
OPERATOR  
FLIGHT CYCLES  
FLIGHT HOURS  
DATE OF LAST INSPECTION  
NUMBER OF CONSECUTIVES INSPECTIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE:  
- In case of more than one finding per side, the operator has 
to replace affected fasteners before next flight leaving no 
more than 1 failed fastener until the 4 months inspection.

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AOT A57N006-14 Appendix C: reporting sheet 
 
 
 
 
Expected date of failed part expedition:_______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RETURN TO:       
        
 Julie BLANCHOT   Ludovic MENARD   
 julie.blanchot@airbus.com  ludovic.menard@airbus.com 
   
 TEL +33 (0)5 61 93 60 20              TEL +33 (0)5 67 19 16 36   
 FAX +33 (0)5 61 93 36 14  FAX +33 (0)5 61 93 36 14   
        
 
AIRBUS 
 CUSTOMER SERVICES ENGINEERING-SEES2 
 WING -PYLON- STABILIZER 
 1 rond point Maurice Bellonte 
 31707 BLAGNAC CEDEX 
 France 
 
 
 
 
 
Fastener 
Number LH side RH side Missing Fastener Migrated Fastener Nut / Tail missing 
  
 
           
  
 
           
  
 
           
  
 
           
  
 
           
NOTE:  
- In case of more than one finding per side, the operator has 
to replace affected fasteners before next flight leaving no 
more than 1 failed fastener until the 4 months inspection.

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